Political influence in public procurement: balancing between legality and illegality by Beke, Mike Balthazar
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA 
 
 
 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
Political influence in public procurement: balancing between legality 
and illegality 
 
 
MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR 
 
PRESENTADA POR 
 
Mike Balthazar Beke 
 
Director 
 
Manuel Villoria Mendieta 
 
 
Madrid, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
© Mike Balthazar Beke, 2017 
  
 
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA 
 
INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO DE INVESTIGACIÓN 
ORTEGA Y GASSET 
 
 
Doctorado en Gobierno y Administración Pública 
 
 
Tesis Doctoral 
 
POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: BALANCING BETWEEN 
LEGALITY AND ILLEGALITY 
 
 
 
Mike Balthazar Beke 
 
Director de la Tesis 
 
Dr Manuel Villoria Mendieta 
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos 
 
 
 
Madrid, 2017 
 
  
 
2 
 
  
 
3 
Acknowledgments 
 
To my family, friends and colleagues in Spain and the Netherlands.  
 
I am particularly grateful for the love and support from Elena, Samuel and Lara. Also I would 
like to thank Balthazar and Jolanda for their conscientious dedication to the education of their 
children. I am indebted to you all.  
 
Also, I extend a notable thank you to Professor Manuel Villoría Mendieta for his mentorship, 
patience and guidance throughout the process of finalizing this study.  
 
 
4 
Table of contents 
Executive summary ........................................................................................................... 9	  
1.1	   Research objectives and methodology .................................................................................. 9	  
1.2	   Main findings ........................................................................................................................ 10	  
1.3	   Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 12	  
Resumen ejecutivo ........................................................................................................... 14	  
1.1	   Objetivos de la investigación y metodología ...................................................................... 14	  
1.2	   Resultados principales ......................................................................................................... 15	  
1.3	   Recomendaciones .................................................................................................................. 18	  
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 21	  
2.1	   Research Objectives ............................................................................................................. 22	  
Hypothesis I .................................................................................................................... 23	  
Hypothesis II ................................................................................................................... 25	  
2.2	   Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 25	  
Study area 1 ..................................................................................................................... 26	  
Study area 2 ..................................................................................................................... 26	  
Study area 3 ..................................................................................................................... 27	  
Case study design ............................................................................................................ 27	  
Data collection and assessment tools .............................................................................. 30	  
Report structure ............................................................................................................... 35	  
Justification and scope of this study .............................................................................. 37	  
3.1	   EU public procurement ........................................................................................................ 38	  
3.2	   EU procurement rules .......................................................................................................... 41	  
3.3	   Corruption in public procurement ..................................................................................... 43	  
3.4	   European Structural and Investment Funds ..................................................................... 47	  
Part I – Collective action for corruption and public procurement ............................. 53	  
4.1	   Corruption ............................................................................................................................ 53	  
Conceptualising corruption ............................................................................................. 55	  
Supply and demand-side of corruption ........................................................................... 59	  
Between petty, grand and systemic corruption ............................................................... 65	  
Balancing between legality and illegality ....................................................................... 68	  
4.2	   Causes of corruption ............................................................................................................ 70	  
Social processes leading to corruption ............................................................................ 72	  
Principal-agent perspective on corruption ...................................................................... 78	  
5 
Collective action perspective on corruption .................................................................... 91	  
Principle-agent and collective action .............................................................................. 96	  
4.3	   Corruption prevention ....................................................................................................... 101	  
Legal versus regulatory prevention ............................................................................... 102	  
Fostering a culture of compliance ................................................................................. 105	  
Collective action as a corruption prevention tool ......................................................... 112	  
4.4	   Public procurement ............................................................................................................ 118	  
Public procurement ....................................................................................................... 118	  
Key principles of public procurement relating corruption ............................................ 130	  
Public procurement on the EU level ............................................................................. 132	  
4.5	   Corruption in public procurement ................................................................................... 136	  
Forms of corruption in public procurement .................................................................. 140	  
Vulnerability of the public procurement process .......................................................... 141	  
Irregularities in public procurement .............................................................................. 145	  
Interface of public and private stakeholders ................................................................. 147	  
4.6	   Anti-corruption in public procurement ........................................................................... 149	  
Considerations to address political interference in public procurement ....................... 151	  
Anti-corruption developments in public procurement on the EU level ........................ 154	  
Collective action against corruption in public procurement ......................................... 159	  
4.7	   Collective action for EU procurement and the transparency deficit ............................. 173	  
Part II – Integrity Pacts as collective action ............................................................... 181	  
5.1	   Integrity Pact cases ............................................................................................................. 183	  
Integrity Pacts across the world .................................................................................... 183	  
Integrity Pacts in Europe ............................................................................................... 197	  
Others ............................................................................................................................ 207	  
5.2	   Integrity Pact structure ...................................................................................................... 211	  
Design of the Integrity Pact .......................................................................................... 211	  
Implementation of the Integrity Pact ............................................................................ 218	  
5.3	   Context of Integrity Pacts .................................................................................................. 219	  
Governance and economic conditions .......................................................................... 220	  
Public procurement conditions ...................................................................................... 227	  
Legal conditions ............................................................................................................ 233	  
Implementation arrangements ....................................................................................... 236	  
Global and European overview of conditions ............................................................... 256	  
5.4	   Collective action of Integrity Pacts ................................................................................... 258	  
Group size ..................................................................................................................... 260	  
6 
Repeated interaction ...................................................................................................... 261	  
Trust and good reputation ............................................................................................. 267	  
Group interdependence ................................................................................................. 269	  
Heuristics/norms ........................................................................................................... 270	  
Monitoring and transparency ........................................................................................ 274	  
Long-term horizons ....................................................................................................... 283	  
Salience of the collective good ..................................................................................... 286	  
Part III Integrity Pact as an approach to prevent corruption in public procurement
291	  
6.1	   Integrity Pact evaluation .................................................................................................... 292	  
6.2	   Integrity Pact indicators of change ................................................................................... 300	  
Value for money ............................................................................................................ 302	  
Trust .............................................................................................................................. 303	  
Social accountability ..................................................................................................... 304	  
Monitoring and transparency ........................................................................................ 305	  
Level playing field ........................................................................................................ 306	  
Heuristics and norms ..................................................................................................... 306	  
Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 309	  
7.1	   Reflections on collective action for corruption and EU public procurement ............... 309	  
7.2	   Reflections on the Integrity Pact main take-away ........................................................... 313	  
Governance and economic context ............................................................................... 314	  
Prevention of corruption ............................................................................................... 314	  
Integrity Pact monitor ................................................................................................... 315	  
7.3	   Reflections on an approach for the Integrity Pact .......................................................... 319	  
7.4	   Reflections on the Integrity Pact for EU procurement ................................................... 320	  
7.5	   Concluding remarks ........................................................................................................... 327	  
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 331	  
Annex I surveys ............................................................................................................. 345	  
Annex II Interviews ................................................................................................... 369	  
10.1	   List of interviews ............................................................................................................. 369	  
10.2	   Interview questions European review ........................................................................... 373	  
10.3	   Interview questions global review ................................................................................. 382	  
  
 
7 
List of tables 
Table 1: EU Member States overview Corruption Perception Index and World Bank Income groups ................ 40	  
Table 2: Intergity Pacts Latvia ............................................................................................................................. 199	  
Table 3: Integrity Pacts Hungary ......................................................................................................................... 201	  
Table 4: Integrity Pacts Bulgaria ......................................................................................................................... 203	  
Table 5: Governance and economic conditions ................................................................................................... 221	  
Table 6: Monitoring conditions ........................................................................................................................... 257	  
Table 7: Access to information Integrity Pact Hungary ...................................................................................... 280	  
Table 8: European Union Member States governance indicators ........................................................................ 321	  
Table 9: European Union Member States corruption perception ........................................................................ 322	  
Table 10: ESI funds and Integrity Pacts in the European Union ......................................................................... 325	  
 
List of figures 
Figure 1: Interview categories European review ................................................................................................... 33	  
Figure 2: Interview categories global review ......................................................................................................... 34	  
Figure 3: World Governance Indicators Spain .................................................................................................... 226	  
Figure 4: Integrity Pact clauses for civil society organisations ........................................................................... 241	  
Figure 5: Integrity Pact clauses for contracting authorities ................................................................................. 241	  
Figure 6: Integrity Pact use of sanctions .............................................................................................................. 252	  
Figure 7: Theory of change Integrity Pact ........................................................................................................... 297	  
Figure 8: Results chain Integrity Pact .................................................................................................................. 299	  
 
  
 
8 
List of abbreviations 
CoST  Construction Sector Transparency Initiative  
CPI  Corruption Perceptions Index  
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility 
EU  European Union  
EUR  Euro 
FCPA  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  
GDP   Gross Domestic Product  
ICT   Information and Communication Technology  
MoU   Memorandum of Understanding  
NLL   National Library of Latvia 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PPP   Purchasing Power Parity  
UNCAC  United Nations Convention Against Corruption  
USD   United States Dollar  
WGI   Worldwide Governance Indicators  
 
 
 
 
  
 
9 
   Executive summary  
The estimated damage of corruption in public procurement on the European Union (EU) level 
runs into the billions of Euros. Procurement irregularities are one of the most common causes 
of administrative errors and financial corrections relating to EU funding. As a result, the EU 
procurement rules establish a EU-wide legislative framework aiming to enhance 
transparency. Nonetheless, in 2015, the European Commission launched a project in order to 
involve civil society in promoting transparency, preventing corruption and creating a culture 
of integrity in public procurement of EU funds. The project launched in 2016 the design and 
implementation of seventeen collective action initiatives in eleven EU Member States. The 
tool used for these initiatives is the Integrity Pact. This is a collective action tool on the basis 
of an agreement between contracting authorities and companies participating in a 
procurement process. Participants are to abstain from bribery, collusion and other corrupt 
practices for the extent of the contract. A third party to the Integrity Pact, often a civil society 
organisation is assigned to monitor all the activities. 
1.1   Research objectives and methodology 
This research study looks at understanding the effect of the Integrity Pact as an anti-
corruption collective action tool for public procurement through the EU funds and the role of 
civil society organisations, businesses and contracting authorities in preventing corruption 
through collective action. The first hypothesis for this study is that the structure for EU 
funding poses corruption challenges in public procurement for EU Member States that can 
more effectively be addressed through collective action. The second hypothesis for this study 
is that an independent monitor, in the form of a civil society organisation through the 
Integrity Pact, can play an effective role in the prevention of corruption and enhancing of 
transparency in public procurement.  
 
The study is divided in three areas. The first provides a theoretical analysis and framework to 
prevent corruption in public procurement in the context of the EU Single Market and through 
the use of collective action. The second identifies conditions that affect the effectiveness of 
civil society organisations to prevent corruption through collective action on the basis of a 
qualitative multi-case study analysis of the Integrity Pact in six EU and ten non-EU countries. 
The third area presents a first integrated approach for the Integrity Pact to prevent corruption 
in public procurement of EU Funds through collective action. Data has been collected 
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through desk research, interviews and surveys. For the assessment of the Integrity Pact cases, 
this study uses a qualitative multi-case study analysis. 
1.2   Main findings 
Debates concerning the lack of effectiveness of strategies based on the principle-agent 
approach to anti-corruption have pointed to considering corruption as a collective action 
problem instead. When “principles” can share in the benefits of corruption or are simply 
indifferent about the problem, normative constraints do not work. Normally these constraints 
should endorse ethical universalism and monitor and prevent deviation from the norms. 
Instead, with the lack of “principled principles”, particularism enables an environment in 
which allocation of public resources is based on a connection between the one in power and 
the one receiving the public goods. This study argues that in the EU there is no one-size-fits-
all solution to corruption and therefor perhaps the principle-agent strategies against 
corruption are not necessarily incompatible with collective action theories in this diverse 
environment.  
 
Political and economic integration of the EU increased for companies and political parties 
competitive pressure. The economic differences in the EU Member States explain how 
corporations resort to criminal behaviour under economic pressure in a climate of increased 
competition. In line with the market integration, the EU developed an extensive procurement 
legislative framework, providing for provisions to prevent corruption and enhance 
transparency, but at the same time generating competitive pressure on the procurement 
market in Member States, particularly affecting local businesses. At the same time, different 
attitudes towards corruption in Member States in combination with weaknesses in the EU’s 
accountability structure have a counter-effect on the normative constraints. Concerning the 
latter, this study discussed how EU integration increases competition and associated societal 
situations in which material success is promoted but means to achieve this are not equally 
accessible for all. For example, with the enlargement of the EU, new Member States were to 
adopt vast amounts of European laws and legislation designed de facto for countries with 
different economic and political characteristics and where corruption could be conceptualised 
on the basis of principle-agent theories. Today, the corruption problem is still significant in 
EU Member States that newly joined the European Union. This study argues that this is 
partially due to the need to conceptualise corruption in those countries as a collective action 
problem. This calls into question whether the EU’s procurement legislative framework can be 
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effective for all Member States. In addition, EU expenditure largely depends on a shared 
management system where the EU has limited control over how EU Member States spend 
funds. It is against this background that the European Commission launched the Integrity Pact 
initiative. This study supports the hypothesis that the structure for EU funding poses 
corruption challenges in public procurement for EU Member States that can more effectively 
be addressed through collective action. The Integrity Pact tool targets an area vulnerable for 
corruption, namely EU public procurement which affects a large part of EU expenditure and 
over which the European Commission has limited control. It targets businesses that can be 
disproportionately affected by corruption such as small and medium enterprises, and can be 
used on different business sectors, on different governmental levels and across regions. The 
Integrity Pact aims to promote best public procurement practices, which could help 
harmonising the implementation of EU procurement rules across the EU Member States and 
ensure an equal level playing field for businesses, which could ensure more cross-border 
public procurement activity and this way complete the functioning of the Single Market.  
 
The main challenge, however, is that the effect or impact of collective action initiatives is 
difficult to determine and that collective action initiatives particularly fair well in endemic 
corrupt environments. Despite that collective action initiatives can also be used in non-
endemic corrupt environments; the question asked is which conditions favour the effective 
use of the Integrity Pact. The contextual analysis done through the multi-case study analysis 
supports collective action views that it is in the best interest of individuals in the group to act 
collectively towards shared objectives, which lies at the core of the Integrity Pact multi-
stakeholder approach. The analysis also points out that elements of the Integrity Pact aim to 
overcome the temptations of short-run self-interest through reciprocity, reputation and trust, 
in order to build conditions to allow individuals to achieve results that are better than rational. 
The sanctions available in the Integrity Pact give impetus to groups to achieve suboptimal 
results and function as deterrence through the commitment to punish those that do not adhere 
to the Integrity Pact. This study finds that an independent monitor, in the form of a civil 
society organisation through the Integrity Pact, can play an effective role in the prevention of 
corruption and enhancing of transparency in public procurement. Three conditions are 
predominantly important for this: the monitor requirements, monitoring 
arrangements/activities, and the selection of the monitor. 
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Concerning the monitoring requirements, this study has, inter alia, finds that the monitor 
should be accountable to the civil society organisations as well as to the bidders, contracting 
authorities and to the public. Ensuring this “fourfold” accountability to stakeholders, with 
different and sometimes opposite interests, is difficult to operationalize. Further, repeated 
interaction between stakeholders is set in formal legislative processes, i.e. the bidding phases, 
or less formalised processes such as contract implementation phases. Within the formal 
procurement framework and the less formal contract implementation framework, parties to 
the Integrity Pact have a degree of manoeuvrability. This study finds that this 
manoeuvrability is in itself a risk area for irregularities and therefore subject to monitoring. 
Concerning the implementation arrangements and monitor activities, this study, inter alia, 
finds that monitors conduct a wide variety of activities and that they way monitors have 
access to information, as well as the frequency and intensity of contact affects the level of 
trust between parties to the Integrity Pact. Concerning the selection of the monitor, this study, 
inter alia, finds that on the basis of the economic and governance conditions in a country it 
can prove difficult to identify a monitor with the requirements needed such as good 
reputation. Ensuring good reputation is difficult in a country with weak governance.  
 
The multi-case study analysis has shown that Integrity Pacts have been designed and 
implemented by different civil society organisations, contracting authorities, companies, 
involving different donor organisations, procurement projects, market sectors, etc. Today, a 
key question posed is how to inform policy-makers on the best ways to scale-up the use of 
the tool on the basis of past learnings. This study presents an evaluation framework in order 
to shape an approach that would support the implementation of the Integrity Pact tool on the 
EU level in order to prevent public procurement corruption. The choice for this framework as 
an approach to prevent corruption in public procurement is based on the need for a flexible 
tool that can be adapted to the contextual conditions in which an Integrity Pact can be 
designed. While the development of this approach in this study is based on findings from past 
Integrity Pacts, the objective is that by using this approach data will be more systematically 
collected in the future and help civil society organisations, donors, and academia to better 
assess in the future the effectiveness of the Integrity Pact as a collective action tool.  
1.3   Recommendations 
This study combines both theoretical considerations as well as practical considerations on the 
use of the Integrity Pact as a tool to prevent corruption in public procurement. Collective 
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action initiatives for the fight against corruption are increasingly used by a multitude of 
stakeholders around the world. With emphasising the relevance of monitoring and evaluating 
these initiatives, this study hopes to contribute to further the understanding of the 
effectiveness on prevention of corruption. It therefore recommends parties to the Integrity 
Pact to:  
1.   Ensure multi-stakeholder engagement by actively involving all parties to the Integrity 
Pact from the design phase up until the end of the collective action initiative.  
2.   Incorporate greater social control mechanisms by considering the inclusion of the 
Integrity Pact as a project-based initiative into a wider array of collective action initiatives 
aiming for long-term change. 
3.   Ensure strong design of the collective action initiative by establishing a rigorous 
methodology and evaluation framework in order to capture baseline assumptions and the 
change that the intervention created. 
4.   Consider the implementation arrangements by establishing a clear set of procedures for 
the imposition of sanctions. This should include a process for screening the complaints 
(and delineation of who can submit them), assessment criteria for the complaint, a 
resolution approach, escalation criteria and procedures in cases where the involvement of 
legal authorities is required, and recourse procedures in cases of disputes.  The procedures 
should be transparent and disseminated to all stakeholders.  
5.   Optimise the role of the monitor by developing capacity to assemble a monitoring team 
that can draw on a variety of expertise when necessary.  
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   Resumen ejecutivo 
El daño causado a nivel Europeo por la corrupción en la contratación pública se sitúa en 
miles de millones de euros. Las irregularidades en la contratación pública son una de las 
causas más comunes de errores administrativos y correcciones financieras relacionadas con la 
financiación de la Unión Europea (UE). En consecuencia, las normas de la UE en materia de 
contratación pública establecen un marco legislativo a escala Europea destinado a mejorar la 
transparencia. En 2015, la Comisión Europea lanzó un proyecto para implicar a la sociedad 
civil en la promoción de la transparencia, la prevención de la corrupción y la creación de una 
cultura de integridad en la contratación pública a través de los fondos Europeos. El proyecto 
puso en marcha en 2016 el diseño y la ejecución de 17 iniciativas de acción colectiva en 11 
estados miembros de la UE. El instrumento utilizado para estas iniciativas es el Pacto de 
Integridad. Se trata de un instrumento de acción colectiva basada en un acuerdo entre las 
autoridades de contratación pública y las empresas que participan en un proceso de 
contratación pública. Los participantes se abstendrán del soborno, la colusión y otras 
prácticas corruptas durante el proceso de contratación y a lo largo de la implementación del 
contrato. El tercer actor del Pacto de Integridad es normalmente una organización de la 
sociedad civil que se encarga de supervisar todas las actividades. 
1.1   Objetivos de la investigación y metodología 
Este estudio de investigación busca entender el efecto del Pacto de Integridad como 
instrumento de acción colectiva contra la corrupción en la contratación publica de los fondos 
Europeos así como entender el papel de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, las empresas 
y las autoridades públicas en la prevención de la corrupción mediante la acción colectiva. La 
primera hipótesis para este estudio es que la estructura de los fondos Europeos plantea para a 
estados miembros de la UE retos de corrupción en la contratación pública que pueden ser 
abordados de manera más efectiva a través de la acción colectiva. La segunda hipótesis es 
que un monitor independiente, en forma de organización de la sociedad civil a través del 
Pacto de Integridad, puede desempañar un papel efectivo en la prevención de la corrupción y 
el aumento de la transparencia en la contratación pública.  
 
El estudio se divide en tres áreas de investigación. La primera proporciona un análisis teórico 
para prevenir la corrupción en la contratación pública en el contexto del Mercado Único de la 
UE y mediante el uso de una estrategia de acción colectiva. La segunda parte identifica las 
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condiciones que afectan a la eficacia de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil para prevenir 
la corrupción a través de una estrategia de acción colectiva. Esta parte se base en un análisis 
cualitativo de múltiples casos del Pacto de Integridad en seis países de la UE y diez países no 
pertenecientes de la UE. La tercera área presenta una primera estrategia integrada del Pacto 
de Integridad para prevenir la corrupción en la contratación pública de fondos Europeos. Los 
datos se han recogido a través de investigación documental, entrevistas y encuestas. Para la 
evaluación de los casos del Pacto de Integridad este estudio utiliza un análisis cualitativo de 
múltiples casos de estudio. 
1.2   Resultados principales  
Los debates acerca de la falta de efectividad de las estrategias basadas en el planteamiento del 
agente principal en la lucha contra la corrupción han señalado que la corrupción podría ser 
más un problema de acción colectiva. Cuando los “principales” comparten los beneficios de 
la corrupción o son simplemente indiferentes sobre el problema, las limitaciones normativas 
no funcionan. Normalmente, estas restricciones deben respaldar el universalismo ético y 
vigilar y prevenir la desviación de las normas. En cambio, con la falta de “principales con 
principios” el particularismo permite un entorno en el que la asignación de recursos públicos 
se basa en una conexión entre el que está en el poder y el que recibe los bienes públicos. Este 
estudio argumenta que en la UE no existe una solución única contra la corrupción y, por lo 
tanto en este entorno tan diverso, las estrategias de agente principal contra la corrupción no 
son necesariamente incompatibles con las teorías de acción colectiva.  
 
La integración política y económica de la UE aumentó la presión competitiva para las 
empresas y los partidos políticos. Las variedad económica en los estados miembros de la UE 
explica cómo las empresas recurren al comportamiento criminal bajo la presión económica en 
un clima de mayor competencia. En consonancia con la integración del mercado, la UE 
desarrolló un amplio marco legislativo en materia de contratación pública, que prevé 
disposiciones para prevenir la corrupción y aumentar la transparencia. Esto resultó en una 
presión competitiva en el mercado de la contratación pública. Al mismo tiempo, las 
diferentes actitudes hacia la corrupción en los estados miembros junto con las debilidades de 
la estructura de rendición de cuentas de la UE generan un efecto contrario a las limitaciones 
normativas. Este estudio explica cómo la integración de la UE aumenta la competencia y las 
situaciones sociales asociadas en las que se promueve el éxito material, pero los medios para 
lograrlo no son igualmente accesibles para todos. Por ejemplo, con la ampliación de la UE, 
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los nuevos estados miembros adoptarán normas europeas diseñadas de facto para países con 
características económicas y políticas diferentes y donde se basa el concepto de la corrupción 
en las teorías del agente principal. Hoy en día, el problema de la corrupción sigue siendo 
grave en muchos de los nuevos estados miembros de la UE. Este estudio argumenta que esto 
se debe en parte a la necesidad de conceptualizar la corrupción en esos países como un 
problema de acción colectiva. Esto pone en duda si el marco legislativo de la UE para la 
contratación publica puede ser efectivo para todos los estados miembros. Además, los gastos 
de la UE dependen en gran medida de un sistema de gestión compartida en el que la UE tenga 
un control limitado sobre la forma en que los estados miembros invierten los fondos 
Europeos. En este contexto, la Comisión Europea lanzó la iniciativa del Pacto de Integridad. 
Este estudio apoya la hipótesis de que la estructura para la financiación de la UE plantea retos 
de corrupción en la contratación pública para los estados miembros de la UE que pueden ser 
abordados de manera más efectiva a través de una estrategia de acción colectiva. El Pacto de 
Integridad se dirige a un área vulnerable de la corrupción como es la contratación publica de 
la UE que afecta a gran parte de los gastos de la UE y sobre los que la Comisión Europea 
tiene un control limitado. El Pacto de Integridad también está dirigido a empresas que pueden 
verse afectadas de manera desproporcionada por la corrupción como son las pequeñas y 
medianas empresas y se puede utilizar en diferentes sectores empresariales, a distintos 
nivelen gubernamentales y en distintas regiones. El Pacto de Integridad tiene como objetivo 
promover las mejores prácticas de contratación pública, lo que podría ayudar a armonizar la 
implementación de las normas de la UE en materia de contratación publica en los estados 
miembros de la UE. Asimismo podría asegurar una  igualdad de condiciones para las 
empresas y así fomentar el funcionamiento de un mercado único. 
 
Sin embargo, el principal reto del Pacto de Integridad es que el efecto o impacto de las 
iniciativas de acción colectiva es difícil de determinar y que las iniciativas son 
particularmente adecuadas para entornos de nivel alto de corrupción. A pesar de que las 
iniciativas de acción colectiva también se pueden utilizar en entornos de nivel bajo o medio 
de corrupción, la cuestión que se plantea es cuáles son las condiciones que favorecen el uso 
efectivo del Pacto de Integridad. El análisis contextual realizado a través del estudio de casos, 
respalda la posición de la acción colectiva que afirma que el óptimo para los individuos en el 
grupo es actuar de manera colectiva hacia objetivos compartidos. El análisis también señala 
que ciertos elementos del Pacto de Integridad pretenden superar tentaciones de interés propio 
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a corto plazo a través de la reciprocidad, la reputación y la confianza, a fin de construir 
condiciones que permitan a los individuos lograr resultados mejores que racionales. Las 
sanciones disponibles en el Pacto de Integridad dan impulso a los grupos para lograr 
resultados sub-óptimos y funcionan como disuasión a través del compromiso de castigar a 
aquellos que no se adhieran al Pacto de Integridad. Este estudio considera que un monitor 
independiente, en forma de organización de la sociedad civil a través del Pacto de Integridad, 
puede desempañar un papel eficaz en la prevención de la corrupción y el aumento de la 
transparencia en la contratación pública. Tres condiciones son predominantemente 
importantes: los requisitos del monitor, los modos de implementación/actividades de 
monitoreo y la selección del monitor. 
 
Este estudio ha determinado que el monitor debe rendir cuentas a las organizaciones de la 
sociedad civil, así como a las autoridades de la contratación pública, los licitadores y al 
público. Garantizar esta “cuádruple” rendición de cuentas a los miembros del Pacto de 
Integridad, con intereses diferentes, y a veces opuestos, es difícil de operar. Además, la 
interacción repetida entre los miembros se establece en los procesos legislativos formales, es 
decir, en las fases de licitación o en procesos menos formalizados, como las fases de 
ejecución del contrato. Dentro del marco formal de la contratación y del marco menos formal 
de la ejecución del contrato, los miembros del Pacto de Integridad tienen un grado de 
maniobrabilidad. Este estudio considera esta maniobrabilidad es en sí misma un área de 
riesgo para irregularidades y por tanto sujeto a monitoreo. Con respecto a los modos de 
implementación y actividades de monitoreo, este estudio, encuentra ente otras cosas, que los 
monitores realizan una amplia variedad de actividades y que el modo en el cual los monitores 
tienen acceso a la información, así como la frecuencia e intensidad del contacto afecta al 
nivel de confianza de los miembros del grupo. Sobre la selección del monitor, este estudio 
considera que las condiciones económicas y de gobernanza en un país pueden afectar a la 
habilidad de identificar un monitor con los requisitos necesarios. Asegurarse de que el 
monitor dispone de  una buena reputación es difícil en un país con gobernabilidad débil.  
 
El análisis de los casos ha demostrado que los Pactos de Integridad han sido diseñados e 
implementados por diferentes organizaciones de la sociedad civil, autoridades públicas y 
empresas involucrando a diferentes organizaciones donantes, proyectos de contratación, 
sectores de mercado, etc. Hoy en día, la clave es desarrollar maneras para que los políticos y 
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tomadores de decisiones pueden ampliar el uso de este instrumento en base a aprendizajes 
pasados. Este estudio presenta un marco de evaluación que pretende dar forma al 
planteamiento de aplicación del Pacto de Integridad a nivel de la UE.  El marco de evaluación 
se basa en la necesidad de un instrumento flexible que pueda adaptarse a las condiciones 
contextuales en las que se puede diseñar un Pacto de Integridad.  El desarrollo del 
planteamiento en este estudio parte de los hallazgos de pasados Pactos de Integridad, sin 
embargo el objetivo es que su uso plantee una recopilación de datos de manera más 
sistemática en el futuro.  Asimismo ayuda a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, donantes 
y académicos a evaluar mejor la eficacia del Pacto de Integridad como instrumento de acción 
colectiva para prevenir la corrupción en la contratación pública.  
1.3   Recomendaciones 
Este estudio combina tanto consideraciones teóricas como prácticas sobre el uso del Pacto de 
Integridad como instrumento para prevenir la corrupción en la contratación pública. Las 
iniciativas de acción colectiva para la lucha contra la corrupción son cada vez más utilizadas 
por una multitud de actores relevantes en todo el mundo. Con el énfasis en la relevancia de 
monitorear y evaluar estas iniciativas, este estudio espera contribuir a la comprensión de la 
efectividad en la prevención de la corrupción. Por lo tanto, este estudio recomienda a los 
actores relevantes del Pacto de Integridad, entre otras cosas: 
 
1.   Garantizar la participación de múltiples actores interesados mediante la participación 
activa de todas las partes en el Pacto de Integridad desde la fase de diseño hasta el final de 
la iniciativa de acción colectiva. 
2.   Incorporar mecanismos de control social al considerar la inclusión del Pacto de Integridad 
como una iniciativa basada en proyectos en una seria de iniciativas de acción colectiva 
más amplia que apuntan a un cambio a largo plazo. 
3.   Asegurar un diseño sólido de la iniciativa de acción colectiva estableciendo un riguroso 
marco común de seguimiento y evaluación para poder captar una base de referencia y el 
cambio fomentado por la intervención. 
4.   Examinar las modalidades de ejecución para establecer un conjunto de procedimientos 
claros para la imposición de sanciones. Esto debe incluir un proceso de evaluación de 
reclamaciones (y una delimitación de quien puede presentarlas), los criterios de 
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evaluación de la reclamación, un proceso de escalado en los casos en que se requiera la 
participación de autoridades legales. Los procedimientos deben ser transparentes y estar 
disponibles para todos los actores relevantes en el Pacto de Integridad. 
5.   Optimizar el papel del monitor, desarrollando su capacidad de crear un equipo de 
monitoreo que disponga de conocimiento en diversas materias. 
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   Introduction 
Total expenditure in the European Union (EU) on public works, goods and services has 
increased over the last years reaching almost one fifth of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
every year1. Procurement irregularities are one of the most common causes of administrative 
errors and financial corrections relating to EU funding2. Such irregularities affect all stages of 
the procurement process. The EU stresses the vulnerability to corruption, linking this 
specifically to abuse of public office for private gain and political party financing3. A study 
from 2013 conducted by the EU’s anti-fraud office OLAF states that the overall direct costs 
of corruption for five sectors in eight Member States was between EUR 1,4 and 2,2 billion4. 
As a consequence, the EU promotes various initiatives to address irregularities and prevent 
fraud and corruption. Inter alia, this includes training of officials, the use of e-procurement, 
and application of ex-ante conditionality for public procurement in order leverage 
administrative capacity improvements. Specifically dealing with corruption, the EU is 
looking at involving civil society in promoting transparency in public procurement5. Specific 
focus has been placed on a collective action tool developed by Transparency International, 
called the Integrity Pact.  
 
The following sections present the study’s objectives, the methodology, and the structure of 
the report.  
                                                            
 
1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012). Commission Staff Working Document: Annual Public Procurement 
Implementation Review 2012 [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/implementation/20121011-staff-working-
document_en.pdf [Accessed on 13/06/2013]. 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public procurement strategy [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/strategy/ [Accessed on 13/06/2013]. 
3 Ibid. 
4 PWC (2013). Public procurement: costs we pay for corruption: Identifying and Reducing Corruption in Public 
Procurement in the EU [WWW]. http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/anti-fraud-policy/research-and-
studies/pwc_olaf_study_en.pdf [Accessed on 15/07/2015]. 
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/es/policy/how/improving-investment/integrity-pacts/ [Accessed on 12-10-
2016]. 
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2.1   Research Objectives 
The purpose of this research study is to further enhance understanding of the effect of anti-
corruption initiatives for public procurement and the role of civil society organisations, 
businesses and contracting authorities in preventing corruption through collective action. The 
main research question posed is: 
 
To which extent are collective action initiatives effective instruments in the fight against 
corruption in public procurement? 
 
The research will focus primarily on the EU as public procurement in Europe is highly 
influenced by the Single Market6. Corruption in public procurement on the EU level is 
recognised by governments and EU institutions (such as the European Commission and the 
European Parliament) as a problem7. Therefore the EU prioritises prevention of corruption 
and the creation of a culture of integrity in EU procurement8. In practice this is primarily 
translated through the EU procurement rules that establish a EU-wide framework aiming to 
enhance transparency of procurement procedures and processes. As argued by scholars, anti-
corruption measures address problems, such as bribery, by conceptualizing corruption as a 
principal-agent problem9. However, the problem of corruption in Europe varies between 
countries, with some EU Member States experiencing more serious forms of (systemic) 
                                                            
 
6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public Procurement [WWW]. Available from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement_en [Accessed on 12-06-2016]. 
7 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Anti-corruption report [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm [Accessed on 12-06-2016]. 
8 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public Procurement [WWW]. Available from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement_en [Accessed on 12-06-2016]. 
9 PERSSON, A., ROTHSTEIN, B., and TEORELL, J. (2013). Why anti-corruption reforms fail – Systemic 
corruption as a collective action problem [WWW]. Governance, Volume 23, Issue 3, p. 343-558. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264645578_Why_Anti-Corruption_Reforms_Fail-
Systemic_Corruption_as_a_Collective_Action_Problem [Accessed on 16-01-2016]. 
MILLER, W. L., GRØDELAND, A.B., and KOSHECHKINA, T. (2001). A Culture of Corruption? Coping 
with Government in Post-Communist Europe. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press. 
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corruption 10 . For example, according to research, post-communist countries in Eastern 
Europe experience corruption rather like a collective action problem, meaning that 
stakeholders fail as a group to prevent corruption when individual interests of stakeholders 
conflict11. The collective action approach differs from the principal-agent approach in the 
sense that the latter takes the existence of non-corruptible principals for granted12, while the 
former does not assume that “principled principals” exist and are willing to hold corrupt 
officials accountable. Such a scenario gives reason to doubt whether EU procurement rules, 
in line with the principal-agent anti-corruption framework, are effective since there is a lack 
of incentive to enforce them. For example, the European Commission’s management of EU 
funds is shared with Member States13. The EU procurement rules are to be transposed to the 
national level and aim, if properly implemented, to prevent corruption in public procurement. 
However, ultimately the European Commission is dependent on the (political) will of the 
Member States to implement EU rules and ensure that EU funds are not ending up in the 
pockets of corrupt officials and businesses.  
   Hypothesis I 
The first hypothesis for this study to explore is that the structure for EU funding poses 
corruption challenges in public procurement for EU countries that can more effectively 
be addressed through collective action. 
                                                            
 
10 See for example the CPI scores or the European Anti-corruption report. TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Corruption Perceptions Index [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview [Accessed on 12-10-2016].  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Anti-corruption report [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm [Accessed on 12-06-2016]. 
11 WARNER, C. (2014). Sources of corruption in the European Union. In The Routledge Handbook of Policial 
Corruption, ed. P. M. Heywood. 
12 PERSSON, A., ROTHSTEIN, B., and TEORELL, J. (2013). Why anti-corruption reforms fail – Systemic 
corruption as a collective action problem [WWW]. Governance, Volume 23, Issue 3, p. 343-558. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264645578_Why_Anti-Corruption_Reforms_Fail-
Systemic_Corruption_as_a_Collective_Action_Problem [Accessed on 16-01-2016]. 
MARQUETTE, H., PEIFFER, C. (2015). Corruption and collective action [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.dlprog.org/research/corruption-and-collective-action.php [Accessed on 16-10-2016]. 
13 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Shared management [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/glossary/s/shared-management [Accessed on 12-02-2016]. 
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The European Commission launched an initiative to fight corruption in public procurement 
through the collective action initiative called the Integrity Pact tool14. The tool uses an 
independent broker, normally a civil society organisation, to monitor procurement in close 
collaboration with businesses and contracting authorities15. The initiative can be seen as an 
approach in which the European Commission relies on “principled principles” that are willing 
to hold officials accountable in a scenario where normative constraints of the law fail. The 
question is however, whether there is a role for civil society organisations and businesses to 
fight corruption and enhance transparency in public procurement, especially when EU 
procurement rules already cover these issues16. Also, questions are raised whether more 
sophisticated forms of corruption, such as undue influence, can be prevented through 
collective action initiatives for public procurement. On the one hand, it can be argued that a 
strong anti-corruption legislative framework provides for sufficient safeguards to prevent 
corruption in procurement. Introducing additional control could be inefficient, costly, and 
undermine other procurement objectives such as value for money. This would make 
collective action monitoring tools obsolete and not recommendable for public procurement in 
the European Union. On the other hand, the legislative framework might not prevent all 
forms of corruption, especially those hidden from plain sight where damage is difficult to 
determine, or those that extend beyond the legal definitions. The (potential) damage of 
corruption could outweigh the costs of having an independent broker monitoring 
procurement. And based on this cost-benefit analysis and on certain external best practices 
the European Commission is interested in exploring the applicability of the Integrity Pact as a 
civil society-monitoring tool for public procurement of the European Structural and Cohesion 
funds.  
 
                                                            
 
14 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/es/policy/how/improving-investment/integrity-pacts/ [Accessed on 12-10-
2016]. 
15 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/integrity_pacts [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
16 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Legal Rules and Implementation [WWW]. Available from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation_en [Accessed on 21-10-
2016]. 
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   Hypothesis II 
The second hypothesis for this study is that an independent broker, in form of a civil 
society organisation through the Integrity Pact, can play an effective role in the 
prevention of corruption and enhancing of transparency in public procurement. 
 
This study will test these hypotheses by 1) first defining the theoretic framework of collective 
action to prevent public procurement corruption. After this, 2) the case of Integrity Pacts will 
be studied in order to identify conditions that positively or negatively determine the role of 
civil society organisations in the prevention of corruption in public procurement. Finally 3) 
this will provide for an evidence-based approach to determine in which way collective action 
can optimally perform in the prevention of corruption in public procurement for EU funds. 
 
The following points elaborate on the understanding of the main areas of the study: 
 
1.   The first area aims to develop a theoretic framework of collective action in order to 
prevent corruption in pubic procurement. This will be done by: 1) defining corruption; 2) 
determining the incentives and disincentives of corrupt behaviour; 3) determining 
collective action approaches to prevent corruption.  
2.   The second area aims to identify conditions that affect the effectiveness of civil society 
organisations to prevent corruption in public procurement through collective action 
initiatives. This will be done by: 1) describing the Integrity Pact tool; 2) a multiple-case 
study analysis of the implementation of the tool; 3) determining the performance and 
potential of the tool. 
3.   The third area aims to provide the conditions required that allow the tool to be translated 
into an integrated approach in which civil society can prevent corruption in public 
procurement on the EU level.  
2.2   Methodology 
This section outlines the methodology for the development of the present study. First the 
overall approach adopted for delivering this study is presented. After this, a description will 
be given on the tools for data collection and assessment. 
 
The study questions have been divided in three areas: 
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-   Study area 1 – Corruption in public procurement as a collective action problem in the EU 
-   Study area 2 – The use of the Integrity Pact tool 
-   Study area 3 – Civil society’s role as monitor in preventing corruption  
   Study area 1 
The first study area covers the description corruption in public procurement. It aims to 
develop a theoretic framework to prevent corruption in public procurement in the context of 
the EU Single Market and through the use of collective action. First, the definition, forms and 
methods of corruption will be discussed which will expose the different levels of analysis (i.e. 
individual, institutional, societal) used in order to determine an integrated approach to deal 
with corruption in public procurement. After this, the causes of corruption will be discussed 
and linked to principal-agent and collective action prevention measures. It its entirety this 
presents a theoretic framework against which the Integrity Pact tool is analysed in order to 
identify conditions that positively or negatively determine the role of civil society 
organisations in the prevention of corruption in public procurement. 
 
The main study questions are: 
 
-   How can corruption be defined? 
-   What are the main causes of corruption? 
-   How does corruption affect public procurement? 
-   What measures are considered most appropriate to prevent corruption in public 
procurement? 
   Study area 2 
The second study area aims to identify conditions that affect the effectiveness of civil society 
organisations to prevent corruption in public procurement through collective action 
initiatives. This will be done by: 1) describing the Integrity Pact tool; 2) analysing cases of 
the implementation of the tool in European and non-European countries; 3) determining the 
performance and potential of the tool. The tool is used to provide multiple-case study 
evidence on the role of civil society to prevent corruption in public procurement. With this 
information, areas can be exposed in which civil society monitoring of public procurement 
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plays a preventive role outside the confines of the existing anti-corruption principal-agent 
framework to prevent corruption in public procurement. The exploratory approach for this 
multiple-case study analysis should also assist in developing a framework for assessing the 
effectiveness of the collective action tool. 
 
The main study questions are: 
 
-   How is the Integrity Pact tool set up? 
-   How is the Integrity Pact tool applied in practice? 
-   What are limitations, strengths and weaknesses of the Integrity tool? 
   Study area 3 
The third study area is where the tool to prevent corruption is translated into an approach to 
prevent corruption. By providing the conditions required for civil society organisations to 
monitor public procurement, an integrated approach is developed to prevent corruption in 
public procurement of EU funds. 
 
The main study questions are: 
 
-   Which conditions are required for an integrated approach for civil society organisations to 
effectively monitor public procurement? 
   Case study design 
The choice for a multiple case study design for this study is based on the limited availability 
and access to information on the use of the Integrity Pact. Assessing the Integrity Pact poses 
methodological challenges, in particular when assessing the impact of civil monitoring 
mechanisms 17  for public procurement. Integrity Pacts are believed to have reduced 
corruption, improved the quality of procurement, and strengthened the call for more long-
                                                            
 
17 For the purpose of this report the concept includes a wide range of social accountability related interventions 
aimed at mobilising/involving citizens, beneficiaries, communities, civil society, in the monitoring of public 
procurement.  
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term reform. However, evidence is largely anecdotal. The main methodological challenges 
faced were: 
 
-   Few impact studies have been done and these often are limited to one specific initiative, 
each with their specific characteristics; 
-   Establishing the preventive effect of Integrity Pacts is difficult due to the lack of a clear-
cut way to measure corruption; 
-   Civil society organisations that implement Integrity Pacts frequently face resource 
restraints, which have effect on the quality of collected data. Establishing baseline 
information to allow for comparison over time is not always evident; 
-   It is difficult to attribute change to specific actions (the attribution problem of causes to 
effects). 
Adopting for this study a multi-case study design allows for researching multiple instances of 
a change programme such as the Integrity Pact. Cases are studied in real-life context, which 
allows for better understanding how these influence and are influenced by the context. 
Through the design, this study looks to untangle causal complexity in which many relevant 
factors could be determined but only observed in certain instances18. The unit of analysis is 
the Integrity Pact tool. The scattered availability and access to information on the use of the 
Integrity Pact complicates the extent to which generalizability is possible. Considering that 
the approach for this study is more directed to practitioner data, rather than deducting through 
testing hypothesis from existing theories, this study is based mainly in grounded theory19. 
Such research virtually always includes a sponsor that is interested in applied theory, which 
was also the case in the work conducted on the basis of the global and European reviews on 
the Integrity Pact. 
 
This study has followed a sequential mixed method in order to determine effectiveness of 
civil society to prevent corruption in public procurement. This was done through desk 
research, interviews and surveys from concrete Integrity Pact experiences inside and outside 
                                                            
 
18 GEORGE, A. L., and BENNET, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
YIN, R. K. (2009). Doing case study research. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
19 CHARMAZ, K. (2006). Constructing Grounding Theory. 1st ed. Los Angelos: SAGE publications. 
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the EU. This method should allow for a field-influenced learning curve that is valuable for 
enhancing theory and practice20. However, the perception of stakeholders that implemented 
Integrity Pacts on what constitutes effectiveness and impact differs. Views on what 
constitutes success of an Integrity Pact in some instances is based on performance indicators 
such as whether the project was implemented within the available budget or that all planned 
activities were conducted. In other instances, stakeholders determined success by the extent 
to which irregularities were detected in a procurement process or whether the Integrity Pact 
promoted further reform against corruption. This study attempts to isolate specific conditions 
that can be considered favourable for an effective role of civil society to prevent corruption in 
public procurement. However, it has to be noted that for this study activities across Integrity 
Pact projects have been bundled in order to be better able to attribute cause to effect. 
 
Particular challenges for this study is to measure a counterfactual, in this case the absence of 
corruption. This quickly precludes the establishment of strong evidence-based findings. It is 
therefore that the study chooses to present a set of cases which as a whole present evidence of 
the effectiveness or impact of civil society organisations in preventing corruption in public 
procurement. Interviewed stakeholders in some instances assert that the Integrity Pact reduces 
corruption due to instilled confidence among bidders and few incidences disrupting the 
procurement process. However, largely these claims are anecdotal with at the same time 
interviewees confirming there is lack of evidence of direct contributions of the Integrity Pact 
to reducing corruption. At the same time, increased incidences could also be a sign that due to 
the Integrity Pact the system of control is working better and therefor more effective. 
 
From an implementation viewpoint, it is noted that the information collected from the 
different Integrity Pacts varies due to the level of access to information as well as the quantity 
and quality of information kept by the different stakeholders that have implemented Integrity 
Pacts. As a result it is difficult to filter out those conditions that favour corruption prevention 
by civil society organisations. Also, for the purpose of this study it is important to keep in 
mind that the two reviews conducted for Transparency International about the Integrity Pact 
above all showed that the tool or approach is of a flexible nature and does not benefit from a 
                                                            
 
20 AGRANOFF, R. (2014). Reconstructing Bureaucracy for Service Innovation in the Governance Era.vIn 
Christopher Ansell and Jacob Torfing (ed.) Public Innovation Through Collaboration and Design. London: 
Routledge. 
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set of pre-established success indicators. From the different perceptions on success, a broad 
list of indicators have been established which eventually are determined by each implementer 
of the Integrity Pact.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that despite the EU legal procurement system, the quality and 
effectiveness of each country’s procurement system could vary. For example, it is 
challenging to determine in each Integrity Pact case discussed in this study whether the 
particular legal context of the country makes an Integrity Pact more or less effective in 
reducing corruption. 
   Data collection and assessment tools 
Research for this study has been collected through desk research, interviews and survey 
work. Part of this data collection has been done in light of studies we conducted in 2013, 
2015 and 2016, respectively on corruption in public procurement in the EU and on the use of 
the Integrity Pact tool. The first report was conducted for the European Parliament21. The 
other two reports for the civil society organisation Transparency International. One concerned 
a review of the use and implementation of the Integrity Pact in Europe22. The other report 
reviewed the Integrity Pact on a global level23 . For the purpose of this study, the two 
Learning Reviews will be referred to as “European review” and “global review” All reports, 
including the data used for this study coming from these reports, are publically available 
online24. This data has been complemented for this study with additional desk research and 
interviews to ensure validation of findings for the purpose of this study. 
                                                            
 
21 BEKE, M., CARDONA, F., BLOMEYER, R. (2013). Political and other forms of corruption in the 
attribution of public procurement contracts and allocation of EU funds: Extent of the phenomenon and overview 
of practices [WWW]. European Parliament. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/es/document.html?reference=IPOL-JOIN_ET(2013)490676 [Accessed 
on 12-11-2013]. 
22 BEKE, M., BLOMEYER, R., CARDONA, F. (2015). Integrity Pacts for Public Procurement [WWW]. 
Available at: https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/accountability/evaluations/4/ [Accessed on 11-07-2016]. 
23 NERO, W., BEKE, M. (2015). Learning review: Transparency International’s Integrity Pacts for public 
procurement [WWW]. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/accountability/evaluations/4/ 
[Accessed on 11-07-2016]. 
24 The data collected for the European Parliament study and the European review of the Integrity Pact have been 
entirely collected, processed and analysed by the author of this study. The data collected for the global review of 
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1.   Desk research.  
Data used for this study varies between legislation, official documents and secondary sources. 
Primary documentation on Integrity Pacts was collected from Transparency International 
Secretariat and the national chapters. Additional documentation was collected from academia 
and civil society organisations other than Transparency International that deal specifically 
with Integrity Pacts or similar initiatives on monitoring of public procurement. The desk 
research established a preliminary factual basis for answering the research questions, further 
substantiated with information derived from the interviews and surveys.  
 
A full list of consulted documents has been included in the bibliography. 
 
2.   Surveys 
Data has been used for this study coming from three different surveys conducted for the 
European and global review reports between in 2015/2016 using the online survey tool 
Surveymonkey. The first and second survey were conducted in 2015 in light of the European 
review of the Integrity Pact conducted commissioned by Transparency International. One 
targeted a list of representatives of national chapters of Transparency International in the EU. 
This was meant to gather basic data on experience with civil monitoring tools for public 
procurement. Respondents were asked to map risks in public procurement in their respective 
countries. The same risk mapping exercise was presented in the third survey that targeted 
local correspondents of the anti-corruption network established by the European Commission 
in order to support the development of the European anti-corruption report. A third survey 
was launched in 2015 targeting representatives of national chapters of Transparency 
International also outside the EU. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
the Integrity Pact has been partially collected by the author of this study in collaboration with the co-author of 
the Global Learning Review. All data has been processed and analysed by both author of this study and the co-
author of the Global Learning Review. Reference will be made in this study whenever data was not collected at 
first hand. 
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The first survey resulted in thirteen responses from eleven countries25. The second survey 
resulted in nine responses from nine countries26  and the third survey resulted in twelve 
respondents from twelve countries27. 
 
The full surveys have been included in Annex 2. 
 
3. Interviews 
 
In light of the study on public procurement corruption for the European Parliament, feedback 
has been collected from stakeholders from the public and private sector as well as academia 
and civil society. Focus was placed on experts on EU affairs as well as the national level. The 
main stakeholders consulted come from the European Parliament, European Commission, 
including the EU´s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), universities and the private sector consultants 
dealing with public procurement. The consultation aimed to explore the view of professionals 
from the EU Member States on anti-corruption tools used in public procurement. This 
resulted in seven responses from six countries28. 
 
For the multiple case-study analysis on the Integrity Pacts, feedback from a total of 66 
stakeholders has been analysed. Stakeholders were consulted by the author of this study in 
face-to-face or telephone and/or Skype meetings (44 stakeholders) and one focus group 
meeting (22 stakeholders).  The main purpose was to gather information about the actual 
practices of institutional behaviour in working on public procurement and anti-corruption. 
Since this necessarily involved subjective views and assessments, data collection aimed for a 
balanced sample of interviews. This included semi-structured interviews with representatives 
of civil society, independent public procurement monitors, contracting authorities (national 
and local level), bidders (construction and information technology sector), and external 
experts.  
                                                            
 
25 This included Greece, Romania, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, 
Slovenia, and Austria. 
26 This included Croatia, Slovakia, Spain, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Slovenia, Estonia and Austria. 
27 This included Argentina, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Latvia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, and South Korea. 
28 This included Spain, Italy, Slovakia, France, Estonia, and Hungary. 
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Figure 1: Interview categories European review 
 
 
Interviews were conducted in the form of individual and group interviews. Face-to-face 
interviews have been conducted at on-site meetings with Transparency International 
Secretariat, and national chapters of Transparency International. Initial feedback from the 
chapters was collected during a focus group meeting in Berlin on 23 February 2015 in which 
fifteen European Transparency International chapters participated, Transparency International 
Secretariat staff and a representative of European Commission Directorate General Regional 
Policy. Additional interviews were conducted over the telephone and/or Skype.  
 
A full list of consulted stakeholders has been included in Annex 3. 
 
For the global review of the Integrity Pact, roughly 21 stakeholders from Transparency 
International chapters, contracting authorities, civil society and private sector participants 
were additionally interviewed either face-to-face during on-site meetings or via telephone 
and/or Skype by the co-author of the review29. Group discussions were used to gather further 
information on actual practices and behaviours in Integrity Pacts and public procurement. In 
addition, semi-structured interviews allowed for in-depth discussions on current expectations 
of the tool within the Transparency International movement and other civil society 
organisations. For the purpose of this study, findings from these interviews have been 
incorporated in the multiple-case study analysis. Whenever findings are presented from the 
                                                            
 
29 A selection of the total interviews has been conducted by the co-author of the global review, William Nero.  
Civil society Contracting authority
Donor organisation Integrity Pact Monitor
Private sector Other
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global review that have not be collected first-hand by the author of this study, this will be 
clarified in this report. A variety of stakeholders were contacted in this process in order to 
establish a balanced range of perspectives and in an attempt to mitigate bias.  
 
Figure 2: Interview categories global review 
 
 
A full list of consulted stakeholders has been included in Annex 3. 
 
3.   Field visits 
For the European review of the Integrity Pact three on-site country missions were carried out 
to allow for in-depth study of specific Integrity Pact projects. Visits were conducted to 
Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria. For the global review of the Integrity Pact, two on-site country 
missions were carried out in India and Mexico30. Discussions were held in a combination of 
focus group meetings as well as individual interviews. The India on-site mission coincided 
with an international conference held by the local Transparency International chapter, 
bringing together practitioners and experts from around the globe to discuss Indian 
experiences with Integrity Pacts. The mission to Mexico focused on government initiatives 
that allow for independent monitors, so-called Social Witnesses, to participate in public 
procurement processes. The local Transparency International chapter facilitated meetings 
                                                            
 
30 The on-site mission to India was carried out by the co-author of the global review, William Nero. Whenever 
findings are presented from the global review that have not be collected first-hand by the author of this study, 
this will be clarified in the study. 
Civil society Contracting authority
Integrity Pact Monitor Private sector
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with government representatives, independent monitors, and politicians involved in the 
implementation of these initiatives. 
   Report structure 
This study is structured as follows: 
 
Part I – Collective action for corruption and public procurement in the EU 
Part II – Integrity Pacts as collective action approach 
Part III - Integrity Pacts as an approach to prevent corruption in public procurement 
 
Before presenting the main parts of this study, the next chapter will first outline the 
justification for this study and limitations of the scope of research.  
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   Justification and scope of this study 
This section will present the background against which this study has been developed. It will 
give an overview of European debates concerning corruption in procurement and a brief 
overview of the most important pieces of EU legislation in this area. 
 
The EU’s single market seeks to ensure the free movement of goods, capital, services and 
people between all EU Member States. As a territory without internal borders or any other 
regulatory obstacles, a functioning single market according to the European Commission 
“stimulates competition and trade, improves efficiency, raises quality, and help cut prices”31. 
Through the Single Market Strategy the European Commission aims to boost trade and 
competition. Specific measures aim to create more transparent, efficient and accountable 
public procurement. This should create business opportunities and contribute to more 
efficient public administration, growth and job creation32. 
 
According to the European Commission, over 250,000 public authorities in the EU spend an 
estimated 14% of GDP on the purchase of services, works and supplies33. Procurement 
covers a wide variety of sectors where public authorities (contracting authorities) purchase 
works, goods or services from companies. The EU sets out minimum harmonised public 
procurement rules in order to create a level playing field for all businesses in the EU. The 
rules are transposed to national legislation and apply to tenders above a certain monetary 
threshold34. 
 
                                                            
 
31 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). The European Single Market [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/index_en.htm [Accessed on 12-09-2016]. 
32 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). The Single Market Strategy [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/strategy/index_en.htm#enhance_access [Accessed on 12-09-2016].  
33 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public procurement strategy [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/strategy/ [Accessed on 13/06/2013]. 
34 For tenders below these monetary thresholds, national rules apply. However, these rules need to respect the 
general principles of EU law. 
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The EU centres better governance in its public procurement strategy 35 . This includes 
professionalization of procurement staff, simplification of procedures (cutting red-tape) and 
making better use of technological developments (e-procurement). This should generate 
transparent, fair and competitive public procurement with public administrations that operate 
more efficiently, effectively and citizen- and business- friendly. The wider impact of this 
would be that the public sector can use procurement to drive the EU2020 horizontal policies 
such as those aiming to create innovative, green and socially inclusive economy.  
3.1   EU public procurement 
Total expenditure in the EU on public works, goods and services has increased over the last 
years reaching almost one fifth of EU GDP every year36. The EU public procurement Action 
Plan for 2014-2020 highlights that procurement irregularities are one of the most common 
causes of administrative errors and financial corrections relating to European Structural and 
Investment (ESI) Funds37. Such irregularities affect all stages of the procurement process. At 
the same time, the EU stresses the vulnerability to corruption, linking this specifically to 
abuse of public office for private gain and political party financing. A study from 2013 
conducted by PwC for the EU’s anti-fraud office OLAF, states that the overall direct costs of 
corruption for five sectors in eight Member States was between EUR 1,4 and 2,2 billion38. On 
the basis of potential financial damage, the EU promotes various initiatives to address 
irregularities and prevent fraud and corruption. Inter alia, this includes training of officials, 
the use of e-procurement, and application of ex-ante conditionality for public procurement in 
order leverage administrative capacity improvements. Specifically dealing with corruption, 
the EU promotes the use of the so-called ARACHNE tool for public authorities to help 
                                                            
 
35 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public procurement strategy [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/strategy/ [Accessed on 13/06/2013]. 
36 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012). Commission Staff Working Document: Annual Public Procurement 
Implementation Review 2012 [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/implementation/20121011-staff-working-
document_en.pdf [Accessed 13/06/2013]. 
37 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public procurement strategy [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/strategy/ [Accessed on 13/06/2013]. 
38 PWC (2011). Public Procurement in Europe: Cost and effectiveness [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/cost-effectiveness_en.pdf 
[Accessed 12/06/2013]. 
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assessing control systems and identifying red flags in public procurement. The EU 
ARACHNE project “aims at providing the MS authorities involved in management of the 
Structural Funds with an operation tool to identify their most risky projects”39. In more 
specific terms, ARACHNE supports “the Management and Control Systems of the OPs 
[Operational Programmes], to lower the error rate and strengthen fraud prevention and 
detection”. In addition, ARACHNE facilitates “the continuous monitoring/overview of the 
internal and external data regarding projects, beneficiaries and contracts/contractors”. 
Apart from this, the EU wants to involve civil society organisations in promoting 
transparency in public procurement. The European Commission looks for this at a tool 
developed by the civil society organisation Transparency International called the Integrity 
Pact. The EU has tasked the Directorate-General GROW and REGIO with piloting the 
Integrity Pact for ESI Funds projects in collaboration with Transparency International.  
 
The potential reach of the Integrity Pact on the EU-level is significant from the perspective of 
amount of money involved (EUR 454 billion on ESI Funds for the period 2014-2020), 
geographical spread (28 Member States), number of businesses involved (supports more than 
2 million businesses), and types of procurement as well as investment areas. In other words, 
the promotion by the EU of these tools presents an opportunity to fight corruption in public 
procurement on a large scale. However, the impact of the tools is not easy to determine.  
 
The overall objective of the EU for this initiative is to: 
  
“explore and promote the use of Integrity Pacts for safeguarding EU funds against 
fraud and corruption and as a tool to increase transparency and accountability, 
enhance trust in public authorities and government contracting, contribute to a good 
reputation of contracting authorities, bring cost savings and improve competition 
through better procurement”40.  
                                                            
 
39 Ibid. 
40 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public Procurement Action Plan [WWW]. Available from:  
https://www.google.es/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=0ahUKEwjcotaVmIbMAhWHch
QKHd8xBZUQFggzMAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2FDocsRoom%2Fdocuments%2F14341%2Fa
ttachments%2F1%2Ftranslations%2Fen%2Frenditions%2Fnative&usg=AFQjCNFtyqX3yN2bdcyIVTU_rby7X
DpwMg&sig2=65N5fN3p4oELa-8KXS6a3A [Accessed on 25-10-2016]. 
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The data on public procurement shows the large quantity of money involved. Waste of public 
resources or misuse, fraud and corruption are apparent risks and should be avoided. The value 
of tenders published in the electronic database Tender European Daily (TED) in 2013 was 
approximately 423 billion euros, 3.7% of the EU´s GDP 41 . Overall, almost half of the 
contracts in TED concern services followed by supplies and works. The works, however, 
usually concern higher sums than for example supply contracts. In 2010, around nine out of 
ten of the notices concern classic public procurement sectors while the remaining concern 
utilities. Data from 2006 to 2010 shows that three out of four public contracts are procured 
through open procurement procedures, constituting more than half of the contracts total 
value42. The restricted procedure for procurement was used in one out of ten public contracts, 
worth a quarter of the contracts total value. The EU Public Procurement Directives set 
common standards in order to minimise these risks. However, EU rules are only applicable to 
one fifth of total EU procurement. The remaining billions of public spending remain under 
the EU´s radar. This could undermine the principles of the Single Market as it obstructs easy 
access for all companies to public procurement. Also it risks limiting effective control, 
increasing the risk for corruption.  
 
Table 1: EU Member States overview Corruption Perception Index and World Bank Income groups 
EU Member State 
Corruption Perception Index Transparency 
International (2015) 
Income group according to World Bank (as of 
July 2016) 
Denmark 91 High income 
Finland 90 High income 
Sweden 89 High income 
Netherlands 87 High income 
Germany 81 High income 
Luxembourg 81 High income 
United Kingdom 81 High income 
                                                            
 
41 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013). European Commission Public Procurement Indicators 2013 [WWW]. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/11022/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native 
[Accessed on 22-09-2016].  
42 PWC (2011). Public Procurement in Europe: Cost and effectiveness [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/cost-effectiveness_en.pdf 
[Accessed 12/06/2013].  
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Belgium 77 High income 
Austria 76 High income 
Ireland 75 High income 
Estonia 70 High income 
France 70 High income 
Portugal 63 High income 
Poland 62 High income 
Cyprus 61 High income 
Lithuania 61 High income 
Slovenia 60 High income 
Spain 58 High income 
Czech Republic 56 High income 
Malta 56 N/A 
Latvia 55 High income 
Croatia 51 High income 
Hungary 51 High income 
Slovakia 51 High income 
Greece 46 High income 
Romania 46 Upper middle income 
Italy 44 High income 
Bulgaria 41 Upper middle income 
Source: own elaboration 
3.2   EU procurement rules 
New EU procurement rules have been in force since April 2016. The old rules included four 
relevant EU directives. The change in EU procurement rules aimed to simplify rules and 
make the procurement system more efficient. The reform also included the aim to provide 
best value for money while respecting the principle of transparency and competition.  
 
Since the first EU directives were put in place, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures 
have been incrementally included to ensure companies to enjoy fundamental freedoms in the 
competition for public procurement contracts. Public procurement in the EU needs to be in 
line with principles of free movement of goods, the right of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services. When public contracts exceed certain amounts, EU coordination of national 
procedures is necessary in order to ensure competition and protect the functioning of the 
internal market.  
 
The old EU directives have been replaced from 18 April 2016 by new directives that intend to 
simplify procurement procedures and make these more flexible. It should:  
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-   Allow contracting authorities to be better able to negotiate terms of contracts;  
-   Shorten deadlines for procedures; and 
-   Decrease tender documentation.  
The new system should also allow contracting authorities to implement environmental 
policies, as well as those governing social integration and innovation. In other words, public 
procurement is becoming a policy strategy instrument. The effort to reduce administrative 
burden is pursued by replacing the differing processes that currently exist in Member States 
to tender for public contracts. The new rules aim to simplify access of companies to cross-
border tendering procedures and reduce administrative burden in relation to tendering 
administrative paperwork. Concerning transparency and anti-corruption, the new rules 
include various measures. The concept of “conflicts of interest” is defined at EU level. This 
aims to simplify the identification and management of fraud and conflict of interest cases. EU 
Member States are asked to take appropriate measures to effectively prevent, identify and 
remedy such cases. The definition reads:  
 
“A situation in which persons involved in, or able to influence, the procedure by 
which a purchaser awards a contract have a direct or indirect financial, economic or 
other personal interest that could jeopardise their impartiality and independence in 
that procedure”43. 
 
Also transparency has a key role in fighting corruption in procurement. Inter alia, EU 
Member States must meet monitoring requirements and report violations to the respective 
national authorities, publicise monitoring activities, and submit a report to the European 
Commission every three years including feedback on sources of misapplication or legal 
uncertainty. This includes any problems in the application of rules, the level of participation 
by small-medium enterprises, the prevention, the detection and the monitoring of fraud, 
corruption, conflict of interest and other cases with serious irregularities. 
                                                            
 
43 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015). Preventing corruption – new public procurement rules as of April 2016 
[WWW]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-
databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8594 [Accessed on 12-09-2016].  
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3.3   Corruption in public procurement 
Determining the level and damage of corruption in public procurement is challenging. 
Nonetheless, it is widely recognized that corruption occurs in public procurement and that the 
impact of corruption is large. It can cost lives, people´s freedom, health and money. 
Mediatised scandals and the recent financial and economic crisis that affected the global and 
EU economy have placed corruption on the international political and public agenda and 
especially the important role of corruption in preventing development has generated strong 
demand of establishing reliable indicators to measure the scale of the problem. For this study 
it is important to reflect on the level and potential damage of corruption in public 
procurement as it influences the relevance of civil society participation to prevent corruption 
as well as influences the benefits of this participation compared to possible costs (i.e. 
administrative burden for public procurement processes). Difficulties to define 
straightforward economic indicators for measurement require more elaborated constructions 
arguably based on subjective inputs44.  
 
Determining the level of corruption depends largely on three different approaches that have 
dominated the debate: 
 
-   Collection of views of stakeholders such as businesses, public officials, civil society 
organisations and citizens; 
-   Assessments of national institutional systems which provides for information on 
weaknesses and strengths in preventing corruption; 
-   Audits of particular projects in which concrete anomalies can be identified. 
The measurements closest to objectiveness are for example experience-based surveys in 
which stakeholders are asked about their experiences with corruption. Also comparing 
individual public procurement projects can generate significant objective measurement of 
corruption, for example between regions. Opinion-based surveys and polls are more 
subjective in which stakeholders are asked about perceived levels of corruption. The fact that 
                                                            
 
44 URRA, F. (2007). Assessing Corruption - An Analytical Review of Corruption Measurement and its 
Problems: Perception, Error and Utility. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service: Georgetown University. 
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this is subjective does not necessary mean it is not important. For example, high perception of 
corruption can affect popular trust of citizens in political and government institutions.   
 
Determining the damage of corruption commonly is identified on various levels: political, 
social, economic and environmental. 
 
1.   Political and social damage 
Corruption and abuse of power by the political representatives challenge the rule of law and 
quality of democracy. It delegitimizes public institutions, affecting the quality of government. 
It is considered that achieving quality of government is the foundation to ensure a solid rule 
of law and with this a society with low levels of corruption and, finally, democratic quality45. 
Corruption erodes the social fabric of society. High popular perception of corruption 
undermines trust of citizens in the political system and delegitimizes its institutions. Surveys 
in Europe46 show decreasing or fluctuating trust in politics and increasing perception of 
corruption. This trend is closely linked to the sense of immorality. In many developed 
countries it seems that a majority believes that most members of their society, and in 
particular those in power, do not comply with the formal norms and act corrupt to obtain 
privileges that most do not receive. A sense of impunity could generate a strong incentive for 
citizens to breach norms. Recent studies do indeed indicate that perception of corruption 
correlates with institutional and interpersonal distrust, while this at the same time undermines 
the culture of legality 47 . In other words, high perception of corruption means less 
interpersonal and institutional trust and a risk of higher public tolerance or legal 
disobedience. Corruption deteriorates society’s social fabric and favours more corruption. 
The departing point or threshold after which this deteriorating process is initiated still has to 
be empirically determined. Further, research shows that opacity in combination with weak 
accountability generates a higher perception of corruption. The behaviour of politicians is 
                                                            
 
45 ROTHSTEIN, B. (2011). The Quality of Government. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
ALEXANDER, A.C., INGLEHART, R., WENZEL, Ch. (2012). Measuring effective democracy: A defense. 
International Political Science Review, vol. 33 (1): 41-62. 
46 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Public Opinion [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm [Accessed on 22-09-2016]. 
47 VILLORIA, M., RYZIN VAN, G., LAVENA, C. (2013). Social consequences of government corruption: A 
study of institutional disaffection in Spain. Public Administration Review Volume 73, Issue 1, pages 85–94. 
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what influences popular perception the most. Subsequently, if one wishes to lower this 
perception, transparency should be improved and accountability strengthened (especially of 
the political class). Serious anti-corruption measures, complemented with collective action 
initiatives could be a step in the right direction. 
 
2.   Environmental damage 
Natural resources and the environment are particularly vulnerable for corruption considering 
there is the conflict between private interests in revenue coming from natural resources and 
public interest in a healthy environment 48 . The environment is collective good, posing 
challenges in terms of allocating resources to the benefit of the public. Areas such as urban 
development and environmental corruption involve primarily governmental institutions. The 
granting of building permits and classification of land are areas vulnerable for corrupt 
practices. For example, a mayor receives a bribe from a businessman to classify a terrain as 
equipped for construction while in fact this area should be protected due to fragile wildlife. 
Studies conducted on the causes of environmental damage due to urban development point to 
institutions basing development on cost-benefit analysis looking at the physical impact of 
construction. In other words, rather than looking at damages to the environment in economic 
terms, urban planners tend to look at economic benefit from construction against physical 
impact of destruction.  Addressing corruption in the environmental sector includes a 
combination of law enforcement, prevention and sustainability.  
 
3.   Financial and economic damage49 
Despite the difficulty to measure the level of corruption, efforts are made to develop 
measurement approaches and collect data to estimate of the size of the problem. Worldwide 
surveys of businesses allow for data collection on bribes paid, but also governance and anti-
corruption perception surveys. However, trying to measure the quantity of bribes alone does 
not include large sums of public money embezzled, theft or misuse of public resources, i.e. 
through public procurement. The World Bank estimates that the annual worldwide bribery is 
                                                            
 
48 WINBOURNE, S. (2002). Corruption and the environment [WWW]. Available from: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACT876.pdf [Accessed on 22-09-2016].  
49 Note that this section outlines the various methods used to measure the economic costs of corruption in EU 
funding. 
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about USD 1 trillion and around USD 200 billion is paid on a yearly basis for bribing public 
procurement50. This corresponds to an estimated overall annual volume of USD 1,5 trillion of 
public procurement effected by bribery. Corruption can have serious consequences for 
economic development. It could make a difference of 3% annual growth for businesses if 
they operate in low corrupt environments. Also, the choice for foreign economic operators to 
participate in public procurement can change depending on the corruption environment51. For 
example, corruption can make local bureaucracy less transparent what would suggest that a 
safer approach for a foreign company is setting up a joint venture rather than a subsidiary 
when aiming to compete in public procurement. This allows the foreign company to use a 
local partner that understands the country´s bureaucratic red tape. At the same time, a corrupt 
environment decreases the foreign company´s protection of assets. After all, the probability 
that disputes between the foreign investor and the domestic partners are adjudicated fairly 
decreases52. Corruption could in other words deter cross-border public procurement, which 
would undermine in the EU case the Single Market. Investment barriers also have effects on 
the success in attracting EU funding. Countries with higher corruption levels are less 
successful in attracting funding, spending this and getting reimbursed by the EU from the 
structural and cohesion funds53. 
 
Corruption in public procurement includes the risk that public expenditure is directed towards 
individual projects favouring private contractors and this way obstructing social investment 
in areas favouring public interest, such as health care54 . The data shows that countries 
perceived as more corrupt have lower government expenditure on health care and higher 
                                                            
 
50 U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTRE (2013). Literature review on costs of corruption for the 
poor [WWW]. Available from: http://www.u4.no/publications/literature-review-on-costs-of-corruption-for-the-
poor/downloadasset/3165 [Accessed on 21-10-2016]. 
51 SMARZYNSKA, B., Wei, S. (2000). Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level 
Evidence [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2000/10/01macroeconomics%20smarzynska/20001001  
[Accessed on 11-06-2013]. 
52 Ibid. 
53 MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, A. (2013). The good, the bad and the ugly: Controlling corruption in the European 
Union [WWW]. Available from: http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ANTICORRP-
Policy-Paper-on-Lessons-Learntfinal.pdf [Accessed on 02-06-2013]. 
54 Ibid. 
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government investment in capital formation 55 . On top of this, the health care sector is 
reckoned to be particularly vulnerable to corruption56. Under spending could fuel related 
problems. In other words, corruption could generate increased government expenditure in 
capital formation given that corrupt officials tend to channel funds to projects that benefit 
private interest. As a consequence there is less room for sufficient government expenditure in 
social welfare affecting areas such as health care, increasing risks of corruption. In case 
countries have excessive expenditure in capital formation and in social expenditure, budget 
deficits could occur. 
 
Public procurement constitutes large part of government spending throughout the EU. This 
on itself highlights potential risks for financial damage given the large sums involved. 
However, the amount of spending is not necessarily an indicator for more corruption. In fact, 
corruption opportunities seem to rather be fuelled by the absence of adequate constraints57. 
For example, in case overspending due to corruption creates budget deficits, an effective tax 
collection system could minimise damages. However, data shows that tax collection is weak 
in countries perceived more corrupt. Absence of adequate constraints is therefore facilitating 
tax evasion. The influential anti-corruption researcher Alina Mungiu-Pippidi estimates that 
EUR 323 billion, twice the EU yearly budget, failed to be collected across the EU in 201058.  
3.4   European Structural and Investment Funds 
The European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds have a budget of EUR 454 billion for 
2014 to 202059. The ESI Funds are the EU’s main investment policy tool. ESI Funds consist 
of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), 
                                                            
 
55 Ibid. 
56 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013). Study on Corruption in the healthcare sector [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
new/news/news/docs/20131219_study_on_corruption_in_the_healthcare_sector_-_summary_en.pdf [Accessed 
on 14-10-2016]. 
57 MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, A. (2013). The good, the bad and the ugly: Controlling corruption in the European 
Union [WWW]. Available from: http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ANTICORRP-
Policy-Paper-on-Lessons-Learntfinal.pdf [Accessed on 02-06-2013]. 
58 Ibid. 
59 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). European Structural and Investment Funds: EU overview [WWW]. 
Available from: https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/overview [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
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Cohesion Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). 
Investment themes vary in size with most money going to competitiveness of Small Medium 
Enterprises, Environment Protection and Resource Efficiency, and Network Infrastructures in 
Transport and Energy. The most money in absolute numbers is reserved for Poland, Italy, 
Spain, Romania, and Germany. Each fund regulates the administration of the funds through 
individual regulations. Each Member State “administers the funds on a decentralised basis 
through shared management”60. This corresponds to approximately 80% of the EU budget 
management being shared between the European Commission and Member States. The rest is 
directly or indirectly managed by the European Commission. The overall responsibility of 
budget implementation always remains with the European Commission.  
 
Through the ESI Funds, more than one third of the EU budget is allocated. The shared 
management between the European Commission and Member States translates in practice 
into regional and national authorities managing three-quarters of the funding. The priorities 
are established at the EU level61. Member States set out their policy framework including 
national objectives62. Operational Programmes are established per region or theme, reflecting 
their specific needs. The European Commission approves the national objectives and 
Operational Programmes after negotiation with the Member States and based on the EU 
priorities. The Member States are responsible for the selecting, controlling and assessing of 
projects while the European Commission monitors the overall programme, makes the 
payments after expenditure is approved, and verifies national control systems.  
 
The process of allocating funds has checks and balances built in to avoid errors. National 
authorities are required to thoroughly check eligibility of expenditure before submitting 
payment claims to the European Commission. First of all, the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the checks and balances established in this process depend on the functioning and 
independence of the different authorities. For example, in case that Member States 
incorporate procurement and control authorities under one ministry, independency might be 
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jeopardised. Secondly, the European Commission has limited control over the individual 
project implementation, as this is the responsibility of the Member States. In other words, the 
European Commission’s effectiveness in controlling spending is partially dependent on the 
quality of national control. Thirdly, the European Commission lacks the human resources to 
monitor all the projects on the ground. In this context there could be a good reason to propose 
the involvement of civil society organisations to monitor how EU money is being spend.  
 
The European Commission stated in March 2013 that throughout the EU an estimated EUR 
120 billion is lost to corruption. According to the European Commission, this amounts to 20-
25% of the value of public contracts63. Regarding corruption affecting EU funding or its 
institutions, OLAF and the European Court of Auditors (ECA) are seen to be the principle 
institutions addressing the problem. Data from OLAF shows that in 2012, the EU anti-fraud 
office opened 718 cases and closed 465. Most cases were relating to the Structural Funds 
followed by external aid and EU staff related cases64. The recommendations made based on 
the investigations were primarily financial followed by judicial, disciplinary and 
administrative. OLAF recommended a total of EUR 284 million for recovery of which 
around EUR 100 million related to the Structural and Agricultural funds. An amount of EUR 
94,5 million was recovered in 2012 as a result of investigations. In 2015, OLAF recorded 
1372 incoming items of information opened 219 new investigations and 305 investigations 
were concluded65. Also in 2015 OLAF focused most activity on the Structural and Social 
Funds. A total of 364 recommendations were made to the EU and national authorities to 
recover EUR 888 million. Eurojust reports that corruption was observed in thirty cases 
registered at the organisation in 2012 and 27 cases as crimes against the financial interests of 
the EU.66 Several corruption cases handled by the organisation concerned public procurement 
involving EU funds or tender procedures. 
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To date, efforts to address irregularities and fraud in the Structural Funds have been 
dominated by a control and audit approach. Starting with the programming period 2000-2006, 
the control and audit arrangements governing the Structural Funds have been strengthened 
substantially. The European Commission pioneered these efforts, addressing demands from 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control, the latter reacting to ECA 
findings of high error rates affecting the Structural Funds67. For the period 2014-2020, the 
European Commission prioritises administrative capacity development. This is founded on 
the notion that Member States gain most from cohesion policy if ESI Funds are effectively 
managed. In addition, the European Commission expressed interest in the Integrity Pact as a 
tool to prevent potential irregularities with regard to procurement. 
 
The Integrity Pact initiative is noteworthy, since the efforts to date on the EU level have been 
of a “punitive” rather than “constructive” nature. Member State authorities expressed 
concerns relating possible administrative burden/cost associated with financial control and 
audit. Considering that the regulatory framework for the current programming period 2014-
2020 has introduced a series of new management and control requirements, the success of the 
Integrity Pact initiative will depend strongly on demonstrating that benefits outweigh any 
additional administrative burden. The experience, in the programming period 2000-2006, 
with “Contracts of Confidence” might provide some useful inspiration for the Integrity Pact 
initiative. The Contracts of Confidence were agreements between the European Commission 
and a Member State or regional EU funds authorities on the quality of the concerned 
authority’s audit work and enabling the European Commission to rely on national/regional 
audit work. For the 2000-2006 programming period, contracts of confidence were established 
in Wales, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Slovenia and Portugal68. 
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Currently the European Commission and Transparency International are collaborating to 
launch pilot Integrity Pacts dealing with EU funds. These efforts could allow researchers to 
draw in the near future comparative lessons from implementation of Integrity Pacts across the 
EU. For the European Commission, positive impact from Integrity Pacts could result in:  
 
-   Reduced credit risks;  
-   Better return on investments;  
-   Funds provided are more likely to achieve objectives; and  
-   A greater likelihood that funds will achieve stated regional development impacts. 
To sum up, an important challenge when analysing corruption in public procurement is the 
diversity in which procurement is managed between jurisdictions. Also it is challenging to 
determine the role of civil society organisations in preventing corruption given that 
attributing cause and effect is difficult. By focusing on the ESI Funds, this study aims to 
narrow down the scope and overcome legal differences in managing procurement. At the 
same time, the added value of focusing on the EU is that it allows for keeping an EU wide 
approach and draw comparative findings from the experiences in different countries which 
increases utility of this study’s findings in case used to prevent corruption in EU public 
procurement. The EU funds’ common legislative framework, EU-wide coverage, variety of 
businesses involved, different investment sectors and types of procurement justify the 
research focus of this study and immediately set the boundaries for this analysis. The EU 
Member States are very diverse but share a common history of EU integration, and in 
particular the integration of the internal market. In addition, the role of civil society 
organisations in fighting corruption in the different Member States can be narrowed down by 
specifically looking at a tool, the Integrity Pact, that targets corrupt practices in procurement 
processes. 
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   Part I – Collective action for corruption and public procurement 
The first study area covers the description corruption in public procurement. It aims to 
develop a theoretic framework to prevent corruption in public procurement in the context of 
the EU Single Market and through the use of collective action. First, the definition, forms and 
methods of corruption will be discussed which will expose the different levels of analysis (i.e. 
individual, institutional, societal) used in order to determine an integrated approach to deal 
with corruption in public procurement. After this, the causes of corruption will be discussed 
and linked to principal-agent and collective action prevention measures. It its entirety this 
presents a theoretic framework against which the Integrity Pact tool is analysed in order to 
identify conditions that positively or negatively determine the role of civil society 
organisations in the prevention of corruption in public procurement. 
 
The main study questions are: 
 
-   How can corruption be defined? 
-   What are the main causes of corruption? 
-   How does corruption affect public procurement? 
-   What measures are considered most appropriate to prevent corruption in public 
procurement? 
4.1   Corruption 
Scholars repeatedly introduce the concept of corruption by citing the complexity of 
determining the definition 69. The complexity becomes visible when considering the political, 
social and economic conditions that could influence the number and variety of corruption 
cases. For example, the number of opportunities for corrupt behaviour increases with the 
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amount of power allocated to persons in the political and social system, and at the same time 
the complexity of the mechanisms to check and balance this. Also the economic system is 
important when thinking about the number of times decisions have to be taken that affect the 
economic interest of people. The complexity of the system also affects the quantity and 
diversity of people, all exercising certain roles of decision-making power. For example, in 
public procurement many actors might exercise bits and pieces of power (i.e. there are 
politicians, procurement officials, auditors, entrepreneurs, consumers, etc.), together making 
for a network of relationships in which individuals have personal interests and pursue 
different goals. Without normative limits or other kinds of constraint on the exercise of 
power, a fertile ground is created for corrupt behaviour70. 
 
However, the complexity of a society does not necessarily mean more corruption takes place. 
For example, economic and political less developed countries are arguably less complex and 
tend to show higher levels of corruption71. This gives reason to question whether the rate of 
corruption increases in function of the number of opportunities. For example, it could be that 
the complexity of systems can immediately enhance performance of monitoring and deter 
misbehaviour (i.e. through transparency and accountability). Also, one could argue that the 
exercise of power can be restrained by social factors. Responsible behaviour can be learned 
in a complex society in which people are constantly in contact (i.e. through participation) 
and, not to forget, can get punished (formally or informally) for violating the boundaries of 
power. Finally it is important to consider that in complex social systems, corruption is less 
visible. Corruption evolves and hides as a result of the measures and sense of responsibility 
that grow with the complexity of societies. This gives reason to believe that 1) developed 
societies actually experience less corruption but also that 2) the “dark numbers” of corruption 
in developed societies are higher than in less complex systems. The damage of corruption is 
difficult to determine when visibility is limited. However, scandals and corruption-related 
crime is detected. This results in criminal prosecutions against politicians and companies and 
has effect on public opinion and consequently has political implications. Scandals also 
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generate more debate on crime prevention72. However, research on prevention of such crimes 
is scarce, possibly due to the complexity of the subject; its connections to other fields such as 
law and public policy, and lack of reliable data73. Diane Vaughan (2007) argues in Pontell 
and Geis’ famous International Handbook of White-collar and Corporate Crime that social 
life is a consequence of macro- and micro-level forces, and to better understand crime 
committed by those in power, she adds to this also meso-level analysis, in particular formal 
and complex organisations74. She notes that organisations “provide a window into culture, 
showing how culture mediates between institutional forces, organizational goals and 
processes, and individual illegality so that deviance becomes normalized in organizational 
settings”. A combination of sociological theory with research on white-collar crime can help 
understanding how people in organizations make decisions to violate rules.  
 
The following sections will situate the on-going debate on the connections between the 
different levels of analysis by explaining corruption committed by white-collar criminals 
such as corporate executives, politicians and public officials.  
   Conceptualising corruption 
Criminal law distinguishes at least four ways to wrongfully obtain control over property or 
personal interests of others75 : through theft; through threat; through fraud; or obtaining 
control through use of social or institutional power. The latter refers to persons that are 
granted power for restricted purposes and use this instead for unauthorized personal gain. For 
example, a procurement official can award a public contract to the company with the best 
offer (granted power for restricted purposes) but instead awards the public contract to the 
company that bribes (use of granted power for unauthorised personal gain). The wrongful 
obtaining of property or personal interest of others means in this case that the offender uses 
its power for restricted purposes in prohibited ways.  
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The definition of corruption most commonly used by international organizations, 
governments, academia and civil society is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain76.  
This definition includes three elements: 
 
-   Corrupt acts occur in the private and public sector; 
-   There is abuse of power held by a public institution or private organization; 
-   The ‘corrupted’ and the ‘corruptor’ benefit from the corrupt act. 
The elements above present challenges when further conceptualising corruption. For 
example, what defines a corrupt act and when is such an act an abuse of power? It also raises 
questions on who are the offenders or the victims? For example, there might be a fine line 
between what is considered a bribe or a legitimate exchange of money for a service or a gift. 
From a legal perspective, the difference could depend on whether the consideration for the 
payment is considered forbidden by law. In addition, there might be moral concerns in 
relation to legal behaviour. Another question for debate is the line between private versus 
public gain. For example, an authority could manipulate a procurement process to favour a 
local instead of a foreign company. This raises the question whether this is corrupt or not. 
After all, the official might not act for private gain but rather for the interest of the local 
economy. Finally, one should also consider unintended behaviour, which could be against the 
rules. For example, the procurement official might not be aware of the fact that certain 
behaviour is corrupt or can result in corruption allegations. In other words, there is a fine line 
between intended and unintended corrupt behaviour, especially considering that people can 
make honest mistakes.  
 
Karstedt and Farral (2006) point to the grey zone of legality versus morality, seen for 
example between aggressive tax planning and illegal tax evasion77. They also point out that 
the public shares moral intuitions that allow for widely held justifications, such as the 
common argument “everybody does it”. The difference between right and wrong can cause, 
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according to Karstedt and Farral, for uninhibited discussions of such behaviour among 
relatives and friends. Kaufmann and Vicente (2005) describe that corruption includes 
collusion between public and private sector players and that may be illegal versus legal78. For 
example, they explain that “legal lobbying contributions by the private sector in exchange of 
passage of particular legislation – biased in favour of those agents – or allocation of 
procurement contracts may be regarded as example of interaction of both private and public 
sector representatives, where the second makes use of her publicly invested power at the 
expense of broader public welfare”79.  
 
Anti-corruption rules as a response to undesired behaviour help determining right from 
wrong. Byrne (2007) argues that corrupt behaviour can be seen as the deterioration of self-
regulated behaviour80. However, it focuses on the legality of behaviour rather than on the 
morality. When behaviour does not self-regulate due to low morality, and falls within the 
boundaries of the law, legal forms of corruption could occur. Some scholars warn that these 
forms of corruption might even be more prevalent than illegal forms of behaviour81. Based on 
this, it could be argued that rather than only creating laws against corruption, also cultural 
changes should be promoted in order to address the problem. A key concept here is for 
example the promotion of ethical leadership and professionalism.  
 
Zimring and Johnson (2007) note that despite conceptual and definitional questions 
concerning corruption, most scholars agree that corruption involves deviant behaviour from 
certain standards82. Three principal approaches to defining corruption dominate: the legal 
approach; public interest approach; and public opinion approach.  
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The legal approach defines corruption on the basis of judicial interpretation; in other words, 
an act is only corrupt if prescribed by law. The public interest approach looks at the effects of 
behaviour. This means that an act is corrupt once it is harmful to the public. On the other 
hand this also means that an illegal act that is beneficial to the public is not corrupt. The 
public opinion approach points to the perception of the public to determine whether certain 
behaviour is corrupt. Here a distinction is made between; “black corruption”, meaning it is 
perceived as such by the majority of the elite and the mass; “grey corruption”, meaning only 
some (e.g. the elite) perceive certain behaviour as corrupt; and “white corruption”, meaning 
the majority tolerates certain behaviour.  
 
For the purpose of this study it is important to keep in mind the conceptual differences when 
analysing the approach adopted by civil society organisations to fight corruption in public 
procurement through the Integrity Pact. For example, the civil society organisation 
implementing the Integrity Pact might adopt a strictly legal approach when scrutinizing a 
procurement process. In such a scenario, the added value of the tool compared to the existing 
procurement legal framework can be questionable. However, as an anti-corruption watchdog, 
it might also consider adopting a public opinion approach, which allows for the tool to impact 
behaviour beyond the legal definitions of corrupt behaviour. Most likely, this study will 
identify examples of Integrity Pacts that combine different approaches to define corruption. 
Another potential challenge here is that public opinion might differ from the concept adopted 
by the civil society organisations. For example, citizens could tolerate corrupt behaviour of 
public procurement officials in case a corrupt contract award generates employment.  
 
Further, it is important to consider whether unintended illegal acts fall within the scope of the 
definition for corruption. For example, when a civil society organisation scrutinizes a public 
procurement process and identifies an unintended act that can be considered against the law, 
it needs to respond. Mistakes made in a procurement process can perhaps result in some form 
of liability but arguably are not criminal. It might therefor be reasonable that also civil society 
organizations implementing an Integrity Pact adopt a mens rea approach, which restricts the 
definition of corruption to only intended corruption. But, perhaps just as important is the 
consideration what to do with the damage caused by the corrupt act. As a civil society 
organization one might consider the damage done as a result of the corrupt act to decide how 
and to what extent there must be a response. This is further complicated by the fact that with 
corruption, as opposed to most conventional crimes, it is difficult to identify victims. There 
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might also be cultural factors in place that affect the condemning of some acts differently 
than others.  
   Supply and demand-side of corruption 
Corruption scandals often point to bribed-elected officials or embezzling civil servants. 
However, the reciprocity that characterises corruption transactions also implies that someone 
paid or offered the bribe in exchange for a favour. It is therefor also important to look at the 
supply-side of corruption, often embodied in the form of corporations and its workers. The 
following sections will introduce the concept of white-collar crime and affiliated concepts of 
corporate, governmental and state-corporate crime, each of which allows us to define 
corruption from the perspective of the offenders.  
 
The “father” of white-collar crime studies was the esteemed American criminologist Edwin 
H. Sutherland (1883-1950). In 1939 he introduced the term into literature and since then 
numerous scholars have debated the definition of white-collar crime. Sutherland talked about 
“crime in the upper or white-collar class, composed of respected business and professional 
men”83. He also referred to the “violation of delegated or implied trust”. Besides pointing to 
the damage of white-collar crime, Sutherland importantly advocated for the recognition of 
white-collar crime as a “real” crime and warned for the influence of upper classes on the 
formulation of criminal laws as well as the means white-collar criminals have at their 
disposal to minimize chances of conviction. Since he introduced the concept of white-collar 
crime, more than six decades have passed and numerous closely related terms and concepts 
have been associated to white-collar crime, creating confusion about the definition. Despite 
the confusion, those that study white-collar crime do generally agree that84:  
 
-   It occurs in a legitimate occupational context; 
-   It is motivated by economic gain or occupational success; and  
-   That it is not characterised by direct, intentional violence (as opposed to conventional 
types of crime such as murder or robberies).  
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Types of white-collar crimes can be violent for example when workers or consumers/citizens 
are exposed to harmful conditions or products85. High profile public scandals concern toxic 
waste or air pollution cases, food or pharmaceutical product scams, but also unsafe 
automobiles. Common types of white-collar violence against workers can concern poor 
health and safety conditions on the work floor, which can have deadly consequences. Non-
violent white-collar crimes concern the abuse of power, fraud and economic exploitation86. 
Prevalent types of fraud involving companies concern trade restraints; financial manipulation, 
copyright violations, unfair labour practices, etc. Abuse of power includes corruption of 
political processes through for example bribery. White-collar crimes against the public could 
take the form of tax evasion or unfair obtaining of public contracts. Non-violent crimes 
directed at consumers include price fixing or manipulation, false advertising, etc. Against 
employees, forms of non-violent crimes include economic exploitation, theft from 
employees, or corporate surveillance. Finally, crimes can also affect other competitors for 
example through monopolistic practices, corporate espionage and theft of trade secrets.  
 
For this study, it is relevant to consider three distinct typologies related to white-collar crime 
which include activities relating corruption and focus on the different roles offenders can 
play. These are: corporate crime: governmental crime; and state-corporate crime. 
 
1.   Corporate crime 
From a criminological perspective, corporate crime includes crime committed by a business 
or individuals acting on behalf of a business87. The concept closely interlinks with other types 
of crime such as organized crime, white-collar crime and state-corporate crime88. The types 
of crime share one important commonality, namely the debate on how to address the 
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behaviour associated to the crimes. Different forms of corporate crime include: corporate 
violence; corporate theft; corporate financial manipulation; and corporate political corruption 
or meddling. It is perhaps no surprise that given the diversity and complexity of what 
constitutes corporate crime, countries differ in how they choose to regulate corporate 
offences through criminal or civil law. In addition, some might perceive acts by companies 
and their employees as criminal without these legally being characterized as such. In other 
words, some forms of legal corporate behaviour can also be considered as unethical or 
immoral. Debates on the ethics of corporate behaviour and how to respond to criminal 
behaviour especially became relevant during the recent global economic and financial 
crisis89. This is for example visible when looking at the formation of grass-root movements, 
such as the Occupy Wall Street Movement in the USA90 or the 15-M Movement in Spain91. 
With the financial and economic crisis, fuelled by risk behaviour in the financial and banking 
sectors and political corruption scandals involving public money, the call for more political 
accountability and transparency, less corporate power and the criminalization of corporate 
offenders increased. The crisis exposed the delicate line between legal corporate behaviour 
versus perceived immoral corporate behaviour. 
 
The concept of corporate crime arguably originates from the introduction of white-collar 
crime in 1939 by Sutherland. Sutherland exposed the fact that crime was not only stemming 
solely from the lower social classes but also from persons in higher social and economic 
classes, such as the business sector. The broad definition of white-collar criminals is 
narrowed down when speaking of corporate crime which links the criminal behaviour to 
companies as well as the economic system. Corporate crime according to Clinard and 
Quinney can be defined as “offenses committed by corporate officials for their corporation 
and the offenses of the corporation itself”92. It distinguishes itself from occupational crime in 
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the sense that it concerns mostly crime in the economic interest of the company and involving 
executives from the corporation and/or the corporation itself. Occupational crime goes 
beyond the scope and refers more to crimes committed by persons when exercising their job. 
Corporate crime can involve different types of criminal acts that generally are characterised 
by low detection by law enforcement or visibility for the public. Illegal activities often take 
place within the framework of legal activities. In fact, offenders and victims are not clearly 
identifiable, especially the latter given this is often embodied in a collective of individuals, 
i.e. the public or other companies93. Kagan and Scholz categorize corporate offenders as 
“amoral calculators, who break laws to maximize profit; political citizens, who disagree in 
principle with regulatory rules or laws; and the organizational incompetent, whose law-
breaking is a product of mismanagement and incompetence.94” 
 
2.   Governmental crime 
Violent crimes committed by individuals in the name of the government have caused millions 
of casualties in the last century alone95. Governments as criminal offenders are discerning, 
especially considering that governments are entrusted with power to protect society from 
such behaviour. But crime by governments is not always violent as it can also concern acts 
for political and economic gain. When we speak of governmental crime, the debate on 
legality and illegality of corruption becomes particularly relevant considering it are the 
governments who decide on what is legally constituted corrupt. In other words, when 
considering governments as offenders there is reason to adopt a definition of corruption 
beyond the legal approach. A distinction can be made between state crime, which is carried 
out on behalf of a state agency, or political white-collar crime, which is carried out by 
officials and politicians for direct personal benefit96. It is arguably the latter which best fits 
the EU context. 
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Political white-collar crime can be defined as “governmental or political party officials 
engaging in illegal and improper activity for personal gain” or gain on behalf of political 
parties97. The related activities aim for personal economic enrichment or for certain political 
advantages, such as to gain power of office. The financing of electoral processes and the 
related practices of lobbying are two parts of the political system that promote corruption, 
especially in democracies such as those in EU Member States. Large donations by private 
business to political parties (and candidates) are means to influence legislative decisions 
and/or to obtain lucrative public contracts. The line between a financial contribution (as a 
legal donation imbedding an unspoken understanding) and a bribe (as an illegal payoff for a 
public contract) is diffuse and highlights the importance of defining corruption. Regardless, it 
is in the realm of political white-collar crime, where the concept of political corruption is 
discussed. 
 
3.   State-corporate crime 
The third concept discussed, concerns state-corporate crime, which combines corporate with 
governmental crime. The concept was introduced by Ronald Kramer and Ray Michalowski 
who defined this as “illegal or socially injurious actions that occur when one or more 
institutions or political governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or more 
institutions of economic production and distribution”98. The relevance in the context for this 
study lies in challenges for society to manage complex economic sectors, such as energy and 
health care. In the EU a frequently chosen method for authorities is through public-private 
partnerships. Allowing private players to take part in these sectors could generate more 
economic efficiency given that slow public bureaucracy is substituted for fast profit 
seeking/business management. However, the specific services provided do not always lend 
themselves to market competition involving private players. For example, public utilities 
such as water management are essential for the wellbeing of the public and its distribution 
cannot be arbitrary. Bad governance could obstruct basic service delivery and have 
significant impact on the public trust and welfare. As a consequence there is political interest 
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in the good functioning of these sectors; hence governments resort to a form of interference 
in the markets.   
 
Limiting competition in utilities markets might be necessary but this comes with the risk of 
undue influence on regulatory decisions by the private sector that would want to influence 
these decisions. Excessive private influence could result in decisions taken based on private 
rather than public interests, so-called regulatory capture. This capture could occur before or 
after the laws have been designed. In case the political elite is involved in securing the private 
interest, state capture is at risk. As a consequence of the eminent risk of governance failure in 
case of private-public partnerships, there is need for solid procedures. Supranational 
institutions such as the EU could address this issue.  
 
Concessions contracts are a useful tool to balance the political sensitivity of public utilities 
service delivery with the opportunity to let the free market generate welfare. Its use allows for 
regulating an economic sector in order to protect consumers. However, the concessions 
market is not unfamiliar with irregularities involving undue political influence and collusion. 
The European Commission identified various sectors vulnerable for breaches in competition 
laws, such as the financial, pharmaceutical, energy and telecommunications sectors99. Their 
vulnerability lies in the fact that often some form of government interference is desired. First 
of all, the concession markets, being economies of scale, do not necessarily benefit from 
competition. Secondly, their provided services are essential to society and, thirdly, capital 
investment could depend largely on public funding. For public procurement of utilities, 
transparency is important but above all professionalism to ensure that long-term concession 
contracts are properly managed. Procurement officials need to manage complex processes, 
where close collaboration with the private sector is protracted and the risk of collusion 
increases. As a result, authorities have established specific controls, training and integrity 
mechanisms, such as codes of conduct, to guide officials and prevent corruption. At the same 
time, the private stakeholders involved in providing public services need to uphold the 
expectations of the people. In order to meet these expectations, quality needs to be delivered 
and potential reputations risks avoided. Consequently, companies have increasingly 
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introduced integrity standards, such as codes of conduct, whistleblowing and other 
compliance mechanisms.  
   Between petty, grand and systemic corruption 
As we have seen above, corrupt behaviour can imply the abuse of public power as well as 
private power. Profits from corruption can be kept by offenders (predatory) or shared with 
others (cooperative)100. The motivation of corrupt behaviour can be instrumental or affective. 
The former refers to a direct exchange of power, the latter to an indirect exchange of power. 
For example, a favour is transferred to a close affiliate such as the case for illegal political 
party financing. Common distinction is made between petty corruption, grand corruption and 
systemic or endemic corruption. 
 
1.   Petty corruption 
Petty corruption, also described as administrative corruption, refers to everyday corruption 
that takes place at the bottom of the chain where the civil servant meets the citizen101. Petty 
corruption often occurs at the stage of implementation of laws, rules and regulations. Rose-
Ackermann (2006) refers to low-level corruption that is susceptible to several generic 
situations. For example, in a system where an official has the discretion to assign scarce 
public benefit, but is subject to quality control, a scenario is created in which qualified 
applicants with the highest willingness to pay and the fewest scruples will be able to get the 
benefit. The problem in such a scenario is that qualified applicants with high integrity 
standards are excluded. Transparent competitive bidding processes could tackle such a 
situation by simply selling the benefit to the highest bidder. Another scenario described by 
Rose-Ackermann (2006) refers to a situation in which low-level officials are requested to 
select qualified applicants but are not subject to control. Scarcity of public benefits in this 
case do not matter because without any quality control, the official can allocate in return for a 
bribe the public benefit to both qualified and unqualified applicants. The amount of 
corruption will in such a case depend on whether qualified applicants with integrity are able 
to approach an honest official instead. According to Rose-Ackermann (2006), this scenario 
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can apply to public contracting in which a procurement official can collect bribes in return for 
a public contract. Control over the procurement official is limited as possible negative 
consequences of the transaction might be difficult to detect or will only reveal with time (i.e. 
once a poorly constructed building collapses). Officials collecting bribes might do this purely 
for personal gain and do not share in profits (predatory structures). The third scenario refers 
to the bureaucratic process that can create opportunities for corruption. For example, 
facilitation payments are transfers in which lower-level officials are paid a small amount to 
accelerate a decision for something that the payer would have the right to in any case (i.e. a 
building permit).  
 
2.   Grand corruption and endemic corruption 
The involvement of top-level public officials and members of senior management of 
businesses characterize grand or political corruption. The bribes and financial benefits are 
often bigger but more importantly; the spoils from the corrupt act have greater consequences. 
For example, political corruption might influence the decision-making process during the 
procurement needs assessment stage, which results in unnecessary procurement. There is no 
clear division between where grand corruption begins and petty corruption ends. For 
example, offenders might collect bribes at lower levels and channel these through to high-
level officials or to political party structures (cooperative structures). 
 
Rose-Ackermann (2006) describes how the public sector can be organised as a rent-extraction 
machine through large-scale corrupt systems. For example, top-level officials collaborate 
with one specific company, de facto ensuring a monopoly on the market. At this level there 
could be some form of capture in which it is unclear who is running things. A second 
scenario by Rose-Ackermann concerns corrupt electoral systems in which money determines 
the outcome. Corruption can undermine and circumvent limits on political party financing. 
The third scenario relates to government that can use public procurement as a way to collect 
kickbacks from companies. Apart from procurement of works, goods and services, also 
concession contracts (i.e. for the exploitation of natural resources) are important, as well as 
privatization of state-owned companies.  
 
The levels of grand corruption can become endemic when the state is captured by private 
interest. This brings us to the third classification of corruption, systemic corruption. This is a 
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form integrated as an essential aspect of the political, social and economic system. It is a 
situation in which institutions and processes of the state are used by corruptors on a 
continuous basis. Citizens are regularly confronted with corruption. The groups of corrupt 
decision-makers limit entry into economic activities and bind the interests of economic to 
political actors. Most petty and grand corrupt practices involve sporadic pursuit of private 
economic interest through the political process. In other words, economics corrupt politics. 
Although this can be damaging, systemic corruption´s economic consequences can be bigger. 
Systemically corrupt governments limit access to markets and resources in order to ensure 
survival. By doing so, the interests of the ruling coalition are guaranteed. It destroys markets 
and prevents development. In other words, politics corrupts economics.  
 
Again, here it is uncertain when grand corruption begins and systemic corruption ends. The 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index considers countries endemically 
corrupt when scoring under 50 on a scale from 0 highly corrupt to 100 highly clean. Looking 
at the European Union, differences can be observed between the EU Member States with 
some scoring close to 50 or less. Most score above the 50 threshold, with Slovenia, Spain, 
Czech Republic, Malta, Latvia, Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia scoring between 51 and 60 on 
the 2015 CPI. Greece, Romania, Italy and Bulgaria score between 41 and 50, indicated levels 
of endemic corruption. Concerning petty corruption in Europe, the Transparency 
International Global Corruption Barometer in 2013 gives some insight, indicating that in 
some European Union Member States citizens are paying bribes for public services in the 
education system, judicial system, medical and health services, police, registry and permit 
services, utilities, tax, and land services102. On a global scale, the EU Member States score 
relatively well in the Transparency International perception studies. When looking at the 
National Integrity System Assessments of anti-corruption watchdog, the picture already 
becomes more nuanced, with significant systemic integrity challenges facing EU Member 
States103.  
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   Balancing between legality and illegality 
Various corruption methods are identified throughout this study. The following section 
presents some methods of particular relevance to corruption in public procurement. 
1.   Bribery 
Shichor and Geis (2007) note that key challenges with regard to bribery is that it is 
characterised by reciprocity and almost always a consensual act. Most countries have 
criminalised bribery but the ways bribery is perceived differs across the spectrum. For 
example, some consider bribery morally wrong as it gives one an unfair advantage over the 
other, while others consider bribery merely an economic transaction. Nonetheless, the legal 
definition most commonly used refers to: “”104. 
 
Bribery violates the explicit or implicit trust bestowed upon a public official. Arnold 
Heidenheim distinguishes three bribery categories based on perception in countries 105 . 
“White bribery” refers to acts that are socially tolerated, often seen in societies based on 
family ties and patron-client relationships. “Grey bribery” is generally seen immoral by 
society but not by those offering and receiving payments for a positively unlawful act; the 
imperfect performance of a duty; and failure to perform a required duty the bribes. An 
striking example are facilitation payments. “Black bribery” acts are generally against the law, 
subject to punishment and perceived as such by most. Bribery can be explained by Cloward 
and Ohlin’s differential opportunity theory, which argues that persons need to posses the 
opportunities to influence decisions. Political lobbying, campaign funding and political party 
financing activities show similar characteristics of bribery but are commonly not considered 
illegal.  
 
2.   Political party financing 
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Various international organizations identify political party financing as a serious problem 
area associated with corruption and in particular bribery106. Throughout the EU, examples can 
be found of corruption in public procurement linked to financing of political parties. For 
example, parties seek control over procurement in order to finance themselves. Particular 
weakness lies in private players that seek to gain access to politicians and influence decision-
making, including the awarding of public contracts, through financial donations. Such 
donations are mostly legal and regulated through national party financing legislation. 
Although not explicitly demanding political influence, these donations imbed an implicit 
understanding between the politician and the businessman that in case of decision-making, 
the individual interests are taken into account. When legal donations result in adjudication of 
public contracts this can be considered a bribe. 
 
The fact that companies resort to donating funds to political parties implies a particular 
interest in maintaining political ties and confirms its benefit for private stakeholders. 
However, proving the latter is difficult as the impact of political donations on decision-
making is difficult to measure. When asked, politicians will most likely deny to have taken a 
decision based on private corporate interests. After all, the legal consequences differ when 
accepting illegal donations without specifying the end goal or accepting illegal donations in 
return for a specific public contract. The prior can be considered as fiscal fraud, while the 
latter as bribery, generally a more serious crime. The same counts for procurement officials 
whom would most likely claim to have based their decisions on technical criteria and for the 
welfare of the general public.  
 
3.   Lobbying activities 
The excessive influence of lobby groups could influence decision-making in favour of private 
interest to the expense of public welfare. Lobbying can also result in bias adjudication of 
public contracts, which could undermine procurement objectives such as value for money, 
effectiveness and efficiency and competition. Due to being part of the democratic process, 
lobby activities are often considered according to the law. However, public perception 
towards lobbying can be negative in which citizens see this as unethical and corrupt 
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behaviour. Some international organisations have linked excessive lobbying activities of the 
financial institutions in order to promote risk-lending practices to the origin of today´s 
economic and financial crisis107. 
 
Since the establishing of the European Single Market, lobbying activities have increased 
significantly in the EU108. While the EU´s competencies augmented to policy areas relating 
health, employment, environment, and consumer protection, the interest of the private 
economic operators to influence decision-making intensified. Estimated figures place over 
5,000 special interest groups and 15,000 lobbyists in Brussels. The majority represent 
business and only one-fifth represent citizens and public organisations. The EU decision-
making lends itself to lobbying as regulatory bodies rely on technical information from third 
parties due to relatively small budgets and sparse numbers of staff as well as the geographical 
spread of the Member States. Besides, EU decision-making is structurally complex and 
fragmented which provides for multiple channels to influence decision-making.  
4.2   Causes of corruption 
In line with the definitional problems when describing corruption, measuring the scale, and 
determining the methods of corruption, also different research perspectives aim to explain the 
causes of corruption. One dominant approach to studying corruption is the principal-agent 
theory, which emphasises rational choice of individuals. This approach has hence dominated 
the anti-corruption strategies adopted during the last decades, especially by the international 
                                                            
 
107 OECD (n.d.). Fighting corruption in the public sector: Lobbying. [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/lobbying.htm [Accessed 3-06-2013]. 
108 See for example: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2015). Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, 
privileged Access [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/lobbying_in_europe [Accessed on 14-10-2016]. 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL EU (n.d.). EU Lobbying [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/focus_areas/lobbying-the-eu/ [Accessed on 14-07-2016]. 
LOBBYFACTS.EU (n.d.). Lobbyfacts.eu [WWW]. Available from: https://lobbyfacts.eu/ [Accessed on 12-10-
2016]. 
CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY (n.d.). The power of lobbies [WWW]. Available from: 
https://corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies [Accessed on 12-10-2106]. 
  
 
71 
community109. However, failure to address (especially systemic) corruption has shifted the 
debate pointing to corruption as a collective action problem. The main point of discussion is 
the assumption of principal-agent theories that there are “principled principles” that are 
willing to hold agents accountable. This is contested by collective action theories that refer to 
systemic corruption scenarios in which principles can share in the proceeds of corruption or 
are simply indifferent about the issue. The lack of normative constraints implies that existing 
societal norms supporting ethical universalism do not work110. Normative constraints endorse 
ethical universalism and permanently and effectively monitor deviation from norms. Instead, 
with the lack of “principled principles”, particularism creates a scenario in which allocation 
of public resources is based on a connection between the one in power and the one receiving 
the public goods. For the purpose of this study it is important to consider both the principle-
agent theory as well as collective action in an EU context. We could argue that the two 
approaches are not incompatible especially when aiming to address corruption as a cross-
border problem in the EU. It is safe to say that the diversity in the EU makes that there is no 
one-size-fits-all solution to corruption. However anti-corruption measures based on 
principle–agent might work for some countries suffering less political corruption (for 
example northern European countries), while collective action initiatives are more adequate 
for others suffering more systemic forms of corruption (for example eastern European 
countries). 
 
This section will start by discussing the main approaches that aim to explain criminal 
behaviour. By considering the social processes that lead to white-collar criminal behaviour, 
we should be able to better understand the two dominant approaches to anti-corruption. First, 
the relation between white-collar crime and corruption will be discussed. Studying white-
collar crime will help us to look apart from the demand-side of corruption (which focuses 
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strongly on the public sector and its institutional structure) also at the supply-side of 
corruption (which places emphasis on corporate criminal behaviour). For the purpose of 
looking at procurement corruption it is important to understand why and how companies and 
their workers come to collude or bribe officials for public contracts. It is also the research on 
criminal behaviour that takes the leap between micro and macro levels to meso levels of 
analysis. This allows us to better situate the debate between the principal-agent and collective 
actions theories to explain corruption. 
   Social processes leading to corruption 
For criminologists, corruption crime falls within the research area of white-collar crime. 
Since the initial introduction of the concept of white-collar crime by Edwin H. Sutherland 
(1883-1950), a variety of closely-related concepts have been discussed by criminologists, 
such as: corporate crime, occupational crime, governmental crime, state-corporate crime, and 
contrepreneurial crime, etc.… According to Zimring and Johnson (2007), research on white-
collar crime can be relevant to the study of corruption given similarities between crimes and 
its offenders, as well as from the fact that both white-collar crime and corruption suffer 
research challenges when trying to define concepts111.  
 
Gobert and Punch (2003) note that a company can provide the context, opportunities, means 
and incentives for criminal behaviour. For example, political party donations or active lobby 
activities of companies to influence legislators give reason to believe that companies aim to 
control the legal and regulatory environment in which they operate. The opportunities to 
deviate are created in a business environment that constantly tries to explore new market 
opportunities created by regulatory weaknesses 112 , such as those in public procurement 
legislation. Conventional crimes (for example burglary or assault) are considered more 
accessible for larger groups of people (such as groups of young people), require for many 
types a limited skill set or planning, and can be rather opportunistic in nature113. Corporate 
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crimes on the other hand are often restricted to a selection of white-collar executives that are 
in a position within the company to exploit unique opportunities 114 . Sutherland (1947) 
developed the social processing theory of differential association115. This theory suggests that 
white-collar workers operate in an environment that provides learning opportunities for law-
breaking behaviour. Whether persons adopt criminal behaviour, when associated with other 
persons that show such behaviour, depends on factors such as the intensity, frequency, and 
duration of contact. The intensity, frequency, and duration of contact between the persons 
allows for an environment in which techniques are learned on how to commit criminal acts. 
The American psychologist, B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) adds to this the social process theory 
of operant learning. This refers to criminal behaviour that is learned and continues if there are 
no negative consequences (such as punishment) that outweigh the positive consequences 
(such as economic gain or the approval of the business environment in which one operates). 
Negative consequences can break a pattern of deviant behaviour. The operant learning theory 
also can be linked to repeat offenders as the absence of identifiable consequences can lead to 
operant behaviour. For corruption this would mean that once it goes unnoticed there is reason 
to believe the pattern will not be broken and behaviour does not self-regulate. A limitation to 
the social learning and process theories according to Goode (2008) is that learning criminal 
behaviour through the interaction with others does not address criminal behaviour of those 
that act on an individual basis, nor the fact that white-collar criminals might in other walks of 
life behave in line with the law116. According to Geis and Goff (1987), it does neither address 
the structural origin or cause of criminal behaviour, but rather focuses on the process of 
involvement in such behaviour117. 
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This brings me to the theory of anomie developed by Robert Merton (1957)118. Merton’s 
theory builds on Émile Durkheim’s concept of anomie, which refers to social instability 
caused by the erosion of standards and values. Merton refers to societal situations in which 
material success is promoted but means to achieve this are not equally accessible for all. As a 
consequence, some pursue material success through criminal behaviour. For example, this 
has been observed for former Soviet states in Eastern Europe that made the transition from 
communism to free-market based economies119. The sometimes-chaotic societal change in 
those countries, in combination with opportunities to plunder public assets and total lack of 
regulation or control, resulted in ‘innovative’ ways (such as corruption, fraud and 
embezzlement) for white-collar criminals to enrich. Anomie could explain why companies 
resort to illegal means to achieve goals that cannot be achieved legally. However, Merton’s 
theory is challenged by the fact that white-collar criminals often do have the means to 
achieve the desired societal goals and therefor fall outside of the scope of his explanation 
which seems more suited for explaining crime of socio-economically lower classes that want 
to achieve wealth.  
  
The economic (general) strain theory has also been used to explain behaviour of corporations 
that resort to criminal behaviour under economic pressure in a climate of competition. Apart 
from the need to economically perform to survive, Robert Agnew’s (1992) strain theory also 
explains more emotional decisions to drive for criminal behaviour, for example when 
companies resort to crime due to stress they experience from competitors120. Such a scenario 
could be present when looking at the integration of the EU single market.  Finally, Lilly, 
Cullen and Ball (2011) refer to a breakdown of conventional behaviour in times of rapid 
social change 121 . This brings us to the debates concerning the question why normal 
counteracting forces in the private or public sector environments do not prevent persons from 
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committing corruption crimes. Grasham Sykes and David Matza (1957) remind us that 
offenders are generally accepting of social norms and values but deviate under certain 
circumstances 122 . This way people rationalise criminal behaviour based on good self-
perception. Vaughan (2007) refers to normalization of deviance, which shows a pattern of 
behaviour that is perhaps perceived by outsiders as wrong but not in the eyes of those taking 
decisions123. The difference with Sykes and Matza’s views here is that the offenders are not 
justifying behaviour they know is wrong, but actually belief what they do is right until it 
backfires. “Deviant actions are viewed as normal because they fit with and conform to 
cultural mandates of the group to which the actor belongs” 124. Sykes and Matza’s techniques 
of neutralization are supposed to follow the differential association patterns by Sutherland 
and distinguish five types: denial of responsibility; denial of substantial harm; denial of 
victimization; condemnation of law enforcement; and invocation of higher principles. 
Techniques of neutralization are in a sense counter to the theory of delinquent subculture, 
which argues that criminals have their own values and rules that differ from the rest of 
society125. While their focus is primarily on conventional crime, Steven Box (1983) looked at 
the corporate environment and argued that offenders could deny responsibility by claiming 
ambiguity in the law, arguing the act was accidental or shifting blame to third parties126. In 
addition, Box notes that corporate offenders might argue that their acts are economically 
beneficial and deny any victims exist as a result of their behaviour. Alternatively, 
corporations might criticise the law and law enforcement by claiming this goes against the 
rules of the free market. Finally, Box argues that corporate offenders might use the 
neutralization technique of invoking ‘higher loyalties’; such as affirming they service the 
needs of the corporation and its stockholders. Engaging in such techniques serves to facilitate 
the creation of sub-culture behaviour, which according to Shover and Hochstetler (2006), can 
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be described as a culture of non-compliance127. The type of rationalisation used by offenders 
might differ per offense type.  
 
Cloward and Ohlin (1960) present the differential opportunity theory, which sees criminal 
behaviour in function of the structure of opportunity 128 . To this end, the Australian 
criminologist John Braithwaite (1992) added to this that especially white-collar criminals 
have in addition the skills to create such opportunities129. This touches upon the conception 
that white-collar crime is a response to a situation in which benefits of crime outweigh 
behaving within the boundaries of the law. In turn, this reflects on the regulatory 
environment, which aims to ensure corporate compliance. This environment adds to the 
socialization of opportunities also the fact that regulations, and in particular the threat of 
punishment, influence criminal opportunity.  
 
Control theorists use a different lens to explain corporate criminal behaviour. Their focus 
shifts to questioning why persons do not commit a crime in spite of the right opportunity. The 
influential American sociologist, Travis Hirschi and his social control theory has been used to 
explain how persons with strong attachment to others, commitment to achievement, 
involvement in conventional activities, and belief in moral validity of rules, are restrained 
from engaging in criminal activity130. The belief component is criticised when looking at 
white-collar crime, especially in relation with the culture of non-compliance. If criminal 
behaviour is part of the culture within a business environment, the moral rationality of the 
law is constantly violated. In addition, people perceive the gravity of crime types differently, 
for example between economic crimes and violent crimes. Also between corporate offenders 
and the general public there are differences in perception. As discussed earlier in this study, 
the difference between illegal and unethical behaviour is blurry. Hirschi, together with 
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Gottfredson, later developed the theory of self-control, which argues that low self-control 
causes persons to commit crimes (1989) 131. Charles Tittle (1995) ads to this that also too 
much control can lead to crime and therefor control should be balanced132. Tittle’s control 
balance ratio refers to the amount of exercised control versus the amount of imposed control. 
Both a surplus and a deficit could cause criminal behaviour. This can be related to the 
scenario described by Rose-Ackerman concerning the bureaucratic process. 
 
Finally, it is important to address the economic theory of crime in which the rational choice 
model embodies a commonly accepted explanation of human criminal behaviour133. Criminal 
offenders are seen to plan and reason, adapt to circumstances and weigh benefits against 
costs. The low likelihood of sanctions in combination with high-expected gains increases the 
likelihood of criminal behaviour. The rational choice model for criminal justice originates in 
the work of Italian nobleman Cesare Beccaria (1974), as well as the English Philosopher 
Jeremy Benthem (1789) who developed the utilitarian view that people engage in a calculus 
to maximise profits and minimize pain. More recent use of the model comes from Gary 
Becker (1968) who argues that there is no difference between criminal and noncriminal 
behaviour and that the main reason to choose one or the other relates to the costs-benefit 
calculus. A subtype of the rational choice model is deterrence, which argues that criminal 
behaviour is inhibited due to the possible punishment that is associated with this. While 
deterrence in the time of Beccaria and Bentham looked at the threat of legal punishment, 
modern day deterrence also looks at informal types. Formal punishments include fines, and 
imprisonment while informal punishments could include shame, guilty feelings and 
embarrassment.  
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In the range of theories presented above; although they each offer an explanation by which to 
explain behaviour of white-collar crime, not only do they vary in their scope and testability 
but it is clear that no one theory fits all solutions to combatting corruption. As Vaughan 
(2015) points out, “in the historical trajectory of theories of cause in the sociology of crime 
and deviance […], each theory of cause suggested a particular strategy of control that 
targeted the causal elements identified in that theory” 134. Regardless of this, Vaughan does 
note that strategies for control of white-collar crime should target the causes of a problem. 
Responses may address social control, opportunistic structures or cognitive states135 . In 
addition, the response to white-collar crime, as with most crimes, run the gambit of being 
preventative in orientation; creating regulatory controls, or attempting to apply punitive 
sanctions against corporate offenders. Arguably, the approach against corruption should 
include a variety of measures, together aiming to reduce the motivation for committing the 
act, address the conditions that provide for opportunity and promote a moral climate that does 
not tolerate such behaviour136. 
   Principal-agent perspective on corruption 
From the macro- and micro-level connections, we now add meso-levels of analysis to better 
understand the causes of corruption. Diane Vaughan argues that “a social actor’s position in 
a structure affects that actor’s understandings, choices, actions, and outcomes” 137. Vaughan 
in particular refers to new institutionalism and the socially embedded character of economic 
action as key theoretical approaches to better understanding this context. The social actor 
could be an individual, organisation or network; the structure could be the social actor’s 
location such as its occupation or institutional environment. When introducing the concept 
‘white-collar crime’, Sutherland focused on individuals of high status and this way turned 
away the focus from the organisations as violators. Not until the 1960s, this turned when 
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Albert Reiss (1966) initiated the concept of organizational deviance138. Christopher Stone’s 
work was important for initiating the concept corporate social responsibility, in which he took 
into account complete organizational structures. The work of Sally Simpson139, as well as that 
of Marchall Clinard and Peter Yeager140, looked at violations and industries. These, and 
other, scholars have since tried to understand the criminal decision-making of people in their 
organisational roles. People, who are well-educated, have opportunities and are generally 
law-abiding citizens.  
 
Corruption is generally seen as a social phenomenon but originates from the decision of 
individuals, groups of individuals and institutions. In order to understand corruption in public 
procurement, the following section will outline the theoretical framework from an 
organizational angle, which with an eye on EU economic, political and institutional 
integration is of relevance.  
 
1.   Institutionalism 
After the Second World War the study of political science through a behavioural or rational-
choice approach gained ground. The shift originated from criticism on studying the formal 
institutional structures in a comparative perspective, an approach coined “old-
institutionalism”. This approach studied the legal and administrative structures of 
governments with as a primary objective to provide an explanation of its functioning and to 
what degree it lived up to democratic norms141. However, the approach failed to address more 
informal relations between the institutions and the government. It failed to understand the 
behaviour of institutions and in particular that of the individuals inside them. 
 
After several decades of dominant behavioural and rational-choice political science research, 
institutions found their way back. A new approach to institutional behaviour was promoted 
                                                            
 
138 REISS, A.J. (1966). The study of deviant behaviour: where the action is. Ohio Valley Sociologist 21, 1966, 
pp- 60-66. 
139 SIMPSON, S. (1986). The Decomposition of Anti-Trust: Testing a Multi-level Longitudinal Model of Profit 
Squeeze,” American Sociological Review 51, 1986, pp. 859–79. 
140 MARSHALL, B., CLINARD and Yeager, P.C. (1980). Corporate Crime. New York: Free Press. 
141 RHODES, R. (1995). The Institutional Approach, in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds). Theory and Methods in 
Political Science, London: Macmillan. 
  
 
80 
on the outset of the economic crisis in the 1980s. This approach was coined “new-
institutionalism”. Especially the different ways the countries responded to the challenges 
posed by the crisis could be explained by institutional factors142. More importantly, scholars 
reckoned the increasing importance (and complexity) to collective life of social, political and 
economic institutions143. European integration could be seen as a core instigator for this.  
 
Numerous scholars have recognised reinstating the institution as an essential variable in 
understanding economic development and the functioning of the political system since.144 
Also the World Bank recognized that the function of norms and rules on the state level and 
the organisations that implement them are key for economic development and social 
cohesion.  
 
Three dominant (and for this study relevant) schools of new institutionalism emerged, namely 
the normative, rational-choice and historical. Normative and sociological institutionalists 
emphasise the “shaping role” of institutions, which follows a perspective in which 
participating actors base their decisions on the appropriateness of the response to the given 
situation. March and Olsen (1984) refer to this as the “logic of appropriateness”145. It parts 
from an open-ended approach to defining the preferences of the participating actors. Despite 
institutional constraints, the actors do have the ability to take decisions. This way normative 
institutionalism in a sense takes rationality serious by permitting the identification of 
preferences through rational but embedded models. However, the ways in which to make 
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decisions differs. For the normative institutionalism it is important to understand the ideas 
which lie at the cause of certain behaviour and to understand why certain decisions are 
preferred over others.  
 
An important concept in historical institutionalism is so-called “path dependence”. This 
concept is crucial in understanding European integration and with this the designed regulation 
relating public procurement. Path dependence originates from the historical approach in 
which conditions under which a trajectory has developed have been essential in shaping its 
path146. In other words, once actors have ventured down a road, they find it difficult (if not 
impossible) to turn back. For example, an economic crisis in relation with political disparity 
but bureaucratic unity results in steps towards European integration rather than 
fragmentation.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that behaviour and decisions of the actors are 
rational. Their behaviour is selfish and self-interested. Their preferences are determined by 
the institutional context in which their choices are taken. The institution functions as a 
structure that provides incentives or disincentives for certain choices based on its formal and 
informal rules. Institutions do not only cause certain behaviour but also are an effect of 
behaviour. They are shaped and changed according to the selfish needs of the participating 
actors. Historical institutionalists contest this notion by questioning the likelihood of 
participating actors having influence on the shaping of institutions 147 . They argue that 
individuals are embedded in many social, economic and political relationships and that it is 
beyond their control to be rational. In other words, their rationality is dependent on the 
environment. 
 
The importance of rational choice institutionalism for studying corruption lies in its reference 
to institutions reducing transaction or information costs associated with market functioning. 
Also, institutions can support contract enforcement and monitoring and this way avoiding 
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that corporations withdraw from the open economy into the shadow economy 148 . An 
important related concept is the principal agent model.  
 
This model adopts that a “principal” enters into an agreement (contractual) with an “agent”. 
Responsibility is delegated to the agent whom fulfils an important role for the principal. The 
power that comes with this could cause problems as the agent might accumulate 
disproportionate amounts of information. As a consequence the agent could enter into self-
interested behaviour conflicting with the principal. The question is now how this behaviour 
can be controlled. The principal-agent model of corruption falls under the neo-institutional 
economical theories. It parts from the notion that institutional factors affect the decisions of 
individuals. Institutions structure and bound the decisions made by individuals, in other 
words, collectively bind the working rules. Within neo-institutional economics, this translates 
to three branches: the property rights branch; transaction costs branch; principal-agent 
branch. 
 
The property rights branch refers to the notion that individuals base their economic decisions 
on the existing property rights of the goods. Institutions include these rights and provide 
individuals with means to defend themselves against possible infringements. The transaction 
costs branch refers to costs involved when allocating resources as well as the structure of 
economic organisation. Such costs can be incurred ex ante when negotiating an agreement or 
ex post when executing the contract. This concept will be further explained after which the 
principal-agent approach to corruption will be discussed in more detail. 
 
2.   Transaction costs branch 
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) shows that there is a correlation between “red tape” and 
corruption as well as trade barriers and corruption149. According to her research, excessive 
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regulation facilitates administrative discretion and this way corrupt behaviour. The countries 
in the EU that score low on control of corruption, according to the World Bank Governance 
Indicators, score at the same time worse in the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development index on ease of doing business. The same counts for data concerning control 
of corruption and time to import based on data from the World Bank. This brings us to the 
bargaining model of bribery described by Fisman and Gatti150. It considers that a bargaining 
situation occurs between a businessman and a public official. The former is confronted with a 
number of regulatory requirements, which bear certain costs. Such regulatory requirements 
could be, for example, upholding social and environmental standards. The company could 
either comply with these requirements or pay a bribe in order to avoid them. The official 
might be able to skew the regulation without bearing any costs. In other words, a bribe 
agreement between the official and the company benefits both parties. However, important is 
the time spent on negotiating the bribe. Time costs will most likely be lower in some 
bureaucracies given that the time spend to come to such an agreement is less. On the other 
hand, negotiations could also be complicated by the fact that companies function as 
economies of scale and therefore seek operational efficiency. However, as shown by the data 
from Mungiu-Pippidi, excessive “red tape” does correlate with high levels of corruption. 
Such barriers force businesses to operate outside the official economy.   
 
The costs of exchange refer to the opportunity costs (such as money, time and goods) of an 
individual to obtain a specific good using a given form of exchange within a given 
institutional setting. These costs could be non-market oriented and refer to resources spent in 
cutting “red tape” and bribing officials. Lambsdorff (2002) details how this behaviour results 
from151:  
 
-   Searching for the appropriate partner; and  
-   Designing an enforceable contract that will minimize opportunistic behaviour during and 
after the corrupt transaction.  
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The latter is of special importance as it refers to the increasing interdependence between the 
corrupted and corruptor. 
 
Lambsdorff (2002) distinguishes between market corruption and parochial corruption152. The 
former qualifies as a competitive form with relatively high transparency. The associated 
relations often focus on petty corrupt acts between contractors. Actors that want to commit 
illegal practices, such as facilitation payments for a speedy delivery of a building permit. 
They are confronted with transparent price systems and the opportunity to choose between 
suppliers of the adequate service153. Parochial corruption does not foresee in a simple choice 
of contractors. It experiences limited entry and exit and therefore choosing a partner in crime 
is a careful process. Consequently the transaction costs for parochial corruption are higher. Its 
process limits competition given that “the number of contractors sought can be assumed to be 
optimal once the marginal transaction costs of searching for another partner are equal to the 
expected gains resulting from a potential better deal with another competitor” 154. With 
higher costs, less potential partners will be sought. After all, efforts are required to search for 
potential partners and carefully explore their willingness to engage in corrupt business. 
 
According to Lambsdorff (2002), three stages exist where transaction costs can arise155. First, 
the stage in which information concerning the required service is gathered in order to initiate 
the contract. At this point no resources are allocated yet and therefore the proceeds cannot yet 
be collected. Second, arrangements have to be made regarding the execution and enforcement 
of the contract. Thirdly, as opposed to legal business dealings, the transaction is not finished 
after the service has been delivered. The corrupt act binds the parties as both posses 
damaging information on the other.  
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In the first stage, two parts to initiating the contract are identified, namely seeking the partner 
and determining contract conditions156 . As mentioned above, the process of seeking an 
adequate partner is difficult. First of all, the partner needs to possess the qualities to actually 
deliver the required goods or services. Especially when dealing with public contracts there is 
a sense of public and political sensitivity towards the output of the project. This process does 
not necessarily have to be discrete and can be transparent. However, as mentioned before, 
when illicit benefits are sought, the search for a limited group of potential partners might be 
preferred as this ensures that the marginal transaction costs do not outweigh the expected 
gains. Secondly, as soon as the potential partners are identified, one has to find out whether 
they are willing to engage in corrupt behaviour. In other words, do they want to provide the 
service in return for a favour? This process is delicate as direct inquiry can be precarious 
given that partners can decide to denounce the request. As opposed to the first step in seeking 
a partner, this process needs to be done discretely. After all, one cannot publicly advertise a 
request for corrupt behaviour. This highlights once more the opaque nature of corruption. 
Disseminating the request for corrupt arrangements needs to be disguised. A common 
practice is the use of middlemen or companies that enjoy a high level of trust. The latter is 
common given it highlights the opportunism of corruption. Already established legal 
arrangements could develop into illegal arrangements. 
 
The process of determining the contract conditions is the second part of the initiation of the 
corrupt arrangement. It highlights, for example, the complexity of establishing an adequate 
value of the bribe. Blowing the whistle on corruption could be beneficial for one´s reputation, 
especially when the gain of the offered bribe is too little. Another reason for blowing the 
whistle could be the risk of detection. When this is higher than the potential proceeds of the 
corrupt act, one could be deterred from entering into the agreement and even denounce the 
offering. Apart from establishing the value of the bribe, it is also important to agree on the 
type, for example a gift, trip or money. The type of bribe is important when looking at the 
public perception. Some societies are more lenient towards travels, gifts, etc. than towards 
money as a type of bribe. Also the window-dressing of the bribe is essential. It makes 
investigation and prosecution difficult when the bribe is not being specified. Besides, instead 
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of a money gift, one could decide to grant a loan with favourable conditions. For example, 
this practice can be seen with donations or loans to political parties in order to circumvent 
legislative party financing requirements. Finally, when deciding on the contract conditions it 
is important for the parties to decide upon the enforceability of the contract. After all, a 
conflict concerning a bribe cannot be adjudicated in court. This brings us to the second stage 
on the enforcement of corrupt contracts. 
 
In the second stage, public procurement is subject to a process with different procedures. 
Corruption tends to extend throughout the process and the act often cannot be reduced to a 
specific effort in time. In other words, the corrupt service may be continuous or needs to be 
expanded, meaning possible additional bribes are needed or parties to the scheme decide to 
default on their obligations. So how can one secure corrupt arrangements? Lambsdorff (2002) 
identifies various mechanisms157: legal enforcement; hostages; reputation; repetition; vertical 
integration; and social embeddedness. In case parties engaging in corrupt arrangements do 
not need to fear prosecutions, they might opt for the use of legal institutions in enforcing 
contracts. This could be the case in societies with politicized and/or corrupt judiciary systems 
or when legislation is insufficient or poorly implemented. An example is the legal 
enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Another reason to opt for legal 
enforcement is when no concrete evidence is kept on the corrupt arrangement. When legal 
ways are void in enforcing corrupt contracts, parties need to ensure these arrangements are 
self-enforcing. “Hostages” are seen as an instrument to facilitate this. For example, Actor A 
transfers a valuable asset to Actor B in order to ensure that Actor A does not benefit from 
dropping out of the arrangement. In case the corrupt contract is infringed, Actor B keeps the 
assets. It functions as a sort of threat and resembles forms of down payments. Public 
procurement tends to be vulnerable to these practices as it concerns public funds. This is 
because the down payment is made to a corrupt company, covering risks for this actor, after 
which a commission is forwarded to the corrupt official, subsequently covering their risk. In 
other words, both corrupt parties benefit from this arrangement while with public money the 
third party (society) carries the risk of non-compliance with contractual obligations. The third 
mechanism, “reputation”, concerns the benefit of honesty when being corrupt. Ironically, 
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corrupt actors that are trustworthy and not opportunistic in the execution of their contracts 
tend to be good partners for corruption158. The opposite behaviour might generate a bad 
reputation and jeopardise future contracts. It is therefore argued that honesty might actually 
reinforce corrupt behaviour and that rather weak morality lies at the core of its cause. In other 
words, “a negative attitude towards opportunism and a positive attitude towards reciprocity 
could promote corruption more than it helps to inhibit it”159. It sure does strengthen the 
enforcement of corrupt contracts. The fourth mechanism concerns repetition of arrangements 
with partners that have proven to be trustworthy and willing to engage in corrupt behaviour in 
the past. The mere threat of cancelling future collaboration avoids opportunism from partners. 
Especially long-standing relations including economic sectors with limited competition (such 
as the utilities markets) are vulnerable for these deterrents. “Vertical integration” is a 
mechanism in which the actors design common ownership over contracts. For example, 
politicians are given an option to buy shares in a joint-venture with public contracts. Both 
partners in a corrupt arrangement are this way inclined to follow the terms in order to ensure 
profits. Similar as with repetition as an enforcement mechanism, also here concession 
industries are vulnerable to such organisational structures. Finally, “social embeddedness” 
refers to the hierarchical relationships and ownership structures that serve as safeguards 
against opportunism. The more partners within one´s organization are involved, the more 
likely opportunism is avoided as these individuals are automatically relying on each other for 
future business160. The social structures of individuals are essential and could be identified as 
a business, family, political party or organised crime groups. The latter is of particular 
importance due to its capability to resort to violence in order to avoid opportunism. 
 
The third and last stage of the transaction costs model described by Lambsdorff (2002) refers 
to the post-contract relations. The previous stages deal with mechanisms to enforce the 
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execution of corrupt contracts. However, as soon as a contract is finalized, the relation 
between the two actors does not end, contrary to normal legal contracts. Both actors became 
mutually dependent as they can still be judicially pursued for their corrupt acts. As a 
consequence the parties possess the power to denounce the other for their own benefit161. The 
reasons for denouncing a corrupt act vary. One could resort to blowing the whistle in case 
this person has notion of the corrupt arrangement but has no risk of prosecution. Another 
reason could be out of revenge for wrongdoing that was stowed upon the person. But not only 
blowing the whistle might have an advantage for a corrupt party, also threatening to blow the 
whistle. This could be used to extort the other party. On top of that, some actors, such as 
media corporations, are willing to pay money for information. Also, prosecutors could 
provide immunity in return for witness testimonies. An important concept in the post-contract 
stage is the ‘asymmetric dependency’ of the partners. This means that the potential damage of 
getting caught might be bigger for one party than for the other. An effect of this might be that 
one party is placed at the other party´s mercy. For example, when a public official accepts a 
first gift from a businessman, a subsequent request for a favour is difficult to refuse. After all, 
the initial acceptance of the gift could be used against the official to spread allegations of 
further misconduct.  
 
3.   Principal-agent branch 
The principal-agent theory stems from the assumption that the agent and principal have 
diverging interests and the former has more information that the latter, which is called 
“information asymmetry”. The agent is required to provide certain services on behalf of the 
principal. The latter delegates authority to the former. A recurring problem is the case in 
which divergence arises between the two actor´s interest due to the agent seeking to 
maximize utility. This “moral hazard” reflects the main problem. The discretion enjoyed by 
the agent could generate asymmetric possession of information, which might conflict with the 
principle´s interests. The principle in turn can prescribe the rules against which the agent 
needs to operate.  
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The principal-agent problem can occur between the public (principles) and public officials 
(agents) but also between the politicians (principles) and civil servants (agents). The 
particular importance of the principle-agent model for this study relates to accountability 
mechanisms that avoid corruption. Public officials (agent) receive the authority from elected 
officials (principle) to allocate resources through formal procurement procedures. In order to 
provide this service a certain level of professionalism from the public authorities is required. 
The benefit for the elected official is that their political activity expands when permitting 
professional bureaucrats to formulate policies for which they themselves do not possess the 
knowledge and understanding 162 . Absence of control of public officials increases the 
likelihood of them including personal preferences in decision-making. The challenge is 
therefore to implement control mechanisms that do not increase the costs for the principle to 
the extent that these outweigh the benefits of using agents. 
 
Defining obligations and duties of agents is best done through procedural requirements. It is a 
form of ex ante control aiming to uphold the objectives set for the respective policy or 
provided service. Such mechanisms reduce opportunities for incompetency, either 
intentionally or unintentionally. Procedural requirements can be standard-setting or rule-
based163. The former allows an agent to meet the objectives in alignment with the situation. 
The latter is more rigid of nature and sets in advance the required conduct for officials in 
order to respond to certain situations. It leaves no discretion to the agent and it could be 
argued that it leaves little room for misconduct.  
 
Ex post control can be in the form of direct principle oversight over the agent. An example is 
parliamentary oversight through hearings, investigations and sanctions or oversight through 
the appointment of a supervisory committee. Most commonly the ex post control is executed 
by the judiciary if all other mechanisms are exhausted. Direct supervision from a ministry or 
parliament has as strength its public legitimacy as well as power to sanction effectively. Its 
main weakness lies in the risk of undue influence from pressure groups affecting their 
supervision over agents. The control by committees partially solves this problem as these 
enjoy a certain level of independence. Also these bodies are more professionalized as their 
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focus is more narrowed down than for example is the case for politicians. A supervisory 
committee could be internally or externally set up. A risk for using internal supervisory 
bodies is that a similar principle-agent relation evolves. Judicial control is mainly used after 
all other mechanisms failed. Its strength is the independence, however often the courts can 
only act upon request and are therefor more reactive rather than proactive. Their working 
methods do address an important risk of the principle-agent model, namely the asymmetric 
information aspect. After all, courts examine all the sides of the coin when adjudicating a 
case. 
 
The dominance of the principle-agent theory in corruption research has been highlighted by 
researchers 164 , as well as the way it has shaped most anti-corruption programs165 . The 
approach emphasises the rational choices made by individuals and implies that policies can 
address corruption by reducing discretion by the agents (including their individual incentive 
calculus) and allowing principles to monitor and sanction agents. Marguette and Peiffer 
(2015) highlight that therefore anti-corruption interventions, guided by the principle-agent 
model, focus on better aligning the incentives of agents with their respective principles, 
primarily by166: 
 
-   Reducing the discretion of civil servants; 
-   Increasing monitoring mechanisms; 
-   Promoting transparency in government; supporting anti-corruption civil society groups to 
serve as watchdogs;  
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-   And strengthening sanctions on those who engage in corruption. 
However, despite the significant effort to invest in principle-agent guided anti-corruption 
interventions, the evidence supporting the effectiveness is weak. Johnson et al. (2012) expose 
gaps in anti-corruption measures and argue that interventions based on a theoretical 
misunderstanding of the nature of corruption fall short in providing viable solutions167. An 
important argument raised for the failure of interventions is the lack of political will. This 
implies that principles (politicians) who are expected, according to the principle-agent theory, 
to be willing to monitor and hold agents accountable are in fact not necessarily willing to do 
so. In other words, the willingness of principles is a condition required for the principal-agent 
intervention to be effective.  
   Collective action perspective on corruption 
This brings us to the collective action theories, which can cover the gap identified when 
looking at corruption and the principle-agent theory. The American economist Mancur Olson 
(1932-1998) described the classic collective action problem in his influential book of 1965 
titled The Logic of Collective Action. Olson explains how there is a high incentive to free-ride 
on the efforts of others and to provide a suboptimal level of good168. When analysing the 
decision from the individual point of view to provide a collective good, it explains that if 
everyone acts in such a way, very little of the collective good will be supplied to the group as 
a whole. Olsen argues that it is in the best interest of the individuals in the group to act 
collectively towards shared objectives. However, members of the group do not do this and 
instead pursue their own interest by doing as little as possible or nothing at all. As a 
consequence, collective benefits are not realised to its fullest potential.  
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The influential American economist Elinor Ostrom (1933-2012) highlighted the crucial role 
of studying collective action to better understand the ways in which rational behaviour affects 
dealing with social dilemmas (1998)169. “Social dilemmas occur whenever individuals in 
interdependent situations face choices in which the maximization of short-term self-interests 
yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off than feasible alternatives”. Ostrom 
highlights that social dilemmas are called many names from collective good problem, the 
free-rider problem, moral hazard, the credible commitment dilemma, generalised social 
exchange, the tragedy of the commons and exchanges of threats and violent confrontations. 
She also notes that the best-known social dilemma has become the prisoners’ dilemma. To 
overcome the temptations of short-run self-interest, Ostrom cites that reciprocity; reputation 
and trust can help building conditions to allow individuals to achieve results that are better 
than rational. 
 
Social dilemma refers to a large number of situations in which individuals make independent 
choices in an interdependent situation170. In a dilemma, members of the group have the 
choice to contribute or not contribute to a joint benefit. In practice, members actually have 
the choice to decide how much they are willing to contribute. If everyone contributes the 
group will get a net positive benefit. However, all individuals face the temptation to shift 
from the group of contributors to the group of non-contributors. No person is independently 
motivated to change his or her position due to the choices of other participants. These are 
dilemmas because a conflict is posed between the individual and the group rationality. The 
challenge is to find ways to move the collective towards optimal participation. Ostrom lists 
four assumptions that are prevalent in most models of social dilemmas: 
 
“(1) All participants have common knowledge of the exogenously fixed structure of the 
situation and of the payoffs to be received by all individuals under all combinations of 
strategies. (2) Decisions about strategies are made independently, often 
simultaneously. (3) In a symmetric game, all participants have available the same 
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strategies. (4) No external actor (or central authority) is present to enforce 
agreements among participants about their choices.”171.  
 
To yield groups from achieving suboptimal results, players could self-enforce equilibrium by 
committing themselves to punish non co-operators as a form of deterrence. However, groups 
are dynamic which carries the probability of irrational players that reciprocate cooperation 
with cooperation. This makes rational players cooperate in the early stage of the game and 
shift to non-cooperation in the end. 
 
Ostrom highlights in her work that communication is an important element that shows how 
individuals can obtain results that are substantially better than rational. Levels of cooperation 
increase substantially when members of the groups are allowed to communicate face-to-face 
before each decision round. It also has a positive effect on cooperation levels when 
individuals are not provided with feedback on group discussion after every round. In the view 
of Ostrom, computerized communication does not show the same level of effectiveness 
compared to face-to-face communication. The reasons why communication facilitates 
cooperation include:  
 
“(1) transferring information from those who can figure out an optimal strategy to 
those who do not fully understand what strategy would be optimal, (2) exchanging 
mutual commitment, (3) increasing trust and thus affecting expectations of others’ 
behaviour, (4) adding additional values to the subjective payoff structure, (5) 
reinforcement of prior normative values, and (6) developing a group identity”172. 
 
However, in order to transfer information, one does need to be able to communicate. Also, as 
the stakes increase and monitoring becomes more difficult, communication becomes less 
efficacious173. 
 
The second element Ostrom highlights is innovation in rules that aim to govern common-pool 
resources and change the structure of underlying social-dilemma situations. Few groups rely 
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on communication alone and therefor establish rules with consequences in case of violations. 
Rules vary to reflect the respective circumstances but commonly include clear monitoring 
mechanisms and graduated sanctions to enforce compliance. Those who incidentally violate 
the rules might receive a modest sanction to explain that the violation has been observed and 
are afterwards allowed to return to the group. Repeat offenders might be sanctioned more 
severely with the ultimate exclusion from the group. Studies show how individuals with low 
trust are willing to contribute to sanctioning systems and respond subsequently more to 
change in the structure of the game than those who are initially more trusting.  
 
Ostrom explains how individuals are “boundedly rational” and do not oversee the complete 
set of strategies available to them for each situation. She notes that individuals use rules of 
thumb that they have learned over time. If frequently confronted with a situation, individuals 
will learn and tailor their rules of thumb to given scenarios. This learning will also allow 
individuals to learn to adopt and use norms and rules. Reciprocity as a strategy can according 
to Ostrom be used in social dilemmas involving: 
 
“(1) an effort to identify who else is involved, (2) an assessment of the likelihood that 
others are conditional co-operators, (3) a decision to cooperate initially with others if 
others are trusted to be conditional co-operators, (4) a refusal to cooperate with those 
who do not reciprocate, and (5) punishment of those who betray trust.”174.  
 
Reciprocity norms are learned but can differ between individuals. As a result, this is 
vulnerable for abuse. Ostrom argues that “individuals vary substantially in the probability 
that they will use particular norms, in how structural variables affect their level of trust and 
willingness to reciprocate cooperation in a particular situation, and in how they develop 
their own reputation”175. Six reciprocity norms are identified when confronted with a social 
dilemma: 
 
1.   “Always cooperate first; stop cooperating if others do not reciprocate; punish 
noncooperators if feasible. 
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2.   Cooperate immediately only if one judges other to be trustworthy; stop cooperating if 
others do not reciprocate; punish noncooperators is feasible. 
3.   Once cooperation is established by others, cooperate oneself; stop cooperating if 
others do not reciprocate; punish noncooperators if feasible. 
4.   Never cooperate 
5.   Mimic (1) and (2), but stop cooperating if one can successfully free ride on others. 
6.   Always cooperate (an extremely rare norm in all cultures)”. 
Levels of trust can be increased by: (1) providing individuals with an opportunity to see one 
another; (2) allow individuals to choose to enter or exit a social dilemma game; (3) sharing 
costs equally; (4) providing opportunities for distinct punishments for nonreciprocators; and 
(5) provide opportunities for face-to-face communication. 
 
To sum up, Ostrom shows that “at the core of a behavioural explanation are the links 
between the trust that individuals have in others, the investment others make in trustworthy 
reputations, and the probability that participants will use reciprocity norms”176. Face-to-face 
communication can change the structure of a situation. It can allow individuals to increase or 
decrease their trust. If successful, individuals will increase their initial expectations to a 
higher probability that others will reciprocate trust and cooperation. When individuals are 
symmetric in assets and payoffs, agreements to share levels of contribution equally are more 
easily made resulting in outcomes closer to optimal levels. If there is asymmetry, the 
agreement is more difficult to make but fairness norms can reduce the time and effort needed 
to achieve this. In case of non-cooperation, punishment can be used but this needs to 
guarantee one’s own reputation and sustain the initial cooperation. A measured reaction as 
opposed to the grim trigger allows for mild punishment for the cheater without punishing all 
individuals in the group. If immediately using the grim trigger, the agreement will be 
terminated and benefits will be lost over time. It is also important to note the dark side of 
reciprocity norms177. If punishment is used to escalate retribution, groups become limited to 
smaller, closed circles of friends. This can result in discrimination to outsider and a focus on 
the return of favours can be the foundation of corruption. 
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Marquette and Peiffer discuss how corruption in collective action theory can be described as 
the manifestation of free riding178. Corrupt behaviour refers to putting personal interest ahead 
of the larger group’s collective interest, such as good quality of government. Largely based 
on the work of Elinor Ostrom, Marquette and Peiffer (2015) list eleven variables that 
arguably are important when looking at collective action theories and corruption: group size; 
group heterogeneity; face-to-face communication; repeated interaction; trust / good 
reputations; group interdependence; voluntary group membership; heuristics / norms; 
monitoring / transparency (contributions and collective good); long time horizons; salience of 
collective good. For the purpose of this study these variable can play an important role in 
determining the favourable conditions for the prevention of corruption through collective 
action. For example, the group size may affect collective action when groups are larger which 
gives members an opportunity to get away with free riding. In addition, in larger groups, 
members can feel that their potential contribution will not make much of a difference in the 
effort to reach a collective benefit. Also, with more members it may be difficult to come to an 
internal agreement on how to coordinate the collective activity. Important is also that smaller 
groups may be challenged by difficulties in mobilizing resources to engage in effective 
collective action. Heuristics are relevant considering group members learn heuristic strategies 
on how to get certain outcomes through personal experiences and from other people. The 
norms learned attach a certain value to a given strategy or outcome. The norms and heuristics 
can affect collective action when an individual’s willingness is enhanced to side-line 
immediate personal goals in the interest of the collective good.  
   Principle-agent and collective action 
Persson et al. (2013) note that the international community prescribes a holistic anti-
corruption strategy that aims to reduce the opportunities and incentives for corruption, which 
falls in line with the logic of the principal-agent framework179. This targets: 
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-   Reducing discretion of public officials through privatisation, deregulation, and 
meritocratic recruitment; 
-   Reducing monopoly by promoting political and economic competition; 
-   Increasing accountability by supporting democratization and increased public awareness 
(for political accountability) and bureaucratisation (for administrative accountability); 
-   Improving salaries of public officials, thereby increasing the opportunity costs of 
corruption if detected; 
-   Improving the rule of law so that corrupt bureaucrats and politicians can be prosecuted 
and punished. 
-   Encouraging greater transparency of government decision making through deepening 
decentralization, increased public oversight through parliament, independent media, as 
well as through the creation and encouragement of civil society watchdogs. 
 
The success of the principal-agent strategy against corruption is questioned, especially in 
developing countries. Examples are ample of countries reforming legal and institutional 
frameworks but continuing to suffer from endemic forms of corruption. A key challenge is 
that countries might have a strong legal anti-corruption framework but still struggle to 
effectively implement the laws. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) discuss that anti-
corruption reforms fail as a result of absence of stakeholders that are willing to act as 
principles and as such enforce effective implementation of the laws. This, according to the 
authors, can be illustrated by the list of scandals in developing countries despite reforms, 
cases of re-election of corrupt politicians, as well as the fact that reporting and conviction of 
corrupt cases remain low. Both the public and politicians do not always play the role of 
principled principles as assumed by the principle-agent model. And, considering that the 
effectiveness of the model ultimately relies on the willingness of principles to hold agents 
accountable, the limited success in fighting corruption in developing countries does not come 
as a surprise. The collective action theory challenges the assumption that “strategic situations 
in themselves give the actors the answer to the question what strategy is most rational to opt 
for” 180 . Instead, it depends on shared expectation about how other individuals in an 
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interaction will behave. The reward of corruption, in other words, will depend on how many 
other individuals are expected to be corrupt. Karstedt and Farral (2006) point out that the 
public shares moral intuitions that allow for widely held justification, such as the common 
argument “everybody does it”181. If it is the case that the shared expectation is that other will 
be corrupt, everybody should be expected to act as such, regardless of whether they are 
principle or agent. This is even the case in a scenario where the majority morally rejects 
corruption and understands that as a group they loose by these practices. However, choosing 
not to be corrupt risks losing in the short-term out on possible gains: “If everybody does it, 
why shouldn’t I”.  
 
To sum up, it is argued that the principle-agent theory mistakenly assumes that there are 
“principled principals” that are willing to hold agents accountable for criminal behaviour. 
This is not the case for collective action in which individuals are in principle assumed to 
pursue self-interests. However, Marquette and Peiffer (2015) point out that this is not entirely 
accurate as the principle-agent theory does not claim principles are motivated by principles 
but rather by interests. In other words, there is no such thing as a “principled principle”. They 
remind us that the problem in applying the principle-agent model to government is that 
officials in principle do not own public assets or have a material stake in them. The principle-
agent model therefor aims to find a way to create this ownership and align interests of the 
agent and the principle. According to Marguette and Peiffer “it is not at all inconsistent with 
principal-agent theory to suggest that where principles do not have a stake in the intended 
outcome they will not be willing to play this role”182. They also note that the collective action 
approach is not entirely incompatible with a principal-agent interpretation of corruption. Both 
describe individual calculations made when deciding whether to not deviate. Both assume 
decisions are based on (bounded) rationality in the pursuit of self-interest. Both approaches 
assume that decisions are motivated by the perception of likelihood of being held 
accountable. Both conclude that more effective monitoring and sanctioning can increase 
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accountability and reduce corruption. Marguette and Peiffer (2015) warn that anti-corruption 
should not be reviewed through one theory only as both can contribute to conceptualizing the 
problem. Arguably this assumption fits within the scope of this study, not the least when 
looking at the European Union.    
 
In the Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption, Carolyn Warner describes how 
corruption in the EU “exists and persists because competitive pressures lead some firms to 
seek an edge against competition through illegal means”183. Where market liberalisation was 
thought to reduce corruption, the increased competitive pressure due to the formation of the 
Single Market caused companies to resort to bribery. Privatisation and decentralisation 
provide for corruption opportunities not the least because of political parties and politicians 
that may seek funds for campaigns and party financing. Warner stresses that market 
liberalisation was thought to address corruption because lack of competition can lead to 
collusion given that companies have little incentive to cut costs. Competition would either 
make companies stop bribing or push corrupt companies out of the market. At the same time, 
politicians that partially dependent on domestic companies would have to stop seeking bribes 
to allow companies to remain in competition and employ voters and pay tax. In other words, 
market integration is expected to break the existing cycles of corruption184.  
 
However, in the EU this has not necessarily been the case. Corruption in a way adapted to the 
situation, arguably due to the weak accountability inherent to the EU’s institutional structure 
as well as the possible differences in attitudes towards corruption in Member States. For 
example, when looking at the ESI funds, the Member States have delegated to themselves 
management of the funds. In the words of the principal-agent theory, the principles (the 
Member State) are for a large portion also the agents. At the same time, the Member States 
also manage the regulatory structure. At the foundation of this arrangement lies the debate on 
the difficulty for Member States to sign away sovereignty to European institutions and 
procedures that should have the power and resources to address corruption. On the national 
level one could add a political establishment that might be 1) concerned about international 
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competition and 2) not necessarily willing to strengthen their own institutions to fight 
corruption. Warner reminds us that the legal and political economist views imply that EU 
fraud is due to a corruptible bureaucracy, existence of programmes vulnerable for third 
parties and too few checks and balances to address administrative monopolies. However, as 
we established, the EU has a governance structure that is different from normal, includes 
many different attitudes towards corruption, and does not necessarily promote free-market 
principles in all sectors (for example think about the economic public investments through 
the structural funds). From a rational-choice point of view, Member States would rely on the 
EU institutions if by doing so they can promote their own interests. However, this is provided 
that there are rules to punish non-cooperative behaviour. Warner continues by arguing that 
countries would in principle never agree to cooperate and delegate sovereignty if there was 
no way of detecting and punishing non-cooperative behaviour. However this way of control 
is inherently weak due to the assumed fear of countries to delegate sovereignty. In such a 
scenario it would only be rational for states to agree to an international regime if 1) the 
benefits of organisation would outweigh the risks of others cheating or if 2) the state sees 
benefits in cheating others. In other words, Member States could see fraud and corruption as 
a marginal cost compared to the benefits from participating. However, one must keep in mind 
that the benefit could actually be the corruption itself. What Warner describes in this scenario 
combines principal-agent dilemmas but also collective action problems. The EU can be 
described as an organisation playing to host various principal-agent relations, for example 
when assuming the Member State as principles and the European Commission as agent. 
However, the ESI Funds show that Member States have largely delegated management to 
themselves, making them the principals and agent. This in itself generates opportunity for 
corruption. The collective action problem lies in Member States that “are able to free ride on, 
or defraud, the EU because the harm caused is dispersed across all the members, while the 
gains are country-specific”185. 
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4.3   Corruption prevention 
Historically, the legislative response to forms of white-collar criminal behaviour 
predominantly included legal controls, often after scandals surfaced 186 . Legal controls 
commonly ensure compliance through sanctioning measures that aim to minimize the harm 
done by crime. These measures depend on the jurisdiction and type of crime, and sanctions 
include the use of fines and if possible imprisonment. An important challenge when 
sanctioning corruption from the supply-side is the ability to attribute responsibility to those 
causing the crime, so-called legal accountability. Because it is difficult to attribute 
responsibility to a company, countries have attempted through legal systems to govern risk-
creating activities of and with businesses. In the twentieth century, laws were developed to 
pursue social change in which employers were forced to manage risks. Also internal 
compliance was promoted while inspection and enforcement systems were set up. Regulatory 
law, instead of criminal law, was used to deal with a legal response to severe offences that 
affected health and safety of workers. Not until the last decades, countries started shifting 
towards criminal law to deal with forms of corporate crimes against workers. But legal 
traditions differ when looking at issues such as criminal liability. Some common-law 
jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, and the United States of America have pursued 
initiatives to legally criminalize corporations. EU Member States with civil law traditions 
have for a long time resisted the corporate criminal liability, strictly seeing criminal law to be 
applicable to natural persons. However, initiatives to deal with corporate crime, i.e. on issues 
such as bribery, from the EU, United Nations and the OECD have pressured countries to 
converge. Today, several countries have pioneered in Europe with measures to address 
corporate liability, for example, the Netherlands, Denmark and France. Countries that 
followed were Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Romania and Slovenia. Italy and Spain indirectly adopted corporate liability, bypassing this 
way any limitations within their legal systems. Germany, Sweden and the Czech Republic 
have not adopted corporate criminal liability and continue to apply administrative liability. 
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   Legal versus regulatory prevention 
While approaches differ from country-to-country in the EU, there is a general tendency to 
rely on formal legal responses as a sanctioning means of corporate crime and serve as a 
quasi-regulatory measure 187 . An important factor explaining this approach is that 
conventional crimes, such as burglary and assault, are perceived as destructive and opposite 
to socially desired behaviour. Crimes committed by companies on the other hand closely 
interact with behaviour that is productive and desirable from a social and economic point of 
view. This is particularly evident when looking at corruption cases that challenge decision-
makers to undo investments that were based on criminal transactions. For example, in Spain 
the importance of tourism in coastal areas weighs on the decision of judges to order the 
destruction of hotels that are built through corrupt practices (i.e. with illegally obtained 
building permits)188. In times of high unemployment, this would mean the destruction of jobs, 
which in the eyes of politicians and the public likely is undesired.     
 
Control strategies against deviant behaviour vary depending on which causal elements have 
to be targeted. For example, in order to control individual decision-making, a rational choice 
approach would be to alter the way in which people weigh benefits against costs, such as an 
appropriate punishment system. Other forms could be ethics training or forced resignation, 
both of which are preventive and pointing to responsible individuals189. However, focussing 
solely on individuals might risk not addressing more systemic factors that cause corruption. 
Marxist theories might aim to control crime by targeting the state and redistribute power. 
Institutional factors, such as competitive pressures, professional and organisational cultures 
might have effect on behaviour. Failing to address systemic factors risks that corruption 
repeats itself. In other words, control should target the causes of a problem. As mentioned 
earlier, the dominant legal response to white-collar and in particular corporate crime is 
regulatory rather than criminal. The perception that corporate behaviour (and crime) is 
closely associated with productivity and activities considered socially desirable makes 
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responding in a punitive manner to corporate crime difficult as this could create an opposite 
effect of productivity. Friedrichs (2010), among others, has observed, that an important 
difference between regulatory versus penal enforcement is that the former has a “lower 
profile and is less likely to involve an adversial confrontation between two parties”, a 
preferred option for decision-makers due to the political sensitivity with which corporate (bad 
or good) behaviour is addressed190.  
 
Orbach (2012) defines regulation as a “government intervention in the private domain or a 
legal rule that implements such intervention”, which implies that rules intend to shape 
behaviour191. Although, the evidence is compelling in stating that while rules and regulations 
may be designed to shape behaviour, there is a virtual inverse correlation between the 
numbers of laws a country has and the amount of crime it has. An example of this is seen in 
Spain concerning the legislative framework against corruption. The European Commission 
notes in its 2014 European Anti-corruption Report that Spain’s anti-corruption legal 
framework is largely in place and that law enforcement made good progress in investigating 
corrupt practices 192 . Regardless, the country has seen during recent years large-scale 
corruption cases, which revealed corruption in public funds and financing of political parties. 
Particular vulnerable sectors are public procurement and urban planning. The reporting of the 
European Commission exposes deficiencies in the implementation of legislation as well as 
more general deficiencies in checks and balances. When coupling this to the business sector, 
regulations can address the functioning of the market, for example to prevent corporate 
cartels from forming or public procurement fraud. Enforcement of violations of regulations 
differs as well as the assessment of whether a specific action is considered compliant or 
noncompliant with regulations. When enforcing regulations, enforcers are confronted with 
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the decision to focus on compliance, or deterrence. Depending on the type of behaviour, one 
or the other approach might be preferred or expected. 
 
The decision to denominate an act as a violation, followed by the decision to enforce can hold 
a degree of discretion by the decision-maker193 . For example, an official might have a 
rulebook that stipulates which criteria are needed before a case can be named a violation. 
However, such a rulebook cannot be expected to provide an answer to every situation, 
meaning that the decision depends partially on the perception of the official. At the same 
time, this decision has consequences, for example it could result in criminal investigation 
(and prosecution) into the doings of a corporation or directly result in an administrative 
penalty. In other words, the official has a degree of decision-making power, which without 
the proper control lends itself for abuse. Government regulation can according to Frank 
(1984) differentiate between regulatory agencies that persuade and cooperate and those that 
prosecute and punish. The dividing line between these styles is not always clear as regulatory 
agencies often adopt a joint approach between persuasion and prosecution. In addition, the 
approach could vary in practice based on the problems encountered when implementing 
regulations. Important factors are the political climate in which the regulatory agency 
operates, the pubic and agency opinion of the regulated company as well as the potential 
damage of non-compliance.  
 
According to Simpson (2002), the typical responses to white-collar and conventional types of 
crime overlap 194 . Popular perception is strongest when asked about the severity of 
environmental crime. After this, people perceive worker’s health and safety crimes to be 
serious followed by price fixing and finally insider trading. Concerning sanctions, Simpson 
highlights that the public prefers more sever sanctions when the offender is a company as 
opposed to a single individual. Such attitudes vary “by the degree of harm and the culpability 
of the act”195. The same is noted for criminal justice authorities that, according to Benson and 
Cullen (1998), perceive corporate crime differently in function of community 
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characteristics196. For example, prosecutors in more urban areas perceive corporate crime as a 
‘very’ or ‘somewhat serious’ problem197. While a criminal justice response is seen as a strong 
deterrent for corporate crime (especially with possible imprisonment) and widely used, 
Simpson raises the question whether criminal law has the capacity to prevent and control 
corporate crime198. The threat of criminal punishment ignores other potential kinds of control 
that deter persons from criminal behaviour, such as “threats to reputation, current and future 
employment, access to competitive resources (e.g. bids, contracts), friendship networks or 
associations, and family attachments” 199.  
 
In 1975, Stone argued that criminal law will fail to address corporate crime given it is not 
flexible enough “to adjust to and permeate dynamic business organizations”200. Various 
reasons why this does not have the desired effect are “limited liability, the lack of congruence 
between the incentives of top executives and the incentives of “the corporation”, the 
organisation’s proclivity to buffer itself against external, especially legal threats”201. Stone 
presents a set of alternatives to criminal law approaches against corporate crime primarily 
focusing on tackling liability questions as well as enhancing corporate social responsibility. 
Stone also argues that the law or profit-making partially dictates corporate behaviour. 
   Fostering a culture of compliance 
Types of interventions might have different effect depending on the characteristics of the 
offense type. Apart from the nature of the crime (e.g. corruption, fraud, violence, etc.), also 
other characteristics are relevant such as the type of victims (e.g. consumers, employees, the 
public or other corporations, etc.) and the type of corporation (e.g. big, small, local, 
international, private or semi-public, etc.).  
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Responding to “violence” committed by companies could require a different approach 
compared to responding to “abuse of power” committed by companies. In both types of 
offences there is a systemic element embedded when trying to understand the causes of 
crimes. Illegal dumping of toxic waste can for example be traced back to the (opportunistic) 
behaviour of a specific individual but penalizing this person might not address the more 
systemic problem, which is the need to dispose of toxic waste in a responsible manner. Add 
to this a business environment that is driven by maximising profits and a risk potential is 
present for corporate crime. Thus responding to dumping of toxic waste by imprisonment 
might deter individuals from repeating their crimes but it does not address the systemic 
conditions that have facilitated and driven this behaviour in the first place and therefore does 
not prevent others from making the same mistakes. The same can be argued when responding 
to abuse of power, such as fraud and corruption, by corporations.  
 
Abuse of power differs from the more conventional types of crime in the sense that damage is 
difficult to determine and evidence of criminal behaviour is difficult to detect. Most 
importantly, abuse of power can blatantly go unnoticed. Also in this case, the conditions in 
which organizations operate provide for a climate in which abuse of power can occur. This is 
for example explained by Fisman and Gatti’s bargaining model of bribery (2002) described 
earlier in this study. Etzioni and Mitchell (2010) note that literature on preventing corporate 
crime highlight the importance of fostering a culture of respect for the law within businesses 
and creating internal controls to prevent misbehaviour202. Business schools have according to 
Etzioni and Mitchell a role to play in preventing corporate crime through educating future 
corporate executives. However, including ethics in the school curriculum is not necessarily 
straightforward as definitions and values can differ. Distinction is made between so-called 
command-and-control strategies and self-regulation approaches203. Concerning the former, 
here the authorities dictate the terms of compliance, which often also includes specific formal 
sanctions in case of non-compliance. Severe sanctions as a deterrent for crime is a frequently 
opted approach in response to conventional crimes. However, arguably severe punishment of 
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corporate crime alone does not work without also ensuring proper inspection. In fact, 
Simpson (2002) argues that inspection frequency is more important than severe sanctioning. 
In other words, reducing the risk of corporate crime can be addressed by detection strategies 
in combination with punishment. Friedrich (2010) emphasises more the conditions when 
looking at crime prevention such as time, place, offender and victim204. The identification of 
offenders arguably does not have the same priority in white-collar crime as it has in 
conventional crime. The fact that corruption is often hidden within normal or legal business 
procedures makes a case for first focusing on ensuring that the crime itself can be detected. 
As mentioned above, techniques can be formal (i.e. through law enforcement) or informal 
(i.e. through company compliance systems). For example, techniques that can be used are 
monitoring systems that red flag possible irregularities or safety mechanisms such as 
compliance systems that strengthen control within business processes205. The interesting 
contemporary element in these techniques is the use of new technologies that allow for real 
time surveillance of complex processes. For example, the use of open data on public 
procurement can allow law enforcement but also normal citizens to identify anomalies in 
public spending206. The use of compliance systems with its tools such as codes of conduct, or 
whistle-blower channels, also supports those workers that want to advocate corporate 
responsibility to act in the interest of the public. Repeatedly, citizens are asked and motivated 
to report suspicious behaviour of companies, for example relating tax evasion or pollution. 
Such techniques are not uncommon in case of conventional crime, for example through 
neighbourhood watch schemes207.  
 
Whistleblowing is most commonly defined as the “disclosure by organization members 
(former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employees, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action”208. Kölber (2015) 
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presents a comparative overview of legal frameworks in Europe to deal with whistleblowing. 
He highlights how systems differ between countries, with Anglo-American countries 
especially have institutionalised systems. Transparency International considers 
whistleblowing a direct method of exposing corruption. However, the organisation highlights 
that whistle-blowers commonly face retaliation, such as harassment, firing, blacklisting, 
threats and physical violence. Aside from this, the functioning of the whistle-blower 
mechanism is challenged by the fear of retaliation209, which raises the question as to whether 
people should be legally protected from this. 
 
Self-regulation is frequently seen as a complementary system to command-and-control 
strategies enforced by the authorities 210 . Corporations can set up compliance systems, 
establish ethical guidelines and adopt informal sanctioning structures. Its objective is to 
reduce crime opportunities. Self-regulation parts from the notion that the corporations 
themselves are best placed to detect and deter crime. The difficulty with self-regulation is that 
its effect is dependent on the internal accountability structures211. In other words, in order for 
structures within a corporation to be able to reduce crime risks an adequate balance of power 
is needed. We could criticise self-regulation on the account of risk for weak enforceability. 
The government can play a role in enforcing self-regulation but the concept does not 
necessarily rely on formal regulation. Braithwaite (1992) talks about the family model of 
crime control in which workers when confronted with crime opportunities make a decision 
based on their understanding of right and wrong, but also the impact of such behaviour on 
their reputation212. This, in other words, challenges rational choice assumptions that see 
offenders as persons that weigh costs against benefits. Self-regulation is therefor seen as a 
form of organizational social responsibility in combination with the norms and values of 
individual workers. The reputational damage or negative publicity as a deterrent for criminal 
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behaviour has been mentioned several times in this study. Arguably, entrepreneurs and 
politicians could suffer negative consequences from allegations, let alone from former 
investigations and prosecution cases. It could have affect on the public image, election 
outcomes, on the market price of corporations, stock prices or sales213. The question whether 
the stigma associated with criminal behaviour weighs equally for conventional and corporate 
offenders and has the same affect in reducing crime risks is uncertain. The labelling theory 
provides some additional insight into the process of how society responds to perceived 
crime 214 . White-collar criminals arguably differ in the fact that these politicians and 
entrepreneurs can have access to means to avoid negative labelling or influence the degree of 
stigmatisation that comes with being labelled as a criminal. For politicians this is seen when 
looking at data on re-election and corruption allegations. In the private sector this is visible 
for bribery settlement cases where companies are willing to pay large sums of money to 
avoid legal prosecution215. An important part of the settlement negotiations concerns the 
question whether corporations can settle without acknowledging wrongdoing. This has 
partially to do with the desire of corporations to not be stigmatised as corrupt.  
 
The call for businesses to operate in an ethical manner is increasingly reaffirmed on the 
national level through its legal system, but also on the international level through conventions 
such as the 1999 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United National Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC). High media-visibility of corruption or fraud scandals, such as 
the Siemens bribery case or the recent Volkswagen CO2 emissions scandals, have made 
companies aware of risks to their reputation. Public pressure, in combination with risks of 
financial sanctions, arguably is a compelling reason for companies to act ethically and take 
proper measures to ensure compliance. An example of corporate self-regulation integrated 
into a business model is corporate social responsibility (CSR). With CSR a company can 
monitor and enforce compliance with the law, as well as ethical standards or national and 
international norms. Self-regulation to prevent corporate crime is a contested approach as 
opponents might argue this is a form of window-dressing to the outside world. Proponents 
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might argue that this fits into long-term business strategies aiming for sustainability and 
therefor desirable. Regardless of the desirability of self-regulation of the business sector, 
research on its effects is contested. For example, Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 52 studies and find that corporate social performance is likely to 
positively effect financial performance216. However, this does not necessarily imply that it 
prevents criminal behaviour from occurring, especially if we take in account rational-choice 
models in which corporations might decide based on maximising profits. In fact, Hong and 
Liskovich (2016) point out that socially responsible companies could receive more lenient 
settlements from prosecutors after being caught bribing217.  
 
In order to target specific interventions to prevent opportunistic corporate criminal behaviour, 
it is important to consider the conditions under which corrupt and fraudulent behaviour by 
corporations takes place. Taking preventive measures such as establishing whistle-blower 
channels and ensuring whistle-blower protection provides for an environment in which 
persons can come forward about undue behaviour. Another element to take into account is 
that corruption can be linked to opportunistic behaviour in which trust between stakeholders 
is important. Transparency and accountability measures are important here, widely advocated 
to reduce the risk of abuse of power and facilitate a business culture less perceptive to 
criminal behaviour. 
 
Globalization and the integration of economies place prevention of corporate crime in a 
different perspective. The cross-border element of corporate crime is, and has become ever 
more important when discussing deterrence and compliance. Since the 1970s, corporations 
operate increasingly across borders, making white-collar crime also cross-border problems218. 
This adds different challenges to classical deterrence models on the national level that assume 
that sanctioning risks and consequences are bigger than the benefits from criminal behaviour. 
First of all, different enforcement of national models could shift the problem from one 
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jurisdiction to the next. In other words, offenders might migrate to jurisdictions where 
enforcement of deterrence models are weaker. For example, anti-corruption watch dogs see 
the bribery of foreign officials in less developed countries by corporations from developed 
countries as a form of corporate crime due to uneven enforcement of law219. Secondly, 
corporations operating in multiple jurisdictions can more easily hide activities and complicate 
law enforcement due to complex company structure220. For example, a corporation might use 
shell companies in different jurisdictions for various reasons, i.e. tax evasion (e.g. in the 
Panama papers scandal). 
 
The debate about the relevance of criminal sanctions to prevent white-collar crime has been 
on-going since the start of the globalization in the 1970s up until today. Agencies of social 
control and regulation face challenges to deal with new forms of white-collar crime and 
increasingly powerful globally operating corporations. Initially international forms of 
regulation promoted market liberalization and privatisation, however increasingly calls 
became louder for re-regulation coupled with self-regulation 221 . Command-and-control 
strategies were replaced by forms of co-regulation made up of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law standards 
that involved the design, implementation and monitoring by state and non-state actors222. In 
Europe, the transition of many eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union resulted in new market opportunities for multinational corporations, immediately 
having effect on the control and regulation of corporate crime when challenging existing 
regulatory mechanisms. As an example, Friedrichs (2010) points to international financial 
institutions that were established to regulate international finance but failed to do so in light 
of scandals such as the infamous LIBOR case223. Pieth et al. (2012) point to the soft law 
standards and peer pressure enforcement mechanisms of the Financial Action Task Force 
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(FATF) 224 . This mechanism started with focusing on anti-money laundering and soon 
extended to terrorism financing, corruption and eventually tax fraud. Pieth et al. (2012) also 
point put that soon after in 1989 the OECD adopted the FATF working methodology and 
initiated the OECD Working Group on Bribery (OECD-WGB) which resulted in the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention (and recommendations) in 1997 aiming to criminalize corruption. 
In 1999 the Council of Europe followed with the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
and eventually in 2003 the UN adopted the UNCAC. A key element returning in all these 
mechanisms is the use of peer reviewing.  
 
Apart from enforcement challenges, a next step in this context of a globalized world would be 
to look at whether criminal sanctions are relevant when dealing with corporate crime. Firstly, 
the potential deterrent effect of criminal sanctions might weigh less on corporate offenders as 
these can be powerful and this way reduce the severity and likelihood of a criminal sanction. 
In addition, a secondary effect of (fear of) criminal sanctions, such as reputational loss can be 
of importance. We have also seen that is an incentive for companies to initiate corporate 
social responsibility programmes. 
   Collective action as a corruption prevention tool 
In ‘A Practical Guide for Collective Action against Corruption’ by the United Nations Global 
Compact, the authors remind us that “even though all companies would benefit from a more 
transparent and competitive business environment, not all of them will be willing to 
individually invest their resources or risk their continuity to build such an environment”225. 
Individual interest could lead companies to act against collective interest. And, in order to 
prevent corruption, which could enhance business opportunities, one should find ways of 
cooperation, provide incentives to participate in common effort and minimise costs 
disproportionate to each individual actor’s disproportional share of group benefits.  
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The World Bank Institute defines collective action as a “collaborative and sustained process 
of cooperation among stakeholders” 226. According to the guide for businesses developed by 
the World Bank Institute, collective action can increase the impact and credibility of 
individual action, bring vulnerable individual players into an alliance of like-minded 
organizations and level the playing field between competitors. “Collective action can 
complement or temporarily substitute for and strengthen weak local laws and anti-corruption 
practices”227. In particular, small-medium enterprises (SMEs) can benefit from collective 
action initiatives, as these businesses risk being disproportionately affected by the effects of 
corruption due to their size228. Also, collective action could ensure that SMEs with less 
human and financial resources are able to install anti-corruption systems, interact with others 
and collectively address level playing field challenges in both non- and endemically corrupt 
business environments. SMEs in endemically corrupt business environments face the 
challenge that the company most likely to pay a bribe has an unfair advantage over those that 
do not resort to such practices. As discussed earlier in this study, a common response by 
businesses is denying responsibility: “if we do not bribe, someone else would”. In addition, 
not necessarily only pertaining to endemic corrupt environments, businesses could also argue 
justification based on higher moral grounds such as bribing is a part of free-market forces of 
supply and demand. Collective action initiatives embrace the neutralization techniques used 
by companies (as well as public officials) to resist tackling the problem of corruption. For 
example, Michael Wiehen and Cobus de Swardt discuss this in their reflections on the 
Integrity Pact as a collective action tool229. They argue that the prevalence of corruption 
disheartens individual companies and even whole nations to take the first step against 
corruption. Companies are facing prisoner’s dilemma scenarios and risk ending up empty-
handed when being the one deciding to conduct clean business while their competitors 
continue bribing. Wiehen and de Swardt acknowledge the problems and note: “nobody in 
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business or government can operate globally without recognizing their role, their 
responsibility, and their risk when it comes to corruption”230. Hence, they suggest collective 
action (in particular the Integrity Pact) as tool to drive economic operators and contracting 
authorities to take steps in doing clean business, to enforce this via an independent broker 
(i.e. civil society) and lay the foundation for an equal level playing field.  
 
The Practical Guide for Collective Action against Corruption by UN Global Compact states 
that collective action initiatives rest on three pillars231: 
 
1.   Multiple parties enter into formal collective action agreements; 
2.   Trusted third parties act as facilitators; 
3.   Public sector agencies participate as parties and / or promoters. 
 
The World Bank Institute presents three levels at which companies may fight corruption232. 
The first and second levels depend on the companies themselves and involves internal and 
external activities. Internal activities include: the assessment of corruption risks; 
implementation of anti-corruption policies; and provision of specific guidance to managers. 
The second level concern activities in which companies share internal policies, best practices, 
experiences and success stories with external stakeholders. The third level at which 
companies may fight corruption is more advanced and refers to collective action in which 
companies reach out to industry peers, suppliers and other stakeholders via neutral facilitators 
and initiate joint activities to fight corruption.  
 
For the internal activities, companies should, according to the World Bank Institute, focus on 
corruption risks by establishing an ethical culture and implementing a strong anti-corruption 
policy. Such risks include: requests for gifts, travel, political contributions, bribes, facilitation 
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payments; requests to overpay commission; money laundering and payments to offshore 
locations; dishonest or incompetent staff, dishonest third-parties (e.g. partners, agents or 
brokers); and dishonest public officials. An ethical corporate culture and strong 
implementation of anti-corruption policy should help protecting corporate assets (e.g. people, 
property, reputation, etc.). Success of corporate compliance programs is determined by 
leadership commitment (or a strong will from the top), as well as a business culture that 
values good sales, and practices and processes that are practical. Important for leadership are 
actions that visibly and consistently support the program and its underlying principles. 
Leadership should avoid double standards of behaviour. Compliance needs to be part of 
operations and as such recognized as supporting corporate sales. Practical practices and 
processes should reflect business circumstances. The World Bank Institute presents a set of 
underlying principles for an effective corporate compliance program. This includes: standards 
and procedures to prevent and detect misbehaviour; oversight from a knowledgeable Board of 
Directors; program management by senior personnel with operational responsibility and clear 
lines of authority; preventive operational safeguards consisting of codes of conduct, internal 
controls and audit, etc.; communication and training to support the program; incentive and 
discipline mechanisms to reinforce appropriate behaviour; lessons learned responses to 
incidents; engagement with other businesses and stakeholders; and separation of internal 
functions and responsibilities. The process in place to continuously improve a compliance 
program should include: the assessment of corruption risks; prevention through policies and 
procedures, communication and training; detection through compliance controls and audits; 
and responses to misconduct through sanctioning mechanisms, global case tracking and 
application of lessons learned. 
 
External activities for companies includes communication of company standards and policies 
to outside External communication, according to the World Bank Institute guide, means that 
companies make a clear note of their principles and policies and set expectations that 
business partners adhere to these. It includes external activities such as reporting to 
stakeholders on internal activities to fight corruption. For example, companies could report in 
annual report, corporate social responsibility reports, etc. The added value of external 
communication includes sharing best practices, a stronger reputation, but also support to 
employees to withstand outside pressure to bribe. 
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Despite the possible benefits of internal and external anti-corruption efforts, companies are 
facing collective action problems. They can still suffer negative consequences of corruption if 
and when competitors do not adhere to corrupt-free business practices. It is therefor that the 
World Bank Institute advocates for collective action initiatives to be able to isolate the actors 
that have bad intentions and promote compliance as the norm. Such initiatives: ensure 
sustainable and collaborative cooperation between stakeholders; increase impact and 
credibility of individual anti-corruption efforts; bring vulnerable individual players into an 
alliance of like-minded organisations; level the playing field between competitors; and 
complement local laws and anti-corruption practices. The World Bank Institute notes that the 
main objectives of collective action are to: strengthen anti-corruption commitments between 
stakeholders; create incentives to avoid corruption in the business environment both inside 
and outside the respective companies or authorities. 
 
According to the World Bank Institute, the benefits from collective action vary for the 
different stakeholders. Companies increase their chances to enter markets and to be selected 
as suppliers in a fair manner (i.e. in public procurement). Companies protect themselves from 
legal sanctions for corruption, save costs, enhance reputations, etc. Public authorities can 
benefit from collective action by enhancing transparency, strengthening rule of law, 
increasing credibility and political stability, improving the investment climate, improving 
effective governance and procurement. Also civil society benefits ultimately from collective 
action initiatives. For example, there can be improved access to essential resources, better 
quality products and services, increased trust in government and business work, enforcement 
of regulations and more transparency and less corruption. The role of civil society 
organisations is particularly highlighted when acting as an independent broker. Although not 
required, the use of an independent facilitator in collective action initiatives is beneficial in 
order to avoid possible anti-trust concerns when only companies convene in collective action. 
Also, an independent facilitator can ensure that outcomes of the initiative are less likely to be 
bias. The facilitators can bring the stakeholders together in a neutral setting and moderate the 
sharing of best practices. Also the independent facilitator can nominate an external monitor or 
auditor. 
 
Collective action initiatives can be applied on a project basis or longer term. The former can 
be an ethical commitment such as an anti-corruption declaration, a kind of public 
commitment that can be enforced through peer pressure. Another project-based initiative can 
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be the Integrity Pact, which rests on external enforcement, for example by a civil society 
organisation in case of non-compliance. The Integrity Pact includes a formal, written contract 
between stakeholders to refrain from certain corrupt practices.  The latter can also include 
ethical commitments such as principle-based initiatives. Another long-term initiative can be 
certified business coalitions. 
 
1.   Project-based – anti-corruption declarations 
 
The objectives of an anti-corruption declaration can be the prevention of corruption in 
individual projects or business transactions. It can initiate debates about corruption and 
collectively set behaviour expectations for stakeholders. It can reduce the risk of corruption 
due to more awareness and standards can be publicized to ensure that other business-levels 
such as sub-contractors. Anti-corruption declarations can include standards on transparency, 
anti-corruption (including no bribery), fair business conduct. Generally anti-corruption 
declarations do not include sanctions provisions. 
 
2.   Project-based – Integrity Pacts 
 
The Integrity Pact functions as a formal contract that is externally monitored by an 
independent party. The objectives can include the reduction of corruption risks in individual 
projects (e.g. procurement) or business transactions. Integrity Pacts can create a level playing 
field for companies operating on a market and provide sanctions for corruption. They also 
shield stakeholders from pressure to be corrupt and send a visible message to the public. An 
Integrity Pact is a formal contract that established mutual rights and obligations between 
parties. It includes similar provision as in the anti-corruption declaration with the difference 
of having an independent broker monitoring the projects or transactions and sanctions in case 
of non-compliance. 
 
3.   Long-term – Principle-based initiative 
 
The concept aims to promote on the long-term the appropriate business conduct within a 
sector or country. As with anti-corruption declarations, principle-based initiatives rely on 
leverage from public or peer pressure to address collective good problems. On the long-term 
such initiatives could push for legal reform. According to the World Bank Institute, the core 
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elements of such initiatives are the shared principles. Optional elements can be advocacy and 
external communication elements, training programs or exchange of best practices. 
 
4.   Long-term – Certifying business coalition 
 
Certifying business coalitions aim to promote standards of business conduct within a country 
or sector. An important element is that standards are positioned as a competitive advantage. 
As for principle-based initiatives, also here the core element is the shared principles, however 
an additional element is the verification of compliance and resulting certification. This 
certification can give members certain advantages in terms of showing that compliance 
measures meet tendering requirements. 
4.4   Public procurement 
While the first part of the chapter (sections 4.1 - 4.3) focused on situating the theoretical 
debate on corruption, causes and prevention, the following section will further detail 
corruption in public procurement and prevention, specifically on the EU level. The term 
public procurement is used to refer to purchasing activities of goods and services by 
governments, which need this to carry out their functions233. In EU legislation reference is 
made to “public procurement” while other organisations use the terms “government 
purchases”, “government procurement”, “public contracts” or “government contracts”.  
   Public procurement 
Public procurement is a highly legal topic, mostly regulated by procurement legislation and 
civil law systems. The prior applies primarily to the procurement phase in which a contractor 
is chosen while the latter applies primarily to the contractual management after a contract has 
been awarded. Three common categories of procurement types are identified: goods; works; 
and services. Procured goods could be simple office supplies, but also more complex and 
expensive products such as defence missiles. Works often refer to construction activities such 
as bridges, roads and buildings. Services can be relating construction such as engineering 
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activities, but also legal and consultancy services. Various forms of contracts are signed 
between the public and private sector. These contracts can be short or long term, involving a 
one-time service, a single product or granting exploitation rights. The latter refers to 
concession contracts, used by governments to give private stakeholders the exclusive right to 
operate, maintain and invest in public utilities for a period of time. These utilities could 
concern water or electricity supply, but also the exploitation of public national resources such 
as gas and oil. Concession agreements often involve a close relationship between the public 
and private sector, also called public-private partnership (PPP). In theory, in a PPP, a private 
party provides a public service for which it also needs to invest own resources and therefore 
adopting part of the financial risk in doing so. Costs are either carried by the end-users or by 
taxpayers. Public procurement regulations generally cover all public contracts for goods, 
works and services entered into by public authorities. Important are the exceptions made, 
primarily in case of extreme urgency or issues relating national security. The defence sector 
is such an exceptional procurement area and important given it accounts for large parts of 
government spending. Other important areas of public expenditures are the health, 
infrastructure and energy sectors.   
 
Most systems of public procurement in the EU are based on shared objectives and 
implemented through legal and regulatory rules. These objectives are234: value for money; 
integrity; accountability; efficiency in the procurement process; equal opportunities and 
treatment of providers; fair treatment of providers; efficient implementation of industrial, 
social and environmental objectives; and access for international trade on public markets. The 
first two objectives are especially relevant. The value for money objective touches upon the 
need for efficiency and effectiveness. It is important that the purchased goods meet the 
requirements under the best possible terms. Value for money dominates most procurement 
systems in EU Member States. Objectives such as equal opportunities, fair treatment and 
access for international trade strongly influences EU procurement as a whole in promoting 
the functioning of the single market. 
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The objective of maintaining integrity throughout the procurement process refers to the 
notion of avoiding corruption. Corruption in procurement can occur in different forms and in 
different stages of the process. Integrity is closely interlinked with the other objectives. For 
example, bribes may prevent governments from contracting the best provider and thus 
affecting the value for money objective. Further, strengthening integrity also ensures fair and 
equal treatment as corruption could prevent providers from participating in the bidding 
process. Integrity in the procurement process is important for the government´s functioning 
as well as the trust it receives from the public. The objective of accountability refers to the 
mechanisms in place to ensure control of the procurement process. Such mechanisms could 
be internal and external, such as allowing the general public to scrutinise the process. The 
efficiency objective could be undermined by the objective to ensure integrity. For example, 
rigid anti-corruption measures could carry financial costs that outweigh the benefits from 
avoiding corruption. Nonetheless governments might value non-financial objectives more 
than for example the private sector.  
 
The public procurement process includes three phases: pre-bidding phase; bidding phase; 
post-bidding phase. The pre-bidding phase refers to decision-making or planning process on 
which goods and services are to be purchased and when. The bidding phase deals with the 
notification of procurement, the decision of who will be contracted and under which 
conditions. The post-bidding phase refers to the administering of the contract and its 
management to ensure effective performance. Each phase consists of several stages and 
activities.  
 
The procurement regulations commonly include financial thresholds indicating from which 
value a specific procedure has to be followed. Each procedure dictates to the contracting 
authority the required level of transparency. Also, the procedures include exclusion criteria 
covering areas that are exempted. For example, in case of contracts declared to be sensitive 
for national security. Regulations also include rules applicable to contracts, establishing 
contract award criteria, rules on publication and transparency, technical specifications, anti-
fraud conditions and means of communication. Finally, procurement regulations specify the 
different procedures in place. The most common procurement procedures in the EU are the: 
open procedure; restricted procedure; negotiated procedure and the competitive dialogue. 
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The procedures set the accessibility for companies to participate, time limits for the process 
and transparency and publicity requirements. The open procedure allows all interested 
stakeholders to submit a tender while the restricted procedure allows companies to participate 
upon invitation. The advantage of this for procurement authorities is that a good number of 
bids can be attracted. On the other hand, the restricted competition demands for more 
transparency and time limits in order to allow fair treatment and equal opportunities. This can 
be time-consuming as well as costly for the contracting authorities. The negotiated procedure 
implies that contracting authorities contact the companies (or economic operators) of their 
choice and negotiate the terms. The benefit of this procedure is that complex problems can be 
addressed in case the contracting authority has no clear view on how to present a solution. 
However, the process is lengthy and especially costly for the companies involved. Similar to 
this procedure is the competitive dialogue in which the contracting authority enters into talks 
with several economic operators in order to come to a solution for a complex problem. The 
last two procedures both pose a problem given its lengthy process, however, could be useful 
under certain circumstances. 
 
The EU Treaties provide the general principles applicable to public procurement law. The 
main articles are: 
 
-   Article 34 TFEU on the free movement of goods within the EU;  
-   Article 49 TFEU on the right of establishment in another Member State;  
-   Article 56 TFEU on the right to provide services in another Member State;  
-   and Article 18 TFEU on the prohibition of all forms of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.  
Directive 71/305/EEC was the first of a list that regulates public procurement on the EU 
level. Since then, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures have been put in place to 
ensure companies to enjoy fundamental freedoms in the competition for public procurement 
contracts. The context against which public procurement unfolds has to be in line with 
principles of free movement of goods, the right of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services. When public contracts exceed certain amounts, EU coordination of national 
procedures is necessary in order to ensure competition and protect the functioning of the 
internal market.  
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At the stage of drafting this study, the principal pieces of EU legislation were: 
 
-   Directive 2004/18/EC for the public sector; 
-   Directive 2004/17/EC for contracts awards by utilities; 
-   Directive 2009/81/EC for contracts awards on defence and security;  
-   and Directive 2007/66/EC on remedies.  
The Single Market Act prioritises the reform of EU public procurement legislation, hence the 
EC published three proposals in 2011 (COM(2011)896 and COM(2011)895) to replace the 
first two Directives. Further, the European Commission introduced a new Directive on 
concession contracts (COM(2011)897). In February 2014 the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union adopted the new Directives. Member States have had until 
April 2016 to transpose the new rules into national law with the exception for rules relating e-
procurement, which was extended to October 2018. 
 
1. Classic sector public procurement 
 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contract, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts is of particular importance in the process and named the 
“Classical Directive”. It applies to public contracts deployed by a contracting authority for 
supplies, services and works.235 The scope of the Directive defines thresholds and excluded 
or reserved contracts.  
 
The thresholds are pre-established by the European Commission every number of years and 
apply to public contracts estimated (excluding Value Added Tax) to be no less than a certain 
(X) amount of EUR for public supply and service contracts awarded by central government 
authorities (ministries, national public establishments); X amount of EUR for public supply 
and service contracts awarded by other contracting authorities (covering certain products in 
the defence sector, research and development, telecommunications, etc.); and X amount of 
EUR for works contracts. 
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The excluded contracts refer to those covered by special sectors such as telecommunication 
network exploitation; contracts declared to be secret or affecting the interest of a Member 
State; contracts after international agreements; and contracts concerning, for example, 
acquisition or rental of existing buildings, purchase, sale or transfer of financial instruments, 
service concessions, etc. 
 
Public contracting is subject to a set of rules defined as: contract award criteria; publication 
and transparency rules; technical specifications; anti-fraud and corruption conditions; 
traditional and electronic means of communication; and electronic auctions. 
 
Contract award criteria are either based on the lowest price only or in combination with 
various linked criteria such as quality-price, technical merit, aesthetic and functional 
characteristics, environmental characteristics, etc. When these criteria are set, the contracting 
authority is to specify relative weighting. 
 
The European Commission has set standards to transparency and publication of information 
on public contracting. Overall this implies that a contracting authority informs the European 
Commission and/or publishes notices nationally. Essential is the timely notification of 
decision taken on contract awards. This should include grounds for not awarding contracts 
and if requested by the economic operator reasons for the rejection. 
 
The technical specifications set the characteristics of the required service, supply or material. 
Important is that these specification do not create an unjustified obstacle to competition and 
that the contract delivers according to the needs of the contracting authority. 
 
Economic operators are subject to conditions that aim to check their economic and financial 
capacity, and technical and professional knowledge or abilities. These conditions aim to 
combat fraud and corruption and can exclude companies that have been found guilty of 
participating in a criminal organisation, money laundering, corruption or fraud. Companies 
may also be excluded based on bankruptcy, prior convictions, grave professional misconduct, 
unpaid taxes or social security contributions or other false declarations.  
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The Classical Directive also specifies different public procurement procedures, namely: open 
procedure; restricted procedure; negotiated procedure; and competitive dialogue. 
 
The open procedure means that all economic operators are allowed to submit a tender. Time 
limits are set to minimum amount of days from the date on which the contract notice was 
published. The restricted procedure decides that companies need to request participation in 
the procedure and, only after invitation, are able to submit a tender. The negotiated procedure 
allows the contracting authority to consult the economic operators of its choice and negotiate 
terms with them. This is subject to justification. The contracting authority can use the 
procedure with prior publication of a contract notice under specific circumstances, such as 
“following another procedure, which revealed the presence of irregular tenders”.236 The 
competitive dialogue refers to complex project contracts in which the contracting authority 
does not possess the knowledge to define technical solutions. A minimum of number of 
candidates is to be invited to discuss solutions for the contract based on award criteria. At the 
end of the dialogue, the companies submit tenders / bids. 
 
Works or service concessions refer to contracts in which the source of revenue for the 
economic operator consists either in the right of exploitation solely or this in combination 
with a payment. Public works concessions of a value exceeding a certain monetary threshold 
are subject to specific rules. 
 
2. Special sector public procurement 
 
This refers to Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors. As with the “Classical Directive”, the so-called 
“Sectors Directive” also applies to supplies, services and works. An important difference is 
that in this case an additional stakeholder can be involved, namely a public undertaking. The 
nature of the special sectors, often delivering primary public services, could result in a close 
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collaboration between the contracting authority and the public undertaking. The prior tends to 
exercise a dominant influence of the latter, either through financial participation, ownership 
or governance. The Directive particularly “aims to preserve equal treatment between public 
sector and private sector contracting bodies”237. 
 
The Utilities Directive applies to areas such as: 
 
-   Service delivery to the public in connection to production, transport or distribution of 
gas, heat or electricity; 
-   Service delivery to the public in connection to production, transport or distribution of 
water; 
-   Water management activities, e.g. land drainage, irrigation, hydraulic engineering 
projects and sewage treatment; 
-   Service delivery to the public in transport by railway, bus, tramways, etc.; 
-   Postal services reserved under the terms of Directive 97/67/EC; 
-   Exploitation of a geographical area for exploring for or extracting oil, gas, coal or 
other solid fuels, as well as the provision of airports, ports, etc. 
If effective competition exists in the sector, public contracts are no longer subject to the 
Directive. The scope of the Directive defines thresholds and excluded or reserved contracts. 
 
Also here, the thresholds are pre-established by the European Commission every X number 
of years and apply to public contracts estimated (excluding VAT) to be no less than an fixed 
amount of EUR in case of supply and service contracts and X amount of EUR for works 
contracts. The excluded and reserved contract are those dealing with, for example, works and 
service concession in the sectors, secret contracts that require special security measures or are 
pursuant to international rules, contracts awarded in the fields of defence and security 
covered by Directive 2009/81/EC, etc. 
 
The rules applicable to the contract are similar to the rules explained above for the Classical 
Directive. A difference is that in case of special sector, the contracting authority can reject 
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tenders that are abnormally low, for example because the tenderer obtained state aid which 
was granted illegally. Also, tenders that contain products amounting to over 50% of its value, 
which originate in third countries without EU market access agreements. The public 
procurement procedures are similar to the one for the Classic Directive. A difference is that in 
case of special sector, no competitive dialogue has been introduced. 
 
3. Defense sector public procurement 
 
This refers to Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply 
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence 
and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC. It applies to public 
contracts in the fields of defence and security for works, supplies and services related to 
military or sensitive equipment. The 2005 Green Paper on defence procurement highlighted 
the importance of creating a European market for defence equipment238. 
 
Monetary thresholds for defence procurement are fixed for supply and service contracts and 
for works contracts. The Directive excludes contracts governed by procedures pursuant to an 
international agreement, contracts involving exchange of secret information, intelligence 
services, foreign missions, etc. 
 
The procedures available for the defence sector are the restricted and negotiated. The open 
procedure is excluded, but Member States may use competitive dialogue in the case of 
particularly complex contracts. Besides, the Directive allows for framework contracts not 
exceeding a specific duration of years. The rules for transparency state that contracting 
authorities may publish prior information notice on their buyer profiles or on TED. However, 
the contracting authorities are obliged to publish contract notices on TED, except for 
exceptional negotiated procedures without publication of a contract notice. 
 
4. Remedies directives 
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The Remedies Directives239 have as a main objective the national review systems, imposing 
some common standards intended to ensure that rapid and effective means of redress are 
available in all EU countries in cases where bidders consider that contracts have been 
awarded unfairly. Before 2007 there were two remedies directives: Remedies Directive for 
the utilities sector (Directive 92/13/EEC) and Remedies Directive for the public sector 
(Directive 89/665/EEC).  
 
The above Directives were substantially amended by Directive 2007/66/EC, which 
introduced two main features. The first feature is a ‘standstill period’, meaning that 
contracting authorities need to wait for at least ten days after deciding who has won the 
public contract and before the contract can actually be signed. This period gives bidders time 
to examine the decision and decide whether to initiate a review procedure. The second feature 
is more stringent rules against illegal direct awards of public contracts. National courts will 
be able to render these contracts ineffective if they have been illegally awarded without 
transparency and prior competitive tendering. The basic objective of the amendment was to 
improve the national review procedures that businesses can use when they consider that a 
public authority has awarded a contract unfairly. 
 
5.   New EU procurement system 
The Classical Directive (Directive 2004/18/EC) and the Sectors Directive (Directive 
2004/17/EC) are replaced from 18 April 2016 by respectively Directive 2014/24/EU on 
public procurement and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors. The new rules are intended to simplify 
procurement procedures and make these more flexible. It should: allow contracting 
authorities to be better able to negotiate terms of contracts; shorten deadlines for procedures; 
and decrease tender documentation. The new system should also allow contracting authorities 
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to implement environmental policies, as well as those governing social integration and 
innovation. In other words, public procurement is becoming a policy strategy instrument. Part 
of the effort to reduce administrative burden reflects on the European Commission adopted 
European Single Procurement Document (ESPD) on 5 January 2016240. The ESPD replaces 
the differing processes that currently exist in Member States to tender for public contracts, it 
will simplify access of economic operators to cross-border tendering procedures and reduce 
administrative burden in relation to tendering administrative paperwork. 
 
Concerning transparency and anti-corruption, the new public procurement Directives include 
various measures. The concept of ‘conflicts of interest’ is defined at EU level. This aims to 
simplify the identification and management of fraud and conflict of interest cases. EU 
Member States are asked to take appropriate measures to effectively prevent, identify and 
remedy such cases. The definition reads: “a situation in which persons involved in, or able to 
influence, the procedure by which a purchaser awards a contract have a direct or indirect 
financial, economic or other personal interest that could jeopardise their impartiality and 
independence in that procedure”241. 
 
Further, prior consultations in which economic operators interact with contracting authorities 
could lead to distortion of competition. The new Directives aim to better regulate such 
consultations by requiring the contracting authorities to take steps to ensure this does not 
affect competition. For example, any information that is shared with the consulted economic 
operator should be sent to other participating companies. If fair competition cannot be 
guaranteed, as a last resort, companies may be excluded. Grounds for exclusion are 
strengthened and extended. Currently companies can be excluded on grounds of conviction 
for fraud and corruption. Added to this are also situations in which companies unduly 
influence the decision-making process leading to the award of a contract. Also false 
statements in connection with the procedure for the award of a contract may provide ground 
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for exclusion. Contracting authorities and Member States may impose exclusion but 
companies do have the right to demonstrate trustworthiness by providing evidence of the 
steps taken to correct the problem or repair damage caused. 
 
The new public procurement Directives also clarify rules on modifications of contracts during 
their term without calling for a new tender procedure. For example, new calls for tender are 
not required for modification that are not substantive, in other words, do not change the 
nature or the economic balance of the contract. Also in case the value does not exceed the 
thresholds for application of the directives and is less than 10% of the value of the original 
contract for goods, services and 15% for work. Further, modifications are allowed that are 
specified in the contract or arising from unforeseen events or relating to additional work that 
can only be done by the contracted company, as long as this does not increase the price with 
50% of the initial contract. 
 
Also transparency has a key role in fighting corruption in procurement. For example, EU 
Member States must meet monitoring requirements and report violations to the respective 
national authorities, publicise monitoring activities, and submit a report to the European 
Commission every three years including feedback on sources of misapplication or legal 
uncertainty. This includes any problems in the application of rules, the level of participation 
by small-medium enterprises, the prevention, the detection and the monitoring of fraud, 
corruption, conflict of interest and other cases with serious irregularities. Also contracting 
authorities must keep copies of contracts for amounts greater than EUR 1 million for service 
and supply, and EUR 10 million for works, throughout the duration of the respective contract. 
Contacts should be available to the public unless national rules on access to information or 
data protection prevent this. Finally, contracting authorities should issue specific reports for 
each public procurement award procedure that explains the main decisions relating the 
procedure concerned, report any conflicts of interest detected and steps taken in this regards, 
and forward this to the European Commission and national authorities on request. 
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In May 2016, the European Commission notified twenty-one EU Member States that they 
have failed to fully transpose the three directives on public procurement and concession into 
national law242. 
   Key principles of public procurement relating corruption 
Various principles related to public procurement are important to establish context for 
corruption, such as integrity, transparency, accountability and competition.  
 
The OECD defines integrity in public procurement as follows: 
“the use of funds, resources, assets, and authority, according to the intended official 
purposes, to be used in line with public interest”243.  
 
This means that: “procurement procedures are transparent and promote fair and equal 
treatment of suppliers/bidders”; “procurement practitioners behaviour is in line with the 
public purpose of their organisation”; “systems are in place to challenge procurement 
decisions, ensure accountability and promote public scrutiny”. Violation of integrity may 
lead to various forms of illicit behaviour: corruption; fraud and theft of resources; conflict of 
interest; collusion; abuse and manipulation of information; discriminatory treatment in the 
public procurement process; waste and abuse of organisational resources. 
 
Transparency is considered a key tool to achieve the objectives of public procurement and it 
is considered most effective in the prevention of corruption244. Arrowsmith, Linarelli and 
Wallace (2000) highlight that transparency implies publicity of contract opportunities as well 
as rules that govern each step in the procurement procedure (i.e. disclosure of award criteria) 
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245. This allows for equality among all bidders enabling them to sufficiently prepare their 
participation in the procedure. Further, transparency supports rule-based decision-making that 
limits the discretion of procuring entities or officers. Limiting discretion prevents poor 
decision-making and abuse. Finally, transparency allows for better verification and 
enforcement of rules. 
 
Transparency in public procurement is a contested objective given that the implementation of 
the principle bears costs, which could weaken procurement economic objectives. Open 
procedures could carry bigger costs in bid preparation and evaluation, which reflects on both 
the contracting authority and the economic operators. The public sector places high value on 
avoiding corruption but also on accountability in decision-making. Not only the economic 
efficiency in procurement is important, but also in the public sector the perceived legitimacy 
of public decisions. This legitimacy is fostered by due procedures in awarding public 
contracts even if due processes may represent more economic costs (i.e. less economic 
efficiency). 
 
Political and administrative accountability refers to responsibilities of the government, 
politicians and civil servants to the public through the legally established accountability 
mechanisms. Accountability is together with transparency key in developing strong 
procurement capacity246. For example, this parts from the assumption that elected officials 
delegate decision-making power to procurement officials in order to achieve professionalism. 
After all, the latter has greater knowledge and experience as to what goods, services and 
works are required for the public and under which terms247. Weak accountability in public 
procurement can first of all result in waste of resources, corruption, misconduct, etc. In 
addition, it distorts incentives of would-be providers to participate in public procurement 
given that weak accountability of officials renders bidders defenceless in case or arbitrariness 
                                                            
 
245 Ibid. 
246 PROCUREMENT CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT CENTRE (2010). Accountability in public procurement – 
transparency and the role of civil society [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.unpcdc.org/media/142496/story%20of%20an%20institution%20-%20accountability.pdf [Accessed 
on 02-06-2013]. 
247 SOUDRY, O. (2007). A principal-agent analysis of accountability in public procurement [WWW]. Available 
from: http://www.ippa.org/IPPC2/BOOK/Chapter_19.pdf [Accessed on 02-06-2013]. 
  
 
132 
in procurement decisions. Finally, weak accountability affects society as end-users of 
potential economically irrational procured goods, services and works.  
 
Finally, besides transparency, fair competition is considered an important tool to achieve the 
objectives of public procurement. Competition prevents corruption and discrimination. At the 
same time it affects the quality of procurement decisions and, more crucially, the final price 
of the goods or services procured because that price will be more adapted to actual market 
trends. Competition is essential in guaranteeing access of would-be bidders to public markets, 
fair treatment and equal opportunities. As with transparency, also the level of desired 
competition is debated. For example, open procedures could prevent long-term relationships 
to develop between an economic operator and the government. But, long-term cooperation 
could be beneficial and incentivise better performance. Also, open procedures complicate 
bargain deals that governments can strike with economic operators. However, despite all 
economic inefficiencies that competitive procedures may bear, competition adds to 
legitimacy of public actions and decisions in procurement. 
   Public procurement on the EU level 
Public procurement plays an important role in the interaction between key actors in most 
policy areas. Of particular importance are the health sector, economic and defence policy 
sectors in which a network of state (elected and public officials) and non-state (economic 
operators and interest groups) interact and negotiate shares of power and, of course, 
resources. Institutional actors strongly influence the interactions between policy actors, 
particularly relevant when looking at the EU level that includes a multi-level governance 
structure. Therefore it is important to understand the form and function of policy networks. 
When applying institutionalism to policy network analysis in the European Union it could be 
argued that a pressure pluralist network applies. This type of network identifies low 
government organization as well as low organization of societal interests. No actor is pre-
eminent as the state is fragmented and accessible to exogenous demands and pressures. There 
is limited capacity for centralised coordination. Non-state actors are also fragmented and 
numerous with relatively weak internal leadership. The EU displays these characteristics in 
which national non-state interest groups rarely advocate unity and allow national interests to 
dominate their agenda. At the same time the state actors display similar characteristics. The 
decision-making on the European political landscape reflects either ideological patterns based 
on national interests or patterns of pro/anti European integration. 
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Apart from playing an important role in policy network analysis, institutions also underline 
the state´s capacity to achieve its goals and objectives. Given the policy network weakness in 
the EU, state capacity could be essential in addressing effectively the problem of corruption. 
The degree of state autonomy is important as it is an indicator of capacity of states to reform 
systems despite societal or political opposition 248 . At the same time it could enhance 
institutional means by which policy makers can adequately coordinate policy 
implementation. For this a professional bureaucracy should be developed with sufficient 
resources. Finally, states can best operate when understanding and including the needs of key 
social partners into their policy. Inclusiveness is essential in designing positive impact and 
avoiding deviant behaviour.    
 
With the revival of institutionalism discussed earlier in this study, the importance of formal 
and informal rules for the functioning of a stable society has been rediscovered, but also the 
importance of the state in its role to create, reform and defend them. Institutions are today 
considered as rules of the game and regularized patterns of interaction that are understood, 
practiced and usually accepted by social partners249. The social partners expect these rules 
will be accepted and respected by the rest. Formal rules can be rigorously changed and 
enforced by the state contrary to informal rules. The latter are created, communicated and 
applied outside the official channels and more difficult for the state to alter250. Besides, 
informal rules can also be useful in response to the failing of formal rules in a certain 
situation251. 
 
In order to channel interactions in an effective manner and avoiding inefficient behaviour, 
fraud and delinquency, a society needs “good institutions”. This means legitimate, fair, 
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efficient, stable and flexible institutions252 . These institutions are required to implement 
public policies while interact with and involve the government, society and private sector. 
“Good governance” is required from good institutions, which can result in economic 
development and social integration253.  
 
Ensuring that economic development becomes sustainable can be achieved by strengthening 
the rule of law as well as a public sector free from corruption254. For this a high quality 
government is required meaning a professional bureaucracy, professional ethics and 
accountable political institutions255. It implies effectiveness and efficiency when attending 
public needs as well as impartiality, understood as equal treatment to all people regardless of 
personal relationships, and transparency256.  
 
In short, quality of government, being responsible for the creation of good governance (and 
democratic quality), must generate a whole range of formal and informal rules that when 
being legitimate, fair, efficient, stable and flexible, constrain inefficient conduct, arbitrary, 
corrupt and illegal interaction between actors (such as principal and agents), and even 
encourage the opposite which is efficiency, impartiality and integrity. This set of rules 
specifies coherent processes for its implementation or logic of appropriateness257. Besides, it 
needs organizations that are not only rational actors in the institutional game, but also moral 
actors that accept the values and its purpose and come to respect and ensure the impartial 
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application of the rules and processes entrusted to them258. Considering the state is not the 
only actor for achieving good governance, quality government needs the support of a 
competitive, honest market and an active, vigilant civil society. For this one needs 
enforcement capabilities and incentives to be used wisely.   
 
The EU plays an important role in facilitating international business and creating a level 
playing field. The EU Public Procurement Directives promote companies in Member States 
to procure across the national border. At the same time, the EU is an important player in 
negotiating access for EU companies to public procurement in third countries. This is 
especially important for securing jobs inside the EU. Being one of the world´s biggest public 
procurement markets, the EU has leverage when negotiating with third countries and at the 
same time possesses normative power to promote positive changes in third countries. 
Promoting EU procurement objectives such as integrity, accountability and value for money 
in third countries will help creating a global level playing field. Also, the EU could play an 
important role in informing European companies how to access public procurement markets 
in third countries. It is important, however, that the EU executes these activities carefully 
without undermining the procurement principles that are promoted inside the EU. After all, 
supporting EU companies in securing business abroad could be perceived as exerting undue 
political influence.  
 
Public procurement is increasingly seen as a possible lever within a strategy for wider 
economic, social and environmental change. Rather than being a simple business transaction, 
public procurement expanded its scope and now includes sustainability criteria, 
environmental standards and respect for labour conditions. In this sense, public procurement 
is acquiring a strategic dimension. This complicates the safeguarding of integrity in the 
procurement process. Supranational institutions, such as the EU and the WTO, are challenged 
with the question as to which international regulations allow for the inclusion of economic, 
social and environmental considerations in the procurement process while at the same time 
ensuring fair and transparent governmental decision-making. In other words, the procurement 
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policy requirements, such as economic, environmental and social goals, could conflict with 
management requirements, such as quality, timeliness, costs, competition and transparency.  
4.5   Corruption in public procurement 
Corruption in public procurement can affect economic performance and state functioning259. 
While determining the damage of corruption is difficult, scholars do warn that the objectives 
of public procurement, be it social, economic or environmental, are difficult to attain once 
corruption is involved260 . Bribery–induced violations of procurement procedures can be 
carried out in many different ways but that overall these can be categorized in two groups: 
hidden violations of procurement rules; legitimate deviations from procurement rules261.  
 
Determining corruption in public procurement is a challenging task. There are examples 
available where corruption is thought to have caused budget overruns. However, while some 
might be caused by corruption, other factors also weigh in such as miscalculation or 
unpredicted external factors. Flyvbjerg and Molloy (2011) list cost overruns as a result of 
strategic underbidding or manipulation by officials to gain approval for favoured projects262. 
Overruns are especially discerning as it can more easily hide kickbacks, mainly because 
oversight is more rigorous during the assigning of contracts. Inflated costs can already appear 
at the start of a procurement project and possible damage can perhaps only be observed by 
benchmarking costs against other similar projects.  
 
Rose-Ackerman describes three scenarios for corruption in public procurement263. The first 
involves a scenario in which both costs and characteristics of the purchase are known ahead 
                                                            
 
259 ROSE-ACKERMAN, S., and PALIFKA, B. (2016). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and 
Reform. Second edition. Cambridge University Press. 
260 Ibid. 
261 SOREIDE, T. (2002).  Corruption in Public Procurement, cause, consequence and cures [WWW]. Available 
from: http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/corruption-in-public-procurement-causes-consequences-and-
cures/ [Accessed on 08-10-2016]. 
262 FLYVBJERG, B., and MOLLOY, E. (2011). Delusion, Deception and Corruption in Major Infrastrucute: 
Causes Consequences and Cures. In Rose-Ackerman, S. And Soreide, T., eds., International Handbook on the 
Economics of Corruption, Volume Two. Chelthenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  
263 ROSE-ACKERMAN, S., and PALIFKA, B. (2016). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and 
Reform. Second edition. Cambridge University Press. 
  
 
137 
of time. Bribes are used to give companies a bigger share of the profit. The second scenario 
refers to inflated budgets, which allow for bribes to be hidden in the extra costs. In practice 
this implies that bribes are paid with taxpayers money. The third scenario involves the 
modification of the nature of the project in ways that benefit corrupt companies. Such a 
scenario allows for creating also future payoff opportunities. It can severely limit competition 
as officials might prefer to work with corrupt companies. It might also drive the formation of 
cartels or bidding rings as “honest” companies might decide to exit the market.  
 
Goods that are purchased for consumption might be more vulnerable for corruption 
considering that ex post it is difficult to discover whether goods were actually delivered. The 
same counts for services, while public works are more permanent and therefor can be 
scrutinised ex post. However, at the same time, public works can be very complex purchases, 
involving multiple stakeholders, and thus creating more corruption opportunities. According 
to Rose-Ackerman, various strategies are used by officials to corrupt public procurement264. 
For example, officials might procure goods, works or services that have no macro economic 
rationale. For example, high-capital investments simplify the possibility of obtaining 
kickbacks. One way to look at this is looking at the association between high levels of 
corruption and higher levels of public investment as a share of the GDP. More corrupt 
countries might spend less of maintenance and operations and have a lower quality of 
infrastructure265. Public investment might be preferred over private investment. Bel, Estache 
and Foucart (2014) showed that in Spain there has been so much construction that supply 
exceeds demand in many places, resulting in higher costs for government in the form of 
subsidies266. Politically well-connected construction companies benefitted while taxpayers 
paid. Another example is the purchase of cement. For example, Rose-Ackerman notes how in 
Italy the annual per capital consumption of cement has been double that of the US, triple that 
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of Germany and Great Britain267. Rose-Ackerman also comments on the notion that people 
tend to value the present more than the promise of any given thing in the future, the so-called 
“discount rate”. People who are more focused on the present have a higher discount rate. 
Officials that want to collect bribes for procurement projects might prefer an inefficient time 
path of net social benefits. Any negative consequences from the bribe might this way come to 
light in the future, perhaps when the official is already off scene. It is not uncommon for 
politicians in general to be accused of having high discount rates. 
 
Rose-Ackerman (2016) highlights that officials and companies can select or design projects 
with corrupt opportunities, even if these are of little social value268 . Projects might be 
designed that are difficult to monitor from the outside. Also, projects can be designed that 
generate big payoffs up front, which result in low long-term social benefits. Companies could 
induce officials (i.e. through lobbying) to underestimate environmental or social impact or 
overestimate demand. Bel et al. refer to the latter in the case of Spain’s investments in freight 
rail and roads269. As a consequence, most concessions awarded since the late 1990s are on the 
border of bankruptcy. Companies might pay to be included in the list of prequalified bidders 
and this way limit competition. Also official might be bribed to specify bidding specifications 
to one single corrupt bidder. More sophisticated forms of corruption could include colluding 
with competitors to submit high bids. Bribery can succeed in circumventing competitive 
bidding requirements, this way making effective use of laws that bypass competitive bidding. 
Another form of corruption may be intentionally in return for a commission leaving tasks off 
the specification lists, allowing this way for lower bids. Later these tasks can be included as 
unforeseen tasks which overruns the budget. Companies can also collude which needs to be 
addressed simultaneously with corruption. The reason is that if anti-corruption measures only 
target payments of bribes to officials, there might have less possibility to be bribed, but 
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companies continue colluding to share the market. In fact, only focusing on the officials 
might even make cartel forming cheaper for companies. Andvig (1995) introduces the 
concept “uplift” referring to an official proposing to the lowest bidder to increase the offer 
before the deadline and this way sharing the profit once the lowest bidder is selected270. 
Another area for concern is when companies function as shadow companies and once 
awarded the contract subcontract other companies. These subcontracted companies might be 
affiliated to officials. A method used in procurement that can distort competition but is not 
necessarily corrupt is using offsets. This refers to contract provisions that promise to provide 
benefits to the contracting authority by using local suppliers. Offsets can undermine 
competition and harmful in case they are used to inflate costs and distort procurement 
objectives. Once a company wins a contract it might try to bribe to get prices inflated, to do 
extra work or to save on quality. A drive to award a contract to a bribe-paying company 
might also be that it provides for multiple opportunities to extort bribes given that contracts 
could be longer relationships. 
 
According to Rose-Ackerman, systemic corruption can “introduce inefficiencies that reduce 
competitiveness. It may limit the number of bidders, favour those with inside connections 
over the most efficient candidates, limit the information available to participants, and 
introduce added transaction costs” 271. The impact of corruption can be significant especially 
considering that concession contracts allow private players access to exploitation of public 
resources. Corruption can have severe impact on the resources, but also the earnings that 
government should get out of this. Impact of corrupt concession contracts is seen in the 
company’s time path of exploitation and unwillingness to invest in fixed capital. Also, the 
impact can be large on environmental, archaeological and social standards 272 . Also 
privatisations are vulnerable for corruption. First, it is difficult to value assets of large state 
enterprises. Weak conflict of interest laws make insider dealing easy. Second, corrupt 
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officials may present information to the public that undervalues public enterprises. Insiders 
are then informed about the actual value and offer. In addition, they could be offered lenient 
regulatory oversight. Third, privatised enterprises are worth more if they retain the monopoly 
they had when public. There is a conflict between revenue maximization and market 
competition but this can be circumvented through corrupt dealings. This way corrupt official 
can protect privatised companies for personal benefit. Fourth, privatised firms may continue 
to engage in corrupt behaviour. 
   Forms of corruption in public procurement 
According to the UNCAC, corruption in public procurement can take various forms: corrupt 
practice; fraudulent practice; collusive practice; coercive practice. 
 
Corrupt practices refer to “offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, 
anything of value to influence the action of a public official in the selection process or in 
contract execution”273 . Bribery and facilitation payments can be given to an official in 
exchange for his or her use of entrusted powers. Bribing includes the involvement of two 
stakeholders: the one receiving the bribe and the one paying the bribe. The payment can be 
made to receive preferential treatment in a service the public official is already obliged to 
provide. Bribes can also be used to bypass laws and regulations or intentionally limit access 
to decision-making processes, such as public procurement.  
 
Fraudulent practice refers to “a misrepresentation or omission of facts in order to influence a 
selection process or the execution of a contract”274. Trading influence or influence peddling 
is a common type of fraudulent behaviour. This is most commonly described as “the situation 
where a person misuses his influence over the decision-making process for a third party 
(person, institution or government) in return for his loyalty, money or any other material or 
immaterial undue advantage” 275 . These acts can be power-oriented, which focuses on 
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winning offices and influencing those who hold them, but also in pursuit of wealth, which is 
targeted at public contracts or policy implementation276. 
 
Collusive practice refers to “a scheme or arrangement between two or more respondents with 
or without the knowledge of the procuring entity, designed to establish prices at artificial, 
non-competitive levels”277. Bid rigging is the most common type that falls under this form of 
corruption. This means that bidders form a horizontal relationship determining who amongst 
themselves should be awarded the contract. Collusive practices are often cartel offences and 
are prohibited by competition law. 
 
Coercive or obstructive practices refer to “harming or threatening to harm, directly or 
indirectly, persons or their property to influence their participation in a procurement 
process, or affect the execution of a contract”278. 
   Vulnerability of the public procurement process 
Campos, Pradhan and Recanatini highlight that the procurement process is “perhaps the 
single most corruption-prone area”279 . Ware et al. (2007) presents several nodes in the 
procurement process were corrupt benefits can be created. Understanding the weaknesses in 
the public procurement processes will be important to better understand measures that can be 
taken to confront corruption and highlight which areas can be strengthened. For example, 
public procurement vulnerabilities can be addressed by legislative means. Procurement 
legislation focuses mainly on the bidding process while contract law applies to the post-
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bidding phase. This generates a certain level of transparency, less found in other areas of 
public procurement, such as the pre-bidding phase. For this phase it is particularly important 
to consider the political influence on this sector. Political interference in public procurement 
is an apparent challenge throughout the entire procurement cycle.  
 
1.   Pre-bidding phase 
The pre-bidding phase is particularly vulnerable for corruption due to the influence of 
external actors such as politicians, consultants and lobbyists280. According to the OECD, the 
most common risks include281: 
 
Lack of adequate needs assessment, planning, and budgeting of public procurement 
 
-   The lack of adequate needs assessment, deficient business cases, poor procurement 
planning 
-   Failure to budget realistically, deficiency in the budget 
-   Procurement is not aligned with the overall investment decision-making process in 
departments 
-   Interference of high-level officials in the decision to procure 
-   Informal agreement on contract 
Requirements that are not adequately or objectively defined 
 
-   Technical specifications 
o   Tailored for one bidder 
o   Vague or not based on performance requirements 
-   Selection and award criteria 
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o   Not clearly and objectively defined 
o   Not established and announced in advance of the closing of the bid 
o   Unqualified companies being licensed, for example through the provision of fraudulent 
tests or quality assurance certificates 
Inadequate of irregular choice of the procedure 
 
-   Lack of procurement strategy for the use of non-competitive procedures based on the 
value and complexity of the procurement which creates administrative costs 
-   Abuse of non-competitive procedures on the basis of legal exceptions 
o   Contract splitting in order to remain below monetary thresholds from which public 
competition is mandatory 
o   Abuse of the “extreme urgency” clause to avoid competitive tendering 
o   Abuse of other exceptions to competition based on a technicality or exclusive rights 
o   Untested continuation of existing contracts 
Timeframe for the preparation of the bid is insufficient or not consistently applied across 
bidders 
 
-   A time frame that is not consistently applied for all bidders, for example, information 
disclosed earlier for a specific bidder 
-   A time frame that is not sufficient for ensuring a level playing field 
 
2.   Bidding phase 
The most common risks at the bidding process are: 
 
Invitation to bid 
 
-   Information on the procurement opportunity is not provided in a consistent manner 
-   Absence of public notice for the invitation to bid 
-   Sensitive or non-public information disclosed 
-   Lack of competition or in some cases collusive bidding that leads to inadequate process or 
even illegal price fixing 
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Awarding of the contract 
 
-   Conflict of interest and corruption in: 
o   The evaluation process (e.g. familiarity with bidders over the years, personal interests 
such as gifts or additional/secondary employment, no effective implementation of the 
four-eyes principle, etc.) 
o   The approval process: no effective separation of financial, contractual and project 
authorities in delegation of authority structure 
-   Lack of access to records on the procedure 
 
3.   Post-bidding phase 
The most common risks at the post-bidding phase are: 
 
Contract management 
 
-   Failure to monitor performance of contractor, in particular lack of supervision over the 
quality and timing of the process, that results in: 
o   Substantial change in contract conditions to allow more time and higher prices for the 
bidder 
o   Product substitution or sub-standard work or service not meeting contract 
specifications 
o   Theft of new assets before delivery to end-user or before being recorded in the asset 
register 
-   Subcontractors and partners are chosen in a non-transparent way, or not kept accountable 
Order and payment 
 
-   Deficient separation of duties and/or lack of supervision of public officials 
o   False accounting and cost misallocation or cost migration between contracts 
o   Late payments of invoices, postponement of payments to have prices reviewed to 
increase the economic value of the contract 
o   False or duplicate invoicing for goods and services not supplied and for interim 
payments in advance of entitlement 
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Apart from open procedures, several alternatives are defined such as restrictive and selective 
procedures as well as negotiated / limited procedures and competitive dialogue that can be 
used under strict conditions. Exceptions to competitive procedures are based on the specific 
nature of the contract (e.g. with technical or artistic qualifications), value of the contract, 
commodity trading, extreme urgencies and national security. Limiting competition on itself 
constitute a risk for irregularities which means special attention should be given to ensuring 
integrity. 
   Irregularities in public procurement 
Throughout all the stages of public procurement, types of corruption or fraudulent behaviour 
can occur. International organisations and civil society organisations, such as the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Transparency 
International, but also governments, supreme audit authorities, tax agencies etc. have 
identified irregularities in public procurement processes. 
 
1.   Pre-bidding phase 
Needs assessment 
 
-   The investment or purchase is unnecessary and benefits private interests 
-   New capacity is installed instead of systemic leak detection or grid loss reduction 
-   The investment is economically unjustified or environmentally damaging 
-   Goods or services are overestimated to favour a particular provider 
-   Contracts are included in the budget which favour political supporters 
-   Contracts are included in the budget for which kickbacks or bribes were paid 
-   Contracts are included in the budget that favour old employers 
Pre-bidding 
 
-   Bidding document and terms of reference are designed to restrict competition and favour 
preselected providers 
-   Bidding documents and terms of reference are designed in an unnecessary complex 
manner to obstruct monitoring of the contract 
-   Grounds for direct contracting are abused (e.g. slicing the thresholds) 
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-   Insider trading in influence (e.g. receiving the Terms of Reference before other potential 
bidders do) 
 
2.   Bidding phase 
Contract awarding 
 
-   Decision-makers are biased (e.g. due to kickbacks, bribes, ideology, political affinity or 
conflict of interest) 
-   Selection criteria are subjective which allows for biases in decision-making 
-   Particular bidders are given preferential treatment through the exchange of confidential 
information 
-   Particular bidders receive further clarification without sharing this information with other 
bidders 
-   The bid evaluation is not made public 
-   Unnecessarily high price as a result of limited or non-existent competition 
 
3.   Post-bidding phase 
Contract implementation phase 
 
-   Winning bidders deliver poor quality, for example to compensate for bribing costs 
-   Those who check the quality of the delivered goods are the same as those who defined 
that quality (i.e. management and control of the management are in the same hands) 
-   Contract renegotiation introduce substantial changes in the original contract 
-   Contract renegotiation increases significantly the costs of the contract 
-   Contract renegotiation is used which contradicts the essence of having a bidding process 
-   Changes in the orders are gradually introduced in order to avoid control mechanisms 
-   False or inexistent claims are filed 
-   Contract managers are bribed to look the other way 
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   Interface of public and private stakeholders 
The ability of a public procurement system to meet its objectives is partially ensured through 
its regulations but it is influenced by various factors, such as the market forces, internal 
forces, legal and socio-economic factors, and the political environment282. The latter is of 
particular interest when analysing corruption in public procurement. It concerns the 
involvement in democracy of many different actors from the private and public sector with 
different interests, beliefs and objectives. These actors for example aim to influence 
legislative processes that change procurement laws, as well as their implementation. Also, 
actors try to influence the budget authorization and appropriations processes resulting in 
compromises between political actors, procurement officials and private economic 
operators 283 . These relations could involve political pressure on decisions taken by 
procurement officials or private economic operators lobbying political actors to influence 
contract allocation. It is here at the interface of political decision-makers, procurement 
officials and private economic operations were anti-corruption measures are to be tested. It 
reflects the challenges in public-private cooperation as well as issues beyond legislation such 
as qualification of civil servants and politicians.  
 
The role of procurement officials becomes more complex with the increasing importance of 
public procurement. While initially the role was limited to facilitating a business transaction, 
now procurement officials are managing the entire process from the needs assessment to 
contract management and payment. Centralised authorities increasingly are responsible for 
managing new technologies and dissemination of knowledge on good practice in 
procurement. Research identifies various challenges for public procurement officials284. First 
of all, officials manage public procurement in an environment in which trade agreements 
allow for domestic and foreign companies to participate. In other words, they are requested to 
promote national economic development while at the same time select the best offer, even 
when this offer might come from a foreign economic operator. Secondly, despite that 
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economic objectives are prioritised, public procurement officials can also be requested to 
include complicated social, environmental and foreign policy commitments. The latter is seen 
frequently in defence procurement in which weapons are sold to other countries. Thirdly, 
procurement officials manage contracts in complex economic sectors in which (undue) 
political influence is not uncommon. These sectors experience close ties between public and 
private interests and tend to be politicised285. 
 
The reason for politicization is that the performance of such sectors could be perceived as the 
responsibility of the governments. In case of failure it affects their political power, despite the 
fact that private players provide the public services. In other words, there is political interest 
in influencing procurement of public utilities even if this breaches competition rules. This 
influence exposes politicians to lobby activities of private players seeking lucrative public 
contracts. For companies, maintaining close ties to political actors, for example through 
bribing, could pay off286. The political influence over public procurement also creates an 
environment in which other conflicts of interest could play out. For example, when decision-
makers decide on procurement activities that have impact on the sector of their former 
employees or use procurement to seek a future career in the private sector. This is why rules 
need to be established on revolving doors. Finally, special attention should be given to 
corruption and risks of state capture through political party financing. 
 
Political influence over public procurement can be direct, with politicians interfering in the 
process in order to secure their personal or party interests. However, influence can also be 
indirect. Public procurement officials are requested to prioritise the general public welfare by 
following the established procedures. This however does not mean that officials are 
inconsiderate of political interests. For example, officials might anticipate difficulties and 
prevent interference by immediately including the political interests in their decision-making. 
Officials might also be aware that bidders have strong political ties and therefore evaluate 
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their bids favourably in order to avoid conflict. In other words, procurement officials will 
often take balanced decisions that include their own objectives (such as efficiency, value for 
money, competition) but also the political objectives (such as the economic sector specific or 
electoral interests). The one does not necessary exclude the other. Nonetheless, the 
interaction between the political actors, private sector and public administrations is complex 
and the efforts to seek influence could balance between legality and illegality. After all, there 
is a thin line between a legal donation to a political party and an illegal bribe, both of which 
might seek influence over public decision-making.  
4.6   Anti-corruption in public procurement 
Campos et al. indeed note that the procurement process is a corruption-prone area but also 
highlight that it “presents the most promising areas for which a set of concrete, quantifiable 
indicators can be developed, from the initial planning phase all the way through to contract 
award and implementation”287. A common trend in anti-corruption reforms is to focus on 
reducing malfeasance but also on improving the efficiency of procurement decisions. 
Reforming procurement exposes a trade-off between avoiding corruption and giving official 
decision-making flexibility. Ware et al. show that procurement should be rule-based, 
competitive, transparent, accountable, economically and time efficient288. Rules can be too 
rigid but are needed to ensure processes against improper high-level influence. Piga (2011) 
argues for more discretion as long as this is exercised by professional procurement officials, 
and couples with ex post monitoring by the public through transparent online publication of 
procurement processes 289 . Piga also sees relevance in a point system based on passed 
performance. In the US, Steven Kelman designed a model to procure based on previous 
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performance indicators290. However, this system proved to be difficult to implement due to 
the lack of a generally accepted technique for evaluating performance. Contractors were to be 
evaluated based on their outcomes rather than input. Debarment processes based on 
corruption and organized crime connections are a widely used form of performance 
evaluation. Kelman’s approach did not really address the issue of grand corruption as it 
focused on mid-level procurement decisions under the control of professional civil servants. 
However in the scenario where procurement decisions are shifted to career officials and 
tender boards, this method could prove useful. The American reforms moved away from 
perfecting the bidding process toward making the overall purchasing environment more 
efficient and effective.  
 
According to Arrowsmith, three principles are found in most regulatory systems on public 
procurement, namely: transparency, competition and equal treatment 291 . The OECD 
identified so-called building blocks of public procurement to support good management and 
integrity.292  These include: a legislative framework; solid administrative infrastructure to 
manage relations with bidders in a sound way; professional public procurement practitioners 
to whom procurement and guidelines are made available, established with their own 
involvement; a review and remedy system that identifies risks in the various points of the 
procurement procedure; internal management control and audit systems; an independent 
external audit; reinforcement of the parliamentary control on big infrastructure projects. 
 
The exposure of trade-offs is also visible in some of these areas. Various overarching 
principles of public procurement could undermine achieving other important public 
procurement objectives. Establishing a certain level of transparency ensures competition and 
integrity. But it also has to be taken in account that transparency does bear costs and could 
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affect efficiency. However, the benefits of adequately defined transparency will most likely 
outweigh possible costs of corruption. In case transparency requirements do not focus on 
specific procurement areas, such as in the pre- and post-bidding phases and competition 
exceptions, other mechanisms could counter possible corruption risks. For example, in the 
case of exceptions to procedures, accountability and internal control mechanisms could 
counterbalance lack of competitiveness in the procedures. Finally, timely and consistent 
disclosure of information also limits room for collusion between bidders. 
 
Public procurement is significant for successful management of public resources. 
Consequently, procurement should be seen as a professional strategy rather than an 
administrative function. The process is driven by the value for money principle, which means 
that governments need to rationalise and increase efficiency. The officials involved should 
therefore be equipped with adequate management and planning skills in order to take well-
informed decisions. Enhancing professionalism should also include ethical guidance on how 
to deal with possible scenarios of conflict of interest. 
 
Public procurement is increasingly seen as a core element of accountability of the 
government to the public. The money spend through procurement has potential impact on 
citizens. Therefore governments have set up internal and external control mechanisms, 
increasingly on a risk-based approach to prevent and detect corruption and identify 
vulnerabilities in the process. Apart from the judicial decisions, also alternative resolution 
systems have been promoted to resolve bid protests and avoid additional litigations expenses. 
Further, also other stakeholders are involved in the control of procurement through 
administrative complaint systems, such as whistleblowing mechanisms. Finally, promoting 
end-users, such as citizens, to scrutinise integrity of procurement process, could provide a 
social form of accountability. 
   Considerations to address political interference in public procurement 
Apart from the overarching principles that address corruption in public procurement, various 
specific measures could address immediate challenges, in particular related to political 
interference.  
 
1.   Pre-bidding phase 
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When referring to the weaknesses in the pre-bidding phase the following measures could be 
taken293: 
 
Lack of adequate needs assessment 
 
-   Conduct an assessment on the need for procurement. Is there need to replace or improve 
existing resources? Is there need to procure for new resources? 
-   When validating procurement (especially for complex, sensitive and high value projects), 
ensure that multiple decision-makers are involved, including end-users. 
-   Ensure transparency in lobbying activities. 
Lack of planning and budgeting 
 
-   Ensure that procurement is in line with the general long-term strategic objectives of the 
organisation. This avoids that short-term political interests undermine the procurement 
objectives. 
-   Prepare a realistic estimation of the budget and timeline applied to all phases of the 
procurement process. 
-   Prepare a strong business case (especially for complex, sensitive and high value projects) 
and include independent peer review. 
-   Create a sound procurement plan including management structures and costs, record 
keeping system, risks analysis and rules on decision-making. 
Requirements that are not adequately or objectively defined 
 
-   Prevent possible conflicts of interest by obtaining declaration of private interest from 
elected and high-level public officials. 
-   Prevent possible conflicts of interest by informing officials on codes of conduct 
-   Inform officials on how to handle potential conflicts of interest. 
-   When drafting the specifications, involve economic operators and end-users (provided a 
representative sample is taken).  
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Inadequate or irregular choice of the procedure 
 
-   Provide clear rules and guidance to choose a suitable procurement method. 
-   Provide clear rules in case of non-competitive, restricted and negotiated procurement 
procedures. 
 
2.   Bidding-phase 
Relating the weaknesses in the bidding phase, the following measures could be taken294: 
 
Invitation to bid 
 
-   Ensure transparency when publishing the procurement opportunity. This includes, timely 
publishing of the notice and including specifications, timeframe, evaluation and award 
criteria, etc. 
Awarding of the contract 
 
-   Establish a transparent procedure for opening the tender. 
-   Include multiple evaluators to avoid biased awarding. 
-   Evaluate the proposals according to the pre-set evaluation criteria. 
-   Document the evaluation reports. 
-   Avoid conflict of interest for the evaluators. 
-   Make the results of the award process public. 
-   Offer a resolve mechanism in case of disputes. 
-   Offer a debriefing session for tenderers. 
 
3.   Post-bidding phase 
Relating the weaknesses in the post-bidding phase, the following measures could be taken295: 
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Contract management  
 
-   Clearly define expectations, roles and responsibilities for the management of the contract 
-   Supervise closely the performance and integrity of the suppliers 
-   Control all changes in the contract 
Order and payment  
 
-   Ensure that audits are independently conducted 
 
   Anti-corruption developments in public procurement on the EU level 
Starting with the supranational level, the EU Treaties foresee the European Commission to 
monitor and verify correct implementation of EU law into national law. The responsibility to 
implement correctly lies with the Member States. Article 258 TFEU and Article 260 TFEU 
give the European Commission the role as watchdog and allow the regulatory body to bring 
the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union. As a result, in 2012 the European 
Commission published for the first time the Annual Public Procurement Implementation 
Review, which monitors across the EU the application of the procurement rules.296 In May 
2016, the European Commission notified twenty-one EU Member States that they have failed 
to fully transpose the new directives on public procurement and concession into national 
law297. Further, the initiative of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to develop a EU 
Evaluation Mechanism in the area of Anti-Corruption will strengthen focus on application of 
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procurement rules and identification and reducing costs of corruption in procurement 
involving EU funds. These EU initiatives are an important step forward in the mapping of the 
impact of corruption on public procurement. While at the stage of drafting this report 
consistent information on the impact of corruption on public procurement is missing, these 
initiatives are expected to change this for the future. Until that moment, this study outlines 
the state-of-play of EU Member States.298 
 
Legislative instruments used to transpose EU law into national law are similar across the EU 
Member States with the government proposing a draft law and parliaments approving this. 
Most commonly the Ministry of Finance or Economics is responsible for transposing the EU 
directives on public procurement. EU rules have been mostly transposed by means of a 
unique legislative act covering all directives. Contracting authorities are generally responsible 
for implementing the procedures while central procurement bodies coordinate and harmonise 
efforts. An example is the Dutch government agency PIANOo299. 
 
Internal and external audit offices supervise procurement procedures. These primarily focus 
on legality, accounting rules, financial efficiency and efficacy. Either specialised independent 
procurement bodies (i.e. Lithuania and Poland) or supreme audit bodies are used (i.e. Italy, 
Spain). Bodies set up to supervise awarding of contracts and especially execution of contracts 
are used to ensure compliance with transparency and competition principles. These bodies 
can sometimes impose sanctions or make non-binding recommendations.  
 
Most countries have central purchasing bodies in place. Such bodies use framework contracts 
to supply administrations with certain goods and services. The main focus of these bodies is 
to rationalise expenditure through transparent and efficient procedures and to force price 
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reductions through massive purchasing of highly consumed commodities by public 
administrations300. An example is the Finnish body Hansel Ltd. 
 
The EU rules had significant impact on the use of review systems across the European Union 
Member States301. Most countries use judicial reviewing, either administrative or civil in 
nature. Various countries (such as Spain, Denmark, Finland, Poland) use specific non-judicial 
review bodies on public procurement. In almost all EU countries the review bodies can 
suspend or cancel the decisions relating the award procedures. At the time of contractual 
review some countries can use nullification (ex tunc or ex nunc) or use alternative sanctions 
such as financial penalties or shortening of duration of contracts. 
 
On the international level procurement standards have been developed by international 
organisations. First the United Nations Convention against Corruption will be discussed, 
followed by the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the G20 Anti-Corruption Plan and World 
Trade Organisation agreements on public procurement. Special emphasis will lie on the role 
of the EU as global economic trade partner and pioneer in international procurement 
standards. 
 
1.   UNCAC 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption is one of the most important international 
treaties against corruption. Adopted in October 2003 by the UN General Assembly it bounds 
more than 160 countries to a framework aimed at harmonizing anti-corruption efforts across 
the globe. Most importantly, the UNCAC recognizes preventive and punitive measures and 
addresses the cross-border nature of the problem. The four highlights of the international 
convention are: prevention, criminalization, international cooperation and asset recovery302. 
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UNCAC promotes model preventive measures directed at the private and public sector. Such 
measures call for countries to ensure that public services are efficient, transparent and that 
recruitment is based on merits rather than political affiliation. Public officials should be 
subject to codes of conduct and rules concerning financial disclosure. Besides, these rules 
should be controlled and disciplinary measures put in place to ensure compliance. UNCAC 
also specifies the need to promote transparency and accountability in matters of public 
financing, especially relating vulnerable areas such as the judiciary and public procurement. 
UNCAC requires countries to establish criminal and other offences to cover the wide range of 
corrupt acts, such as bribery, embezzlement, influence peddling and concealment of proceeds 
of corruption. Article 9 of UNCAC is dedicated to “public procurement and management of 
public finances”303. On public procurement it states that countries shall “take the necessary 
steps to establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition 
and objective criteria in decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing 
corruption”304. 
 
2.   OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
On 17 December 1997, the Convention on Combating bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) was signed305. The 
convention encourages sanctions against bribery in international business transactions carried 
out by companies in the member countries. The idea behind this was that large bribes were 
paid by big western multinationals in developing countries creating an unequal level playing 
field for international business. The signatories are required to criminalize the act of bribing 
foreign public officials. An important recommendation is to sanction bribe payers with 
“temporary or permanent disqualification from participation in public procurement”. 
 
3.   G20 anti-corruption action plan 2010 
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In 2010 the G20 leaders established the Anti-corruption Working Group and endorsed the 
first Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Fighting corruption in public procurement is reckoned to 
be an important aspect but no concrete measures are proposed. The commitment states that an 
objective is “ensuring we have in place systems of procurement based on transparency, 
competition and objective criteria in decision-making to prevent corruption”. Nonetheless, in 
a common position paper of 5 March 2013, the G20 presents some concrete measures. For 
example, it states that “G20 governments should adopt and urge all governments to promptly 
enact the standards for procurement and public financial management, consistent with 
Article 9 of the UNCAC and the OECD Principles on Enhancing Integrity in Public 
Procurement.” 
 
4.   WTO 
The relevance for the international context lies in the importance of government procurement 
for domestic and foreign suppliers. Despite this, important international trade agreements, 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947) and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS, 1995), exclude public procurement. Nonetheless, 
countries have repeatedly addressed the issue resulting in: the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA); the negotiation on government procurement in services following Article 
XIII: 2 of GATS; the work on transparency in government procurement in the Working 
Group established by the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1997. 
 
The first GPA was signed in 1979 and entered into force on 1 January 1981. After broadening 
the scope of the agreement, in 1994 the members signed the new GPA including also 
purchases by sub-central governments as well as the construction services sector. In 2012, the 
Decision on the Outcomes of the Negotiations under Article XXIV: 7 of the GPA (GPA/113) 
was adopted by political decision. The agreement aims to open business to international 
competition. It is a multilateral agreement with 42306 members and includes general rules and 
obligations as well as schedules of national entities in each member state whose procurement 
is subject to the GPA. The GPA is grounded on the notion that procurement systems have 
significant impact on the efficient use of public funds, which in turn affects good governance 
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and influences the public confidence in government. The principal requirements for public 
procurement are value for money, public access to information and fair competition. 
 
The GATS does not subject members to obligations on market access or non-discrimination 
in public procurement. However, Article XIII does stipulate that there shall be multilateral 
negotiation on this issue. So far, WTO Members hold different views as to how to interpret 
the scope of the mandate for negotiations. Some see this involves market access and non-
discrimination, including transparency, while others do not. At this stage, the 
recommendation to the WTO Members is to “engage in more focused discussions and in this 
context put greater emphasis on proposals by Members, in accordance with Article XIII of 
the GATS”.307 
 
The Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement analysed issues relating a 
potential agreement on transparency in government procurement. This included four areas: 
definition, scope and coverage; access to information and procedural matters; compliance 
mechanisms; and issues related to developing countries. Of particular interest are the areas on 
access to information and on compliance mechanisms. The prior discusses issues relevant for 
a possible agreement and relating transparency in procurement such as: procurement 
methods; publication of information on national legislation and procedures; information on 
opportunities, tendering and qualification procedures; time-periods; transparency of decision 
on qualification; transparency of decisions on contract awards. The latter deals with remedies 
such as Domestic Review Procedures and the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures. 
   Collective action against corruption in public procurement 
The challenge with the different legislative mechanisms to fight corruption in public 
procurement described above is that their effectiveness is difficult to determine. In fact, 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) argues that failure of many approaches to-date is due to the top-down 
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approach308. Instead, a combination with bottom-up is advocated to increase sustainability of 
reform and ensure that change occurs at all levels of society. Collective action hinges towards 
social learning theories in which the relevance of social or group dynamics to influence one’s 
decisions is important. Trust in others and the real or perceived behaviour of other influences 
the way one looks at deviant behaviour. If corruption is seen as normal in a certain context, it 
also facilitates such behaviour. Collective action initiatives could break patterns when for 
example people stop bribing (supply) with the consequence that asking (demand) will 
become more difficult. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4) and the international 
anti-corruption movement Transparency International (2015) define collective action as 
“actions undertaken by individuals and/or groups towards a collective purpose or goal” and 
highlight the growing support for such initiatives in order to fight corruption. According to 
the organisations, lack of political will undermines effectiveness of top-down anti-corruption 
approaches.  
 
Various types of collective action are identified by U4 and Transparency International, 
ranging from individualistic to collectivistic, normative to non-normative and punishable to 
un-punishable. A further differentiation between persuasive and confrontational forms of 
collective action refers to those actions aiming to solve internal issues, for example through 
lobbying or petitioning, versus to those that directly target other parties, i.e. through 
demonstrations. The collective action tool primarily used for public procurement is the 
Integrity Pact. This tool was developed in the 1990s to improve procurement processes. By 
applying a collaborative approach, the tool aims to establish a level playing field in a 
contracting process. This is ensured by: encouraging companies to refrain from bribery; 
committing government agencies to prevent corruption; and following transparent 
procedures. Integrity Pacts include key criteria for anti-corruption in public procurement, 
such as transparency, professionalism and accountability. Applied since the 1990s, a solid 
sample of cases is available for review, covering countries across the world. The 
characteristics of each case differ, requiring the Integrity Pact model to be flexible in order to 
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be an effective anti-corruption tool. At this stage, experience with Integrity Pacts shows that 
four main elements are crucial309:  
 
-   Political will of the authorities;  
-   Transparency and professionalism throughout the contracting process;  
-   External independent monitoring;  
-   And a participatory/multi-stakeholder involvement.  
Rose-Ackerman (2016) suggests that to avoid corruption and collusion in public 
procurement, all potential bidders and the responsible authorities are to pledge to refrain from 
fraud and corruption. Integrity Pacts generally include clauses covering transparency and 
monitoring by civil society groups, enabling competing firms and outside parties to ensure 
fairness both in the bidding process and in the delivery. The no-bribery pledge is a variant of 
the prequalification processes by Kelman but with an anti-corruption twist. Transparency 
International prepared sample-bidding documents and descriptions of bidding procedures that 
inform companies of the procedure. Companies are to pledge to refrain from bribery and have 
internal compliance systems in place. Payments to agents must be disclosed. Rose-Ackerman 
notes that these pledges look redundant because corruption is in any case illegal, however 
they have the added value of highlighting the issue. Transparency International also 
recommends that countries express a commitment to impose sanctions. For example, if an 
Integrity Pact is signed in the context of the World Bank or any other International Financial 
Institution and if the official tries to extort bribes, Transparency International can point to the 
Integrity Pact and threaten with debarment if it engages in bribery. Especially if funding by 
financial institutions is involved, the Integrity Pact can be powerful for firms to resist 
extortion by officials. Rose-Ackerman warns that some fear that too few firms will bid on 
major projects that include prequalification procedures. However, a low amount of bids can 
be the result of less possible profit. Companies compare the fixed costs of a bid with the 
expected benefit or in other words the profit multiplied by the probability of winning the bid. 
More bidders could also be a sign of more corruption, as the profits might be higher. These 
reflections expose the difficulty of determining the effectiveness and impact of the tool to 
fight corruption. Of particular interest is the determination of which factors or conditions are 
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required for the tool to reach its full fullest potential as an anti-corruption measure. For 
example, if we look at some of the elements considered important for Integrity Pacts to work, 
we see various challenges. First, an adequate level of transparency should be defined, second, 
professionalism of contracting officials is desired and finally accountability needs to be 
ensured. Each challenge holds a set of best practices in order to confront corruption. 
 
1.   Transparency in public procurement 
Transparency is an important anti-corruption element but in public procurement arguably it 
has to be handled with care. In order to balance the need for transparency, procurement rules 
should ensure that when starting the process the sensitivity of information has been taken into 
account as well as the specificity and value of procurement. For example, in commercially 
and security sensitive information, transparency could be restricted. Also there is a certain 
principle of proportionality when publishing procurement opportunities. For example, big 
amount contracts may require either more transparency or more confidentiality depending on 
the matter at stake. In big-value contracts, at the pre-bidding phase, government officials 
could engage the private sector and citizens in dialogue to make suggestions in the drafting of 
specifications or support with market studies. This dialogue can be facilitated through online 
surveys or working groups, provided that sufficient and a variety of stakeholders participate. 
At the bidding phase, government officials could use new information and communication 
technologies. For example, ICT tools applicable could be e-procurement portals (for 
information on bids, specifications, etc.), contract management tools (for consulting and 
management of contracts, e-invoicing), information management systems (for the collection 
and storage of procurement statistics), electronic aggregation tools (for standardisation of 
goods and services), registers of suppliers (for suppliers repository) and e-catalogues (for 
information on products and services from registered suppliers). When inviting bidders to 
tender, contracting authorities could enhance transparency by ensuring clear documentation 
on the procurement opportunity (e.g. standard templates, guidelines) provide bidders with 
information about evaluation criteria and assure that bidders receive information at the same 
time in case of changes. Also, contracting authorities could ensure that bidders are able to 
request further clarification and receive sufficient time for preparation of bids. When 
awarding the contract, bidders could be notified in a transparent manner to ensure trust that 
the process was conducted fairly. Transparency when notifying the contract award could 
include the publication of the name of the winner and the reasons why bids were selected or 
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rejected. Debriefing the rejected bidders could benefit both supplier and buyer. A standstill 
period between the contract award notification and the start of the contract provides bidders 
with time to challenge any decisions taken by the contracting authority. At the post-bidding 
phase, internal management processes are required to deal with activities between the 
administration and the supplier. This is generally not covered by procurement law, but rather 
by contract and civil law. Integrity can be safeguarded through accountability and guidance 
mechanisms such as: adequate planning; risk management techniques; restriction and controls 
over change in the terms of the contract; accurate and timely supervision; new technologies to 
monitor the process; shared accountability such as performance bonds; and public scrutiny. 
When addressing exceptions to competitive procedures, a key challenge is ensuring equal 
treatment of bidders. Measures to ensure this can be: defining strict criteria for using non-
competitive procedure; publication of an advance contract award notice; opening bids in an 
official manner; specific guidance to procurement officials; additional controls to verify 
justification of legal derogation in the approval phase; specific reporting requirements for 
using the exceptions; minimum transparency requirements. Low-value contracts, urgency 
procurement and defence procurement require specific efforts to ensure integrity. 
 
2.   Professional capacity in public procurement 
Enhancing professionalism to prevent integrity infractions in public procurement requires 
guidelines that ensure the use of public funds for the intended purpose, enable public officials 
to adapt to a changing environment and minimise corruption potential. Procurement could 
therefor be planned strategically, over the long term and with a transparent budget in order to 
ensure proper use of funds for the intended purpose. There is a need for governments to 
identify procurement goals, targets and milestones that link with their business plans, outputs 
and government objectives. Project-specific procurement plans could be an additional asset to 
minimise risks for large-scale projects. Appropriate budgeting is essential, this way for 
example financial commitments could be approved before starting the procurement. For 
example, parliaments could be given the opportunity to examine fiscal reports on public 
procurement. Strengthening internal responsibility mechanisms could be done by 
performance reporting, statements of responsibility by senior officials and improved internal 
financial control systems. Ensuring an appropriate segregation, such as separate functions to 
verify budget procurement, project and payment activities, and distinct reporting relationships 
could be used. Accountability can be extended from focusing on the purpose intended to the 
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outcomes achieved. Challenges concerning the definition of a budget consistent with the 
expected costs of a solution could be dealt with by referring to market prices (for example 
through commercial catalogues), dialogue with suppliers early in the process, or using 
existing knowledge from prior procurement processes. 
 
Procurement develops from administrative tasks during the bidding phase to more contract 
management once the contract has been awarded. This requires different skills from officials. 
Daily management of public procurement is often the responsibility of individual public 
sector bodies. The overall oversight and coordination of public procurement activities can be 
centralised to an overarching entity. The development in the organisation of procurement 
systems depends on different factors such as the demand for more efficient government, 
technological changes and external commitments such as World Trade Organization and EU 
membership. Centralising procurement (or elements of procurement) could contribute to 
strengthening integrity. A central body could for example scrutinise relations between the 
contracting authority and the end-users, harmonise working methods and enhance 
transparency. Certification requirements and specific training could be deployed to prevent 
mismanagement. Public officials need the commercial expertise and required negotiation 
skills to operate in the economic market. This means that close contact is required with the 
private sector. Especially revolving-door situations in which public officials change career to 
the private sector increase risks of breaches of integrity. Cooling-off periods could be agreed 
upon, including rules on conduct.  
 
According to the OECD, the prevention of conflict of interest and corruption is best 
addressed through management procedures and guidelines on ethical standards. The prior 
refers to ensuring separation of duties and authorisations between entities (for example 
between entities that require procurement and entities that procure), functions (such as 
strategic planning, budget and performance programme, accounting and reporting), stages of 
the procurement process, commercial and technical duties, as well as financial duties. 
Rotation of officials could be an effective mechanism or sharing responsibility, the so-called 
four-eyes principle. Ethical standards through for example codes of conduct could prevent 
conflicts of interest. Overall these codes can outline: standards concerning personal, family 
and business interests; rules concerning gifts and hospitality; political affiliation; disclosure 
of financial interests; and rules concerning revolving-door scenarios. The application of the 
standards starts with the selection process in which governments could decide to issue 
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security clearance for public procurement officials, verify their backgrounds and use public 
selection mechanisms. Also procurement authorities could request bidders to declare that they 
have financial resources to perform the contract as well as declaring that they hold a 
satisfactory record of integrity. Bidders that in the past have infringed incompatibility rules or 
have been convicted of corruption crimes could be denied access to the procurement process, 
so-called debarment.  
 
3.   Accountability in public procurement 
Together with professionalism and transparency, public procurement should operate with 
mechanisms that ensure accountability in the process310. A pre-condition for the effective 
functioning of control mechanisms is the establishment of accurate track records. This can be 
seen as the procurement process´ footprint in order to be able to trace back the decisions 
made. Such records ideally are kept digitally in order to allow for real-time monitoring of 
performance and integrity. Most important for keeping track of the procurement 
documentation is the internal audit and control mechanism. Another accountability approach 
focuses on risk analysis in which authorities try to identify vulnerable areas for irregularities. 
 
Internal control mechanisms require a clear chain of responsibility in order to approve the use 
of funds throughout the various stages of the procurement process. High-ranking officials 
often play key roles in defining evaluation criteria, evaluations and contract awarding. An 
additional assurance could be the involvement of independent peer reviewers. The external 
audit function in public procurement is conducted by supreme audit institutions or courts of 
accounts. These institutions may play an essential role in detecting and investigation 
corruption. Their role extends to also suggesting systemic improvements. Supreme audit 
institutions should have sufficient capacity, in terms of resources and independence, to deal 
with public procurement auditing. Also, they should have transparent and accountable 
governance structures. 
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Very important in controlling the procurement processes are the complaint and recourse 
mechanisms. Procedures should be put in place to allow officials to expose irregularities. On 
top of this, it is very recommendable to protect the people that report corruption, the “whistle-
blowers”. Recourse systems function primarily as oversight mechanisms but should provide 
the opportunity for bidders to contest the process or verify its integrity. Dealing with these 
complaints should be done in a timely manner, independently, efficiently and offer adequate 
answers. 
 
Finally, ensuring public scrutiny can be an accountability structure effective in fighting 
corruption in public procurement. Independent oversight bodies such as parliamentary 
committees relating public procurement or the Ombudsman are primarily used to identify and 
address irregularities in public procurement (top-down). A form of direct social control 
would be to include in the monitoring the private sector, end-users, citizens and civil society 
(bottom-up).  
 
4.   Implementation tools 
Governments should ensure that their procurement systems are systemically strengthened. 
This means that an analysis is required of its overall capacity in terms of resources and legal 
framework and its governance in terms of transparency, accountability and professionalism. 
Once weaknesses have been identified, specific tools can be implemented. Regarding the 
governance, the OECD identified key recommendations to develop a policy framework: 
 
1.   Transparency 
 
a.   Provide an adequate degree of transparency in the entire procurement cycle 
b.   Maximise transparency in competitive tendering 
c.   Take precautionary measures to enhance integrity, in particular for exception to 
competitive tendering 
 
2.   Good management 
 
a.   Ensure that public funds are used according to the purposes intended 
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b.   Ensure that procurement officials meet high professional standards of knowledge, 
skills and integrity 
 
3.   Prevention of misconduct, compliance and monitoring 
 
a.   Put mechanisms in place to prevent breaches in integrity 
b.   Encourage close cooperation between government and private sector 
c.   Provide specific mechanisms to monitor the process, detect irregularities and sanction 
accordingly 
 
4.   Accountability and control 
 
a.   Establish a clear chain of responsibility 
b.   Handle complaints fairly and timely 
c.   Empower civil society, media and the wider public 
Four practices in preventing corruption in procurement are particularly interesting given that 
these cover all integrity dimensions identified by the OECD, namely transparency, good 
management, prevention of misconduct and accountability. These practices are electronic 
record keeping, reporting guidelines for selecting procurement methods and in case of non-
competitive tendering and guidelines in case of emergency procurement. Further, various 
tools are recommendable given their relevance throughout the entire procurement process, i.e. 
during the pre-bidding, bidding and post-bidding phases. These are: indicators of 
procurement risks; gifts and benefits checklist; registration of personal interests and a code of 
conduct for procurement practitioners. 
 
Record keeping efforts are reckoned to be among the best practices in avoiding corruption in 
public procurement. This practice covers all dimensions discussed above and applies to the 
entire procurement process. It supports the principle of transparency, provided that access to 
information is allowed to relevant stakeholders and to the public at large. Regulations on 
access to information should be in place. Secondly, it allows for professionalism if 
procurement records allow officials to analyse the process and improve performance. Thirdly, 
records can be used to prevent, investigate and, if needed, sanction corruption. For the 
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optimal use of records it is recommended to digitalize them. The World Bank and the OECD 
provide information on which documents are essential in record keeping311: 
 
Pre-bidding phase 
 
-   Need assessment reports and studies 
-   Deliberations of political bodies 
Bidding phase 
 
-   Public notices 
-   Technical requirements, including justification in case of changes 
-   Documentation made available to the bidder 
-   Bid analysis documents 
-   Selection criteria 
-   Final bid evaluation report, including records on why certain bids were rejected, appeals 
-   Terms of the awarded contract 
Post-bidding phase 
 
-   Records of changes in contract, i.e. affecting deadlines, performance, quantity, prices etc. 
-   Invoices and payments 
-   Certificates of inspection 
-   Records of claims and outcome 
-   Supplementary contract work 
As with record keeping, setting criteria for selecting tender methods also covers all 
dimensions of good practices against possible corruption in procurement. Documenting 
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guidance to procurement officials on the choice of methods available is essential, especially 
when dealing with exceptions to the rules and non-competitive tendering. The latter should be 
clearly defined in order to limit irregularities. The selection of the tender methods takes place 
in the pre-bidding phase and should be based on a needs assessment. Framework agreements 
could be a good approach312. The EU rules define such an agreement as “an agreement 
between one or more contracting authorities and one or more economic operators, the 
purpose of which is to establish the terms governing contracts to be awarded during a given 
period, in particular with regard to price and, where appropriate, the quantity envisaged”. 
The advantage of framework agreements is that once awarding contracts through the 
agreement, no full procurement processes need to be followed. 
 
When procurement officials decide to select non-competitive methods, it is recommended by 
the OECD to document this process including information on: why the contracting authority 
did not use competitive methods; and which procedures have been followed during the non-
competitive tendering process. Special focus could lie on ensuring integrity in this process. 
Also, it is recommended to distribute this information to the central procurement authority in 
order for this body to monitor the process and use the experience to advice other contracting 
authorities. Ideally, governments establish clear guidelines on the use of non-competitive 
tendering including criteria for transparency, good management, corruption prevention and 
accountability. 
 
The significant corruption risks of accelerated procurement procedures can be addressed by 
setting guidelines for its use. Such guidelines will enhance integrity in public procurement 
addressing all governance dimensions described above. The importance of preventing 
irregularities in this process lies especially in the immediate need of end-users of the procured 
goods, for example in case of a natural disaster. Accelerated procedures, such as in case of 
emergency, establish alternative procedures given governments need to act fast. Abuse of 
such circumstances occurs and therefore guidelines should establish clear criteria on when 
such procedures can be used and by which contracting authorities. But prior to this, it is 
recommendable to procure in advance the commonly used supplies and services. This 
                                                            
 
312 OECD (2011). Procurement tools [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/site/sigma/publicationsdocuments/47450487.pdf [Accessed on 03-06-2013]. 
  
 
170 
reduces incentives for corruption since normal procurement procedures can be followed. Also 
here, framework agreements can be useful313. 
 
Red flag systems in public procurement could guide public procurement officials in the 
identification of corruption risks throughout every stage of the procurement cycle. Awareness 
during all steps is essential to prevent irregularities and improve good procurement practices. 
Central procurement bodies could play an important role in disseminating indicators and 
adapting these on the local procurement practices in general or even on a project basis. 
Besides raising awareness, public procurement officials (and also private stakeholders) 
should be supported in taking action against irregularities. Complementary to formal appeal 
mechanisms, an important tool is a whistle-blower system allowing staff to report 
irregularities. This should be backed-up with sufficient protection.  
 
Public procurement officials should be guided on how to deal with gifts and other benefits, 
such as travels, conferences, etc. offered by private stakeholders. Accepting gifts could pose 
serious integrity problems as the line between a gift and a bribe is blurred. Electronic systems 
are reckoned to be most useful. In the case of receiving a gift, a public official can report this 
immediately online and receive proper guidance in case of possible conflict of interest.  
 
The disclosure and registration of personal interests is important when identifying potential 
corruption risks and to avoid conflict of interest provided that these disclosures are duly 
verified. Further, transparency regarding this aspect can affect public perception. Such a tool 
could be applicable to civil servants but also politicians. The advantage of this is that 
potential conflicts between public positions and private interests can be identified already in 
the pre-bidding phase, for example during the needs assessment. It is important to note that 
besides promoting transparency and preventing conflict of interest, declaring assets and 
interests is also important to preclude false accusations of misconduct by civil servants and 
politicians. 
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Establishing a clear code of conduct provides procurement officials with an understanding of 
what behaviour is expected, measures applicable in case of conflict of interest and rules on 
revolving-doors. Besides, a code of conduct is a tool that generates positive public 
perception. Given that many countries have codes in place applicable to public officials in 
general, it is recommendable to complement this with provisions directed to procurement 
officials. An important provision is one on efficiency and effectiveness requiring officials to 
reach the objectives relating public expenditure. A code should be clear in enforcement and 
sanctioning. It is recommendable to have an independent body in place to monitor 
compliance. 
 
Other tools that can be used to address procurement weaknesses could direct particular 
elements in the procurement system. During the pre-bidding phase, stakeholders could: use 
public consultation of stakeholders when drafting the specifications; limited disclosure of 
sensitive procurement information (for example commercial or defence information); 
formally commit not to commit misconduct and corruption; establish procurement plans 
include post-bidding guidelines. During the bidding phase stakeholders could:  use e-
procurement tools; ensure wide dissemination of the bid notice; use standard/model templates 
for procurement documentation; establish clear evaluation criteria including weightings; 
report to bidders on changes in the bid; allow for bidders to request clarifications and 
disseminate these to all; provide for sufficient time to prepare; monitor the process through a 
procurement council; publish all relevant information once the contract is awarded (for 
example the name of the successful bidder, the nature of goods and services, the award 
criteria, contract award rationale, price of the winning bid, etc.); allow for contracts awards to 
be challenged; and to ensure a standstill period between the contract award and the start of 
the award. During the post-bidding phase stakeholders could: use e-procurement in the 
contract management; restrict and control changes in the terms of the contract; share 
accountability or risk between contractor and contracting authority; and ensure public access 
to procurement documents/records. 
 
To ensure good management, in particular strengthen professionalism, and prevent 
misconduct various measures could be taken. For example, measures could include specific 
training for procurement officials on the use of new technologies, on integrity and anti-
corruption or building capacity on commercial expertise. Another measure to ensure 
professionalism could be the enhancement of certification requirements of procurement 
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officials, as well as fair and stable labour conditions. Also developing the procurement 
‘memory’ through a strong internal database including information on bidders, former 
procurement and the execution of the contract could help. An important measure could be the 
separation of duties and authorisations (e.g. between entities, functions, stage of 
procurement) as well as rotation of duties, codes of conduct for contractors and for 
procurement officials. Finally, the OECD also highlights partnership with civil society and 
private sector in monitoring procurement (for example an Integrity Pact). Specific 
accountability and control mechanisms are:  
 
-   Information systems including data on: 
o   Financial aspects of procurement; 
o   Characteristics of procurement processes (e.g. criteria, exceptions); 
o   Number of complaints and recourse mechanisms; 
o   Types of control. 
-   Public access to procurement information; 
-   Internal audit and financial control; 
-   Internal management control; 
-   Clear chain of responsibility; 
-   Independent examination of procurement; 
-   External audit control; 
-   Risk mapping tools; 
-   Whistleblowing systems and protection; 
-   Mechanisms to challenge the fairness of the procurement procedure (remedies scheme); 
-   Mechanisms to challenge procurement decisions; 
-   Independent complaints review system; 
-   Efficient resolution of complaints system; 
-   Informal problem solving; 
-   Independent oversight bodies (e.g., Ombudsman, parliamentary committee).  
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4.7   Collective action for EU procurement and the transparency deficit 
While challenges to ascertain the scale and impact of corruption in EU procurement remain 
an obstacle to determine the effectiveness of any anti-corruption measure, its potential 
damage as discussed above does legitimise looking into the role civil society could play in 
preventing corruption in public procurement. Also, this could be further justified by taking a 
look at some of the challenges procurement of EU funds is facing.  
 
Transparency of EU budget and implementation lies at the core of this challenge. 
Documentation on the EU budget and implementation is largely accessible online. However, 
in order to get a full overview, data has to be collected from different sources. There is no 
centralised access point where documentation is collected in a standardised way. Instead 
there are different sources where important information concerning budget implementation is 
presented. For example, the European Commission has a dedicated website on the budget314 
containing figures on the multi-annual financial framework, annual budgets, programmes and 
funds available. An important addition to this is the Financial Transparency System portal315 
that contains data on beneficiaries directly managed by the European Commission. The open 
data portal on the ESI Funds316 provides aggregated data on budget implementation in the 
EU, per fund, country and investment area.  
 
The principle of transparency is embodied in Article 15 of the Treaty of the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU).317  “In order to promote good governance and ensure the 
participation of civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall 
conduct their work as openly as possible”. In addition, Article 15 states “any citizen of the 
Union […] shall have a right of access to documents of Union […]”. The functioning of the 
transparency principle depends on regulations set forth by the European Parliament and the 
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Council. Relating the implementation of the EU budget, a key legislative instrument is the 
Financial Regulation318. From 1 January 2016, a new Financial Regulation is applied and 
accompanied by new Rules of Application. The latter includes the more detailed and 
technical rules, which manage day-to-day implementation of the Financial Regulation. 
Transparency on beneficiaries of funds depends on the management type or mode used for 
budget implementation, namely: direct management; indirect management; and shared 
management. 
 
1.   Direct management 
Data on funds directly managed by the European Commission are captured through the 
Financial Transparency System319 in accordance to the Financial Regulation. The database 
includes information on beneficiaries of the EU budget directly administered by the European 
Commission departments, its staff in the EU delegation and through the executive agencies. 
In addition, the Financial Transparency System also includes information from the European 
Development Fund. Various types of funding mechanisms are published: grants; prizes; 
public procurement; financial instruments; budget support; and external experts. Information 
can be searched on: who receives funds; purpose of expenditure; location of beneficiary; 
amount and type of expenditure; responsible European Commission department; EU budget 
lines; and year. The database does not include information on public procurement contracts 
lower than EUR 15,000 or confidential information on the beneficiaries. 
 
The legal basis for the Financial Transparency System is foreseen in Article 35 of the 
Financial Regulation320. It states that the European Commission “shall make available, in an 
appropriate and timely manner, information on recipients, as well as the nature and purpose 
of the measure financed from the budget, where the latter is implemented directly in 
accordance with point (a) of Article 58(1), and information on recipients as provided by the 
entities, persons and Member States to which budget implementation tasks are entrusted 
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under other methods of implementation”. Point (a) of Article 58(1) refers to the direct 
management by departments, including staff in the Union Delegations under the authority of 
their respective Head of Delegation or through executive agencies. Article 35(3) states that 
information “shall be made available with due observance of the requirements of 
confidentiality and security, in particular the protection of personal data”. More detailed 
rules on the publication of information on beneficiaries can be adopted through delegated acts 
by the European Commission. 
 
The Rules of Application provides more details on application of Article 35 of the Financial 
Regulation. Article 21(1) of the Rules of Application states that “information on recipients of 
Union’s funds awarded under direct management shall be published on an internet site of the 
Union Institutions, no later than 30 June of the year following the financial year in which the 
funds were awarded”321. In addition, it lists the information that has to be published. 
 
2.   Indirect management 
Article 58(1) point (c) of the Financial Regulation sets out the definition of indirect 
management which refers to budget implementation tasks for: “third countries or the bodies 
they have designated; international organisations and their agencies; the European 
Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund; bodies referred to in Articles 208 and 
209; public law bodies; bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the 
extent that they provide adequate financial guarantees; bodies governed by the private law of 
a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership 
and that provide adequate financial guarantees; persons entrusted with the implementation 
of specific action in there CFSP pursuant to Title V off the TEU, and identified in the relevant 
basic act”. Article 60 of the Financial Regulation details that persons entrusted with budget 
implementation tasks shall respect the principles of sound financial management, 
transparency and non-discriminations. Paragraph 5 states that the following information is to 
be provided to the European Commission: a report on the implementation of the tasks 
entrusted to them; accounts for the expenditure; a summary of the final audit reports. 
 
3.   Shared management 
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Article 59 of the Financial Regulation states that in case of shared management the European 
Commission delegates implementation tasks to the Member States. Principles such as sound 
financial management, transparency and non-discrimination have to be respected by the 
European Commission and the Member State. Each stakeholder has to fulfil respective roles 
concerning control and audit obligation. Complementary provisions can be laid out in sector-
specific rules. Paragraph 5 requires bodies to provide the European Commission by 15 
February of the following financial year with accounts on expenditure incurred. Those 
accounts are to include pre-financing and sums for which recovery procedures are underway 
or have been completed. Also, the European Commission is to receive an annual summary of 
the final audit reports and controls carried out, including an analysis of the nature and extent 
of errors and weaknesses identified in systems, as well as corrective action taken or planned. 
Member States “may, at the appropriate level, publish the information referred to in this 
paragraph”. 
 
From the outset of the transparency provisions for each EU fund management type, it is clear 
that the European Commission has limited control over spending of the funds in the different 
Member States. This supports the relevance to explore the role of third parties in the control 
of public procurement of ESI Funds. Stakeholders from the public sector, as well as civil 
society and academia, have expressed concerns in relation to the EU budget transparency. For 
example, the platform Openspending Community concludes that one of the main transparency 
concerns is the “missing link between the two major EU budgetary instruments (the seven 
years framework and the annual budget regulation) and the funds themselves”322. Another 
concern is that there is no equivalent to the Financial Transparency System for beneficiaries 
funded through shared management, meaning that the level of transparency depends on the 
Member States’ “will” to deliver data in a transparent and accessible manner. As a 
consequence, public scrutiny of EU funding is limited to the national/case-by-case level (i.e. 
through a tool as the Integrity Pact) and EU-wide or comparative analysis is difficult. From 
the perspective of accessibility, Transparency International criticises the applicability of 
different data formats323. The Centre for Industrial Studies (CSIL) notes similar concerns in a 
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study for the European Parliament conducted in 2009. The study found that many national 
websites provided data in formats (such as PDF) that do not support Open Data standards324. 
In addition, CSIL notes that the use of different languages and currencies complicated data 
comparison. 
 
The promotion of the European Commission to fight corruption in ESI Funds contains two 
specific initiatives, one purposely allowing civil society to detect and prevent corruption in 
public procurement (Integrity Pact), another giving this role to the contracting authorities 
(ARACHNE). By analysing the use of the Integrity Pact tool to date this study aims to 
understand the role of civil society organisations in the fight against corruption but also 
identify to which extent this compares to providing the contracting authority with means to 
detect and prevent corruption. Integrity Pacts are agreements between government agencies 
(such as contracting authorities) and economic operators (such as bidders) participating in 
public procurement processes. The agreement commits parties to refrain from paying, 
offering, soliciting or accepting bribes, and from colluding with other bidders during the 
procurement process to frustrate the competition. A third party to the agreement (such as civil 
society) monitors compliance of the stakeholders. Integrity Pacts include key criteria for anti-
corruption in public procurement, such as transparency, professionalism and accountability. 
The aims of the Integrity Pacts fall in line with public procurement objectives applied in the 
EU, namely ensuring a level playing field for all actors, and ensuring value for money by 
avoiding corruption325.  
 
Integrity Pacts were developed by Transparency International in the 1990s as a tool to 
improve procurement processes. It adopts a collaborative or collective approach and aims to 
establish a level-playing field in a contracting process. Since its development, hundreds of 
cases have been implemented across the world by subsidiaries or local chapters of 
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Transparency International, but also by third parties. Not all Integrity Pacts have been 
systematically documented but to date Integrity Pacts and similar projects have been 
conducted in over twenty countries across the globe. This includes: Argentina, Benin, China, 
Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Rwanda, South Korea, Uganda and Zambia. In Europe, six EU Member States have had 
relevant experience with Integrity Pacts, namely Germany, Latvia, Austria, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Italy. Two EU Member States recently started to work with Integrity Pacts, 
namely Spain and Romania. Eleven EU Member States have no experience with Integrity 
Pacts (Lithuania, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, France and Portugal). The United Kingdom and Poland explored Integrity 
Pacts relating the defence sector. In Poland, these efforts did not materialise in a concrete 
project. Greece acquired knowledge on the Integrity Pact by having supported relevant efforts 
in 2011326. The pilot project initiated by the European Commission in collaboration with 
Transparency International expands the list of EU Member States that will be in the near 
future initiating and implementing Integrity Pacts. Pilot Integrity Pacts in eleven EU Member 
States will cover public procurement processes co-funded by EU funds. This includes 
projects in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia and Poland.  
 
The World Bank Institute denominates the Integrity Pact as a collective action tool. It defines 
collective action as a “collaborative and sustained process of cooperation among 
stakeholders” 327. According to the World Bank Institute, collective action can increase the 
impact and credibility of individual action, bring vulnerable individual players into an 
alliance of like-minded organisations and level the playing field between competitors. 
“Collective action can complement or temporarily substitute for and strengthen weak local 
laws and anti-corruption practices”328. In particular, small-medium enterprises (SMEs) can 
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327 WORLD BANK INSTITUTE (2008) Fighting Corruption through Collective Action [WWW]. Available 
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from: http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/11/6/collective-action-a-new-approach-to-combat-corruption-part-
8.html [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. Slide 4  
  
 
179 
benefit from collective action initiatives, as these businesses risk being disproportionately 
affected by the effects of corruption due to their size329. Also, collective action could ensure 
that SMEs with less human and financial resources are able to install anti-corruption systems, 
interact with others and collectively address level playing field challenges in both non- and 
endemically corrupt business environments. SMEs in endemically corrupt business 
environments face the challenge that the company most likely to pay a bribe has an unfair 
advantage over those that do not resort to such practices. A common response by businesses 
is denying responsibility: “if we do not bribe, someone else would”. In addition, not 
necessarily only pertaining to endemic corrupt environments, businesses could also argue 
justification based on higher moral grounds such as bribing is a part of free-market forces of 
supply and demand. The Integrity Pact embraces the neutralization techniques used by 
companies to resist tackling the problem of corruption. Michael Wiehen and Cobus de Swardt 
discuss this in their reflections on the Integrity Pact as a collective action tool330. They argue 
that the prevalence of corruption disheartens individual companies and even whole nations to 
take the first step against corruption. Companies are facing dilemma scenarios and risk 
ending up empty-handed when being the one deciding to conduct clean business while their 
competitors continue bribing. Wiehen and de Swardt acknowledge the problems and note: 
“nobody in business or government can operate globally without recognizing their role, their 
responsibility, and their risk when it comes to corruption” 331 . Hence, they suggest the 
Integrity Pact as tool to drive economic operators and contracting authorities to take steps in 
doing clean business, to enforce this via an independent broker (i.e. civil society organisation) 
and lay the foundation for an equal level playing field. On first sight the choice of the 
European Commission to use the Integrity Pact as a tool seems to target various elements of 
interest for the EU. The tool targets an area vulnerable for corruption, namely EU public 
procurement which affects a large part of EU expenditure and over which the European 
Commission has limited control. Secondly, it targets businesses that can be 
disproportionately affected by corruption such as SMEs, which are specifically targeted 
through the EU public procurement reforms. Thirdly, the Integrity Pact aims to promote best 
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public procurement practices, which could help harmonising the implementation of EU 
public procurement measures across the EU Member States. Also it aims to ensure an equal 
level playing field for businesses, which could ensure more cross-border public procurement 
activity at this way complete the functioning of the Single Market. Finally, the tool can be 
used on different business sectors, on different governmental levels and across regions. 
 
The main challenge, however, is that the effect or impact of collective action initiatives is 
difficult to determine and that collective action initiatives according to the World Bank 
Institute particularly fair well in endemic corrupt environments. Despite that collective action 
initiatives can also be used in non-endemic corrupt environments, the question does raise 
which conditions favour the effective use of the Integrity Pact. Without better understanding 
this, we would not be in a position to simply justify the use of the tool in EU Member States. 
It is therefore that the next section of this study aims to better understand which conditions 
favour the use of the Integrity Pact tool and this way aim to determine the effective role of 
civil society organisations to prevent corruption in public procurement. 
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   Part II – Integrity Pacts as collective action 
The second study area aims to determine the compatibility of the Integrity Pact tool on the 
basis of the collective action approach to prevent corruption in public procurement. The tool 
is used to provide multiple-case study evidence on the role of the independent monitor to 
prevent corruption in public procurement. With this information, areas can be exposed in 
which civil society monitoring of public procurement plays a preventive role outside the 
confines of the existing anti-corruption framework to prevent corruption in public 
procurement. 
 
The main study questions are: 
 
-   How is the Integrity Pact tool set up? 
-   How is the Integrity Pact tool applied in practice? 
-   What are limitations, strengths and weaknesses of the Integrity tool? 
The Integrity Pact initiative was developed by Transparency International in the 1990s and 
was initially coined as “Islands of Integrity”. The idea originated from the notion that 
corruption is different in each country and that change does not happen over night. De Swardt 
and Wiehen note332 that businesses may not know how to make government change its way 
of dealing with the private sector and that governments may not be able to keep out 
corruption because it cannot stop companies from bribing. The latter, they note, is of 
particular relevance in developing countries where foreign companies bribe the country’s 
officials. According to the founders of the Integrity Pact, the way to achieve change is to 
work together transparently on an “island of integrity” which allows both sides to 
fundamentally change the nature of the game. The idea of the “island of integrity” was first 
tested on procurement, partially due to its vulnerability for corruption and therefor need for 
transparency, partially because public procurement is an important driver for development in 
developing countries and emerging economies. “Passing new laws alone is not enough to 
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address the problem. The challenge is to change practices that have become deeply rooted 
over time.”333.  
The collective problem described by De Swardt and Wiehen in Pieth (2012) describes the 
scenario in which corruption is perceived endemic: “if other people don’t want to tackle it, 
you can’t expect us to”334. Individual companies are reluctant to take the first step as it risks 
that their competitors do resort to bribing. In order to tackle this, the experts suggest three 
actions: pressure on the top; encourage good practices to stakeholders; and support citizens to 
make change happen from the bottom up. In operational terms this means that voluntary 
agreements are made between bidders and government to restrict opportunities for corruption 
in a particular project. Bidders agree not to pay bribes and disclose all commissions paid. The 
government agrees to ensure measures to avoid corruption in the process, and sanction any 
official that accepts or demands bribes. With the Integrity Pact, independent experts and civil 
society organisations are used to increase transparency and accountability as well as 
compliance with the agreement’s commitments. According to De Swardt and Wiehen the role 
of the civil society expert is crucial in addressing the collective action problem. After all, 
with their involvement the companies “can abstain from bribing in the safe knowledge that 
their competitors have provided assurance to do the same”335.  
The concept of “islands of integrity” also, apart from the Integrity Pact, has been applied on 
different tools. For example, so-called Development Pacts were used to reconfirm promises 
made by those governing to those governed. Communities and committed public officials 
publically negotiate an agreement in which local improvements are outlined. The former 
would monitor the compliance of the latter in achieving these improvements. The 
Development Pacts have been used for example in Kenya where the local community group 
signed a pact with the local water company setting standards for service provision. In India 
the Development Pacts were used to monitor election promises of politicians. Another tool 
which builds on the Islands of Integrity is the Integrity Pledge which is used to seal and 
legitimize commitment of leaders to integrity with public monitoring. Finally, new 
technologies could break the boundaries of the “islands” by allowing wider social control of 
integrity beyond the reach of a specific civil society organisation.  
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5.1   Integrity Pact cases 
This following section will present the Integrity Pact case studies. The first sections includes 
an overview of the reviewed cases on the global level, the second section will present in more 
detail the European cases.  
   Integrity Pacts across the world 
The main body of Integrity Pact cases are documented by Transparency International, which 
across the globe has operated as a civil society monitor for public procurement. However, 
also other organisations engage in Integrity Pacts or similar types of initiatives, such as the 
Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST). The following section will introduce the 
initiatives that will form the basis this study’s analysis to determine the favourable conditions 
for an effective role of civil society to prevent corruption in public procurement.  
 
Transparency International is a decentralised civil society organisations with a secretariat in 
Berlin and local chapters in around 100 countries world-wide. The chapters of the 
organisation enjoy a great degree of independence and therefor vary greatly in size and 
organisation. Chapters have designed and implemented Integrity Pacts in Latin America, 
Asia, Africa, and Europe. Although not all cases have been documented, Integrity Pacts in 
roughly 20 countries have been implemented. Some countries implemented numerous 
projects while in other countries the tool was used once or twice. Also the shape of each 
Integrity Pacts differs which complicates taking stock of the cases in a structured manner. In 
Latin America there have been Integrity Pacts implemented in Argentina, Colombia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Mexico. In Asia there have been Integrity Pacts in China, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and South Korea. In Africa, projects have been documented in Benin, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. In Europe, there have been Integrity Pacts in Austria, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy and Latvia.  
 
Civil society organisations in some countries are in the initial stages of exploring the use of 
the Integrity Pact or recently launched projects. For example, in Honduras the chapter of 
Transparency International is in the process of designing projects for the healthcare sector. In 
Spain, the national Transparency International chapter is starting the launch of Integrity Pacts 
as part of the Siemens Integrity Initiative. In Romania, the national Transparency 
International chapter started a project in 2015. Transparency International United Kingdom 
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and Poland explored the use of Integrity Pacts for monitoring procurement in the defence 
sector but did not come to implement.  
 
1.   Colombia 
One of the most experienced stakeholders on Integrity Pacts is the chapter of Transparency 
International in Colombia. The first documented projects date back to the early days of the 
Integrity Pact in the 1990s. The projects covered a range of economic sectors such as health, 
infrastructure, education, finance, energy, housing, communications and transport, and were 
implemented on the local, regional and national level. According to the Transparency 
International chapter, the Integrity Pacts promoted dialogue on ethics and public 
procurement, improved procurement processes and public contracts, supported in the 
identification of risks, raised public awareness and strengthened accountability336. 
 
The implementation of the Integrity Pact posed challenges to the chapter337. For example, in 
monitoring corruption in public procurement it was a challenge to determine the difference 
between legal corruption and ethical or moral corruption. In order words, some behaviour by 
contracting authorities can be within the boundaries of the law but from a moral point of view 
of the monitors unethical. The second challenge is how to respond to such a scenario. For 
example, the civil society monitor needs to formulate a response to such unethical but legal 
behaviour. Towards the public the reasoning behind such a response does not always explain 
itself. A third challenge for the civil society organisation is the participation of actors in the 
Integrity Pact using the tool as a form of window-dressing rather than an effort to drive for 
change. Also the Transparency International Colombia chapter identified a lack of 
willingness of participants in a procurement process to blow the whistle on identified 
irregularities as a problem338. 
 
2.   El Salvador 
                                                            
 
336 Survey feedback global review, September – November 2015. 
337 Survey feedback global review, September – November 2015. 
338 Survey feedback global review, September – November 2015. 
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In El Salvador the Integrity Pact as a tool was introduced in 2009 after election debates in the 
country centred around issues such as corruption and transparency. The national chapter of 
Transparency International entered into dialogue with the Ministry of Public Works to 
formulate a response to irregularities and corruption in public procurement. In collaboration 
with the contracting authority and the construction sector, the first Integrity Pact was 
launched in 2010. By the end of 2015 around 31 Integrity Pact projects were conducted 
allowing for external monitoring of around USD 62 billion in public procurement.  
 
The Integrity Pact included transparency and anti-bribery commitments for both the 
contracting authority and the bidder339. For example, the stakeholders are not to offer or 
accept any payment, gift or favour in exchange for advantages, and have to disclose relevant 
information to the monitor such as personal asset declaration requirements. Also the Integrity 
Pact ensures that information is published online about progress made in the procurement 
process. Also stakeholders are asked to come forward about any inappropriate acts. 
 
A challenge in the Integrity Pact used in El Salvador is that monitoring only initiates after the 
winning bid has been decided and the contract is being implemented 340 . The national 
procurement law keeps information during the bidding process confidential which limits the 
transparency overall and limits access to the procurement process by the independent monitor 
from the civil society organisation. In practice this means that only the winning bidder will be 
subject to monitoring once this economic operator is fulfilling contractual obligations. A 
second challenge experienced in the El Salvador Integrity Pact cases has been to identify and 
provide evidence of corruption341. Instead the civil society organisation used transparency 
and accountability indicators to determine level of compliance. This included rating the 
quality and amount of information provided by the ministry website and the number of 
complaints filed against signatory parties to the Integrity Pacts. Another challenge was the 
response to possible irregularities. The Integrity Pact does not provide for a proper 
mechanism but instead the independent monitor needs to take the claim to the public 
prosecutor or directly escalate to the head of the Ministry of Public Works. 
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186 
The outcomes of the Integrity Pacts in El Salvador is that no corruption was identified in the 
project monitored between 2010 and 2015342. It is therefor seen more as a tool to deter 
corruption despite its limitations due to the fact it only monitors one particular phase in the 
procurement process. In 2013 the Ministry of Public Works joined the Construction Sector 
Transparency Initiative in order to further build on the experience with the Integrity Pact. 
 
3.   Honduras 
In 2015 the Transparency International chapter of Honduras entered into dialogue with the 
Ministry of Health in order to establish an integrity framework to deal with health care 
procurement343. The Integrity Pact was foreseen as part of the agreement in order to deal 
specifically with the purchase of medicines. This market was identified by the civil society 
organisation as a vulnerable area due to the frequent use of emergency procurement 
procedures. Preceding the agreement, the Transparency International chapter drafted a 
concept and strategy paper on the issue and approached the industry in order to ensure 
support for the activities relating the integrity framework. 
 
The objective of the Integrity Pact according to the chapter is to counter weaknesses in 
control mechanisms of the Ministry of Health and strengthen internal control. Longer-term 
objectives include more structural reform on procurement procedures as well as sector-
specific issues such as the dispensing of medicines. 
 
Commitments on behalf of the bidders include commitments for companies not to bribe, 
collude or commit any other illegal acts. Also the private sector actors will be held liable for 
fraudulent representation. Contracting authorities will be requested to disclose procurement 
information to the bidders and public, and ethically commit to the rules of interaction with 
bidders during the procurement process. Whistle-blowing is promoted by allowing 
stakeholders to review and comment on bidding documentation and entitling them to make 
allegations of Integrity Pact violations.   
 
4.   India 
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Transparency International India is one of the most experienced chapters using the Integrity 
Pact344. The approach used for the Integrity Pact in India is different from others discussed in 
this study. In 2006 the chapter launched its first project with the Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation Limited, an Indian Public Sector Undertaking. Soon after, the Integrity Pact was 
recommended as a tool to promote transparency in public procurement through a government 
report on ethics in government. In 2007 the Central Vigilance Commission officially 
recommended the adoption of the Integrity Pact by all Public Sector Undertakings. In 2009 
the Central Vigilance Commission issued a circular note outlining the Standard Operating 
Procedure for Integrity Pacts. This includes:  
 
-­‐   Promise on the part of the principal not to seek or accept any benefit, which is not legally 
available; 
-­‐   Principal to treat all bidders with equity and reason;  
-­‐   Promise on the part of bidders not to offer any benefit to the employees of the Principal 
not available legally;  
-­‐   Bidders not to enter into any undisclosed agreement or understanding with other bidders 
with respect to prices, specifications, certifications, subsidiary contracts, etc.;  
-­‐   Bidders not to pass any information provided by principal as part of business relationship 
to others and not to commit any offence under the law;  
-­‐   Foreign bidders to disclose the name and address of agents and representatives in India 
and Indian bidders to disclose their foreign principals or associates;  
-­‐   Bidders to disclose the payments to be made by them to agents/brokers or any other 
intermediary;  
-­‐   Bidders to disclose any transgressions with any other company that may impinge on the 
anti-corruption principle345. 
 
The Standard Operating Procedures further define that the Integrity Pact should cover the 
entire procurement process. It also provides implementation guidelines, appointment 
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procedures and the role definition for the monitor, and established a periodical review 
system. Each Integrity Pact is to be prepared by the Public Sector Undertaking and approved 
by the Central Vigilance Commission. Almost half of the Public Sector Undertakings have 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Transparency International India to ensure 
collaboration but this is not mandatory. The Central Vigilance Commission approves the 
monitor selected by the Public Sector Undertaking and this person needs to be of “high 
integrity and reputation”. The Integrity Pact has been institutionalised to a certain degree in 
India. In the defence sector this has become a practice since 2006 with the introduction of an 
independent monitor in the Defence Procurement Procedures.  
 
The outcomes of the Integrity Pact have been assessed by Transparency International India in 
2012. This shows that the Integrity Pact has been effective in enhancing transparency in the 
procurement process, increasing the level playing field, boosting vendor confidence and 
improving brand image. The purpose of the Integrity Pact in India is to increase transparency 
through ethical conduct in public contracting and procurement, provide a mechanism for the 
detection of risks and red flags, and promote corrective measures. Nonetheless, Transparency 
International India also noted various difficulties in relation to the implementation of the 
Integrity Pact346. For example, the fact that the Integrity Pact is institutionalised risks that the 
exercise reduces to ticking off boxes rather than aiming to drive for change in ethical 
behaviour. Another challenge is allocating sufficient resources to oversee many procurement 
procedures. In India this is the responsibility of the Public Sector Undertaking and allocating 
insufficient monitors to a procurement project could result in less scrutiny. The chapter of 
Transparency International in India is now looking into redefining the role of civil society in 
monitoring and social auditing. 
 
5.   Indonesia 
In 2013 the Indonesian chapter of Transparency International initiated a project that supports 
businesses based on four different pillars: participation, integrity, transparency, and 
                                                            
 
346 Interview feedback Field Mission India, collected by co-author global review, 17-23 September 2015. 
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accountability (PITA)347. The project as a whole covers a wide array of activities to help 
private sector players and in particular state-owned companies to harness anti-corruption 
standards. Part of this includes active engagement of civil society in the monitoring of 
procurement. According to the chapter, a major risk for state-owned companies is undue 
influence by political parties, in particular the ruling party. In addition, the companies face 
corruption on the ground when interacting with citizens. The combination of these two 
requires a holistic approach and therefore it is considered that a project such as PITA can help 
shield these companies against this. A major project by the Transparency International 
chapter focused on the country’s second biggest electricity provider, whose director at the 
time asked them for assistance. In 2013 and 2014, they introduced the project in 47 business 
units and 10 subsidiaries. The main driver behind the successful implementation is the 
leadership of the company. This project is considered a flagship given it is the first time such 
intensive collaboration materialised between civil society and the private sector348. 
 
The Integrity Pact function of the PITA project builds on the assumption that procurement is 
vulnerable to corruption and can only be addressed through systematic monitoring and multi-
stakeholder involvement349. This includes collaboration between the country’s anti-corruption 
commission, the company itself and civil society. Together they evaluate existing regulations 
on procurement, identify weaknesses and loopholes and provide policy recommendations. 
The project includes provisions for bidders and for the contracting authorities. For bidders 
this includes the provision not to bribe, collude or engage in other illegal activities350. The 
contracting authorities are in addition asked to disclose information on procurement to the 
public and to bidders. Also, they have to report any attempted or completed breaches of the 
clauses, ethically commit to rules of engagement between bidders and authorities and 
disclose financial interests. 
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The PITA project does not include specific sanctions apart from those foreseen in the law. 
The chapter highlights that monitoring activities are seen as a way to enhance learning of 
stakeholders351. In case irregularities are identified the stakeholders first try to solve these 
through collective agreement. If this fails, the decision can be taken to follow judicial 
procedures. There are no clear criteria for success, however the PITA project is considered a 
learning exercise. There is an exit strategy in which the chapter aims to finish the project 
once they consider the company can be self-sustainable in its anti-corruption efforts. At the 
time of this study, the chapter is looking into new PITA projects dealing with state-owned 
companies in the mining sector352. 
 
6.   Malaysia 
The national chapter of Transparency International in Malaysia introduced Integrity Pacts as 
tools to address business integrity. For example, one initiative concerned the mining company 
KSSB (Kumpulan Smesta Sdn Bhd). This included an agreement in which clear codes of 
behaviour were established including ways to sanction misconduct. Another case concerned 
an Integrity Pact for the company MRT (Mass Rail Transit). The MRT case concerned the 
building of a rail network around Kuala Lumpur. Apart from the mining and public works 
sectors, Transparency International Malaysia also advocates for the use of the tool in other 
sectors. For example, in 2010 the chapter called for the inclusion of an Integrity Pact in 
relation to a rehabilitation project of a major river, which included works for RM 50 
billion353. Spill-over effects identified from the Integrity Pacts have included plans from the 
public authorities to extend the tool to local councils354. 
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Malaysia’s anti-corruption agency refers on its website to the use of the Integrity Pact in 
2010355. According to the agency, the main objectives of the Integrity Pact are to strengthen 
efforts towards improving integrity and transparency in government procurement while at the 
same time reduce waste and curb the abuse of power 356 . The Integrity Pact covers 
government employees involved in public procurement and members of procurement-related 
committees, such as bidders and appointed consultants. Sanctions in case of violations 
include termination of contracts and liability of damages resulted from this termination. 
Further, sanctions include forfeiture of bids or performance bonds, blacklisting and criminal 
or disciplinary action against employees.   
 
7.   Mexico  
In Mexico, the federal government introduced the Social Witness Program (Testigo Social) in 
2004 after piloting various civil society public procurement monitoring projects in 
collaboration with the Mexican Transparency International chapter. Since that time, 
Transparency International Mexico has monitored over 200 public procurement processes357. 
 
The legally adopted formula for monitoring stems from the Integrity Pact model designed by 
Transparency International but differs in various ways from examples identified across the 
spectrum358. For example, natural and legal persons can register and be accredited in order to 
be eligible for monitoring federal procurement processes. A government selection committee 
appoints a monitor from a pool of accredited experts to a specific procurement project. De 
facto, the monitor cannot choose the process it wishes to monitor. The contracting authority 
will include the monitor in the process, provide access to documentation and meetings, and 
remunerate the work based on time sheets. The monitor has an observatory role, but can 
comment on procedures and promote good practices. In case the monitor identifies 
irregularities, it can take the decision to escalate these to competent authorities. Primarily its 
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role is to ensure that the procurement process is done according to the law. In the end, the 
monitor drafts a monitoring report that will be made public.   
 
The Social Witness Program in Mexico specifically focuses on the bidding process. This 
however does not mean that the monitors do not ask questions about the activities relating to 
the pre-bidding or post-bidding stages 359 . Apart from looking at compliance with legal 
procurement rules, independent monitors from Transparency International Mexico strongly 
focus on asking authorities and bidders to justify decisions they take. The idea is that this can 
break information asymmetries within the contracting authority and also between bidders and 
authorities. 
 
Transparency International Mexico has conducted projects for numerous federal contracting 
agencies. A frequent authority is the state-owned electricity company CFE (Comisión Federal 
de Electricidad). Currently CFE is being privatized and once operating on the private market 
it will not be required to use Social Witness for its procurement. Nonetheless, the company 
opted for continuing this and is currently developing its own version of the tool360. The 
Mexican Transparency International chapter provides the company with advice on how to set 
this up. This includes involving other private sector players in discussing with CFE how to 
best design this.  
 
Transparency International Mexico and contracting authorities subject to their Social Witness 
programme identified improvements in procurement quality, which had impact on the final 
public goods, works and services361 . The method adopted by the independent monitors 
includes motivating the contracting authority to trace back decisions taken and assess whether 
these suit the needs of the public or economic means at their disposal. With this, the monitors 
hope to break the information cycle and move the contracting authority to overturn decisions 
that might impact public procurement in a negative way. In Mexico, the Transparency 
International chapter argues that in the future the Integrity Pact as a tool is expected to 
become part of an interactive ecosystem of tools that aim to reduce corruption362. The role of 
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modern technology, i.e. through open data, in combination with access to information and 
transparency laws creates new opportunities for citizens to play an active role in monitoring 
public procurement. 
 
8.   Pakistan 
In 2001 Transparency International Pakistan implemented an Integrity Pact for the K-III 
Greater Karachi Water Supply Scheme (K-III Project). The Integrity Pact was part of a larger 
initiative aiming to revive Karachi economically. Apart from the Integrity Pact the 
municipality also used different processes to enhance transparency in contracting 363 . 
Transparency International Pakistan selected and appointed consultants for the design, 
supervision and selection of contractors364. The pact was signed by all bidders and included 
clauses in order not to offer or accept bribes and collude with other bidders. Bidders were to 
disclose all payments and to report breaches of the Integrity Pact. A violation of the Integrity 
Pact could be sanctioned with liability for damages as well as blacklisting. 
 
Transparency International Pakistan noted that an important factor for its success was the top-
down support by the managing directors of the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board365. As a 
result of the Integrity Pact and estimated PKR 1000 million were saved. This was calculated 
by comparing the actual contract award costs with the initial estimated costs. Savings were 
based both on difference on the contract design costs and on the contract award costs. Apart 
from cost savings, the Integrity Pact in Pakistan was also institutionalised with the adoption 
in 2004 for public procurement above PKR 10 million. With this adoption the approach of the 
Integrity Pact changed. Now the civil society organisation did not monitor anymore directly 
but this was done by the contracting authority itself. Transparency International would 
become a channel through which bidders could file complaints on the procurement process. 
The chapter could then decide to forward the case to the contracting authorities or any other 
regulatory bodies involved. While this posed challenges relating the independent monitoring 
of the Integrity Pact, on the long-run the chapter argued that a healthier investment climate 
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developed since the Integrity Pact was institutionalised. For example, more international 
bidders have been taking part in procurement in Pakistan.  
 
9.   Rwanda 
The Rwandan chapter of Transparency International initiated dialogue with the public 
authorities after the Government of Rwanda adopted in 2000 a decentralisation policy and 
strategy for its implementation. On the basis of the strategy new corruption risks for public 
procurement were identified and Transparency International Rwanda started assessing the 
relevance of anti-corruption tools in the Rwandan context. Soon after the organisation 
realized that an Integrity Pact could be the right tool to monitor procurement on the local 
level, and started mobilizing stakeholders and organising information meetings366. It was not 
until 2011 that this materialised in expression of interest in the Integrity Pact for large-scale 
infrastructure procurement. The Rwandan chapter organised meetings with stakeholders in 
order to explain and promote the Integrity Pact. They expected that the tool would help 
exposing corruption practices and at the same time help reduce such practices367. Through the 
Ministry of Local Government the chapter approached local authorities that due to 
decentralisation were newly exposed to large-scale procurement. Once an agreement was 
made, the Chapter started working through the details of the Integrity Pact. Meetings were 
arranged with business representatives and officials, access was requested to documentation 
and the organisation prepared initial reports. In 2013, the decision was taken to start 
monitoring two different projects. 
 
Both the bidders and contracting authorities had commitments to adhere to in the Integrity 
Pacts. For bidders, provisions included not to bribe, not to collude, to refrain from all other 
illegal acts, and to accept liability. They were also to disclose information regarding 
payments to agents and other intermediaries, provide the same undertakings from 
subcontractors and report any attempted or fulfilled breaches of the Integrity Pact. 
Contracting authorities were requested not to demand or accept bribes and to refrain from all 
other illegal acts. They were to disclose relevant and equal information to all bidders, 
guarantee data protection disclose public information on the contracting process and ethically 
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commit to establishing rules of interaction with bidders during and after tender processes. 
Also, contracting authorities were to report any attempted or completed breach of the clauses. 
Concerning sanctioning, the Integrity Pacts in Rwanda provided additional sanctions to the 
ones foreseen by law. For example, bidders could lose a contract or be denied one upon 
breaching the pact. In addition, violations could lead to debarment from contracting with the 
authority. The Rwandan Integrity Pact spans the entirety of the procurement process and 
contract execution phase. It includes whistle-blower protection and foresees independent 
monitoring. The pacts do not have a predetermined procedure in place to pursue breach 
claims because law already foresees this. 
 
In Rwanda, the monitor had procurement expertise in combination with civil engineering 
knowledge368. The monitor was selected through an independent selection committee coming 
from Transparency International Rwanda’s Board, staff, the private sector, and government. 
The independent monitor is required to identify and prevent irregularities. A key tool of the 
monitor is the entitlement to allege Integrity Pact violations. Any anomaly identified by the 
monitor was to be reported to the chapter and the contracting authority. The chapter 
subsequently exercised discretion whether or not to inform the public on this369. The role of 
the monitor focused on ensuring that laws were followed, and to scrutinise bidding 
documents and proposals. 
 
Increased confidence and trust by the bidders is considered a positive outcome from the 
Integrity Pacts370. However, the chapter noted that no definite feedback could be given on 
impact on corruption compared to non-Integrity Pact public procurement projects, cost 
savings or increased public support for the government. Concerning its preventive impact, the 
chapter points out that, the mere fact that stakeholders are aware of the presence of an 
independent monitor affects behaviour. In more concrete terms, the Integrity Pacts resulted in 
the Rwandan Private Sector Federation to develop a code of conduct that requires signatories 
to refrain from bribery. 
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According to Transparency International Rwanda, the most important elements for a 
successful Integrity Pact are government support, sufficient budget for monitoring and the 
close involvement of civil society organisations 371 . However, the chapter confirms that 
aiming for sustainability is obstructed by the high costs for independent monitoring. This 
makes the Integrity Pact a one-time anti-corruption tool. Consequently, Transparency 
International Rwanda opted for using the Civil Society Procurement Monitoring Tool 
developed by the national chapter of Transparency International in the United States. This 
allows the chapter to now monitor three procurement processes in real time, using permanent 
staff members. Special audit activities are combined with online monitoring, creating a form 
of social audit. Thus, all procurement processes are put online and as a consequence citizens 
can also become monitors. At the time of this study Transparency International Rwanda was 
promoting the tool in four different districts in the country. The fact that Transparency 
International is involved already increases trust in the districts according to the chapter. At 
the same time, their advocacy is creating awareness among policy-makers. With the support 
of policy-makers and backing of civil society, the organisation now aims to institutionalise 
the tool through legislative reform. They foresee the Ombudsman to play a role as 
independent watchdog. 
 
10.  Uganda 
The Ugandan chapter of Transparency International started developing the Integrity Pact 
concept in 2008 and 2009. They initially organised trainings and meetings on Integrity Pacts 
in order to inform stakeholders and gather support. A model was developed in collaboration 
with a Swiss organisation. The idea was to target road and water works funded by 
international donors such as the World Bank and the EU. The reasoning behind this was that 
these donors could advocate for the incorporation of an Integrity Pact372. 
 
The projects eventually did not materialise. The Transparency International chapter was 
confronted with reluctance on behalf of the contracting authorities373. First, the authorities 
were uncomfortable with the concept of an independent monitor participating in a 
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procurement process. Secondly, they considered the legal framework sufficient to allow for a 
corruption free procurement environment. Finally, the chapter struggled with a lack of funds 
to complete the Integrity Pact. The private sector had expressed interest in the projects but 
this was dependent on the willingness of the contracting authority to promote it. 
 
According to the Ugandan chapter, the local context in Uganda is suited for a tool such as the 
Integrity Pact374. There are problems with collusion, bribery and kick-backs, even though the 
procurement process overall is considered open, by way of public websites, transparent 
bidding and public awarding of contracts. Despite this openness, according to the chapter, 
more sophisticated forms of corruption, such as collusion, are not necessarily prevented. In 
addition, the system does not cover contract implementation, which is considered 
problematic. The chapter expects that here the Integrity Pact could add value. 
   Integrity Pacts in Europe 
1.   Latvia 
The Transparency International chapter in Latvia (Delna) has been involved in two civil 
monitoring of public procurement projects. One involved tracking the privatisation of the 
Latvian Shipping Company, and the second concerned the construction of the National 
Library of Latvia (NLL). This overview focuses on the latter. 
 
In 2004, the Minister of Culture invited Delna to monitor the construction of the new 
National Library in Riga. The construction was launched with political and public support. 
The decision to procure was made in 2002, but it was not until 2004 that a new government 
declared the construction a national priority. A special state agency was created under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Culture, and was called the Three Brothers (Jaunie Tris 
Brali). This agency had to manage the construction of the library and two other projects - a 
concert hall, and a museum for contemporary arts. The total cost of the library was estimated 
at roughly EUR 270 million (USD $300 million). The economic implications of the project 
can be considered relevant, in light of Latvia’s small size (approximately 2 million 
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inhabitants) and, compared to the EU average, low per capita GDP per capita.375 Since the 
start of the project in 2004, economic and political support declined as new governments took 
office, and economic uncertainty increased in light of the global economic and financial 
crisis. Construction took place against a backdrop of perceived corruption in the construction 
sector. All of these factors challenged Delna from the start of the Integrity Pact in September 
2005 until the NLL was commissioned in August 2014376. 
 
The agreement aimed to stop corruption, unethical behaviour and inefficient procedures 
during the construction and to promote transparency. The Integrity Pact established terms of 
participatory monitoring of the NLL construction in order to ensure good governance. Delna 
was assigned the role of monitor of decisions and activities of the ministry and the agency. In 
order to do so, Delna was given permission to:377 monitor decisions of ministerial staff at all 
levels; participate in internal meetings and with third parties; ask for clarifications in written 
and orally; explore third party complaints; analyse documentation prepared by project parties 
from a good governance and anti-corruption perspective; attract external construction, legal 
and other experts when needed. 
 
Specific objectives set for the Integrity Pact were that378: anti-corruption declarations were to 
be included by the Ministry of Culture for every procurement contract, including for 
subcontractors; all suppliers that violated or refused to sign the declaration were to be 
excluded from further participation in tenders, and existing contracts with them were to be 
terminated; suspicions of corruption were to be communicated to the prosecutor general. 
 
Long-term objectives of Delna included that the Integrity Pact would lead to improvements in 
the legislation governing public procurement and contracting379. 
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Table 2: Intergity Pacts Latvia 
 Case 1 
Name Integrity Pact National Library of Latvia 
Role civil society organisation Independent monitor 
Date Integrity Pact September 2005 – 2016 
Sector public procurement Construction 
Agencies involved Ministry of Culture 
Size public procurement EUR 163,1 million 
Level of public procurement National 
 
2.   Hungary 
From 2011 to 2015, nine Integrity Pacts have been implemented in Hungary, two of which at 
the national level and seven at the local level. Procurement types varied from public relations 
and financial management services, to technical controller, planning, construction, taxi 
services, and computer hardware acquisition. 
 
The 2010 Global Corruption Barometer shows that citizens perceive political parties as the 
most corrupt institutions. The negative perception of political parties is worsened by apparent 
links between business and politics. Transparency International Hungary in 2012 warned that 
an estimated 65-75% of procurement is affected by corruption. An estimated 25% of large-
scale procurement works are affected380. The EU Anti-Corruption Report also references 
concern over the link between business and politics. Transparency International’s National 
Integrity System assessment report states that corruption risks arise from the interdependent 
relationship between the political and business elite, concerns regarding the independence of 
control institutions, and the lack of transparency in the legislative process. Together these 
risks raise concerns on state capture381. An example is the case of Közgép Incorporated, 
which has won over EUR 710 million in public procurement. The owner of the company was 
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considered a close friend of the Prime Minister, former finance director of the ruling party, 
and former head of the national tax authority. The company’s success in public procurement 
also has been noted through EU’s Operational Programmes382. 
 
Against this background, the Government adopted in 2012 a two-year anti-corruption 
programme. This included important steps in the fight against corruption, such as reviewing 
laws on public procurement and distribution of funds. Unfortunately, the measures generally 
failed to address vulnerable sectors such as the business sector, local governments and the 
legislature383. For the development of the anti-corruption strategy, civil society participated in 
initial consultations through hearings. The impact of the anti-corruption strategy on the state 
public administration can be considered effective from the perspective that this level is not 
widely regarded as a corruption risk environment. Nonetheless, concerns are voiced that 
politicization of the administration can spill over to lower levels of governance. The 2011 and 
2012 Integrity Reports by the State Audit Office identified several irregularities in the public 
institutions384. 
 
Integrity Pacts were introduced in Hungary for all procurement procedures relating to the 
project Development of Ózd town’s drinking water supply infrastructure and distribution 
systems and its sustainable control385. In the Integrity Pacts, the municipality signed as 
contracting authority, together with the bidders, independent monitors, Transparency 
International Hungary and managing authorities and development agency. The Swiss 
Contribution Office covered costs for the Integrity Pact. Transparency International Hungary 
developed a visualization tool for the project allowing visitors to track easily the process of 
procurement and the project’s current phase. Bidders could voluntarily sign the Integrity Pact 
in the agreement pertaining to the construction investment. Adherence to the Integrity Pact 
was possible by signing the declaration, which was part of the tender documentation. All 
bidders signed the declaration. 
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The municipality of the XIII-District of Budapest signed an Integrity Pact with Transparency 
International Hungary as monitor for the public procurement and the implementation of a 
nursery refurbishment. Bidders joint the Integrity Pact during the procedure. The 
municipality contracted an independent company in charge of the procurement procedure. 
Prior to monitoring the public procurement, Transparency International reviewed the 
procurement regulations of the municipality and called for changes. Costs for the independent 
monitor were covered by the municipality.  
 
The Hungarian Public Procurement Act (PPA) does not foresee exclusion of bidders. In 
Hungary experience shows that breaching the contract can result in disclosure to the public, 
which has a preventive effect. In case the monitor identifies or suspects a violation of the 
provision of Act LVVII of 1996 or that of the Treaty of the EU, he/she will notify the 
contracting authority. On the basis of the PPA, the contracting authority will notify the 
competition authority. The monitor can also turn to the procurement authority, the police or 
the public prosecutor. 
 
Transparency International Hungary has prepared e-learning material to inform and brief 
every single employee/colleague in the institutions signing Integrity Pacts. If an Integrity Pact 
is not correctly implemented it could become an appearance-measure and an additional 
administrative burden. 
 
Table 3: Integrity Pacts Hungary 
 Case 2 Case 3 
Name Integrity Pact Ózd Water Supply Rehabilitation 
Project 
XIII- District Nursery 
Role civil society organisation Advisor Independent Monitor 
Cost Integrity Pact EUR 40500 1% of EUR 1,3 million 
Date Integrity Pact January 2011 – January 2016 January 2013 – December 2014 
Public procurement sector Water supply construction Construction (education) 
Agencies involved National Development Agency, 
Managing Authority, Municipality 
of Ózd 
XIII-District of Budapest 
Size public procurement EUR 5 million EUR 1,3 million 
Level of public procurement Local and international Local 
  
 
202 
 
3.   Bulgaria 
The European Union’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) monitors Bulgaria’s 
progress made since the accession to the EU in 2007. The most recent CVM report from 
January 2015 highlights the effect of political uncertainty on public opinion concerning 
corruption386. The Special Eurobarometer showed that citizens are concerned about the fight 
against corruption, judicial reform and tackling organised crime387. The CVM reports clearly 
show progress in the country’s efforts to strengthen rule of law however the European 
Commission finds anti-corruption deficiencies. Two key issues repeatedly addressed are the 
need to develop and implement a sound evidence-based policy-making strategy, and 
strengthening the institutional independence and the capacity of anti-corruption units to 
develop and monitor the execution of anti-corruption policies. 
 
Various key corruption risk areas are identified in Bulgaria, such as impunity of political 
corruption, influence peddling between members of political parties and members of 
organised crime, and public procurement. Key vulnerable sectors identified are the health 
care and energy sectors. The former experienced decentralisation from the state to the 
regional level, which has not objectively been assessed. The latter requires transparency in 
market regulation and execution of large public procurement tenders. 
 
Transparency International Bulgaria implemented at the time of this study three Integrity 
Pacts in light of their involvement in the Siemens Integrity Initiative388. Three different kinds 
of procurement projects were selected covering three different public bodies389 managing 
national and EU funds. From February 2012 to December 2013, the chapter implemented the 
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Integrity Pacts, which in total covered five public procurement contracts (two public works 
and three for the provision of goods and services). 
 
Table 4: Integrity Pacts Bulgaria 
 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Name Integrity Pact Truma Motorway 
Renovation Medical Care 
Homes for Children 
E-Data Exchange System 
for Social Security 
Role civil society 
organisation 
Independent monitor Independent monitor Independent monitor 
Date Integrity Pact 
May 2012 – December 
2013 
July 2012 – July 2013 
July 2012 – October 
2013 
Sector public procurement Construction Construction Health Care Consultancy IT 
Agencies involved 
Road Infrastructure 
Agency, Ministry of 
Regional Development 
and Public Works 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy 
Size public procurement EUR 102 million EUR 105 million EUR 46000 
Level of public 
procurement 
National National National 
 
 
4.   Germany 
The German chapter of Transparency International has implemented four Integrity Pacts390. 
In Bremen and Hannover, the chapter implemented Integrity Pacts for the procurement of two 
health care projects. In Berlin, the organisation implemented Integrity Pacts for a housing 
project and for the construction of the Berlin-Brandenburg International Airport. 
 
The Bremen hospital procurement ran at a cost of roughly EUR 230 million. Transparency 
International Germany monitored both the planning and construction of the works. The 
Integrity Pact (signed June 2009) was seen as a pioneer project warranting transparency and 
anti-corruption391. A monitor was assigned to the Integrity Pact with a legal and construction 
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background. The contracting authority acknowledged the importance of having an 
independent monitor on their side portraying both such qualifications392. 
 
The construction costs of the hospital in Hannover came to EUR 180 million 393 . A 
construction expert was publically appointed as monitor for the duration of the Integrity Pact 
(signed June 2010). The contracting authority highlighted in its press release the importance 
of the Integrity Pact as a tool to signal fair competition, corruption prevention and no 
collusion. 
 
The Integrity Pact for the Berlin housing project (signed July 2010) included a team of two 
monitors with technical, economic and legal backgrounds. The monitors were required to 
scrutinise the entire planning and construction phase for the modernization and repair of 
2,300 apartments in Berlin. The rehabilitation of the apartments started in the 1990s and in 
total cost roughly EUR 1.2 billion. 
 
The first and largest Integrity Pact in Germany was signed in 2005 to monitor the 
construction of the Berlin-Brandenburg International Airport. Being one of the largest 
construction projects in Europe, the total cost of the procurement project was initially 
estimated at EUR 2.4 billion. Due to numerous project changes, delays and technical 
problems, the final cost will be significantly higher394. At the stage of drafting this text, the 
date of opening of the airport was still uncertain. In 2005, Transparency International 
Germany and the company Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld GmbH (FBS) issued a public call 
for a monitor team lead, resulting in the appointment of an independent external monitor with 
a strong professional record in public procurement. For ten years the Transparency 
International chapter engaged in Integrity Pact activities. In March 2015, the chapter chose to 
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end cooperation due to reported corruption incidents. The experience in this Integrity Pact has 
led the chapter to question the tool’s effectiveness395.  
 
5.   Romania 
Transparency International Romania has provided technical assistance for large procurement 
processes, engaging in collaboration with a utilities company called Electrica, which led to 
development of an Integrity Pact.  
 
The Integrity Pact includes a conflict of interest provision, disclosure of anti-corruption 
policy, monitoring obligations, budget, and quality review 396 . The Integrity Pact legal 
contract was part of the tender documents. All parties that participated in the bidding were 
required to sign the Integrity Pact. At the time of data collection for this study, the chapter did 
not yet start monitoring activities. 
 
In case of breach, the Integrity Pact foresees a complicated scheme of financial corrections. 
Further, provisions for a dispute resolution mechanism stated that complaints first must be 
mediated. If not successful, the contractor, bidder and independent monitor have the right to 
appeal to an arbitration panel of experts. If no solution is foreseen, the contracting authority 
can impose sanctions and initiate formal legal proceedings. 
 
Romania planned to organise a platform of civil society to discuss the monitoring report 
before launching the Integrity Pact. The aim of such a platform is to ensure full civil society 
coverage and, this way, improve the report. At this stage, concrete results from the Integrity 
Pact have been the successful advocacy to government stakeholders of the Integrity Pact 
process for Electrica. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is also a 
shareholder together with the government, investment funds and other small shareholders. 
 
6.   Italy 
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In 2000, Transparency International Italy analysed the Integrity Pact model and its 
applicability to the Italian system based on Integrity Pact experiences from other countries as 
well as findings from a workshop in Bogota at the time. The chapter undertook training and 
education activities and attempted to implement Integrity Pacts397. 
 
The research team dealing with the Integrity Pact first carefully analysed the tool and 
systematically assessed which elements are optional or required for the Italian system398. 
Subsequently, the organisation drafted a model agreement and started approaching 
municipalities to explore interest. Despite expressions of interest, the Integrity Pacts did not 
materialize quickly. They were confronted by a “climate of suspicion and inertia/apathy” 
perceived as a general characteristic of public environments399. In 2000, six municipalities 
were contacted (Bergamo, Como, Genoa, Milan, Palermo, and Varese). The municipalities of 
Milan and Genoa tentatively committed. 
 
Feedback received by the organisation in 2008 provides insight into the workings of Integrity 
Pacts in Italy. In the sequence of activities associated to the implementation of an Integrity 
Pact, the organisation first collects information about the entities that have problems with 
integrity of procurement processes. Key is to identify champions within the public 
administration to allow for support of the Integrity Pact concept. After this, they establish 
contact and offer support, for example through the use of an Integrity Pact. Once an 
agreement has been made at the management level, training is foreseen on Integrity Pacts for 
procurement staff. Support is given when preparing general purchase conditions in order to 
introduce the clauses of the Integrity Pact. After this, bidders are informed about the need for 
integrity and transparency. Contracting authorities are asked to establish clear mechanisms 
for contract awarding. Bribes are to be excluded and real competition to win a bid should be 
based on technical-commercial advantages. The chapter recommends offering the authority 
continued support throughout the project implementation. 
 
                                                            
 
397 Survey feedback global review, September – November 2015. 
398 Desk research internal documentation, Italy_Integrity_Pact 2000.pdf, p. 47  
399 Desk research internal documentation, Italy_Integrity_Pact 2000.pdf, p. 47  
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In Milan, an Integrity Pact materialized400. The Integrity Pact included an undertaking of the 
public authority and the bidders. For the latter, the Integrity Pact includes provisions not to 
bribe, not to use facilitation payments, not to collude and disclose information regarding 
payments related to the contracting process. Sub-contractors were excluded. Transparency 
International Italy highlighted that collusion was the most difficult hurdle. In addition, it was 
noted that facilitation payments were a common practice and the organisation expressed 
concerns that could also affect a certain range of projects abroad. In order to dispel 
misunderstandings, bidders were urged to signal grey areas. Provisions concerning the 
authorities included: not to demand or accept bribes; not to demand or accept facilitation 
payments; to disclose relevant and equal information to all bidders; to guarantee protection of 
restricted information; to report any attempted or completed breaches; and to provide public 
information on the contracting process. Disciplinary sanctions were included such as: loss or 
denial of contract, forfeiture of bid and performance bonds; liquidated damages to principal 
and competitors; and debarment for a period of five years. Breaches would be dealt with 
through national arbitration. 
   Others  
As mentioned about, the concept of “islands of integrity” has been applied on different tools. 
The following section presents some examples from Transparency International chapters as 
well as other civil society organisations, all example relating to public procurement. 
Feedback from European Transparency International chapters401 shows that many conduct 
research and advocacy work relating corruption in public procurement. The Transparency 
International chapters in Czech Republic and Croatia are involved in other types of 
monitoring activities. The former monitors public procurement cases once they are red 
flagged through their Anti-Corruption Legal Advisory Centre (ALAC). The experience 
gained with monitoring activities is subsequently used to advocate for legislative 
improvements and training activities. The latter has provided technical assistance to the 
Ministry of Health on audit procedures and public procurement procedures. This resulted in 
                                                            
 
400 Desk research internal documentation, see IP Italy_final versión 2008.doc  
401 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, Romania, Greece. Feedback from: 
Survey feedback global review, September – November 2015; Focus group feedback Berlin workshop, 
European review, 23 February 2013. 
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the cancellation of four tender procedures estimated worth EUR 2,6 million. Transparency 
International Italy and Czech Republic note experience with training public officials on 
corruption in public procurement. Transparency International Greece supported complainants 
that issued warnings of lack of transparency in public procurement processes relating to staff 
selection, works and supplies. 
 
Transparency International Slovakia in collaboration with Fair-play Alliance has designed the 
Open Contracts Portal that helps citizens to read, search and assess the profitability of public 
contracts 402 . Through automated analysis and public involvement in the evaluation of 
contracts, it draws attention to those contracts that most require review. Since 2011, all 
contracts relating to management of public resources, state and local property in Slovakia 
have to be disclosed. Transparency International Czech Republic developed a similar 
initiative and established Indicators of transparency in public procurement. The set of 
indicators were designed to assess the transparency of the public procurement market in the 
country. It is based on the assumption that the greater number of open tenders with no limit 
on bidders, the greater the pressure for efficiency and the lower the likelihood of corruption.  
 
It is important to highlight that both examples allow for better public control but do not 
necessarily scrutinise directly procurement processes or authorities themselves. An example 
focusing more on the institutional level is the Transparency International Czech Republic’s 
Efficiency of control systems in procurement initiative. The organisation examined the 
competences and impact of the Supreme Audit Office and the Office for Protection of 
Competition. Another example looking into procurement from an institutional level is 
Transparency International Bulgaria’s initiative Monitoring the transparency of public 
procurement with high public interest in Bulgaria: The case of highway. Together with the 
America for Bulgaria Foundation, the chapter initiated the project in order to help reduce the 
risk of misuse of public funds when awarding and carrying out transactions of substantial 
public interest in the country. A key element of the project is the development of a 
methodology for independent civil monitoring of large-scale public works. The methodology 
is applied to the procedure for selecting a contractor for the construction of the Trakia 
highway.  
                                                            
 
402 See the Open Contracts Portal: http://otvorenezmluvy.sk  
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Transparency International Bulgaria’s initiative shows similarities to Integrity Pacts, 
however, it does not necessarily provide for a methodology on monitoring procurement 
contract implementation. It does address key characteristics such as independent monitoring, 
tailor-made application, and public outreach. The Trakia project is seen by the organisation as 
a step towards a full Integrity Pact project403. Transparency International Romania presents us 
with a project example that also includes execution of contracts. The Monitoring structural 
funds management project is designed to monitor the management of structural funds by 
public authorities in the country. The monitoring process aims to evaluate the extent to which 
integrity standards are respected by both the public institutions and authorities disbursing the 
funds, as well as by eligible beneficiaries. The project also established a mechanism for 
monitoring the implementation of structural funds, parallel to the public one404.  
 
The civil society organisation Access Info developed a practical guide for civil society, 
journalists, academics and others to evaluate whether the key information needed to prevent 
and/or identify corrupt practices within government is in fact readily available. The 
methodology draws on international anti-corruption treaties such as UNCAC, as well as other 
international standards and best practices, to propose some core classes of information, which 
should be published by democratic and accountable governments. These include, for 
example, copies of public procurement contracts, assets declarations by public officials, and 
information on decision-making in privatisation processes. 
 
The UNDP developed a methodology for measuring the index of responsibility, transparency 
and accountability at local level. This tool aims to measure the exposure of a given institution 
to corruption and/or corruption risks. It covers three areas: public procurement, urban 
planning and financial management in local government. It can be used as a mechanism for 
self-evaluation by the local government or for identification and monitoring by independent 
agencies. It has been applied in Macedonia. 
 
                                                            
 
403 Interview feedback Field Mission Bulgaria, European review, 31 March – 2 April 2015. 
404 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL BULGARIA (2007). Raport de Monitorizare a gestiunni fondurilor 
structural in Romania http://www.fonduricomunitare.ro/RMonitorizare.pdf [Accessed on 22-01-2016].  
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To conclude this section we will take a brief look at the CoST initiative. The tool provides a 
clear overview on the way the organisation aims to achieve good quality delivery of 
infrastructure projects 405 . Summarized this translates to services being provided to 
governments in order to put systems in place that allow for public access to information 
relating the project. At the same time, the initiative facilitates a multi-stakeholder platform to 
oversee and validate this information. This results directly in a system in place giving public 
access, and better-informed stakeholders. Once empowered with information, stakeholders 
can raise concerns over poor governance, mismanagement or corruption. As a consequence 
governments will investigate and sanction, build capacity and improve procedures and 
regulations. The outcome of this is more accountability, corruption prevention, more efficient 
spending, increased competition and better governance. The wider impact could be cost 
savings that can subsequently be allocated to different priorities and increased public trust. 
 
The CoST initiative shows similarities to Integrity Pacts. Based on a comparison of projects 
across the globe, CoST identified potential benefits for the different stakeholders. For 
governments this includes406: greater efficiency of public spending; improved quality of 
public services; improved business environment; building public confidence; enhanced 
political reputation; reduction in risks to public safety resulting from poor building practices; 
increased prospects for investment. For the private sector this includes: greater confidence 
that a level playing field exists; the potential to invest in new markets based on fair 
competition; a more predictable business environment and improved levels of trust; reducing 
reputational risks and improved access to financial markets. For civil society this includes: 
greater opportunities for public involvement; identify if value for money is being achieved; 
demand improved service delivery; provides assurances that corruption is being mitigated.  
                                                            
 
405 CoST (n.d.). Objectives [WWW]. Available from: http://www.constructiontransparency.org/the-
initiative/objectives?forumboardid=3&forumtopicid=3 [Accessed on 28-10-2016].  
406 CoST (n.d.). Benefits [WWW]. Available from: http://www.constructiontransparency.org/the-
initiative/benefits?forumboardid=4&forumtopicid=4 [Accessed on 28-10-2016].  
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5.2   Integrity Pact structure 
The 2013 Integrity Pact guide developed by Transparency International provides practical 
guidance to civil society organisations on how to design and implement the tool407. The guide 
is meant to help readers to understand the Integrity Pact as a tool to monitor public 
procurement projects and as an approach to prevent corruption. The authors lay out a 
roadmap of seven steps in order to implement the Integrity Pact: 1) consider the use; 2) 
design; 3) undertake initial activities; 4) prepare the Integrity Pact document; 5) sign the 
Integrity Pact document; 6) monitor during the bid; 7) monitor after the bid. In other words, 
the Integrity Pact should according to Transparency International concern two main elements: 
1) design; and 2) implementation. The following sections introduce considerations that are of 
relevance to civil society organisations when designing and implementing Integrity Pacts. 
   Design of the Integrity Pact 
Transparency International sums up four steps when considering the use of the tool408: 
 
-   Learn about the Integrity Pact and issues of corruption in public contracting; 
-   Select a project to which it can be applied; 
-   Identify the requirements, resources and capacity needed to implement it; 
-   Get support and expertise where necessary. 
When designing an Integrity Pact it is important to take into account internal and external 
conditions that determine the tool’s functioning. The tool does not stand on its own in the 
fight against corruption in public procurement. Its effective functioning can depend on the 
political, social and legal context in which it is being conducted409. The external conditions in 
which it operates are determined by the legal public procurement framework, as well as, the 
                                                            
 
407 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/resources_about_integrity_pacts/3/ [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
408 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/resources_about_integrity_pacts/3/ [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. p. 
15 
409 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/resources_about_integrity_pacts/3/ [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
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involvement of different stakeholders that have different motivations and expectations. The 
internal conditions relate to the management considerations that determine how an Integrity 
Pact is efficiently managed to ensure optimal effectiveness. 
According to Transparency International, the Integrity Pact is not considered a tool to 
substitute public procurement legislation410. In fact, the tool is considered a supplement to the 
existing legal framework and a way in which the implementation of the framework can be 
enhanced. For example, if we look at the corruption in public procurement risks, most risks 
are to an extent covered by existing procurement regulation. However, this does not mean in 
practice that the risks are not present in a particular context. After all, the legal framework 
only produces safeguards against corruption to the extent to which the laws are obeyed and 
enforced. We have discussed in this study that the level of compliance with laws differs per 
jurisdiction, per country, etc. and equally so does the level of enforcement. This is the case 
for each and every EU Member State. Despite that the EU legislative framework for public 
procurement aims to level the playing field, stakeholders (might) interpret and enforce the 
rules differently.  
Conducting risk identification and establishing mitigation measures allows stakeholders to 
assess external considerations but also deals with internal considerations for the efficient and 
effective functioning of the Integrity Pact. For example, a map of which corruption risks 
could occur during the procurement process (external consideration) allows a civil society 
monitor to identify which Integrity Pact activities could detect or identify such risks. It allows 
them at the same time to use their (often) limited Integrity Pact resources (internal 
considerations) efficiently in order to aim for more effectiveness of their Integrity Pact 
activities.  
 
The risk assessment also allows for a better understanding of the socio-economic and 
political context in a country (external considerations). Specific corruption risks or a 
combination of risks could indicate that the political context in which an Integrity Pact is 
implemented influences the outcome of the activities. This is particularly crucial in big public 
works investments and long-term concessions, including privatisations. Once a civil society 
monitor knows which risks can occur in the procurement process, an assessment can be made 
                                                            
 
410 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/resources_about_integrity_pacts/3/ [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
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on the likelihood of this occurring and the severity. The likelihood of each scenario to occur 
could be assessed by taking into account the present situation without considering the current 
controls in place to avoid these risks. On the basis of the reflections in this study, some 
factors that could be considered are: 
 
-   Incidents that occurred in the past relating the specific activity or stakeholder; 
-   Culture of openness in the public administration or private sector; 
-   Level of contact between the different stakeholders; 
-   Complexity of the activity related to the risk; 
-   Political connections and interests that led to decide the public investment in question 
(pork barrelling); 
-   The quality and deepness of the studies that preceded the procurement decision (on public 
works, concessions and privatisations); 
-   Etc. 
 
Subsequently, each scenario could be assessed by looking at the potential severity or impact. 
The impact of the scenarios can vary from financial, legal, operational and reputational 
damage. Some factors that could be taken into consideration are: 
 
-   Impact of past incidents on key stakeholders; 
-   Severity of penalties / sanctions imposed in past incidences; 
-   Impact on the procurement process; 
-   Etc. 
 
Applying values to the rating allows for an assessment table, which then can be used to 
prioritise the areas in need of specific attention. Again, it is noted that while primarily 
contextualising external considerations, also this exercise deliberates internally. We could 
argue that such an exercise could help a civil society organisation with limited resources to 
narrowing their monitoring target to high-risk scenarios in public procurement. Prioritising 
which scenarios to focus on could address key concerns for civil society monitors relating the 
potential reputational damage on the basis of public procurement complexity, which entails 
the risk of failing to identify irregularities.  
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Apart from understanding the procurement regulation in a country, the design of the Integrity 
Pact should also consider other laws that might influence the procurement legal framework 
when addressing corruption (external considerations). Such related laws are for example the 
transparency laws, access to information laws, auditing and oversight laws, and anti-
corruption laws. As mentioned before, the Integrity Pact does not intend to substitute the 
procurement rules but rather complement these. If for example the local procurement rules do 
not provide for access of a third party to specific steps in the procurement process, the design 
of the Integrity Pact ought to be adapted in order to ensure optimal effectiveness. A law on 
access to information could perhaps ensure that where the procurement rules fail to provide 
access to the civil society, at least afterwards the information can be requested to conduct 
post-monitoring functions. It is therefor that we could advocate that during the design stage 
of the Integrity Pact a thorough legal feasibility study is conducted411. This does not only 
strengthen the Integrity Pact in terms of transparency but also addresses another relevant 
element in anti-corruption, namely accountability.   
 
The design stage of the Integrity Pact can be used to consider the way in which transparency 
in the procurement process is foreseen. One would need to know which type of information 
should be published during the procurement process and at what stages in the process. At this 
stage, it is important to consider which information is restricted due to data protection 
provisions. For example, in case the bids of companies contain business secrets it is likely 
that only authorities can access this. This might complicate the work of the independent 
monitor and therefore other means need to be used in order to ensure the Integrity Pact can 
still be of use. Perhaps the law on access to information foresees ways to get access to these 
documents or perhaps permission needs to be granted by the companies after which a 
confidentiality agreement is established with the civil society organisation. The design stage 
can be used to anticipate such problems, which is relevant from the perspective that without 
transparency for the independent monitor it will be difficult for an Integrity Pact to function 
effectively.  
 
                                                            
 
411 Legal feasibility studies were conducted by chapters of Transparency International in order to prepare for 
Integrity Pacts, i.e. in the case of Bulgaria and Spain. Interview feedback #20 and #28, European review, 
February – April 2015. 
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The design stage of the Integrity Pact can be used to consider the way in which the 
accountability structure is set up as well as determining how to enforce in case of non-
compliance. In order to do so, it is crucial to map the stakeholders that will be involved. In 
particular, concerning the external considerations it is important to look at the available 
sanctioning mechanisms. Sanctions as a way to hold stakeholders accountable for corruption 
but also mismanagement are according to Transparency International a key cornerstone in the 
Integrity Pact412. Two elements are to be clarified in the design, namely the kind of sanctions 
that can be applied and the process in which this has to be determined. The kind of sanctions 
can be foreseen by law or can be specifically included in the Integrity Pact. For example, by 
law a stakeholder is (normally) not allowed to bribe and can be sanctioned. The Integrity Pact 
can reinforce the detection of bribe (i.e. by external monitoring of public procurement) and 
help drive for a sanction (i.e. by reporting irregularities to the authorities). At the same time 
the Integrity Pact can have alternative sanctions such as naming-and-shaming. An important 
response to irregularities identified in Integrity Pacts is the termination of the agreement. This 
can be considered a clear signal to the public that the procurement process does not comply 
with the required level of transparency, accountability and stakeholder participation desired 
by the Integrity Pact.   
 
A final element concerning the external considerations for the functioning of the Integrity 
Pact concerns the mapping of stakeholders. Generally there are three stakeholder groups 
involved in the Integrity Pact: the government including the contracting authorities, the 
bidders/companies, and civil society organisations as independent monitors. A fourth 
stakeholder group could be the public as the ultimate beneficiaries of the procured goods, 
works or services. In particular the motivations of stakeholders to participate have effect on 
both the efficient and effective implementation of the Integrity Pact. 
 
In the Transparency International document ‘Integrity Pacts: A how-to guide from 
practitioners’ 413  we note that the buy-in from the government is not always very 
                                                            
 
412 Focus group feedback Berlin workshop, European review, 23 February 2013. 
413 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2015). Integrity Pacts: a how-to guide from practitioners [WWW]. 
Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/integrity_pacts_a_how_to_guide_from_practitioners  
[Accessed on 21-10-2016]. p. 15 
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straightforward. For example, the motivation for the contracting authority to participate in an 
Integrity Pact might be to ensure more transparency and accountability but, from the side of 
the government, they might not be the only stakeholders able to influence the procurement 
process and others might have different motivations with regard to the desired level of 
transparency in the procurement process. The other way around could be a scenario in which 
the contracting authority is requested from the top, i.e. from the executive or from the 
legislative branch (parliamentary oversight), to implement an Integrity Pact. The companies 
can be forced to be subject to oversight through the Integrity Pact when this is required by 
law or by the contracting authority. Companies can also be motivated to partake in an 
Integrity Pact if this levels the playing field in which they operate. An Integrity Pact ensures 
that their competitors are held up to the same accountability and transparency standards, 
which ensures a level playing field when bidding for public contracts. A third motivation for 
companies to partake in bidding processes with an Integrity Pact is that it gives them a fairer 
chance of winning a public contract as it protects them to possible bias decision-making by 
public authorities.  
 
Internal considerations in order to effectively implement an Integrity Pact include 
organisations to assess project management and coordination capacity, expertise in public 
procurement processes, access to human resources and capacity to communicate and 
disseminate work 414 . Of particular importance is the expertise in public procurement 
processes. As discussed above in this study, the professionalism in public procurement is 
considered besides transparency and accountability a key element to fight corruption. The 
capacity to communicate and disseminate the work is relevant from the perspective of active 
multi-stakeholder participation. Collective action includes the involvement of the bidders, 
contracting authorities, civil society organisation, but also the public or citizens directly 
affected by a public procurement project. From a project management perspective it is 
important in order to understand which groups are likely to affect or be affected by proposed 
activities. For preparation of an Integrity Pact one can assess the background and the role of 
the stakeholders in the procurement process and target activities to these actors. It is relevant 
                                                            
 
414 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2015). Integrity Pacts: a how-to guide from practitioners [WWW]. 
Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/integrity_pacts_a_how_to_guide_from_practitioners  
[Accessed on 21-10-2016].  p.11 
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to understand the stakeholders involved when designing the Integrity Pact. For example, 
understanding the contracting authorities will strengthen a civil society organisation’s 
position during ‘negotiating’ an Integrity Pact agreement. Understanding bidders and their 
interconnections as a ‘social group’ can help prevent collusion.  
 
Above we discussed internal and external considerations for the initial preparation of the 
Integrity Pact. The second stage in the design phase is the design of the Integrity Pact 
process. This is builds on the four steps above and includes415: 
 
-   Deciding when to start the Integrity Pact; 
-   Deciding who to involve; 
-   Listing the activities that need to be included in the Integrity Pact and the type of 
document to have; 
-   Deciding on the implementation arrangements; 
-   Determining the monitoring system and selecting a monitor; 
-   Communicating about the IP and building support; 
-   Getting ready to provide information about the process; 
-   The initial phase of the design process.  
The third stage includes the undertaking of initial activities (i.e. starting the monitoring 
agreement and the implementation arrangements, and undertaking activities before the 
bidding process starts such as public hearings and reviewing bidding documents). The fourth 
stage in the design phase is the preparation of the Integrity Pact document, which establishes 
the content of the agreement and also includes informing the stakeholders involved. The 
design phase is concluded with the signing of the Integrity Pact. The World Bank Institute 
notes that an Integrity Pact should contain certain mandatory elements such as a formal 
contract, external monitoring and sanctions. The formal, written contract is ideally signed by 
the top responsible stakeholders of the participating parties. It should describe the rules and 
principles in accordance with the law. Third party monitoring should be included in an 
Integrity Pact considering this is a tool to enhance the level playing field. The independent 
                                                            
 
415 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/resources_about_integrity_pacts/3/ [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. p. 
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monitor’s role could reduce the risk of non-compliant behaviour but also reduce the risk of 
non-awarded companies to initiate lawsuits. In addition, the World Bank Institute notes that 
the external monitor can add value to the companies and contracting authorities by advising 
them on procurement process related issues. Including sanctions in the Integrity Pact ensures 
that credibility is increased and non-compliance is met with consequences. 
   Implementation of the Integrity Pact 
The second phase is the implementation of the Integrity Pact. This includes two stages, 
namely the activities during the bidding process and the activities after the bidding once the 
contract is being implemented. Each participating stakeholder plays a specific role in the 
Integrity Pact with the contracting authority and the companies focusing their work primarily 
on the activities relating the tender or procurement process. The civil society organisation 
plays both a monitoring and communication role in the Integrity Pact.  
 
A key role in the implementation of the Integrity Pact is for the independent external monitor. 
This person or group of persons have different tasks. For example, the monitor can participate 
in meetings at all procurement process stages. The monitor could receive the tender 
documents and all offers for transparency-focused review, participate in communication 
between the companies and contracting authorities and issue monitoring report on the tender 
process. The monitor can also have an active role in asking for clarification of decisions, 
inform on identified irregularities and drive for addressing these. The World Bank Institute 
highlights that the monitor is more a witness to the procurement process rather than a 
decision-maker416.  
 
Transparency International considers contracting authorities the lead implementers of the 
Integrity Pact417. Ideally, they work closely together with others stakeholders, particularly the 
civil society organisations. Contracting authorities might also not implement the Integrity 
                                                            
 
416 WORLD BANK INSTITUTE (2008) Fighting Corruption through Collective Action [WWW]. Available 
from: http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/11/6/collective-action-a-new-approach-to-combat-corruption-part-
8.html [Accessed on 12-10-2016].  
417 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/resources_about_integrity_pacts/3/ [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. p. 
56 
  
 
219 
Pact alone, but do this in coalition with other government agencies, decision-makers or 
control and oversight agencies. 
 
A key element in the implementation of the Integrity Pact is the communication of the 
Integrity Pact418. Communication can be directed internally to the bidders and contractors on 
their rights and obligations in the Integrity Pact, but can also be external to the public on the 
monitoring of the procurement process. 
 
During the bidding process, the Integrity Pact could facilitate the debate on the bidding 
documents. This enables the participation of all potential bidders to the process, which could 
enhance levelling the playing field. Once the tender invitation has been issues there is a time 
frame for questions and answers. The Integrity Pact could ensure that all questions are 
addressed and openly communicated to all stakeholders. This ensures fair competition. 
Further, the Integrity Pact could guide the closing of the tender period by ensuring that the 
received bids are publicly opened. More importantly, the Integrity Pact could play a strong 
role in the bid evaluation and awarding process. Also in case of reopening of tender 
procedures, the Integrity Pact can ensure that this is done in a fair manner. Following the 
contract award, the Integrity Pact can then monitor the contract negotiation up until the 
signature. After the bidding process finalises, the Integrity Pact shifts its focus from 
procurement to contract management and could monitoring the implementation of the works.   
5.3   Context of Integrity Pacts 
The analytical framework to analyse the role of the monitor to prevent corruption in public 
procurement through collective action starts with a contextual analysis or defining of initial 
conditions. The context includes external factors the group members of the collective action 
initiative face, as well as, other conditions relating resources and assets, sources of 
vulnerability, legal structures and power relations. These conditions should allow us to clarify 
the constraints and opportunities that determine the context in which group members aim to 
                                                            
 
418 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
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reach collective outcomes. This section discusses findings from the global and European 
reviews on Integrity Pacts and is structured as follows: 
 
-   Governance and economic conditions; 
-   Public procurement vulnerabilities; 
-   Legal conditions; 
-   Implementation arrangements. 
 
   Governance and economic conditions 
For the global review of the Integrity Pacts we attempted to draw lessons from governance 
characteristics of countries that have introduced Integrity Pacts. We have seen a 
geographically diverse range of countries that have used the Integrity Pact. By taking a closer 
look at some of the governance indicators for the countries that have implemented the 
Integrity Pact, some similarities can be identified.  
 
The figures below are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). Scores for the WGI range from -2,5 (for weak governance) to 
2,5 (for good governance). The WDI allows for a distinction between low income (L), lower 
middle income (LM), upper middle income (UM) and high income (H) countries. Figures for 
the WGI are given for the year of Integrity Pact implementation. In Europe it is noticeable 
that with the exception of Germany, most countries that have introduced the Integrity Pact 
suffer significant levels of corruption. The same can be said about the total picture of 
countries that have implemented Integrity Pacts, averaging a score of -0.11. If we remove the 
outlier (Germany) this reaches -0.22. 
 
 
  
 
221 
Table 5: Governance and economic conditions 
Country 
Year of 
IP 
Implem
entation 
World 
Developm
ent 
Indicator 
Worldwide Governance Indicator GDP per capita 
2007 
(PPP, 
current 
USD) 
CPI 
201
5 
WD
I 
201
5 
Governme
nt 
Effectivene
ss 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Estimate 
Control of 
Corruption 
Europe 
Italy 1999 H 0.77 0.81 0.80 0.72 33,731.2 44 H 
Germany 2005 H 1.54 1.50 1.66 1.86 36,735.8 81 H 
Latvia 2006 UM 0.69 1.00 0.64 0.29 19,083.7 55 H 
Bulgaria 2012 UM 0.14 0.54 -0.64 -0.24 12,984.9 41 UM 
Hungary 2011 H 0.68 1.03 0.74 0.32 19,269.6 51 H 
Spain 2015 H 1.15 0.78 0.94 0.53 32,806.7 58 H 
Romania 2014 UM 0.00 0.60 0.15 -0.14 13,172.0 46 UM 
Latin America 
El Salvador 2012 LM -0.14 0.32 -0.75 -0.39 7,122.3 39 LM 
Colombia 1999 LM -0.17 0.05 -0.79 -0.43 9,710.9 37 UM 
Argentina 2000 UM 0.06 0.29 -0.20 -0.34 * 32 UM 
Ecuador 2000 LM -0.80 -0.527 -0.69 -1.01 8,366.1 32 UM 
Mexico 2001 UM 0.23 0.291 -0.45 -0.24 13,717.5 35 UM 
Honduras 2014 LM -0.78 -0.384 -0.97 -0.79 4,074.3 31 LM 
Asia 
South 
Korea 
1999 UM 0.33 0.314 0.73 0.34 27,872.1 56 H 
Indonesia 2000 L -0.27 -0.18 -0.75 -0.89 7,040.7 36 LM 
Pakistan 2001 L -0.58 -0.73 -0.95 -0.82 4,054.6 30 LM 
China 2004 LM 0.00 -0.28 -0.43 -0.56 6,807.1 37 UM 
India 2006 L -0.05 -0.24 0.19 -0.30 3,523.0 38 LM 
Africa 
Rwanda 2012 L -0.06 -0.10 -0.26 0.65 1,072.1 54 L 
Source: own elaboration 
 
From the countries that have introduced the Integrity Pact, half belong to upper middle 
income and high-income countries and half to lower middle income and low-income 
countries. This gives reason to believe that the decision to introduce the Integrity Pact is not 
determined by the economic classification of a country. If we look at most of the countries 
that have implemented the Integrity Pact it also becomes clear that, from the perspective of 
the Transparency International’s CPI, many countries suffer endemic levels of corruption. 
According to the CPI, countries suffer from systemic corruption when scoring at or below 50 
on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean).  
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If we narrow down on European countries, it is clear that the outlier is again Germany. 
Nonetheless, most countries that have implemented Integrity Pacts, experience high levels of 
corruption perception. Some of these countries fall under the 50 points labelling threshold. 
From this perspective, it could be argued that, despite being considered upper middle or high-
level income, the CPI scores underscore concerns about whether normative constraints of the 
law suffice to fight the problem. After all, these countries all apply EU procurement 
directives, which hold provisions to enhance transparency and fight corruption, but still 
consider the use of the Integrity Pact as relevant. On the other hand, European Union 
Member States in the higher percentiles of the CPI have not used the Integrity Pact to address 
corruption in public procurement. On the global level, although we have not analysed the 
different procurement systems in each country, we do see that the same can be said about 
those countries scoring worst in the CPI. The Integrity Pact has not been introduced in those 
countries scoring the worst, which could imply that some level of public sector integrity is a 
pre-requisite before introducing the collective action initiative. The public procurement 
systems possibly are weak in those countries, as is the rule of law, which reduces trust of 
private sector stakeholders in an Integrity Pact given that enforcement cannot be guaranteed. 
This can for example be supported by looking at the government effectiveness indicator. This 
examines the perceptions of the quality of public services, civil service, and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures. As discussed in the chapters above on public 
procurement, these elements can be relevant to the procurement process and the application 
of the Integrity Pact. Looking at the ranking above, most countries score between -0.5 and 
0.5, which demonstrates a fairly even distribution of scores. This suggests that Integrity Pacts 
have been introduced in countries that, while not performing by governance standards, do not 
necessarily belong to the worst performers. Finally, if we look at the GDP per capita figures 
we see that most countries that have implemented the Integrity Pact can be classified as 
middle-income with the exception of the European countries and South Korea. In the 
European Countries this differs from the global picture. Within the European Union 
countries, the countries with the lower per capita figures (PPP) are those that have 
implemented Integrity Pacts. 
 
Overall what the figures above tell us is that the governance and economic indicators can 
provide insight into the operating environment of Integrity Pacts. From these figures it is not 
certain which governance and economic prerequisites might influence whether countries 
decide to initiate the Integrity Pact, neither the success of the Integrity Pact. In this section 
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some commonalities were identified but above all differences in how countries score 
comparatively.  
 
Data for government effectiveness and voice and accountability, vis-à-vis a country’s per 
capita GDP show that the governance score is positively correlated with per capita GDP. 
Analysis of other governance indicators such as regulatory quality, control of corruption, 
political stability, and rule of law and their correlation with per capita GDP, also confirms 
this positive relationship. The relationship between governance and economic development 
varies across the various dimensions of governance. Government effectiveness is more 
closely correlated with per capita GDP than voice and accountability. In fact, government 
effectiveness has the highest correlation with per capita GDP among the six World Bank 
Governance Indicators, and voice and accountability has the lowest419. On this basis it would 
be relevant to look at those countries that on the basis of the indicators above do not fit the 
profile of low governance and/or low GDP. For example, in Europe the Integrity Pacts in 
Germany stand out. The same can be said for South Korea compared to the other Asian 
countries that have implemented the Integrity Pact. The question could be asked why these 
countries initiated an Integrity Pact given the economic and governance indicators in the 
respective countries. The answer probably lies in the chain of events leading up to the 
initiation of the Integrity Pact.  
 
Initiation refers to the putting forward of the proposal for collective action in an Integrity 
Pact. The support of the government and the respective contracting authority is essential in 
order to be able to get an Integrity Pact of the ground. However, other stakeholders, such as 
civil society organisations or even companies themselves, can also drive initiation. Also 
donor organisations could play an important role. This is for example seen in the project in 
Bulgaria and Spain, both driving by the Siemens Integrity Initiative. Most often, the initiation 
of an Integrity Pact is a combination of champions advocating for the use of the tool. This 
study found various factors contributing to the decision to initiate an Integrity Pact:  
 
                                                            
 
419  IMF (2014). Governance unbundled [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/06/jha.htm [Accessed on 12-10-2016].  
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-   The emergence of an acute concern for transparency and anti-corruption, for example the 
postponement of a tender process or the use of an emergency procedure without 
understanding why; 
-   A change in government priorities to fight corruption or improve governance, for 
example after a scandal or when the leadership changes; 
-   A similar event or situation that brought the Integrity Pacts as a potential solution. 
 
To illustrate, in Germany when plans were made for the construction of the Berlin airport in 
1995, Transparency International Germany approached the airport authorities with the 
suggestion of using the Integrity Pact. The offer was initially rejected by the authorities with 
the argument that this would be an admission of corruption in the project. Shortly thereafter 
several corruption allegations reached the media, culminating in stopping of construction in 
2001. As further allegations arose three years later, the airport authority returned to 
Transparency International Germany and its recommendation of the Integrity Pact, which was 
then signed in January 2005. Transparency International Germany ultimately ended its 
relationship with the contracting authorities in March 2015, following a series of corruption 
incidents since early 2013.420 This example shows that not necessarily the economic and 
governance conditions in the country predetermined the relevance of using the Integrity Pact 
but instead an isolated factor, namely a corruption scandal421.  
 
In Spain, the Integrity Pact initiative was promoted under the Siemens Integrity Initiative. 
While this can be considered a driving force behind the use of the tool, the conditions 
arguably are favourable in the country for such an initiative. As discussed before in this 
study, Spain, according to the EU anti-corruption report has a strong legal framework against 
corruption. Also, Spain’s meritocratic civil service at the central government levels allow for 
                                                            
 
420 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL GERMANY (2015), Korruption nicht ernst genommen – 
Transparency Deutschland beendet Kooperation mit BER [WWW]. Available from: 
https://www.transparency.de/2015-03-24-Integritaetspakt-BE.2603.0.html?&contUid=6031 [Accessed on 21-
10-2016].  
421 Interview feedback Field Mission Germany, collected by global review co-author, 28 September-1 October 
2015. 
  
 
225 
an acceptable degree of impartiality in the implementation422. Nonetheless, the country is 
experiencing increased public perception of corruption423. This can be partially attributed to 
the increase efforts of law enforcement to investigate corruption and of the Judiciary to 
prosecute also important politicians424. Data from the Public Prosecutor Office shows an 
increase of 20% of corruption cases under investigation425. Another reason identified is the 
relation between perception of corruption and the state of the national economy426.  
 
Since the economic crisis in 2009, also the WGI on voice and accountability decreased 
indicating that social accountability mechanisms to enhance control of the government are 
not fully exploited. 
                                                            
 
422 VILLORIA (ed) (2012). El marco de integridad institucional en España. Situación actual y recomendaciones. 
Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2012. Chapter 4 
423 DE LANCER, P., and VILLORIA, M. (2014). Understanding and addressing citizens’ perceptions of 
corruption: the case of Spain. International Review of Public Administration, 19, No. 1 (January, 2014): 23–43. 
424 Ibid. 
425 FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO (2015). Memorias 2013-2015 [WWW]. Available from: 
https://www.fiscal.es/memorias/memoria2015/Inicio.html [Accessed on 12-09-2016]. 
426 Natalia Melgar, Maximo Rossi, & Tom W. Smith, “The Perception of Corruption”. International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research, 22(1) (January 2010): 120-131; Stephen D. Morris “Disaggregating Corruption: A 
Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico”. Bulletin Of Latin 
American Research, 27(3) (July 2008): 388-409. 
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Figure 3: World Governance Indicators Spain 
 
Source: WGI Spain 2000-2015 
 
The WGI data show on the one hand that control of corruption is a problem, which justifies 
an anti-corruption initiative such as the Integrity Pact. On the other hand, the government 
effectiveness sees after a steep drop (up until 2006) a steady recovery indicating that quality 
of civil servants and the independency from political pressure is warranted. However, the 
nuance in Spain lays in the different procurement challenges facing the country, in which 
compared to the state level more problems are identified on the regional and local level. The 
local and regional governments do not have such a strong integrity system in place resulting 
in politicization427. This in combination with decreasing voice and accountability, indicates 
that the conditions for initiating an Integrity Pact would be suitable. In fact, arguably, Spain 
has faced collective action problems in the past on the local and regional level. For example, 
during the years of economic growth in the country, the citizens continued to support corrupt 
regional and local governments despite the scandals 428 . Currently, this perception has 
                                                            
 
427 VILLORIA (ed) (2012). El marco de integridad institucional en España. Situación actual y recomendaciones. 
Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2012. Chapter 4 
428 JIMENEZ, F. (2008). Un balance la lucha contra la corrupción política”, in Informe sobre la democracia en 
España/2008. Ed. Joaquin Estefanía (Madrid: Fundación Alternativas, 2008): 185-238 
COSTAS-PÉREZ, E., SOLÉ-OLLÉ, A., and SORRIBAS-NAVARRO, P. (2011). Corruption Scandals, Press 
Reporting, And Accountability. Evidence From Spanish Mayors”, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona Working 
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changed which provides for a scenario in which the collective approach to prevent corruption 
in public procurement could provide effective.  
 
Whether the economic and governance conditions could determine the success of the 
Integrity Pact is difficult to say. In the view of Transparency International Germany, the 
Integrity Pact for the Berlin airport was not a success429. In other words, the favourable 
economic and governance conditions in Germany have not necessarily contributed to a 
successful Integrity Pact.  
   Public procurement conditions 
1.   Corruption in procurement risks 
 
Above we noted that the Integrity Pact is not considered a tool to substitute public 
procurement legislation. In fact, the tool is considered a supplement to the existing legal 
framework and a way in which the implementation of the framework can be enhanced. The 
limits of the EU procurement rules come to light when we ask procurement officials, civil 
society actors and anti-corruption experts in the EU about the different corruption risks and 
mitigation measures in public procurement. The 2015 survey for the European review 
collected information on corruption risks and measures in European procurement systems. 
From the survey results it is shown that, regardless EU procurement rules, there are 
differences in views on the weaknesses in procurement, the likelihood of irregularities 
throughout the process and the severity of these irregularities both depending the country and 
depending the type of respondent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
Paper, 2011. Available from: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/aplicacio/fitxers/2011/4/Doc2011-9.pdf (Accessed on 10-
12-2015) 
GÓMEZ, B., CABEZA, L., and PALACIOS, I. (2008) Las elecciones autonómicas de 2008 en Andalucía: los 
costes de la corrupción urbanística. In Elecciones generales 2008, ed. José Ramón Montero and Ignacio Lago 
(Madrid: CIS, 2011), 409-438. 
429 Interview feedback Field Mission Germany, collected by global review co-author, 28 September-1 October 
2015. 
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The survey targeting civil society experts (mainly Transparency International430) and other 
anti-corruption experts431 across the EU measured their views on the likelihood432 of risk 
scenarios to occur as well as the severity of such a risk433. The respondents indicated that in 
their respective country during the pre-bidding phase, a lack of adequate needs assessment, 
planning, and budgeting of public procurement is most likely to occur and has moderate to 
very severe consequences. Broken down per risk, the respondents rated the following: 
 
-   The lack of adequate needs assessment, deficient business cases, poor procurement 
planning (3,3/2,4) 
-   Failure to budget realistically, deficiency in the budget (3/2,2) 
-   Procurement is not aligned with the overall investment decision-making process in 
departments (2,4/1,8) 
-   Interference of high-level officials in the decision to procure (3,2/2,4) 
-   Informal agreement on contract (2,9/2,4) 
 
Concerning the second stage of bidding preparation, namely the contracting preparation, 
common risks relate to selection requirements that are not adequately or objectively defined, 
inadequate of irregular choice of the procurement procedure, or a timeframe for the 
preparation of the bid that is insufficient or not consistently applied across bidders. Broken 
down per element, the respondents rated the following: 
 
-   Technical specification are vague or not based on performance requirements (3/1,8) 
-   Technical specifications are tailored for one bidder (3,1/2,4) 
-   Selection and award criteria are not clearly and objectively defined (2,8/2,0) 
-   Selection and award criteria are not established and announced in advance of the closing 
of the bid (1,6/1,6) 
-   Lack of procurement strategy for the use of non-competitive procedures based on the 
value and complexity of the procurement which creates administrative costs (2,3/1,5) 
                                                            
 
430 Data was collected from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Romania 
and Slovenia. 
431 Data was collected from Austria, Spain, Estonia, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia. 
432 Likert-scale 1-4 (very unlikely, unlikely, likely, very likely). 
433 Likert-scale 1-3 (slightly severe, moderately severe, very severe). 
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-   Contract splitting in order to remain below monetary thresholds from which public 
competition is mandatory (3,2/2,4) 
-   Abuse of the “extreme urgency” clause to avoid competitive tendering (2,7/2,0) 
-   Abuse of other exceptions to competition based on a technicality or exclusive rights 
(2,8/2,2) 
-   Untested continuation of existing contracts (2,6/1,7) 
-   A time frame that is not sufficient for ensuring a level playing field (2,0/1,8) 
 
Although the transition between the pre-bidding phase and bidding phase is not always very 
evident, generally the bidding process includes the invitation to bid and the awarding of the 
contract. Broken down per element, the respondents rated the following: 
 
-   Information on the procurement opportunity not provided in a consistent manner (1,9/1,7)  
-   Absence of public notice for the invitation to bid (2,0/1,8) 
-   Sensitive or non-public information disclose (1,4/1,1) 
-   Lack of competition or in some cases collusive bidding that leads to inadequate process or 
even illegal price fixing (2,9/2,6) 
 
The awarding of the contract is more conflictive with especially risk of conflict of interest. 
Broken down per element, the respondents rated the following: 
 
-   Obligation to include a sub-contractor pre-defined by the contracting authority (2,0/1,4) 
-   Inadequate, discriminative modification of the call for tenders (1,9/1,4) 
-   Conflict of interest and corruption in the evaluation process such as familiarity with 
bidders over the years (2,8/2,3) 
-   Conflict of interest and corruption in the evaluation process such as personal interests 
such as gifts or additional/secondary employment (2,8/2,3) 
-   Conflict of interest and corruption in the evaluation process such as no effective 
implementation of the four-eyes principle (1,9/1,6) 
-   Conflict of interest and corruption in the approval process such as no effective separation 
of financial, contractual and project authorities in delegation of authority structure 
(2,0/1,8) 
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-   Lack of access to records on the procedure in the award that discourages unsuccessful 
bidders to challenge a procurement decision (1,9/1,5) 
 
The post-bidding phase starts with the signing of the contract and includes contract 
management and order and payment. Broken down per element, the respondents rated the 
following: 
 
-   Failure to monitor the performance of the contractor, in particular lack of supervision 
over the quality and timing of the process, that results in substantial change in contract 
conditions to allow more time and higher prices for the bidder (3,0/2,5) 
-   Failure to monitor the performance of the contractor, in particular lack of supervision 
over the quality and timing of the process, that results in product substitution or sub-
standard work or service not meeting contract specifications (3,2/2,4) 
-   Failure to monitor the performance of the contractor, in particular lack of supervision 
over the quality and timing of the process, that results in theft of new assets before 
delivery to end-user or before being recorded in the asset register (2,0/1,4) 
-   Failure to monitor the performance of the contractor, in particular lack of supervision 
over the quality and timing of the process, that results in that subcontractors and partners 
are chosen in a non-transparent way, or not kept accountable (3,1/2,4) 
-   Deficient separation of duties and/or lack of supervision by public officials that results in 
false accounting and cost misallocation or cost migration between contracts (2,2/1,9) 
-   Deficient separation of duties and/or lack of supervision by public officials that results in 
late payments of invoices, postponement of payments to have prices reviewed to increase 
the economic value of the contract (2,2/1,8) 
-   Deficient separation of duties and/or lack of supervision by public officials that results in 
false or duplicate invoicing for goods and services not supplied and for interim payments 
in advance of entitlement (1,9/1,8). 
 
Feedback collected from procurement officials 2013 for a study for the European 
Parliament434 on anti-corruption measures showed that at the pre-bidding phase, officials 
                                                            
 
434 BEKE, M., CARDONA, F., BLOMEYER, R. (2013). Political and other forms of corruption in the 
attribution of public procurement contracts and allocation of EU funds: Extent of the phenomenon and overview 
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viewed as relevant the public consultation of stakeholders when drafting tender 
specifications. Involving different parties in this process could avoid undue political influence 
during the needs assessment stage as long as a representative sample of stakeholders 
participate. The fact that all stakeholders are involved from the start in the decision-making 
process allows for stopping unnecessary public works but also ensures that when approved, 
the project carries sufficient public support. The study further showed that officials found the 
inclusion of post-bidding guidelines in the procurement plans moderately important when 
addressing corruption. The formal commitment of stakeholders not to commit misconduct 
and corruption on the other hand was highly valued. However, it was raised that this measure 
is seen as a soft tool creating awareness rather than having serious consequences. At the 
bidding phase, the e-procurement system was valued as very important to avoid corruption. 
Also the use of clear evaluation criteria, including the weightings, ranked high in importance. 
This is essential to avoid bias decision-making. Also, setting up strong criteria protects 
procurement authorities from strategic bidding practices. Such practices are not uncommon 
and in general permitted. The bidders can strategically use the scoring method applied for the 
evaluation of bids in order to reach the highest possible scoring. For example, bidders can 
shift the budget between line items and this way take advantage of the set scoring criteria. 
Such practices are perceived as unwanted and perhaps manipulative. However, this is not 
necessarily negative. After all, bidders are allowed to present the most financially attractive 
offers and could even decide to carry losses, for example, in case their objective is increasing 
their market share. Rather than prohibiting strategic bidding, procurement authorities should 
ensure a solid scoring system. Measures concerning equality, transparency and timeliness of 
communication with the bidders are considered very important to the procurement officials. 
Special emphasis is placed on communicating the contract award, which should include 
information on the successful bidders, nature of goods and services procured, award criteria, 
etc. Regarding the rejected bids, the respondents agree that grounds for rejection should be 
communicated upon request. Using a council to monitor the bidding process was valued 
moderately important by the consulted stakeholders. On measures against corruption in the 
post-bidding stage, the surveyed officials responded with mixed views on the importance of 
e-procurement in contract management. The principle reason for this could be the lack of use 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
of practices [WWW]. European Parliament. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/es/document.html?reference=IPOL-JOIN_ET(2013)490676 [Accessed 
on 12-11-2013]. 
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of e-contract management as opposed to e-bidding procedures. Restrictions and controls over 
changes in the terms of the contracts are overall seen as very important. The public access to 
procurement documents and records received support. However, it is important to highlight 
that this carries administrative costs as the documentation needs to be collected and a level of 
discretion is needed when disclosing business sensitive information. 
 
The use of risk assessment to determine the condition in which an Integrity Pact operates can 
be illustrated by the Integrity Pacts implemented by the Transparency International chapter in 
Bulgaria. The chapter showed took a proactive approach by identifying for each step in the 
procurement process specific risks (labelled by the organisations as deficits) and linking 
Integrity Pact activities (labelled as transparency and integrity indicators) to these risks435. 
For example, the organisation identified a potential deficit concerning the contract 
implementation, namely “failure to take prompt actions due under the contract, indifference 
and / or slowness in carrying out actions by the contracting authority”436. An activity in order 
to mitigate this risk is according to the organisation the scheduling of working meetings 
concerning the progress, on-the-spot checks, and inspection of documentation and assessment 
of proofs related to contract execution.  
 
2.   Procurement cycle 
 
On the basis of the corruption risk assessment an important follow-up question needs to be 
posed, namely, to which phases of the procurement process the Integrity should apply. 
Integrity Pacts can cover the entire or parts of the procurement process cycle. As we have 
seen in this study, corruption risks occur in all phases of the process. Also, we have discussed 
how corrupt activities can take place in one phase and only come to light during another. 
Stakeholders’ feedback from the European and global review confirmed the added value of 
the Integrity Pact as a tool that potentially covers an entire process, from start to finish. This, 
in combination with the multi-stakeholder approach, provides for a strong basis to prevent 
corruption at all levels. In practice, however, civil society organisations implement Integrity 
Pacts at different phases of the procurement cycle. The Transparency International chapters 
                                                            
 
435 Interview feedback Field Mission Bulgaria, European review, 31 March – 2 April 2015. 
436 Desk research internal documents, document Indicators for transparency and integrity under public 
procurement procedures, p. 78. 
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that have implemented Integrity Pacts have not always been able to start monitoring activities 
in the pre-bidding phase and only started after the decision to procure had been taken, often at 
the start of the bidding-phase. In addition, chapters have not always included Integrity Pact 
activities for the post-bidding phase. The need for increased financial and technical capacity 
in order to monitor contract execution can pose challenges for civil society organisations 
before reaching post-bidding activities. As a consequence, most Integrity Pacts focus 
specifically on the bidding phase.  
 
To illustrate, the Social Witness Program in Mexico specifically focuses on the bidding 
process. This however does not mean that the monitors do not ask questions about the 
activities relating to the pre-bidding or post-bidding. Feedback from the interviews conducted 
with stakeholders in Mexico shows that monitors, apart from looking at compliance with 
legal procurement rules, strongly focus on asking authorities and bidders to justify decisions 
they take437. An interesting angle provided by authorities during an interview was that the 
questions raised by monitors could break information asymmetries, both within the 
institution, but also between bidders and authorities438. For example, the contracting authority 
had always relied on the uncontested expertise of their senior engineers when taking 
decisions. Not until the Social Witness asked the senior engineers to justify their input did the 
authorities realise that perhaps they had more options. The Transparency International 
chapter highlighted that despite the fact that they were not monitoring contract execution, 
their involvement in the bidding phase could prevent problems afterwards439.  
   Legal conditions 
The legal condition in which the Integrity Pact operates is considered one of the most 
distinctive features of the tool. All Integrity Pacts operate alongside procurement laws, but 
how, when and why an Integrity Pact is implemented is influenced by its status within the 
country’s laws and regulations. Overall, the case analysis exposed two different types of 
relations: those that are a legal requirement; and those that receive direct promotion and 
recommendation from the government through directives or similar means. In practice, most 
                                                            
 
437 Feedback interview # 31, #32, #34, global review, September-November 2015. 
438 Feedback interview # 35, global review, September-November 2015. 
439 Feedback interview # 35, global review, September-November 2015. 
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Integrity Pacts have been applied in isolated instances for select public procurement 
processes. This has been the case for example in Argentina, Colombia, and Germany, among 
others. Elsewhere however, the Integrity Pact has become a legal requirement in public 
procurement processes under certain pre-defined conditions at various levels of government, 
as seen in Mexico, India, Italy, Pakistan and South Korea. This distinction in approach is an 
important dividing line in how the Integrity Pact has been applied. It is significant with regard 
to the number of Integrity Pact projects implemented in a country. It also touches upon the 
question whether from a collective action point of view the Integrity Pact is the right 
approach to deal with corruption problems. As we have discussed earlier in this study, too 
many Integrity Pacts could lead to monitoring over-stretch for civil society organisations in 
which case alternative efforts to combat corruption in a sector should be considered (i.e. 
business certification). For example, Transparency International India began promoting the 
Integrity Pact in 2001. It was first adopted in 2006 by one public company. In 2007 the 
Integrity Pact was recommended for all major procurements undertaken by central public 
companies 440 . As a consequence, nearly 100 contracting authorities have now adopted 
Integrity Pacts as a requirement for their procurement processes, institutionalizing the tool 
and seeing it repeated on a large scale. In Mexico, the federal government introduced the 
Social Witness Program (Testigo Social) in 2004 after piloting various civil society public 
procurement monitoring projects in collaboration with the Mexican Transparency 
International chapter. Since that time, the chapter has monitored over 200 public procurement 
processes. The legally adopted formula for monitoring stems from the Integrity Pact model 
designed by Transparency International but differs in various ways from examples identified 
across the spectrum. For example, natural and legal persons can register and be accredited in 
order to be eligible for monitoring federal procurement processes. A government selection 
committee appoints a monitor from a pool of accredited experts to a specific procurement 
project. De facto, the monitor cannot choose the process it wishes to monitor. The contracting 
authority will include the monitor in the process, provide access to documentation and 
meetings, and remunerate the work based on time sheets. The monitor has an observatory 
role, but can comment on procedures and promote good practices. In case the monitor 
                                                            
 
440 CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION (2009). Circular No. 10/5/09 [WWW] Available from: 
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identifies irregularities, it can take the decision to escalate these to competent authorities. 
Primarily its role is to ensure that the procurement process is done according to the law. In 
the end, the monitor drafts a monitoring report that will be made public. Contrary to the 
Indian and Mexican cases, in other countries, such as in most EU countries, Integrity Pacts 
are case-based. Transparency International Germany has been promoting Integrity Pacts since 
1995, but it has in fact only conducted four. The Latvian chapter of Transparency 
International started an Integrity Pact in 2006 and only concluded this in 2015.  
 
Either approach of promoting the Integrity Pact as a requirement or promoting it in isolated 
procurement tenders can presents strengths and weaknesses. The former ensures that more 
procurement processes are monitored, which, if well-implemented and successful in 
achieving their stated objectives, will have a better chance for sustainability of positive 
outcomes beyond a single tender. More stakeholders will be exposed to the Integrity Pact, 
reducing the learning curve for participants. More case examples within a specific national 
context will also provide greater opportunities to fine-tune and improve the approach, 
developing a repository of knowledge, lessons learned and best practices. This is seen 
particularly in Mexico and India where the both academia and the civil society organisations 
have produced research, conducted trainings and events. The negative side of institutionalised 
Integrity Pacts is that it risks becoming a check-box exercise and potentially worse, a form of 
window-dressing. This would have potentially long-term negative consequences for the 
credibility of the civil society organisations involved and the tool more generally. Even with 
the political support of the government, the inclusion of the Integrity Pact within a broader 
reform programme, or commitment of resources in support of the Integrity Pact, the tool risks 
becoming a formality in the procurement process, without actual intention of implementing 
the commitments. The Integrity Pact as a project-based tool, applied to a small number of 
tenders can allow for more selective monitoring of corruption risks. This way civil society 
organisations can be more selective in the choice of projects, commit resources and attention 
to those that could potentially experience the greatest benefits from increased transparency 
and accountability that an Integrity Pact can provide. This in turn can help promote the 
further use of the tool and reduce the future risk of abuse of the Integrity Pact as window-
dressing. The negative side from the single-project Integrity Pacts is that learnings risk to get 
lost post-project once no follow-up action is foreseen. Also, the longer-term impact on anti-
corruption for public procurement will be difficult to determine. More intangible elements of 
  
 
236 
anti-corruption such as awareness-raising becomes more difficult if civil society 
organisations occasionally enter into monitoring of procurement projects. 
   Implementation arrangements 
The implementation arrangement contains many different elements that could determine the 
success of the Integrity Pact. At the foundation of the Integrity Pact lies the multi-stakeholder 
participation. Implementation arrangements depend on the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders. This is one of the characteristics of the Integrity Pact that is most important to 
stakeholders when defending its adoption.  
 
1.   Multi-stakeholder participation 
 
The multi-stakeholder participation manifests itself not only through the way in which 
signatory parties come together to sign shared commitments of integrity on a project, but also 
through sharing of information with the beneficiaries of the projects in question (the public) 
and their contributions. Transparency International in its guide points to methods to achieve 
such as targeted public hearings or town hall meetings, facilitating discussion with the 
community on project impacts, a proactive media presence, and active civil society 
involvement, by either channelling information to or serving as a representative of the 
public441. 
 
We have seen in the section above that stakeholder participation is also an important element 
in the theory of change that the Integrity Pacts seeks to support. The idea is that through 
effective participation of and outreach towards the public, the Integrity Pact can support 
empowered citizens, who through increased attention on and information about the 
procurement process, may submit legitimate concerns, generating a response from the public 
authorities towards improvement of the process. From what we have seen through the 
governance indicators, countries differ in the degree to which civil society and citizens in 
general enjoy freedom of expression and active participation of the media in policy discourse. 
If this feedback loop is limited due to a minimal role or tradition of civil society activity 
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within a country, this may influence the design, success and impact of the Integrity Pact. 
This, however, cannot be fully supported by the feedback received from Transparency 
International chapters. For example, for the global review survey only one of six respondents 
confirmed that it implements some form of town hall/targeted public hearings as part of the 
Integrity Pact. The use of Internet and other electronic disclosure mechanisms for Integrity 
Pacts results were slightly higher, with three of six respondents having used this for the 
Integrity Pact. The European review showed that Integrity Pact activities focused mainly on 
publicity or public education, but less on the exchange of information between the 
authorities, bidders and citizenry. The global review did point to the use of public hearings in 
past Integrity Pacts in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Pakistan and South Korea. 
In South Korea, the public hearings were used at all phases of the procurement process (pre-
bidding, bidding and contract implementation)442.  
 
2.   Mandatory or voluntary participation 
 
One of the first issues is to consider whether an Integrity Pact is to be mandatorily or 
voluntarily signed by bidders. Transparency International prefers the mandatory signature of 
the Integrity Pact in order for bidders to participate in a tender process443. However, this is 
not always possible given that procurement rules do not always permit such conditionality. 
Mandatory signature was identified for Integrity Pacts in Argentina, China, Ecuador, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Latvia, Mexico, Pakistan and South Korea. In Colombia, El 
Salvador, Paraguay and Peru the signature was voluntary. The main argument in favour of 
mandatory signature is that this is considered an effective method to ensure that all actors 
acknowledge and express intention to play by the same rules. In other words, the mandatory 
signature is considered a condition for ensuring the level playing field. Also, stakeholders 
argue that the signature ensures ownership of the Integrity Pact. Voluntary signature risks 
partial ownership of the Integrity Pact, which according to interview feedback could result in 
unequal participation in the collective action, which could have effect on the success of the 
initiative. Those advocating in favour of the voluntary signature argue that it keeps the 
Integrity Pact from becoming another requirement for participating in a tender 444 . The 
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argument was also noted in those examples where Integrity Pacts were institutionalised such 
as in India and in Mexico. Another reason for voluntary signature could be that mandatory 
signature would be considered confrontational and risking this way sufficient buy-in from 
bidders. 
 
3.   Content Integrity Pact 
 
The content of the Integrity Pact in some instances can be subject to negotiation. The 
document or contract of the Integrity Pact sets out the different elements. It can include the 
activities to be undertaken by the civil society organisation, rights and obligations and 
procedures in case of cancelation of the Integrity Pact445. Also the procedure for selection of 
the external monitor could be part of the contract. In addition, the document could also 
include the rights and obligation of the other participating parties such as the commitment of 
the contracting authority to disclose all tender documentation. An important element of the 
contract is the procedure in case corruption is detected. Another question arises concerning 
the need to make the Integrity Pact provisions mandatory for bidders. The feedback from the 
interviews shows different views on whether bidders should be obliged to participate in the 
Integrity Pact. Overall, a mandatory approach is preferred. The main argument is that if 
agreements are watered down after negotiating with companies it could create an unequal 
level playing field. Another argument against negotiating is that in some cases the large 
number of parties potentially involved in the process would make such negotiations 
impractical. This risks undermining other procurement objectives such as value for money. A 
drawback to mandatory content in an Integrity Pact may be the effect on bidder participation 
in a tender process. This would undermine market principles for procurement that should 
allow all actors to bid, regardless of their negotiation capacity. The example we identified 
was in India where some companies perceived the Integrity Pact as one-sided, to the 
detriment of bidders446. In other instances, such as in Latvia, it was noted that the bidders 
were willing to adhere to Integrity Pact obligations as long as that was requested by the 
contracting authority447. They perceived the mandatory participation in the Integrity Pact as 
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part of business costs for participating in the tender process. Overall, the study into the 
Integrity Pact shows that in most cases the companies are not participating in the design of 
the content. Some stakeholders do recommend including bidders in the process as this can 
create buy-in and encourage the signing of the Integrity Pact. While the need for participation 
in the design of the Integrity Pact by the bidders is questionable, the requirement to have all 
parties (including bidders) to sign the Integrity Pact is considered a key requirement. Without 
all parties recognizing the shared obligations for the procurement process under an Integrity 
Pact, the process can become a unilateral pledge. This would strip the collective action 
initiative from its multi-stakeholders approach. 
 
The content of Integrity Pacts varies; however, in the view of Transparency International 
various elements are obligatory to include for all signatories such as448:  
 
-   Undertaking by the authority that officials won’t demand or accept bribes, kickbacks, 
gifts, facilitation payments, etc., with appropriate administrative, disciplinary, civil or 
criminal sanctions in case of violation. 
-   Undertaking by each bidder that it has not paid and will not offer or pay any bribes, 
kickbacks, facilitation payments, gifts, etc., in order to obtain or retain a contract; along 
with the appropriate contractual, administrative civil or criminal sanctions in case of 
violation. 
-   An undertaking by each bidder that it has not colluded and will not collude with other 
bidders in order to rig or influence the tender process in any way. 
-   An undertaking by each bidder to disclose to the authority and the monitor all payments 
made, or promised, in connection with contract in question to anybody (including agents 
and other middlemen). This refers to payments made directly as well as indirectly through 
family members, etc. 
-   The explicit acceptance by each bidder that the no-bribery commitment and the disclosure 
obligation as well as the corresponding sanctions, remain in force for the winning bidder 
until the contract has been fully executed. 
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-   The explicit acceptance by each bidder that it will have to provide the same Integrity Pact 
undertakings from all its subcontractors and joint-venture partners. 
 
Additional obligations that are suggested by Transparency International are449:  
 
For bidders 
 
-   Requirements or requests to have a code of conduct and compliance programme, 
including a whistle-blowing mechanism. 
-   Commitment that documents provided are truthful and the acceptance of strict liability for 
misrepresentation, fraudulent representation or false declarations. 
-   Statement of lack of involvement in conduct forbidden by the IP or any other corruption-
related behaviour in a period prior to the bid. 
-   Cap on payments to agents. 
-   Extension of the bidders’ undertakings to other obligations, i.e. taxes and social security 
payments connected to the bidding. 
 
For contracting authorities 
 
-   An ethical commitment similar to the Integrity Pact for all officials directly or indirectly 
involved with the contracting process.  
-   A requirement for the authority to make public any contracting information of relevance. 
-   Regular disclosure by authorities involved in the process of their personal assets and 
family assets. 
 
For bidders and contracting authorities 
 
-   Extension of undertakings to include that they “refrain from all other illegal acts”. 
-   Requirement to report to the monitor all attempts or failed breaches of the Integrity Pact. 
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Feedback received from the different Transparency International chapters for the global 
review showed that Integrity Pacts use different clauses for bidders: 
 
Figure 4: Integrity Pact clauses for civil society organisations 
 
Source: Global review survey 
 
The global review survey shows that the main requirements for bidders has been the 
commitment not to offer or accept bribes, not to use facilitation payments, not to collude, and 
the requirement to disclose information regarding payments relating to the contracting 
process. A similar pattern of core clauses emerges when looking at requirements of the 
contracting authorities, which include: not to demand or accept bribes and facilitation 
payments, and a requirement to disclose relevant and equal information to all bidders. 
 
Figure 5: Integrity Pact clauses for contracting authorities 
 
Source: Global review survey 
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One particular clause raises discussion, which is the extension of obligations to sub-
contractors. The main challenge the bidder face with this is that further down the chain it 
becomes more difficult for them to control compliance. Sub-contractors might not be aware 
of compliance and anti-corruption which risks breaches for the hiring company in the 
Integrity Pact. This issue was flagged both in the Indian Integrity Pact experience as well as 
the Latvian case450. The former included the extension in the Standard Operating Procedures 
of the Central Vigilance Commission, the government anti-corruption oversight body that 
published recommendation for Integrity Pact implementation. The main challenge faced by 
bidders in India was that often for public works large numbers of contractors were sub-
contracted. Applying the extension of Integrity Pact obligations to these companies proved 
difficult, let alone easy to control. On the other hand, the corruption risk was identified for 
this area, which legitimises the inclusion of the provision in the Integrity Pact. This was the 
case in Latvia where the hiring company was to ensure whistle blower channels for sub-
contracted parties. If the Integrity Pact would not include this clause, the risk of success for 
the tool decreases. The inclusion of all parties to the Integrity Pact is argued essential to the 
effect and impact of the collective action initiative. 
 
Overall, determining whether certain clauses are conditional for success of the Integrity Pact 
is challenging. Mainly due to the fact that Integrity Pact stakeholders perceive success of the 
tool different from each other. Transparency International, for example, suggests that success 
of Integrity Pact means451: 
 
-   That everything (in the procurement process) went as planned. 
-   Visibility, accountability and transparency, with information shared and communicated 
with the public as well as active involvement of stakeholders. 
-   Lack of scandals or conflicts and complaints were minimised and effectively managed, 
when arising.  
-   Observed reduction in costs or prices compared to the original procurement budget. 
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-   Process improvements and reforms benefiting future projects at organisational and 
institutional (legal) levels. 
-   Successful detection and handling of any forms of corruption, with direct savings and 
prevention of damages.   
 
The attribution of a specific clause as a condition for the tool’s success cannot be supported 
by the data collected for this study. However, it is possible to argue that absence of clauses, 
which relate to identified corruption risks does undermine the potential effect of the tool. If 
corruption in public procurement manifests itself in the relationship between awarded 
contractor and sub-contractor, the absence of Integrity Pact clauses on these stakeholders 
means that the collective action tool cannot be optimally effective. 
 
3.   Role of civil society 
 
From the collective action point of view, the role of the civil society organisation is of 
particular importance in order to deal with collective action problems with which the 
contracting authority and the bidders are dealing. Above we already discussed the relevance 
of having strong support from public authorities and the need for a buy-in from the bidders. 
Civil society organisations play and have played a major role. After all, the tool has been 
developed and pioneered by Transparency International chapters all across the globe. The 
civil society organisation can play an important part not only in guaranteeing the Integrity 
Pact’s multi-stakeholder credentials and connections to the public but also in a leading and 
active role. From the data collected, we note that historically chapters have served a number 
of roles in the process. They have served as: initiators, facilitators; lead implementers, 
monitors; investigators, etc. 
 
As initiators, civil society organisations started conducting their own research and risk 
analysis and using its network to raise awareness for the Integrity Pact and then gathering 
relevant stakeholders. It can also refer to the government contracting authority inviting the 
chapter to act as initiator in order to conduct the necessary research and risk analysis to 
support the buy-in by stakeholders in the early phase of the Integrity Pact. This will also 
frequently involve advocacy work. For example, when Transparency International Italy 
initiated an Integrity Pact in 2000, this involved an analysis of the Integrity Pact model and 
its compatibility with the Italian legal system, coupled with training and education activities 
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of the signatories to the Integrity Pact. A model agreement was drafted and brought to several 
municipalities to explore interest, following a positive response several regions and 
communes now require potential bidders to sign the Integrity Pact as a standard requirement 
for public procurement452. However, the chapter does not get involved in monitoring of the 
bidding process. 
 
As facilitator, the civil society organisations took on the role of mediator between the various 
parties that have signed the Integrity Pact. This can involve serving as a go-between, or entail 
a more pro-active role particularly as part of the oversight responsibilities regarding 
adherence to the procurement regulations. As facilitator, the civil society organisation could 
be required to be the neutral spokesperson acting on behalf of the various stakeholders, either 
for the signatories themselves, or towards the public, the monitor, donors or other 
stakeholders. Communication of the outcome of the Integrity Pact, as well as advisory and 
training to stakeholders could also be among the tasks. 
 
As lead implementer the civil society organisation takes up the implementation of the 
agreement that constitutes the Integrity Pact. Normally, this is a combined undertaking with 
the contracting authority, however, when the civil society organisation takes the role of lead 
implementer, this will entail a majority of responsibilities falling under its remit. This can 
entail preparing the Integrity Pact plan of implementation, logistical preparations for 
meetings between stakeholders, drafting and/or signing the monitor agreement, implementing 
the signature of the Integrity Pact document itself, and project management tasks. 
 
As monitor, the civil society organisation is primarily involved in ensuring Integrity Pact 
implementation and ensuring that there is no violation of the Integrity Pact and that bidders 
and contracting authority have fulfilled all obligations. In concrete terms this could include 
examination of all documents during the bidding process, providing commentary on tender 
documents prior to their issuance, providing feedback to bidders’ questions, facilitating 
public hearings or meetings of bidders, site visits, clarifying Integrity Pact-related complaints, 
regular communication with the authority, suggestions for improvements to the process. 
Several examples of Transparency International chapters that have served as monitor for an 
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Integrity Pact can be found in Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia. In El Salvador, the chapter 
started as initiator to later also include monitoring of Integrity Pacts in 2012 together with a 
local civil society organisation responsible for monitoring other Integrity Pacts in the country. 
As investigator, the civil society organisation will take up a more pro-active role beyond 
monitoring activities and also investigate to ensure sanctioning of corruption. It is important 
to establish the process, steps and escalation measures, as well as grounds for passing 
information to legal authorities. 
 
In some countries, the civil society organisations are playing more of an advisory and 
advocacy role in the Integrity Pact process. This has partially to do with the issue of capacity 
restrictions to play the same role in all Integrity Pacts being implemented. For example in 
India, should a contracting authority commit to the Integrity Pact, it then has the option of 
entering into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Transparency International chapter. 
This Memorandum of Understanding does not entail monitoring of the procurement process 
by the chapter itself. Instead, they assist the contracting authority by providing a draft 
structure of an Integrity Pact, conduct training of stakeholders (i.e. independent external 
monitors, public procurement staff, etc.) on implementation and red flags, and explaining the 
process overall. The actual monitoring is undertaken by independent external monitors 
selected by the contracting authority, and vetted by the Central Vigilance Commission. The 
monitors are hence not affiliated with Transparency International India. The Indian case 
shows that for a civil society organisation it is important to consider the capacity available to 
perform certain functions for the Integrity Pact. For example, the Indian case is very country-
specific on account of the level to which it has been institutionalised and made mandatory for 
many tenders. This has resulted in nearly 100 contracting authorities adopting Integrity Pacts 
for 90-95% of an individual contracting authority’s procurement. The sheer number of 
Integrity Pact in a particular country may affect the ability of one civil society organisation to 
engage in the Integrity Pact monitoring or monitor selection process, thus an advisory and 
facilitation role is more realistic, though even here resources may be stretched because these 
roles may also be demanding in practice. In Latvia, where Integrity Pacts have been 
conducted for single-procurement projects, the civil society organisation did engage in 
monitoring. Yet, it was found that challenges were faced in ensuring that monitoring always 
received the requisite time and expertise necessary from in-house staff, thus a few years into 
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the Integrity Pact, the chapter engaged external experts for procurement monitoring as well, 
in order to provide a stronger technical component to the process453. The chapter provided 
backstopping for the external monitor, and concentrated instead on communication of the 
Integrity Pact to the public.  
 
Determining the role of a civil society organisation, as well as other stakeholders in an 
Integrity Pact implementation process, is generally arranged through a Memorandum of 
Understanding. This establishes information such as responsibilities of the civil society 
organisation and the contracting authority, monitor selection procedure, information 
disclosure clauses, necessary steps to be undertaken in case of corruption being detected, 
level of collaboration, and any involved fees454. To determine which role for a civil society 
organisation is favourable in order to effectively prevent corruption in public procurement, it 
is arguably dependent on the capacity of the organisation to comply with the Integrity Pact 
obligation in terms of monitoring the procurement process. This means that the main 
condition is to selection, appoint and support the monitor in conducting monitoring activities. 
 
4.   Monitoring 
 
Both the World Bank Institute and the Transparency International guidance stress the 
importance of the monitor and monitoring system to the Integrity Pact.  
 
Monitor 
 
From the interview feedback, it is suggested that a monitor should be independent from the 
project that is under procurement and the companies bidding as well as not having any 
conflicts of interest with the contracting authority. The monitor should also be knowledgeable 
about the procurement process both legally and technically, and where necessary be able to 
call on technical advice in relation to the subject matter of the procurement. The monitor 
should: be of good reputation; be accountable for its role; have the capacity to fulfil its role 
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properly and in a timely manner and have the commitment to act in what can be a challenging 
environment. The objective of the monitor is to add credibility to the entire process by 
ensuring that all parties fulfil their obligations. In essence the monitor in the Integrity Pact is 
a key spill in dealing with the collective action problems facing public expenditure through 
public procurement. In addition, the monitoring function can directly bring the public into the 
procurement process, enhancing the Integrity Pact’s multi-stakeholder credentials and 
reinforces the public accountability elements of the Integrity Pact. In the end, the main task of 
the monitor is to see that there is no violation of the Integrity Pact by ensuring bidders and the 
authority uphold their obligations.  
 
The independent role of the monitor is to a degree determined upon various elements: 
selection, funding and the applicable monitoring scheme. The selection and funding of the 
monitor has varied across the cases we looked at for this study. In some instances the role of 
monitor was played by the civil society organisations themselves. In other instances, the 
monitoring of procurement was conducted by an independent expert(s), selected and/or 
approved by the civil society organisation, the contracting authority, or a joint effort. In most 
cases of external monitoring, financing has been the responsibility of the contracting 
authority. In Latvia and Bulgaria there was donor funding available for monitoring. In India, 
monitors are expected to perform their duties without monetary recompense and with 
approval from the authorities. In Mexico, the contracting authorities remunerate the expenses 
of the independent monitors. 
 
Feedback from stakeholders from Transparency International chapters and contracting 
authorities across the globe were nearly unanimous in emphasising the effect of a good 
monitor on the successful functioning of an Integrity Pact. In particular a monitor that takes 
an empowered approach to their engagement is considered relevant. The Integrity Pact cases 
reviewed in Bulgaria and Germany note a proactive approach in monitoring that expanded 
beyond the formal requirements focusing on anti-corruption as positive drivers towards 
successful Integrity Pacts. The same was noted in Mexico and India where the role of 
Transparency International chapter are different. In Mexico, the chapter engaged in 
monitoring but they did not exclusively provide monitoring service in the country. The 
Mexican Social Witness programme allows contracting authorities to select monitors from a 
pool of pre-approved monitors. A selection committee assigns, from this pool of experts, a 
monitor to a specific procurement process. The monitor partakes in meetings and has access 
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to a list of documents predefined by law. Its principal role is to ensure that the process is 
conducted according to the law and to flag those practices that are or can be problematic. The 
chapter highlighted that quality of monitoring this way could differ 455 . In India, some 
representatives from contracting authorities noted that the monitor only operate upon 
receiving complaints456. Those proactively engaged would further distinguish themselves. 
 
Monitoring arrangement 
 
The effect of skills and qualities of a monitor is influenced by the nature of the monitoring 
agreement. Such an agreement establishes explicitly the rights, obligations, terms of 
engagement and (where relevant) fees of the monitor(s). It can be applied in several different 
methods, depending on how the monitoring, accountability channels and division of labour is 
constructed457. For example, when a civil society organisation takes lead implementation 
roles, a monitoring contract or Memorandum of Understanding is signed between the monitor 
and the civil society organisation. The same can be seen when the contracting authority is the 
principle implementer of the Integrity Pact. From experiences in Germany and Latvia with 
Integrity Pacts, critical in this agreement is the process for potential withdrawal from the 
Integrity Pact, of either the monitor (including the chapter, when playing this role) or of the 
chapter in general. Withdrawal from the Integrity Pact by the monitor and/or chapter makes a 
strong statement to the public and other stakeholders as to the overall integrity of the 
procurement process. Clearly outlining the circumstances under which this process takes 
place and the escalation procedures can help to avoid any limitation as to civil society’s 
capability to make use of this tactic. This was the case in Latvia, where governance concerns 
surrounding the rewarding of a tender elicited discussion in the Transparency International 
chapter as to potentially withdrawing from the Integrity Pact 458 . This course of action 
however was not undertaken due to lack of this clause as reasoning for withdrawal from an 
Integrity Pact. Transparency International Germany’s experience before carrying out 
                                                            
 
455 Interview feedback #36, global review, September-November 2015. 
456 Interview feedback Field Mission India, collected by co-author global review, 17-23 September 2015. 
457 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/tools/resources_about_integrity_pacts/3/ [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
p. 85. 
458 Interview feedback Field Mission Latvia, European review, 23-25 March 2015. 
  
 
249 
withdrawal from the Berlin Airport Integrity Pact exposed similar challenges. The chapter did 
not have a contract with the contracting authority that outlined rights and obligations, with 
the monitor reporting directly to the contracting authority. Following several corruption 
allegations and dissatisfaction in the manner in which these allegations were handled by the 
contracting authority, the chapter withdrew from the Integrity Pact, learning from the 
experience that clearly defined information rights, obligations, and grounds for withdrawal 
are necessary elements for future Integrity Pact implementation459. The fact that the monitor 
reported directly to the contracting authority also meant that monitoring continued despite 
that the civil society organisation withdrew from the initiative. 
 
Despite the primacy of the monitor’s role in the experience and recommendations of many 
chapters, independent monitoring does not always feature in Integrity Pacts practiced to date. 
In Italy there is no independent monitoring, as it was anticipated that costs would prove too 
high for its inclusion. Transparency International Italy would occasionally serve in an 
independent consulting role (at the request of a contracting authority), providing the chapter 
with an opportunity to analyse compliance with rules and laws of the Integrity Pact and 
informing the contracting authority in cases of irregularity. It cannot however stop the 
bidding process460 . Now in Italy, following a Protocol signed in 2009, 461  the Court of 
Auditors is seen as acting as a monitor to the Integrity Pact process by being assigned the 
duty of checking all expenditures made and the bidding process linked to the Integrity Pact. 
With no extra costs being incurred for this work, the model was seen as a more feasible form 
of monitoring in the Italian Integrity Pact experience. The Court of Auditors, however, plays 
an important, but entirely different role to that of a monitor. The review is usually retroactive 
and based on criteria that may not necessarily be the same as the functions exercised by a 
monitor; its reports may also be confidential and not accessible to the public. Where a 
monitor is able to engage proactively in the Integrity Pact implementation and is otherwise 
empowered to investigate and take remedial action as may be necessary, it can have a 
decisive effect on the success of the Integrity Pact. After all, for a collective action initiative 
to reach suboptimal outcomes, there is need for frequent communication as well as some 
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form of trust building. Arguably the post-procurement process involvement of the Court of 
Auditors defeats the purpose of the Integrity Pact from being a real-time collective effort. 
 
The global review of the Integrity Pact highlighted also the case of Pakistan where since 
2004, Integrity Pacts were implemented without the use of a monitor. The fact that Integrity 
Pacts were from 2004 without a monitor is a shift away from earlier Integrity Pact 
experiences in the country. In 2001 the Pakistan Transparency International chapter served as 
the monitor in the completion of the Greater Karachi Water Supply Project (K-III) and had a 
robust role. In addition to observing compliance with Integrity Pact obligations, the monitor 
prepared evaluation criteria for the short-listed selection of consultants, was involved in the 
project’s design and supervision, assisted in developing evaluation criteria, and provided 
advice on the selection procedure. Following institutionalisation of the Integrity Pact the 
monitor function was not included. Some stakeholders have praised the institutionalisation of 
Integrity Pacts and learning from it. Within the context of this study as a reflection on which 
conditions favour effective corruption prevention, this can be considered a valuable lesson. 
An Integrity Pact can cause longer-term institutional and professional change. This, however, 
must be contingent upon outcomes and implementation mechanisms that have a positive 
impact such as the independent monitoring. The feedback collected during the global review 
indicates that concerns were raised that the lack of a monitor in the current institutionalised 
version of the Integrity Pact in Pakistan has limited the extent of the tool’s effectiveness in 
uncovering instances of corruption or plain procurement irregularities. In other words, from 
the stakeholder feedback it is possible to determine that the use of an independent monitor is 
a required condition for the Integrity Pact to effectively prevent corruption in public 
procurement. 
 
To conclude, most stakeholders interviewed for this study highlight the importance of 
independent monitors that hold a specific skill set (e.g. constructive, independent, respectful) 
and have sufficient professional experience (e.g. in procurement and/or technical issues). The 
monitoring can either be conducted by one person or a team of monitors. Some Transparency 
International chapters however identified challenges when deploying monitors, due to limited 
resources. There is only so much one or multiple monitors can do over the course of a 
procurement process. In addition, procurement can be very specialized, further limiting the 
pool of experts from which to choose.  As a consequence, various Transparency International 
chapters highlighted different tools that can be deployed in order to more extensively monitor 
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public procurement. A driving factor behind this has been legislative developments in 
countries concerning transparency and access to information, but also technological 
developments have opened up new avenues for monitoring procurement, i.e. through the use 
of open data. Chapters with Integrity Pact experience have changed the Integrity Pact model 
(i.e. Indonesia, Rwanda) from a “closed” monitoring exercise, meaning only using designated 
monitors, to an “open” exercise, meaning allowing the wider public to perform monitoring 
activities. It is argued that the latter allows for wider stakeholder participation. Other chapters 
consider this (i.e. Mexico) or have always opted for the open monitoring function (i.e. 
Slovakia). The chapters aim to have an open participation of any citizen to the procurement 
process. Transparency legislation in countries ensures a degree of openness of procurement. 
In combination with open data, anyone could function as a monitor to scrutinise processes. It 
is clear that there are differences between the degree of access to procurement processes 
between an “open-monitoring approach” and the “closed-monitoring approach” as adopted by 
Integrity Pacts (such as access to meetings). It is argued that the essence of both approaches 
is to hold parties accountable. The premise is that this is best facilitated by allowing a wide 
range of participants, and not only a handful of monitors, to ask questions. The question that 
can be raised is whether open monitoring facilitates trust building between the stakeholders. 
Also, face-to-face communication, an important element in collective action, is limited when 
focus is placed on “open” monitoring arrangements. 
 
5.   Sanctions 
 
In case of breaches in the Integrity Pact, Transparency International recommends in the 
implementation guide the inclusion of sanctions462. These special Integrity Pact sanctions are 
complementary and do not supersede those criminal, civil, disciplinary or administrative 
sanctions already established by law. It is recommended by Transparency International that 
Integrity Pact sanctions should be proportionate to the actual breach itself, and should provide 
a swift mechanism for the monitor to ensure that the appropriate authorities are informed in 
cases of misconduct. Sanctions cannot result from suspicion alone, however suspicion of 
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impropriety is sufficient to start an investigation or request for clarifications from a monitor 
or the authorities. The main sanction noted for the use of the Integrity Pact are463:  
 
-   Denial or loss of contract; 
-   Forfeiture of security and performance bonds; 
-   Liability for damages to competing bidders; 
-   Debarment. 
 
Feedback received from the different Transparency International chapters for global review 
showed that Integrity Pacts use different types of sanctions: 
 
Figure 6: Integrity Pact use of sanctions 
 
Source: Global review survey 
 
The fact that Integrity Pacts include sanctions could imply that this has a preventive effect on 
stakeholders. Especially given that, from the reviews of the Integrity Pacts, the use of 
sanctions has been limited. This is explained partially due to the fact that a majority of survey 
responses indicates that Integrity Pacts lack a specific process for the activation of sanctions. 
The Berlin Airport Integrity Pact did not include additional mechanisms for conflict 
resolution or for sanctions. In this case, existing mechanisms were already established under 
German law and applicable to the contracting authority. On the other hand, it did include 
sanctions that the contracting authority itself could apply. The process went as follows: upon 
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suspicion of a breach of the Integrity Pact, the monitor (who does not impose sanctions) 
would notify management of the contracting authority, who is then responsible for addressing 
the issue. Should there be no response from the contracting authority or should there be no 
timely response, the monitor would then have to pass the issue on to the prosecuting 
authorities 464 . One could argue that the lack of applied sanctions is indicative of the 
preventative power of the Integrity Pact. Under this hypothesis, due to the threat of sanctions 
in case of a breach, the Integrity Pact has fostered compliance with the clauses and ensured a 
procurement process free of corruption. This argument however is unpersuasive without 
further feedback from stakeholders and actual perceptions of sanctions specifically in the 
context of Integrity Pacts. The opposite could in fact be the case, whereby a poorly applied 
Integrity Pact never has instances of sanctions due to the Integrity Pact being co-opted and no 
longer fit for purpose. 
 
Similar experiences were noted in other Integrity Pacts. Most Transparency International 
chapters focus on the detection and follow-up of ‘red flags’ indicating poor governance. 
Sanctioning is a last resort, whereas instead, a constructive approach is commonly adopted to 
find solutions to problems. This was seen during Integrity Pacts in Latvia, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, the Transparency International chapter even opted for a “white list” as 
a positive incentive rather than a more punitive blacklisting for bidders. The main reason why 
Transparency International chapters opt for a constructive approach is that parties to the 
Integrity Pact prioritise long-terms goals such as a successful procurement project. Second, in 
the case of many identified ‘red flags’ that could lead to the application of sanctions it is 
difficult to prove illegalities. Oftentimes the monitor lacks the means to investigate 
effectively. Hence, cases are flagged to the Integrity Pact stakeholders or in serious cases 
referred to the relevant authorities. A third reason identified is that monitors and civil society 
organisations struggle with judging the seriousness of the situation. Implementing an 
Integrity Pact involves significant collaboration with authorities and bidders, which could 
cloud judgements as to the right approach in a grey zone situation. This was the case of 
Germany and the decision of the chapter to withdraw from the Berlin Airport Integrity Pact 
only after years of corruption allegations. The late decision of the chapter prompted many 
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questions from journalists. Finally, the sanctions mentioned above are very definite. 
Debarment or loss of contract is a final decision that cannot be taken lightly. It is unclear 
from the interview feedback which criteria are used by stakeholders to come to such a 
decision. There are differences between Integrity Pacts on how stakeholders define a serious 
breach and at the same time implementation of sanctions can vary. As a consequence various 
risks are identified. For example, when in one Integrity Pact actors apply different criteria for 
sanctioning than in another Integrity Pact, it might create an uneven playing field. Also, 
inconsistent application of sanctioning might fail to address problems arising from repeat 
offenders.  
 
One occasion has been identified where through the Integrity Pact sanctions were imposed on 
a bidder465. In 2004 an Integrity Pact for the defense sector in India resulted in a cancellation 
of a helicopter deal worth USD 753 million. The Government of India cancelled the deal in 
the wake of corruption allegations466 . As a consequence also six more companies were 
blacklisted following allegations of bribery467. These examples show that the consequences 
for companies can be far-reaching with according to commentaries significant financial and 
reputational damage468. The example in India strengthens the argument that Integrity Pact 
sanctions can have serious consequences. From the perspective of collective action this is 
important to ensure that all stakeholders remain alert on the risks of non-compliant behaviour. 
From this we could argue that rather than the sanction itself, the sanctioning mechanism 
possibly is even more important. Sanctions should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
but in practice we see that there is little sanctioning going on through the Integrity Pact. In 
order to be able to get the most out of the preventative power of sanctions, we would instead 
have to look at the sanctioning mechanisms in place. Such mechanisms should have clear red 
flag lists, dialogue and escalation procedures for the criteria under which investigations are 
                                                            
 
465 Interview feedback Field Mission India, collected by co-author global review, 17-23 September 2015. 
466 BBC (2014). India scraps $753m Finmeccanica helicopter deal [WWW]. Available from:  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-25568464 [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
467 PRES INFORMATION BUREAU INDIA (2012). MoD Debars Six Firms from Business Dealings for Ten 
Years [WWW]. Available from: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=80699 [Accessed on 12-10-2016]. 
468 DEFENSE NEWS (2015). What Finmeccanica stands to gain and loose with new name [WWW]. Available 
from: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2015/10/31/what-finmeccanica-
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triggered and subsequently the use of sanctions, in order to give increased credibility and 
effectiveness if and when they must be applied. 
 
6.   Dispute resolution 
 
At the basis of the identified lack of examples of imposed Integrity Pact sanctions lies the fact 
that monitoring does not always expose corruption, nor provides sufficient evidence for 
sanctions. Another important factor identified is that stakeholders in the Integrity Pact adhere 
to various objectives, one of which is anti-corruption, and therefor take decisions based on 
multiple interests such as the need to complete a procurement process. As a consequence, 
stakeholders emphasise that trust needs to be build and that they rather adopt a constructive 
approach to problems rather than a punitive approach which could jeopardise the project as a 
whole. These considerations were identified both among civil society organisations, that tend 
to prioritise the anti-corruption objectives, and contracting authorities. As a result the 
emphasis is placed on dispute resolution rather than sanctioning. When conflicts arise during 
an Integrity Pact, differences are observed between signatory parties surrounding the 
interpretation or implementation of an Integrity Pact. In Ecuador, Colombia, Indonesia and 
Pakistan Integrity Pacts included specific dispute resolution mechanisms that included 
national arbitration469.  
 
Transparency International notes that dispute resolution mechanisms and sanctions have 
rarely been activated by chapters globally, on the grounds that the Integrity Pact, having 
already created conditions for greater integrity in the procurement process, has effectively 
limited breaches of the Integrity Pact. This statement is exceedingly difficult to prove 
empirically. For example, two of the six survey responses from global review highlighted 
“fear of sanctions” as the principle reason behind the absence of corruption in public 
procurements conducted with an Integrity Pact. Experiences with the tool in Latvia show that 
lack of sanctioning is not because there are no breaches against the Integrity Pact. In fact, the 
chapter identified breaches but decided after internal deliberation to continue working on the 
project. In Bulgaria, the Transparency International chapter adopted a totally different 
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approach and favoured positive reinforcement, rewarding good behaviour. Sanctioning can 
thus be seen by civil society organisations as counterproductive. 
   Global and European overview of conditions 
When bringing together the different elements discussed in this section, various common 
threads can be identified that show how the Integrity Pact is shaped. In the global review we 
denominated these models as the classic model, institutionalised model, open-monitor model 
and no-monitor model. 
 
The classic model of the Integrity Pact includes most common clauses, sanctions and 
requirements as set out in the guidance documentation by Transparency International. This 
model is applied to a selection of procurement projects on an on-and-off basis. The 
Transparency International chapters with experience in such a model include for example 
Argentina, Colombia, and El Salvador in Latin America. In Europe this model is identified in 
Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Romania and Spain. 
 
The institutionalised model refers to an Integrity Pact that has become a requirement for 
certain procurement processes. The tool has therefor received significant support from 
governments on different governmental levels through legislation or specific policy 
recommendations. Such examples include India, Mexico, Pakistan and South Korea. 
 
The open-monitor approach Integrity Pacts take into account a wider number of stakeholders 
to participate in procurement monitoring. It is a newer approach, which makes use of 
technological developments such as the use of open data. Examples are seen in Indonesia, 
Rwanda, Mexico and Slovakia. This approach opens new ways of ensuring accountability 
and enhancing transparency. The no-monitor Integrity Pact means that no monitoring is 
foreseen by the civil society organisation or an independent expert. Such examples are seen 
in China, Italy and Pakistan. 
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Table 6: Monitoring conditions 
Country 
Monitor Open-Monitoring 
Mandatory 
Signature 
Legal Basis 
Mexico ü ü ü ü 
Pakistan û  ü ü 
Colombia ü  û  
South Korea ü  ü ü 
El Salvador ü  û  
India ü  ü ü 
Indonesia ü ü ü  
Hungary ü  ü  
Germany ü  ü  
Bulgaria ü  ü  
Italy û  ü ü 
Latvia ü  ü  
Source: Global review 
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5.4   Collective action of Integrity Pacts 
The context presented in the previous section should affect the collective action arena. This 
arena is where the collective action experiences take place, where decisions are made and 
corruption is prevented. The Integrity Pact as a collective action model on first account seems 
to cover elements essential to dealing with collective action problems. The collective problem 
scenario is clear, as described by De Swardt and Wiehen, in which corruption is perceived 
endemic and individual companies are reluctant to take the first step as it risks that their 
competitors do resort to bribing470. Also, from the cases discussed above we can relate to 
Olson’s view that it is in the best interest of individuals in the group to act collectively 
towards shared objectives, which lies at the core of the Integrity Pact multi-stakeholder 
approach. Ostrom’s elements to overcome the temptations of short-run self-interest through 
reciprocity, reputation and trust, in order to build conditions to allow individuals to achieve 
results that are better than rational, also comes forward in the Integrity Pact. The sanctions 
available in the Integrity Pact give impetus to groups to achieve suboptimal results and 
function as deterrence through the commitment to punish those that do not adhere to the 
Integrity Pact. The question is to what extent the Integrity Pact performs in those elements. 
Marquette and Peiffer recall that from the perspective of collective action, “corruption is the 
manifestation of free-riding itself, as the motivation for engaging in corrupt behaviour is 
usually depicted as coming from putting personal interest ahead of the larger group’s 
collective interest”471. The benefit of collective action can be a corruption-free environment 
or a good quality government. This can be associated with some tangible economic and social 
outcomes and a governance environment that citizens and companies/investors trust to be fair 
and reliable. The benefit of collective action can also be “no depletion of resources”, which 
reflects in effective and efficient public service delivery. Corruption would mean that free 
riding depletes the capacity of the contracting authority to spend money. Marquette and 
Peiffer recall that the Integrity Pact, by “bringing all actors together to make a formal 
agreement, acknowledges that the most precarious risks for corruption often lie in collective 
dynamics” 472. Also, the authors note that the successes of Integrity Pacts are built on trust 
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within the group of stakeholders involved. Transparency International adds various other 
considerations that determine success of an Integrity Pact such as473: 
 
-   Transparent, accountable contracting, free of corruption; 
-   No delays to the process as a result of confusion, lack of transparency; 
-   Social, economic and development goals have been achieved or not impaired by 
corruption; 
-   Trust in government and government officials has improved and reputations of all 
participants have improved; 
-   Corruption has been detected, and where occurring, and eliminated.   
 
However, we have noted in this study that success of an Integrity Pact can be challenged, or 
in other words, collective action can be influenced, when determinant factors are not in place. 
Transparency International notes for example the following factors474: 
 
-   Political will of the authorities; 
-   Transparency and professionalism throughout the contracting process;  
-   External independent monitoring; 
-   And a participatory/multi-stakeholder involvement. 
 
These challenges legitimise the need for a reflection on the limits of the collective theory 
approach to anti-corruption. This way we can attempt to test the hypothesis that an 
independent monitor, in form of a civil society organisation through the Integrity Pact, can 
play an effective role in the prevention of corruption and enhancing of transparency in public 
procurement. In order to do so, the European Integrity Pact cases will be analysed on the 
basis of a set of variables briefly introduced earlier in this study, namely: group size; repeated 
interaction; trust and good reputation; group interdependence; heuristic norms; monitoring 
and transparency; long-term horizons; and salience of the collective good. The following 
section will further reflect on these variables, illustrated with examples identified through the 
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review of Integrity Pacts in Europe. However, we need to be aware that the different 
variables overlap and cannot be fully detached. Therefore some findings discussed below 
cover various variables that may affect collective action.  
   Group size 
Larger groups may affect collective action given that group members can get away easier 
with free riding. In addition, in larger groups, members can feel that their potential 
contribution will not make much of a difference in the effort to reach a collective benefit. 
Also, with more members it may be difficult to come to an internal agreement on how to 
coordinate the collective activity. Important is also that smaller groups may be challenged by 
difficulties in mobilizing resources to engage in effective collective action. 
 
The adaptability of the Integrity Pact model, first and foremost, generates debate within the 
Transparency International movement475. There are different views as to what defines an 
Integrity Pact. Transparency International’s Implementation Guide highlights that Integrity 
Pacts are both a document (a legal contract) and a process (a series of activities)476. Within 
this framework, there is room for debate as to which elements should or should not be 
included. When we take stock of activities of Transparency International chapters across the 
EU relating corruption in public procurement, we see that various initiatives have a systemic 
approach by addressing public procurement in general. It could be argued that such an 
approach primarily aims at reforming procurement systems in a specific region or sector. This 
is shared by Integrity Pacts, which in theory could aim for long-term impact through 
reform477. However, Integrity Pacts do not primarily focus on system process review, but 
more so look into specific procurement projects. Its activities not only enhance transparency 
based on existing public information, but also create transparency by entering into informal 
decision-making structures. Integrity Pacts thus require a different degree of professionalism.  
 
Overall we find that Integrity Pacts require a degree of flexibility in order to be effective, to 
be manageable, and to be sustainable. Although the debate on the definition of the Integrity 
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Pact tool within the Transparency International movement is relevant from an institutional 
perspective, from an operational perspective it might limit its capacity. Rather than pre-
defining Integrity Pacts, it is more important to provide the stakeholders involved with the 
adequate criteria for action and subsequently tools to design and implement an Integrity Pact 
project resting on the foundations of integrity. 
   Repeated interaction 
Through repeated interaction, group members can facilitate learning and this way affect 
collective action. Careful preparation of an Integrity Pact project allows for its adaptation to 
different procurement projects, different sectors, types of procurement, and legal, cultural and 
economic contexts. Regardless of the situation, designing Integrity Pacts is each time over 
again a learning process. One expert stressed that: “each Integrity Pact makes you smarter, 
not necessarily faster”478. With this, the expert highlights that the monitor can learn from 
each Integrity Pact, but that this does not avoid careful planning. Monitors need to understand 
the legal, political and economic conditions at hand before and during the Integrity Pact. 
Secondly, monitors should study the other stakeholders involved in the Integrity Pact, as well 
as the corruption risks involved in the procurement. This allows them to effectively focus 
their activities in order to maximise the impact of the tool. At the same time, understanding 
the other parties and their problems strengthens their position when negotiating an Integrity 
Pact. Thirdly, monitors should carefully plan their activities based on the objectives they 
want to achieve for the Integrity Pact. The project plan should allow the organisation to 
monitor their achievements and ensure that during the Integrity Pact they do not lose track of 
their goals. Finally, monitors should adapt the communication and monitoring activities 
planned for the Integrity Pact to the available capacity. In case the monitor has limited 
resources for a large procurement project, it should prioritise what will be monitored. 
 
Further, several considerations have been identified in relation to the monitor requirements, 
monitoring arrangements/activities, and the selection of the monitor. 
 
1.   Monitor requirements 
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According to the Transparency International, a monitor requires: independence; knowledge; 
reputation; accountability; capacity and commitment479. Independence is important for the 
monitor to do his/her job objectively. The work needs to be performed independently but 
should also be perceived as such by all stakeholders. Knowledge, or expertise, is required 
both from a legal perspective, when looking at the contracting process, but also from a 
technical perspective, when looking at the specific procurement sector. Such expertise can be 
found in one monitor or ensured through a team of monitors. Monitors in the eyes of Integrity 
Pact practitioners need to have a spotless reputation in order to ensure that their activities are 
credible 480 . Monitoring activities require time and resources, including a high level of 
commitment. Sufficient capacity should be assigned to effectively conduct monitoring. The 
monitor should be accountable to the civil society organisations as well as to the bidders, 
contracting authorities and to the public. Ensuring this “fourfold” accountability to 
stakeholders, with different and sometimes opposite interests, is according to this study 
difficult to operationalize. 
 
Based on the experience of the stakeholders consulted for this study, additional requirements 
are identified. In Hungary and Latvia, the stakeholders stressed that monitors needed to have 
a practical and constructive mind-set 481 . Construction projects are characterised by 
interactions between expertise from architects, financial controllers, lawyers, and engineers, 
etc. In general terms, construction phases into design and build. The design lays out 
construction processes, which subsequently are followed during the building phase. It is task 
for the constructor to build according to these plans. Within this framework, constructors 
have a degree of manoeuvrability in order to cope with any (unforeseen) challenges they 
might face. This manoeuvrability is in itself a risk area for irregularities and therefore subject 
to monitoring. A practical monitor understands these processes and thinks with the 
contractors. The constructor in the Hungarian XIII-District case spoke highly of the selected 
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technical monitor as a person thinking with the project manager and coming to constructive 
solutions to challenges482. 
 
The constructive and practical nature of monitors was also mentioned in Germany, Latvia and 
Bulgaria. The role of the monitor in effect was also meant to build bridges between 
stakeholders, especially in case of conflict. In Germany and Bulgaria, the role of the monitors 
went beyond anti-corruption and transparency to ensuring the procurement complied with 
good governance. In Germany, monitors for the Hannover and Bremen Integrity Pacts were 
perceived to have gone beyond their task to monitor corruption and provided broader 
management advice. This was attributed to commitment to the project, but also good personal 
relations between the monitor and the stakeholders involved483.  
 
The second requirement concerns communication skills given that outreach to the public is a 
key Integrity Pact activity. In general, outreach activities are conducted by the civil society 
organisation. However, the monitor can play a key role especially when drafting and 
presenting the periodical monitoring reports. 
 
2.   Monitor’s activities 
The case study analysis shows that monitors conduct a wide variety of activities. In principal, 
they could include: review of documentation; participation in meetings/inspection; 
communication activities. The activities of the monitors in the Integrity Pact analysed for this 
study were either conducted on-site or off-site. On-site activities included attending meetings 
and visiting building sites. Off-site activities primarily concern documentation review. The 
arrangements between the monitoring organisations in the cases differed. The monitor teams 
consisted of in-house and external experts. In Hungary, a mixed team was monitoring from 
the start until the end of the project. In Latvia, the organisation relied primarily on in-house 
expertise in combination with ad hoc external expertise. In Bulgaria, monitoring activities 
primarily relied on external experts with strong support of the civil society organisation, 
especially with relation to communication activities. The degree of direct contact with the 
procurement stakeholders varied. In Bulgaria, most contact with the contracting authority and 
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the bidders first went through the monitoring organisation. In Hungary, the in-house expert 
focused primarily on the contracting phase given her legal background. Technical monitoring 
during the contract implementation phase was externalised. 
 
One external monitor involved in the Bulgarian Integrity Pacts had a legal background and 
specialised in public procurement. The second expert interviewed in Bulgaria was an 
engineer, specialised in road infrastructure. Both took a proactive approach in monitoring the 
Integrity Pacts. This approach expanded beyond the formal requirements focussing on anti-
corruption. Transparency International Bulgaria played an important role by ensuring that the 
scope of their activities did not lose track of the anti-corruption objectives set for the Integrity 
Pact. Together the team managed to effectively monitor anti-corruption, transparency, but 
also value-for-money aspects relating to public procurement.  
 
Transparency International Latvia relied primarily on in-house staff but insisted to have a 
stronger technical involvement in the project484. In 2010 this matured when the civil society 
organisation was able to direct resources to this purpose and attract external expertise. The 
organization prior to this depended on public relations, good governance rhetoric, and 
suggestions and recommendations based on international experience. With more technical 
expertise, the chapter was able to analyse in more detail the particular construction project. 
Consequently their interactions carried more weight with project stakeholders. Also their 
confidence increased when communicating with the public.  
 
Independent monitoring was not foreseen in Italy. According to documentation, costs would 
have been too high. However, the law foresees access of civil society to monitor the award 
process and the project execution. Nonetheless the Integrity Pact in Milan allowed for the 
contracting authority to appoint a monitor. This could be a civil society organisation if 
requested by the authorities. The monitor is to review drafts of bidding documents, comment 
on evaluation and award processes, observe the implementation of the contract, and attend 
internal meetings. The monitor has access to relevant documentation at any moment. This 
information is generally not public and therefore the Integrity Pact can be considered an 
effective tool to increase transparency. It is mentioned in the case documentation that in a 
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specific case the municipality appointed an officer to deal with data requests concerning the 
project. In case a breach is detected it will be disclosed to the public authority. Independence 
of the monitor was not guaranteed in the case of Milan given that this person was accountable 
to the mayor. Transparency International Italy was available for consultation but had no 
direct role in monitoring activities.  
 
The case study analysis suggests that the role of a civil society organisation as Integrity Pact 
monitor could be threefold: communication; project management; public procurement 
monitoring. The strength of the civil society organisation is to communicate the activities and 
findings of the monitors to the public. The main added value of the organisation is the 
capacity to translate technical information to more accessible language. In addition, civil 
society organisations can have good access to the public. A second role for the civil society 
organisation is the management of the Integrity Pact as a project. This included monitoring 
the project (meaning Integrity Pact) implementation and documenting activities. In addition, 
the civil society organisation should manage the external monitors. This primarily ensures 
managing their resources in order to allow for sufficient capacity. If needed, the organisation 
can also protect the external monitors from possible pressure or obstacles they might face. 
The third role civil society can play is monitoring itself. Civil society organisations such as 
Transparency International has in-house staff that hold expertise in anti-corruption and 
transparency. Such expertise can be used to monitor the contracting phase but also to ensure 
that external experts remain focussed on the core objectives of Integrity Pacts, namely 
detecting and preventing corruption, increasing transparency, etc. 
 
3.   Selection of the monitor 
The selection method of the monitor largely depends on the context of the Integrity Pact. 
Regardless of whether this selection takes place through an open call or another more 
restricted procedure, key requirements described above are recommended always be taken 
into account.  
 
In the selection of the monitor, the case study analysis suggests that on the basis of the 
economic and governance conditions in a country it could prove difficult to identify a suitable 
monitor with the requirements needed. For example, interview feedback indicates that finding 
a monitor with the right reputation in countries with weak governance can be challenging. 
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Also, the procurement project might be of such a nature (i.e. size or sector-specific) that in a 
country only few people have the capability to monitor a specific procurement project. As a 
solution to such a problem, interviewed experts indicate that a monitor could be engaged 
coming from outside the country. This has also happened in Integrity Pact cases, such as in 
the case of the ad hoc monitoring support in Latvia. However, experts also point to a 
downside to this practice 485 . The collective action initiative could benefit from an 
international angle in some contexts, i.e. countries with very weak governance, but should 
ensure local ownership in order for the initiative to be successful. It is therefor recommended 
to ensure a balance in monitoring capacity both including local and non-local experts. 
 
Civil society organisations struggle primarily with defining the workload for monitors. It is 
difficult to estimate the amount of time and effort that should go into the work of the monitor. 
It exposes the organisations to the risk of under-budgeting with the consequence of not being 
able to effectively conduct activities up until the project closure. A possible safety 
mechanism applied by civil society monitors is relying partially on in-house staff. Above all, 
this concern highlights the importance of engagement of the external monitor as well as 
effective management throughout the project to ensure that the monitor has sufficient 
resources. Initially the civil society organisation should adapt the level of monitoring to the 
resources available. A possible way to avoid the risk of missing out on important moments in 
the procurement process is to assess ex-ante where to direct monitoring efforts. During 
interviews, monitors were asked how they would divide efforts in case of limited resources. 
The main approach was through a risk assessment. This could identify the key areas for 
concern. It was stressed that this would allow monitoring to be most effective, however, as 
long as activities would be able to span the entire procurement process. In other words, 
monitors recommended not applying monitoring only to one specific procurement phase. 
 
Securing funding for the monitor is a challenging task for a civil society organisation. 
Various methods have been used. In Latvia and Bulgaria, the Transparency International 
chapters relied on external funding. In the case of Latvia, this funding was ad hoc and did not 
cover the entire project cycle. The external donor was the Partnership for Transparency Fund. 
In Bulgaria the Integrity Pacts were financed through the Siemens Integrity Initiative. This 
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covered almost the entire project cycle and ensured the full coverage of all activities, 
including the funding for external experts. The contracting authority financially covered the 
monitoring activities in Hungary.  
 
In Italy there was no direct correlation between the funding of the project and Transparency 
International Italy. Any activities undertaken by the project fell within the wider activities of 
the organisation and were therefor automatically covered. Transparency International Italy 
chose this approach in order to ensure full independence at all times. In the case of the Milan 
Integrity Pact there was no indication that the organisation examined expenses made. As for 
human resources, the organisation needed project managers and legal experts. These were 
attracted from a pool of Transparency International members and volunteers. The chapter 
points out that for future references it would be useful to intern staff at the premises of the 
public authority486.  
   Trust and good reputation 
Trust and good reputation can help making group members more willing to contribute to the 
common good. Group members can base trust on good reputation, past collective action or 
other reasons. Together these would contribute to more willingness to reach objectives. 
 
From the European Integrity Pact cases, stakeholders clearly stressed the relevance of trust 
and good reputation in collective action. The main concern for civil society organisations is 
reputational damage given that Integrity Pacts cannot fully exclude corruption and the 
possibility that contracting authorities and companies use the Integrity Pact for window-
dressing. Civil society organisations also expressed awareness of potential negative effects 
for other stakeholders involved in the Integrity Pact. This was expressed by the fact that cases 
were identified in which they attempted to solve problems during the procurement process 
beyond those that relate specifically to corruption. Primarily the civil society organisations 
were concerned with problems that could delay procurement. It was argued that delays could 
undermine popular perception of a good procurement process, jeopardising the success of the 
Integrity Pact, and subsequently damaging the reputation of the stakeholders involved. 
Regardless of whether delays were attributed to the Integrity Pact, civil society organisations 
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and monitors systematically felt the responsibility to solve this. This study finds that this 
responsibility was not always shared equally among the stakeholders. In fact, overall 
Transparency International chapters struggled with detaching what constitutes a success for 
an Integrity Pact, from what constitutes a success for a procurement project. In other words, 
the success of the Integrity Pact and the procurement project are perceived as interdependent. 
Given the complexity of an Integrity Pact this is understandable, however the tool is 
primarily about preventing corruption while a procurement project, as discussed in this study, 
covers a wider array of objectives, such as value for money and/or social and environmental 
objectives. Arguably, civil society organisations should not be required to carry the larger 
share of the burden to succeed. Success of the Integrity Pact, and with that the procurement 
project, can be considered a shared responsibility which requires a degree of collaboration 
and trust between stakeholders. For example, In Bulgaria the civil society organisation 
responsible for monitoring clearly pursued ways to avoid delays in the procurement project. It 
could be argued that the organisation took full responsibility regardless of whether delays 
were the result of external factors beyond the Integrity Pact itself. The main reason identified 
why the organisation feared delays, was the effect these might have on public perception and 
in result their image487. 
 
Trust between the contracting authority and the civil society organisation/monitor repeatedly 
played a role in order to mitigate risks. By building strong relations with stakeholders, 
monitors attempted to mitigate that Integrity Pacts were abused to keep up the appearance of 
a clean procurement process. Repeatedly, monitors and contracting authorities stressed the 
importance of good relations in order to effectively implement Integrity Pact activities488. 
However, civil society organisations also highlight the risk that close relations could 
jeopardise the monitor’s independence. The ways in which chapters mitigated this varied.  
 
In Hungary, the contractor in the XIII-District case commented that some decisions in the 
contract execution phase suffered minor delays due to the required approval of the Integrity 
Pact monitor 489 . The contractor did confirm that the benefits from additional technical 
expertise through the independent monitoring outweighed this problem. Concerning 
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duplication of monitoring activities, the contractor confirmed that the project benefitted from 
‘two’ sets of eyes monitoring the activities. The contracting authority in the Hungarian case 
acknowledged that the external monitoring activities could overlap with internal control490. 
However, the former was perceived as a more holistic form of control throughout the entire 
procurement process while internal control is more sporadic and limited to audit. 
   Group interdependence 
When group members are aware that group resources are dependent on the contributions of 
others, they will be more inclined to contribute to collective action. Group interdependence 
may affect collective action. From the cases analysed in Europe, concerns were raised by 
stakeholders in relation to negative effects of Integrity Pacts such as window-dressing. Risks 
of window-dressing and duplications of monitoring activities were tested but not confirmed. 
Various lessons can be drawn from the cases we have reviewed. Monitors are aware of the 
potential negative effects of Integrity Pacts. They are first and foremost aware of their own 
exposure when engaging in an Integrity Pact (this was confirmed mostly when civil society 
organisations themselves did the monitoring). On the other hand, interviewed stakeholders 
also expressed awareness in relation to the negative effects for other parties to the Integrity 
Pact. This suggests that stakeholders through the Integrity Pact indeed raise awareness of the 
interdependency of a successful Integrity Pact. 
 
Companies expressed concerns in relation to the timeliness of procurement projects 491 . 
Economic operators are under financial and time pressure to comply with contract 
requirements. Some concerns were raised as to possible delays resulting from the additional 
scrutiny from the Integrity Pact. Companies expressed particularly concerns with costs 
relating anti-corruption measures that need to be adopted in relation to the Integrity Pact. 
These concerns seem to have some relation to the exposure of the companies to the European 
Single Market. Those primarily operating locally do not seem to weigh in the potential 
financial damage of not complying with anti-corruption standards. This could relate to 
impunity on the local level. Those operating on the international market stress the importance 
of compliance due to international enforcement of anti-bribery legislation. In addition, these 
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companies also seem to factor in the social value of complying with anti-corruption and good 
governance standards. This suggests that those stakeholders indeed acknowledge the 
interdependence of the group members in terms of contribution to the collective goods.  
 
For example, in the Latvian NLL-case, the contracted construction company highlighted that 
the measures they took to comply with the Integrity Pact were only included due to the 
collective action initiative492 . The interviewed representatives expressed reluctance as to 
whether they would repeat such efforts in future projects if this was not forced upon them. A 
different position was adopted by a contractor responsible for construction oversight. The 
company stressed their dedication to compliance with international anti-corruption standards, 
partially based on the fact that they are listed on the New York Stock Exchange and operate 
across Europe493. However, the company ensured efforts to actively engage the Integrity Pact 
monitor. This resulted in a close cooperation in which effective control was exercised over 
the construction company. 
   Heuristics/norms 
Group members learn heuristic strategies through personal experiences and from other people 
on how to get certain outcomes. The norms learned attach a certain value to a given strategy 
or outcome. The norms and heuristics can affect collective action when an individual’s 
willingness is enhanced to side-line immediate personal goals in the interest of the collective 
good.  
 
The Integrity Pacts reviewed for in Europe shows that activities contributed to changes 
concerning the key stakeholders involved. An important driver behind the change is the 
visibility of the procurement project. This was primarily achieved through media outreach. 
Limited evidence was found of visible procurement through direct citizen’s participation in 
the European cases, more so on the global level.  
  
The Integrity Pact requires civil society organisations/monitors to acquire a high degree of 
technical expertise in order to effectively monitor procurement. Given the fact that some of 
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the civil society organisations that have implemented the Integrity Pacts in Europe have 
limited staff and procurement knowledge capacity, external expertise was attracted in order to 
undertake the Integrity Pact activities. This had impact on the professionalization of the civil 
society organisations, especially on knowledge capacity on corruption in public procurement. 
To a degree, the Transparency International chapters normally cover a wide array of anti-
corruption campaigns. The Integrity Pact forced them to target one specific area and abstain 
from general anti-corruption rhetoric. The main challenge identified was the risk that the civil 
society organisations do not capitalise on the capacity development resulting from the 
Integrity Pact. A second area of influence of the Integrity Pact on civil society organisations 
was the need to adapt or adjust the approach to fighting corruption to the requirements of 
Integrity Pact. Integrity Pacts as collective action tools require a constructive and proactive 
approach vis-a-vis other stakeholders. Civil society organisations therefore needed to adopt a 
long-term vision to achieve change rather than reactive short-term approach to fighting 
corruption.  
 
The Integrity Pacts have also influenced contracting authorities. This primarily relates to 
operational aspects of the procurement process, meaning that Integrity Pacts have impact on 
the way procurement is being done. However, more importantly the Integrity Pacts have 
impact on visibility of public procurement, which could translate to increased legitimacy and 
credibility of the contracting authority. The main driver behind visibility of the procurement 
project is the outreach activity of the civil society organisation. As a consequence of this 
outreach, contracting authorities were incentivised to participate in this. Despite the fact that 
contracting authorities are spending public money, they do not always engage in outreach to 
the public. Integrity Pacts drive contracting authorities to engage either in proactive outreach 
or force them to react to public debate instigated by the civil society organisation. Feedback 
from the contracting authorities confirm that public exposure ultimately increases legitimacy 
and credibility of the public authority and expenditure494.   
 
In the global review, contract authorities also confirmed that Integrity Pacts gave them the 
opportunity to reflect on why certain decisions were taken. For example, in Mexico the 
monitor would ask why the contracting authority would decided to procure certain products 
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with certain specifications. This would then motivate the contracting authority to trace back 
decisions taken and assess whether these suited the needs of the public or economic means at 
their disposal. A contracting authority interviewed in Mexico confirmed that this way they 
decided to overturn decisions taken by their in-house experts495. The case did not relate 
specifically to corruption but involved engineers that took a decision based on out-dated 
technical knowledge. The questions of the monitor broke the information cycle within the 
contracting authority and opened up avenues for modernization. Another example given in 
Mexico related to the monitor asking bidders why they would propose to use one construction 
method over another. According to the monitor, the answers received from bidders allowed 
the contracting authority to take a more informed decision on the contract award496. It helped 
the contracting authority to compare answers and compensate for their own lack of technical 
knowledge. 
 
Finally, Integrity Pacts also influenced heuristic strategies by companies/bidders. The main 
impact of the Integrity Pact on the companies is that they participated in a presumably clean 
procurement process. Based on the feedback received from the companies, the business 
sectors they operate in are not free of corruption497. A main concern voiced by the companies 
is unfair competition due to low price offers of contractors working partially in the shadow-
economy. Their participation in the Integrity Pact provides companies with the opportunity to 
show dedication to fair competition and at the same time limit access to companies working 
according to unfair practices. 
 
The Latvian NLL-case had a significant impact on the Latvian Transparency International 
chapter, especially due to the need to attract external expertise498. In addition, the Integrity 
Pact forced the organisation to adjust a more short-term, reactive approach to fighting 
corruption, to a more long-term approach in order to achieve change. Part of this has to do 
with the nature of Integrity Pacts. In the Latvian case, the Integrity Pact took multiple years 
covering different governments. This had effect, especially when the government changed 
and attempted to change governance practices of the predecessors. Another external factor 
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that contributed to different conditions was the economic situation. This made the contracted 
construction company slightly more prone to reach compromises.   
 
The Latvian case did not only affect the Transparency International chapter. Also the 
contracting authority benefitted from the Integrity Pact. During the first stage, the chapter 
concentrated efforts on assisting the contracting authority in setting up anti-corruption 
procedures inside the organisation as well as in relation to outside interactions. In addition, 
they prepared a code of ethics for the Ministry of Culture499. Feedback during the stakeholder 
interviews highlighted the added value of the public presentation of monitoring reports500. 
The public discussion between the civil society organisation and the contracting authority on 
the conclusions of the monitoring report increased visibility. The contracting authority 
confirmed that the public comments they received, including criticism, opened up the 
procurement project to the public and eventually benefitted credibility.  
 
The Latvia Transparency International chapter acknowledged wider impact of the project as a 
result of making findings known to the public. This raised awareness in this specific 
construction project but also impacted general understanding of corruption risks in public 
procurement. It has facilitated public inquiry and has initiated official investigations more 
easily501 . A wider change of strategy identified is the perceived increased pressure that 
monitoring has placed on other institutions apart from the contracting authority, such as audit 
and supervision institutions. 
 
In Bulgaria, the Transparency International chapter conducted an assessment of the achieved 
results. Overall, they perceived increased transparency and publicity. Especially the pre-
bidding phase of the procurement process benefitted from this as in normal circumstances 
this phase remains behind closed doors502. The Integrity Pact opened this to the media and the 
general public. In concrete terms, transparency was ensured by disclosing information on the 
website of the monitoring organisation and on the website of the contracting authorities.  
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In Hungary, the contracting authority in the XIII-District case highlighted the importance of 
the involvement of the monitor in order to increase the visibility of the procurement 
project503. While in normal circumstance the media attention would be limited to the local 
level, the Integrity Pact raised nation-wide visibility. 
   Monitoring and transparency 
Monitoring can affect the collective action when activities can be easily monitored. This will 
reduce the risk of free riding out of fear that this will be detected. Monitoring can also expose 
certain levels of free riding in which case group members will be less includes to contribute 
to the collective good. 
 
1.   Detection and follow-up of irregularities 
 
Various lessons can be drawn from the case study analysis of European Integrity Pacts. 
Firstly, the Integrity Pacts provide civil society organisations with the means to detect 
corruption. The degree of access to information together with presence during key decision-
making moments in the procurement process allow monitors to identify forms of corruption 
such as bribery and collusion. However, the possibility to detect corruption through an 
Integrity Pact is not straightforward. Monitors as a consequence have directed their attention 
to wider governance of the procurement process, and in particular the detection of 
irregularities in the process. Such irregularities are identified as “red flags” of corruption but 
do not necessarily have to be corruption. The main reason why monitors focus on wider 
governance of public procurement is that they struggle with collecting evidence to proof 
corruption, and especially with answering the question whether irregularities are intentional 
or unintentional.  
 
The second lesson from the case study analysis suggests that once the monitor feels that 
sufficient evidence is gathered of a suspected corruption case, they tend to inform the 
signatories to the Integrity Pact agreement and subsequently inform the relevant authorities. 
Procedures are generally clear-cut given that the national legal systems have mechanisms in 
place to investigate and prosecute corruption. However, we have established that Integrity 
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Pacts focus more on bad governance of public procurement, rather than only on one of its 
symptoms, namely corruption. This motivates monitors to raise concerns of corruption (and 
other bad practices) and allow for intervention through the Integrity Pact. In case this 
intervention is not satisfactory to the monitors, they can decide to step out of the Integrity 
Pact. As we have seen in the previous sections, clear sanctions could be in place once one of 
the parties violates an Integrity Pact clause.  
 
In other words, while mechanisms for following-up a corruption case are rather straight 
forward, dealing with detected irregularities requires a different approach. This requires a 
constructive approach in which the monitor aims to find a mutual solution to the problem of 
the irregularity together with the other parties to the Integrity Pact. Once no solution is found, 
the monitor’s strongest message is the decision to step out of the Integrity Pact. In case of a 
clear violation of the Integrity Pact clauses, the agreement can provide also for other 
sanctions. Such sanctions only apply to the signatories of the Integrity Pact and are secondary 
to sanctions foreseen by law. However, the analysis suggests that overall the Integrity Pact 
stakeholders prefer a constructive approach to dealing with irregularities rather than a 
punitive approach. One reason is the difficulty to prove intention as mentioned above. Yet, 
we find that the main reason is the fact that monitors have long-term interest in successfully 
completing an Integrity Pact project.  
 
The third lesson from the analysis concerns the finding that follow-up and sanctioning of 
irregularities seems more ambiguous. Monitors are successfully undertaking their activities 
resulting in concrete detection of irregularities. Once detected, the civil society organisation 
is confronted with the need to take decisions as to how to proceed. While clear sanctions can 
be foreseen by law or through the Integrity Pact agreement, Integrity Pacts in practice seem to 
be more constructive or collaborative rather than punitive. Clear procedures defined through 
the Integrity Pact agreement can assist monitors and civil society organisations in how to 
follow-up. However, detailed procedures cannot fully provide answers to all possible 
scenarios. For example, the civil society organisation can be confronted with the need to take 
a strategic decision based on a subjective assessment, such as whether the clarification 
received by the contracting authority after a suspected breach is deemed sufficient to continue 
the Integrity Pact. Such a clarification can also include promises to change, which require 
trust from the monitor.  
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To illustrate these lessons learned we refer to the Latvian Integrity Pact case for the 
construction of the National Library of Latvia. The Transparency International chapter in 
Latvia, as monitor to the Integrity Pact, managed to detect and follow-up on possible 
irregularities. In order to do so, the organisation planned various activities504. These activities 
resulted in cases of suspected irregularities. For example, the review of contracts signed prior 
to the Integrity Pact exposed concerns as to dealings involving civil servants. The case led to 
an investigation by the prosecutor general. A second case identified by the monitor concerned 
the possible circumvention of public procurement laws by several cabinet ministers. The 
Transparency International chapter in Latvia successfully submitted an application to the 
Constitutional Court to investigate this case.  
 
Apart from the concrete detected cases, the chapter throughout the Integrity Pact primarily 
exposed risks of corruption. The majority of risks were adequately addressed by the 
authorities, however one particular case stood out. In this case, the monitor raised concerns 
regarding the decision of the contracting authority to impose an emergency situation for a 
procurement procedure. This meant that a contract was awarded through a negotiated 
procedure without announcing a public procurement tender. After receiving explanation, the 
monitor decided to continue the Integrity Pact and not raise this issue to law enforcement 
authorities505. This case challenged the team because internally there were opposing views on 
how to respond to this particular situation506. Through external mediation a decision was 
taken to continue the Integrity Pact despite the detected concerns. This decision was based on 
the fact that an irregularity was detected and this was communicated to the contracting 
authority. Subsequently the contracting authority provided clarification on their decision. In 
concrete terms, by providing transparency, the contracting authority fulfilled the Integrity 
Pact agreement’s requirements.  
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In the case of the Latvian Transparency International chapter, the decision to continue was 
taken by the organisation in a transparent manner. However, there are indications that the 
decision was not fully a result of an internal compromise507. This is not always required as 
each organisation has its own decision-making procedures and mechanisms. However, in this 
case the decision had effect on key persons involved in the implementation of the Integrity 
Pact. The leading monitoring staff at the time left the organisation. Whether this was as a 
direct or indirect consequence of the internal dissent that emerged cannot be determined from 
the interview feedback. However, it is clear from this example that several group members to 
the collective action initiative had different views on the prevalence of objectives of the 
Integrity Pact. In the end, the civil society organisation decided to set aside individual 
interests of members of the team in order to make room for the achievement of longer-term 
objectives in terms of ensuring procurement objectives shared by all stakeholders. This 
touches upon the collective action variable concerning long-term horizons. In addition, this 
case illustrates also raises questions as to the group size of the Integrity Pact.  
 
2.   Transparency  
The review of European Integrity Pacts suggests that prevention of corruption through 
Integrity Pact is perceived more effective than detection of corruption. The interviewed 
stakeholders argue that Integrity Pacts cannot rule out corruption, and therefor primarily is 
meant as a preventive tool. Transparency is seen together with accountability as the main 
factor to ensure integrity in public procurement. Across the analysis, stakeholders confirmed 
that Integrity Pact prioritised transparency as the key objective.  
 
Various ways have been identified to fill in the transparency objective. First of all, 
transparency is directed inwards from the contracting authority to the monitor/civil society 
organisation and outwards from the contracting authority and monitor/civil society 
organisation to the public. Outward transparency is primarily linked to media outreach. 
Inward transparency is primarily linked to access to documents and information. When we 
break this further down, we could argue that a key strength of the Integrity Pact is to enhance 
transparency towards the public. Outreach to the public is either directly done by the 
contracting authority and/or directly via the monitor/civil society organisation. The main 
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activity identified is the publication of the (periodical) monitoring reports. These translate the 
findings of the technical independent monitors and communicate these to the public. The 
quality of these reports is intrinsically linked to the degree of transparency provided by the 
contracting authority to the monitor. Confidentiality is the only possible restriction.  
 
A more problematic factor in the Integrity Pact implementation is inward transparency, in 
particular the information exchange arrangement between the contracting authority and the 
monitor. The arrangement is primarily pre-defined through the Integrity Pact agreement, 
stipulating which documents are made available, and in which meetings monitors can 
participate. However, within this arrangement challenges are identified. The main issue is 
whether information streams are ‘pull’ or ‘push’ based. Arrangements on pull information 
mean that the monitor requests and receives information. A push system is based on the 
contracting authority anticipating the needs of the monitor and automatically informing 
without specific requests. This study finds that an arrangement that largely depends on 
information delivered by the contracting authority on request of the monitor risks that the 
former adopts a reactive approach in the Integrity Pact. This could result in the contracting 
authority alienating from the Integrity Pact and failing to engage in the project. This is 
problematic given that successful implementation of an Integrity Pact is a collective effort 
and dependent on the engagement of all stakeholders. It is therefor important to enforce, 
promote and expect a degree of proactive behaviour regarding information disclosure from 
the contracting authority. In other words, push information arrangements can be considered 
enhancing transparency as well as the engagement from the contracting authority. At the 
same time, it prevents the contracting authority from responding to information requests in a 
reactive manner and avoids the possibility of late detection of irregularities.  
 
The European cases also show that Integrity Pacts can increase access to information beyond 
the foreseen access by law. In addition, Integrity Pacts can expose or close gaps that have 
been identified in many EU countries relating the implementation of access to information 
laws 508 . Integrity Pacts could allow monitors access to information that under normal 
circumstances would be confidential. As mentioned before, the confidentiality could be 
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considered a restriction to the transparency of the procurement procedures and consequently 
the effectiveness of the Integrity Pact. However, from the cases we found no concrete 
examples where confidentiality clauses restricted the role of the monitor. In case monitors 
due to confidentiality restrictions cannot use public outreach as a pressure tool to call for 
change, other tools are available to internally exercise pressure such as meetings with the 
stakeholders. 
 
The case studies suggest the potential comprehensive preventive effect of Integrity Pacts, 
meaning potentially covering all stakeholders. Stakeholders confirmed that Integrity Pacts 
have a disciplinary effect on those involved. This, very importantly, also applies to 
bidders/contractors and therefor has effect on the private sector. The Integrity Pact promotes 
a solution to corruption in the private sector following best practices promoted by 
Transparency International which includes: private companies taking internal preventive 
measures; authorities enforcing measures and; stakeholders engaging to transparency.509 
 
The Hungarian XIII District-case provides a good insight into which documentation the 
monitor (in this case Transparency International Hungary) consulted. On the website of the 
chapter an introduction is given of the Integrity Pact, including contact details in case of 
complaints510. Four monitoring reports are published outlining the information accessed by 
the monitors and conclusions drawn. Monitoring reports are published after concluding a 
specific phase in the procurement process. Overall, conclusions from the monitoring are 
positive. Whenever needed, the information disclosed is complemented with additional 
documentation on request of the monitor. The contracting authority took a proactive stance 
by automatically consulting the monitor before taking decisions. The team would receive via 
email documentation after which they were given two days to respond. Loosely speaking the 
working arrangement between the monitor and the contracting authority was largely based on 
information push511 with information pull512 whenever needed. 
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Table 7: Access to information Integrity Pact Hungary 
Procurement phase Documents disclosed 
-  Preparation of contract 
award procedure 
-  Contract notice 
-  Tender documentation 
-   Investment programme and target plan regarding the investment 
-  Draft of preparatory documents of the procedure including inspection of the 
possibility to divide the contract into lots, the inspection of the process 
determining the estimated project value, and the inspection of the issue of 
one-off payment and green procurement 
-  Draft notice launching the contract award procedure 
-  Draft of documentation process 
-  Monitoring the process 
starting from the dispatch 
of the notice launching the 
contract award procedure 
-  The rectification 
concerning previously 
submitted 
recommendations 
-  The provision of 
additionally necessary 
information 
-  Request for supply of missing information concerning the notice launching 
the contract award procedure sent by the Notice Control Department of the 
Public Procurement Authority and the accordingly completed notice 
-  Records of on-the-site inspections 
-  Extension of the time limit for submission of tenders in case supply of 
additional information is required 
-  Amendment notice 
-  Amended schedule 
-  Provided information to the requests for additional information and their 
dispatch 
-  Demolition records 
-  Request for supply of missing information and for provision of information 
and their dispatch 
-  Request of justification 
-  Monitoring the process 
starting with the 
evaluation of tenders and 
finishing with the 
conclusion of the contract 
-  Proposal for decision and written expertise opinion of the Evaluation 
committee 
-  Evaluation sheets 
-  Resolution of the Council closing the public procurement procedure 
-  Summary of the evaluation of the tenders and documents verifying the 
dispatch of the summary 
-  Draft contract 
-  Signed contracts and their annexes 
-   Information notice about the result of the procedure 
-  Request regarding the dispatch of the information notice about the result of 
the procedure 
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-  Monitoring the process 
staring with the 
conclusion of the contract 
conducted as a result of 
the public procurement 
procedure and finishing 
with the completion of 
public works 
-  Draft of the contract amendment 
-  Contract amendment 
-  Minutes from the meeting on cooperation 
-  Notice and request of contract amendment 
-  Partial invoices 
-  Documents regarding the implementation of the contract 
-  Draft instructions of the CEO of XIII District Public Service Ltd, based on 
experiences collected during the renovation works of the nursery school. 
Source: Transparency International Hungary 
 
While throughout the Integrity Pact, the monitor in Hungary closely interacted with the 
contracting authority; the bidders only were actively involved during the contract 
implementation. Most Integrity Pact activities were directed towards the contracting authority 
and only once the contract was executed the bidder interacted with the monitors of the 
Hungarian Transparency International chapter. During the interview with the bidder it was 
confirmed that the Integrity Pact adds value to their work513. First of all because of the 
perceived corruption in the construction sector. Secondly, the bidder was supportive of the 
Integrity Pact given the importance to the client, meaning the contracting authority. Thirdly, 
the bidder added that the Integrity Pact strengthened the fact that the contract was fairly 
awarded.  
 
In the Latvian NLL-case, a different working arrangement materialised between the 
contracting authority and the monitors from the Latvian Transparency International chapter. 
The team was granted access to all relevant documentation relating the construction, 
including financial documentation514. In addition, the contracting authority supported the 
monitors to obtain information through the State Audit Office. This included information that 
normally would not be accessible to the public. However, in the Latvian case also restrictions 
on access to information were incorporated. These presumably resulted from negotiation 
between the parties at the stage of Integrity Pact design515. These restrictions primarily had an 
effect on the freedom to communicate with the public. The Latvian Transparency 
International chapter did not perceive this as a problem because they felt that the overall 
                                                            
 
513 Interview feedback #1, European review, February-April 2015. 
514 Desk research internal documentation, European review, PTF book Chapter 9, p. 124 
515 Desk research internal documentation, European review, comments on Delna’s 03.03.11 report.doc 
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access to information through the Integrity Pact was more important than the few 
confidentiality restrictions on that information516.  
 
The working arrangement between the monitor and the contracting authority in Latvia was 
largely based on a pull system. Team members involved in the implementation of the 
Integrity Pact confirmed that the contracting authority always delivered information once 
requested. According to the chapter, the arrangement did not impede them from conducting 
effective control. It is important that in addition, the team was able to attend meetings and 
this way actively participated in the debates. However, in practice, the limitations of the pull 
system were acknowledged517. Especially given that the monitor at times suffered limited 
capacity, which affected the degree of monitoring. Not being able to exert continuous 
pressure on the contracting authority exposed the team to the risk of missing out on important 
decision-making moments. Various examples have been identified in which the monitor was 
forced to respond retroactively to potential concerns. With full capacity, this could have been 
avoided. Alternatively, push information could have also limited the risk of not being present 
at all times.  
 
While the bidder in Hungary only got involved during the contract execution, in Latvia the 
bidder was engaged from the start of the procurement procedure. The bidder included in the 
proposal a code of conduct and established a whistle-blowers policy. This can be directly 
attributed to the Integrity Pact given that the bidder used templates from Transparency 
International in order to develop the proposals. During the contract execution, the 
bidder/contractor disseminated the code through information panels at the building site and 
enacted channels for staff to submit complaints. Direct staff and sub-contractors were able to 
anonymously file complaints or directly contact the director of the building company. These 
systems were complemented by hotlines to the monitor and the contracting authority. 
 
3.   Competitiveness 
The global review pointed to examples of companies in Italy being excluded from tenders 
due to a refusal to sign the Integrity Pact. The tracking and reporting on the numbers of firms 
                                                            
 
516 Interview feedback #6, #9, European review, February-April 2015. 
517 Interview feedback #6, #9, European review, February-April 2015. 
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that have been denied participation in procurement processes due to a refusal to sign or a 
violation of the Integrity Pact could provide further evidence for Integrity Pact success in 
increasing competitiveness in the bidding process, by either removing non-compliant firms 
from the market and/or pressuring them to reform. Isolated efforts have been made by some 
contracting authorities in this regard. For example, between 2012 and 2013 the Commune of 
Milan excluded 453 bidders, primarily for violations of the Integrity Pact. 
 
While overall, the potential of the Integrity Pact to increase the level playing field was 
confirmed, little evidence has been collected from the European review that Integrity Pacts 
indeed increased competition. In the case of Latvia, it was confirmed that one foreign 
company was excluded from bidding due to domestic corruption charges pending518. In the 
case of Hungary, the contractor confirmed that competition in the construction sector is 
challenged due to dominance of some players519. While the Integrity Pact in the view of the 
contractor could provide access to procurement, this could not be proven in terms of more 
eligible bids received for the specific procurement assignment. 
   Long-term horizons 
Group members with long-term horizons are more likely to contribute to the collective good. 
These members should be willing to set aside immediate personal interests for the sake of 
long-term interests of the group. 
 
The Integrity Pact experiences show how some learned heuristic strategies are influenced 
through the repeated interaction of group members in the Integrity Pact. The tool has 
contributed to changes concerning the civil society organisations/monitors, contracting 
authorities, and companies. An important driver behind the change is the visibility of the 
procurement project. This driver remains important also after project activities end, especially 
with a view on the contracting authorities and the companies. The visibility created during 
the Integrity Pact can be used for monitors to maintain a certain degree of pressure on the 
contracting authorities and companies/bidders also after the Integrity Pact finishes. For the 
civil society organisations, the most important factor for sustainability through follow-up 
                                                            
 
518 Interview feedback #14, European review, February-April 2015. 
519 Interview feedback #1, European review, February-April 2015. 
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activities is funding. Important factors that contribute to achieving sustainable change are 
technical expertise, presence during decision-making moments and good relations with 
stakeholders. 
 
Securing sufficient funds for the Integrity Pact is the main problem civil society 
organisations/monitors face. Funds for post-project activities seem to be covered by general 
budget lines within the organisations. As a consequence, concrete monitoring activities are 
either suspended or limited to the minimum. Monitors do include activities to follow-up on 
Integrity Pact results, such as outreach activities in the form of presentations to academia. 
This study found limited indications of active pursuing for funding specifically for Integrity 
Pacts. The main reasons identified are the low capacity of some organisations, high staff 
turnover, and the role of external monitors post-project. Concerning the latter, the monitors 
enjoy a degree of independence and are normally contracted specifically for the Integrity 
Pact. This means that the monitor risks not always being able to capitalise on the knowledge 
and network this person acquires during the course of the Integrity Pact. 
 
For example, the Integrity Pact in Latvia continuously suffered from budget restraints. Some 
of these restraints were lifted when an external donor (Partnership for Transparency Fund) 
stepped up. The civil society organisation/monitor confirmed that without the intervention of 
the donor, successful monitoring would have been challenged and consequently jeopardising 
the possibility to further secure funding 520 . Communication between the donor and the 
monitoring organisation provides indications of activities directed to post-project interests. 
Based on the field visit, it is not clear whether these interests will materialise given that the 
project manager at the time maintained contacts with the donor and currently has left the 
organisation. This is a clear example in which continuity of the Integrity Pact is jeopardised 
due to staff turnover. 
 
Regardless of the funding challenges, we found some indications of change post-project. It 
has to be noted that the cases analysed in Europe were in some instances recently concluded 
or are still on going. Nevertheless, Integrity Pacts have contributed to changes in the 
contracting process, such as internal changes with relation to control of public procurement. 
                                                            
 
520 Interview feedback #9, European review, February-April 2015. 
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It could be argued that such policy changes are easier to achieve given that public authorities 
can do so within existing legal frameworks. A particular strength we identified of the 
Integrity Pact is the real-time control that is being exercised through the tool. This is 
perceived as more complete compared to internal control mechanisms of public authorities 
that are more reactive and audit oriented. 
 
Stakeholders perceived increased legitimacy of procurement processes due to Integrity Pacts. 
One possible way to measure this, as well as determining sustainability, is by looking at the 
perception of corruption. The question whether the Integrity Pact changed the perception of 
corruption in public procurement was posed to stakeholders during interviews. Respondents 
highlighted that this was difficult to determine. The main problem with identifying change is 
connected with the fact that most Integrity Pacts did not measure perception before or after 
the application of the tool. This touches upon a more general problem identified during this 
study, namely the fact that objectives for the Integrity Pact were not always clearly set out at 
the start, let alone monitored.  
 
In Hungary, the contracting authority explained that at the time they were revising their 
regulations for internal control of public procurement521. They aimed to implement a control 
system that is more aligned with practices used by the external monitors during the Integrity 
Pact. The underlying thought is that control becomes a real-time rather than a reactive 
activity. In addition, the contracting authority clearly expressed their interest into follow-up 
Integrity Pact projects522. The municipality argued that good governance had been a priority 
of the mayor at the time and therefore lessons-learned from the tool could be beneficial for 
future procurement. With strong political will of the mayor, the likelihood for more Integrity 
Pacts was acknowledged. However, sustainability would possibly be jeopardised in case of 
political change. It was confirmed by Transparency International Hungary that this could be a 
possible obstacle523. Therefore the organisation actively promotes the Integrity Pact also with 
opposition parties. According to the contracting authority, the opposition party in the 
municipality generally supported the Integrity Pact during its implementation. This expressed 
itself primarily by no public objection against the procurement process. An interesting added 
                                                            
 
521 Interview feedback #2, European review, February-April 2015. 
522 Interview feedback #2, European review, February-April 2015. 
523 Interview feedback #5, European review, February-April 2015. 
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value of the tool in this case was that the municipality perceived high pressure to comply with 
procurement rules. This pressure allegedly is exerted due to the fact the ruling party in the 
municipality is on the central level in the opposition. This arguably could make them a target 
for state institutions dealing with control. The Integrity Pact functioned in a way as a tool to 
protect from political persecution.  
 
In Latvia, the Integrity Pact identified a potential risk in procurement based on the lack of a 
Public Works Department. This questions the model upon which authorities design and 
procure without in-house staff capable of undertaking pre-feasibility studies or preparing 
design briefs. The monitor identified the opportunity to raise this issue with the contracting 
authority project manager due to good working relations during the Integrity Pact524. The 
expression of these concerns could lead to reforms in Latvian public procurement. According 
to the organisation, factors that have contributed to this, inter alia, are: 525 
 
-   A developed understanding of major construction projects; 
-   Having a seat at the table; 
-   Developing good relations with involved actors; 
-   Acting as a silent observer. 
 
The monitor in Latvia also managed to change procurement practices. For example, the 
organisation argued that government agencies should not charge bidders a fee for 
procurement documentation. As a consequence, agencies agreed to put all procurement 
documentation online. Also, the agencies accepted the procedure of public discussion with 
potential competitors before each competition. Although it is not certain that this practice will 
be sustained for future operations, the monitor perceives that it has contributed to the final 
establishment of a project management structure at the contracting authority that is equipped 
to withstand pressure from companies526. 
   Salience of the collective good 
                                                            
 
524 Interview feedback #9, European review, February-April 2015. 
525 Desk research internal documents, European review, comments on Delna’s 03.03.11 report.doc 
526 Desk research internal documents, European review, final report latvia lp 2011.doc 
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If the collective action is of importance to the livelihood or survival of group members, than 
these members are incentivised to act collectively. The objectives of the Integrity Pacts 
differed depending on the stakeholders interviewed. Some defined the objective in terms of a 
corruption-free procurement project, other adopted a wider positions aiming for better 
governance of procurement.  
 
1.   Costs and time savings 
 
Attributing efficiency in the procurement process to the Integrity Pact is challenging. We 
looked at various indicators to assess whether Integrity Pacts make procurement more 
efficient. This looked at whether observable reductions in costs compared to the original 
budget could be attributed to Integrity Pacts. In addition, the study looked at whether the use 
of an independent monitor had effect on the resources allocated by the contracting authorities 
to the procurement process. Also, timeliness was addressed and the question whether the 
Integrity Pact reduced time needed to resolve conflicts.  
 
The case study analysis did not find evidence of Integrity Pacts relating to specific delays 
suffered in the procurement activities. Various procurement projects with Integrity Pacts 
suffered overall delays. However, these delays were primarily attributed to external factors 
such as political changes and the economic crisis.  Establishing whether Integrity Pacts make 
procurement activities more cost efficient is difficult to determine. One possibility is by 
looking at the cost of corruption in public procurement and allocating a figure to potential 
savings in case corruption is prevented. However, such an approach exposes us to various 
methodological challenges given we cannot determine the degree of corruption prevented. 
After all, not all procurement processes are by definition corrupt. If we expand the scope of 
Integrity Pacts from an anti-corruption tool to a good governance tool, we see a wider array 
of cost savings that could be attributed to the Integrity Pact. Good procurement processes can 
save costs. However, also here we ask the question what economic value can be attributed to 
the Integrity Pact.  
 
This leaves us to conclude that costs savings through Integrity Pacts are case specific and 
cannot be generalised. For example, concrete cost savings can be made by carefully 
supervising construction activities and quality of materials. This activity might go beyond the 
technical expertise or capacity of the monitoring civil society organisation. The focus of the 
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Integrity Pact’s value perhaps should be sought in the area of social value. For example, one 
might be able to convince contracting authorities that the monitor’s services provided through 
the tool are efficient from an internal management perspective, i.e. through the independent 
monitor, rather than efficient from a procurement corruption cost savings perspective. After 
all, a donor or public authority is willing to pay/cover costs of a service that is affordable and 
implementable.  
 
The Latvian NLL-case showed clear cost savings compared to the estimated budget. The 
Latvian Transparency International chapter and the contracting authority highlighted that the 
involvement of an external construction supervisor had strong impact on expenditure527. The 
company supervised the construction site, which included over 40,000 different items. The 
company would scrutinise these by applying a price-quality check in order to ensure best 
value for money. Despite delays in the project, the construction of the National Library of 
Latvia cost significantly less than planned. The cost savings cannot directly be attributed to 
the Integrity Pact, however both the contracting authority and the construction supervisor 
stressed that the successful monitoring during the construction was a team effort including 
that of the Integrity Pact’s monitor.  
 
The delays in Latvia are primarily attributed to changes in the political landscape and the 
economic crisis. Despite the delays, the monitoring civil society organisation took initiatives 
whenever possible to reduce further delays. For example, they took the initiative to organise a 
mediation meeting after an unhappy bidder appealed a decision taken by the procurement 
committee. This meeting brought the different stakeholders around the table and allowed for 
discussion. The appeal was not withdrawn. However, it is important that the monitor 
undertook activities to ensure increased efficiency in dispute resolution. The contracting 
authority confirmed that this was a valuable contribution 528 . By discussing directly the 
concerns of the bidder, similar situations can be avoided for future procurement processes. 
 
In Italy, Integrity Pacts allowed according to public authorities for 30% savings on the 
procurement budget. The Italian Transparency International chapter confirmed reduced costs 
                                                            
 
527 Interview feedback #6-15, European review, February-April 2015. 
528 Interview feedback #14, European review, February-April 2015. 
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in various major construction projects529. According to the organisation, the main impact of 
their activities was an increased quality of bidders as well as more transparency in the 
process. Also, the organisation deemed it important that awareness was raised on the 
importance of integrity.  
 
In Bulgaria, the Transparency International chapter took efforts to avoid delays by using the 
Integrity Pact as a tool to bridge communication gaps between stakeholders. They argue that 
the mere role as independent observer already influences interaction between the contracting 
authority and the contractor530. The organisation positioned itself as an independent third 
party ready to mediate in case of conflict and this way avoiding cost increase or delays531. 
                                                            
 
529 Desk research internal documents, Italy (draft 3) 2010.doc 
530 Interview feedback #20, European review, February-April 2015. 
531 Desk research internal documents, global review, Integrity Initiative report, p. 42. 
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   Part III Integrity Pact as an approach to prevent corruption in public 
procurement 
The third area is where the tool to prevent corruption is translated into an approach to prevent 
corruption. By providing the conditions required for civil society organisations to monitor 
public procurement, an integrated approach is presented to prevent corruption in public 
procurement on the EU level. 
 
The main study question is: 
 
-   Which conditions are required for an integrated approach for civil society organisations to 
effectively monitor public procurement? 
 
This study has looked at the Integrity Pact experiences in terms of effectiveness. As a 
consequence, the study looked at multiple units of observation and analysis. Translating this 
into a corruption prevention approach is challenging due to various reasons. First of all, 
collective action is a dynamic process that deals with social relationships. Establishing 
indicators that allow for measuring effectiveness should take into account that Integrity Pacts 
differ over time, across cultures, between government levels, etc. Another difficulty concerns 
the different methodological approaches used by social science disciplines. This study 
attempted to include different disciplines by looking at more traditional economic analyses 
that focus on incentives of individuals to participate in collective action within institutional 
settings, as well as sociological approaches which look more at behaviour of groups and how 
action is motivated through social networks and organisations.  
 
We have seen from the cases discussed in Part II of this study that Integrity Pact projects 
have been designed and implemented by different civil society organisations, contracting 
authorities, companies, involving different donor organisations, procurement projects, market 
sectors, etc. Today, a key question posed is how to inform policy-makers on the best ways to 
scale-up the use of the tool on the basis of past learning. The data collection from the two 
reviews we conducted of the Integrity Pact in 2015/2016 highlighted that many projects were 
implemented throughout the world by Transparency International chapters and others, but 
that these were scarcely documented which complicated learning from the different 
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experiences. It was therefor that we recommended an additional step to the roadmap for 
Integrity Pact, namely evaluation. In other words, the Integrity Pact should concern three 
elements: 1) design; 2) implementation; and 3) evaluation. The following sections will 
present the evaluation element in order to shape an approach that would support the 
implementation of the Integrity Pact tool on the EU level in order to prevent public 
procurement corruption. While the development of this approach in this study is based 
primarily on findings from looking back at the experiences of the Integrity Pact, the objective 
is that by using this approach data will be better collected in the future and help civil society 
organisations, donors, and academia to better assess the effectiveness of the Integrity Pact as 
a collective action tool in the future. 
6.1   Integrity Pact evaluation 
Transparency International, nor the World Bank Institute, provides detailed information on 
evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the Integrity Pact. In fact, as we have seen in this 
study, assessing the effectiveness of collective action initiatives is overall an underexposed 
area. The learning review recommended adding evaluation as an additional phase to the 
Integrity Pact roadmap. The main driver behind this recommendation was the difficulty of 
defining the effectiveness and impact of the Integrity Pact on the merit of limited availability 
of data. But also, the collected evidence on its effectiveness as shown by this study does 
make a case for stronger evaluation methodologies in order to better assess effectiveness and 
impact in the future. The experiences with the Integrity Pact differ greatly, which complicates 
drawing comparative answers from the different cases. Another driver behind this approach is 
the fact that collective action in the fight against corruption is in the first stages of 
implementation and that to date there is very little knowledge on the effectiveness and impact 
of initiatives. This study aims to modestly contribute to this. 
 
1.   Developing a monitoring and assessment framework 
Developing a monitoring and assessment framework could support the implementation of the 
Integrity Pacts and strengthens also the evaluability in order to be able to measure results and 
impact more accurately. Monitoring is primarily a management tool, which helps those that 
implement Integrity Pacts to regularly check progress against plans. It allows the 
implementers to follow project activities at all times and ensure that these are implemented in 
line with available resources. Monitoring can help the stakeholders to detect, in an early 
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stage, problems relating the implementation of the project and mitigate these. Above all, 
monitoring can support the achievement of expected output, results and impact. 
 
The relevance of monitoring becomes clear when looking at the Integrity Pact project. As we 
have seen from the case study analysis in this study, Integrity Pacts are frequently considered 
complex projects with many different activities and involving different stakeholders with 
different interests but collective goals, sometimes covering an extended period of time. 
Without systematic monitoring, a project manager from a civil society organisation might 
lose track of activities and could face multiple problems. For example, when the use of funds 
is not monitored during the project, one could run into overspending which would be 
considered unfavourable, none the least in the eyes of donors, but also in order to achieve 
objectives such as effectively preventing corruption in public procurement. This in turn could 
lead to need for additional resources or cancelling project activities all together. The former 
might result in donor organisations pulling out of funding Integrity Pacts, the latter could 
result in insufficient supervision over a procurement process with the consequence of 
increasing the risk for corruption. 
 
While monitoring provides insight about what is happening during a project, evaluation aims 
to answer the question of why things happened as they did. Once an Integrity Pact project is 
completed, it is relevant to reflect on whether the objectives that were established at the 
beginning were, at the end, met. This is relevant for civil society organisations but also for 
the other stakeholders involved in the Integrity Pact (as well as donor organisations that have 
to justify value for money when funding civil society organisations). Learnings from such 
assessments can help further determining the conditions that favour effective corruption 
prevention in public procurement by civil society. As this study discussed in the sections 
above, civil society organisations are recommended to deal with internal and external 
considerations when designing an Integrity Pact. This for example includes determining 
which resources are put into a project. The Integrity Pact implementer needs to make sure to 
monitor whether these resources (such as funding and time) are used according to plan. 
Perhaps a civil society organisation could run into a situation in which fewer resources are 
put into the project than expected. If this is the case one could still re-allocate resources to 
other activities or even extend the scope of the project. As a consequence, a more favourable 
climate can be created to prevent corruption. Monitoring capacity input can ensure that no 
overspending occurs. With the resources put into the Integrity Pact project, the implementer 
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aims to deliver specific services or products, such as press conferences, press notes, 
monitoring reports etc. On the basis of the input, Integrity Pacts can have different forms of 
output. As an implementer it could be relevant to monitor whether the output is produced 
according to plan and within a specific timeframe. But while the input and output are 
important to consider when looking at Integrity Pacts, more important is whether these are 
coherent with the desired objectives. We would need to look at what the Integrity Pact aims 
to achieve, determine the activities that are coherent with these objectives and determine its 
effect. After that, practitioners might be able to filter out the different elements that favour 
effective prevention of public procurement corruption by civil society within their specific 
environment. For example, with organizing a press conference, one might aim to ensure that 
stakeholders are better informed on the procurement project that is being monitored. As an 
Integrity Pact implementer one could try to monitor during the project whether the press 
conference led to the desired result of better informing citizens on the Integrity Pact. If one 
then realizes that instead, the press only reported on possible delays of the procurement 
project due to whatever reason, the implementer could consider to review the way it designed 
the press conference in order for it to better support the objective. In other words, it allows a 
civil society organisation to adjust favourably the conditions to be more effective in 
preventing corruption in public procurement. A distinction can be made between 
intermediate, long-term and/or indirect change as a consequence of the activities civil society 
organisations undertake in an Integrity Pact. This is where it becomes rather tricky, especially 
when we want to attribute the intervention to desired impact. For example, on the long-term 
one might aim for better quality public procurement by organizing training activities of 
procurement officials. The impact of the training activities might not be immediately visible 
during the project but could become visible some time after they have been completed. At the 
same time, improvements of quality in public procurement could depend on multiple factors, 
not only the intervention by the civil society organisation through the Integrity Pact. In other 
words, group members to a collective action initiative might not have direct control or 
influence over this. As a project manager, one is not expected to be able to monitor the 
impact during the project, given that this often only becomes visible after a period of time532. 
                                                            
 
532 Due to the challenges in monitoring impact during the project, this element primarily is something that 
should be addressed through evaluation. 
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Nonetheless, it may be possible to identify aspects of the impact during the project, especially 
when a project covers multiple years.  
  
2.   Integrity Pact theory of Change 
To illustrate the context in which a civil society organisation is operating an Integrity Pact 
this study will reconstruct a sample logic model that outlines the activities deployed in order 
to achieve operational, specific and wider objectives of the Integrity Pact. Developing a 
theory of change is a useful tool to help defining what a project aims to change. The 
stakeholders involved in an Integrity Pact can use the model to reflect on why they are 
collectively working on preventing corruption in public procurement. The process of 
developing a theory of change is critical for initiatives that involve multiple actors. It 
strengthens the need for actors to come together and discuss the monitoring and evaluation 
framework for impact monitoring. Going together through such a process is a way to help 
stakeholders to align systems and practices. On the basis of the learning reviews conducted in 
2015 a model has been developed. If adapted to the EU framework for public procurement 
relating EU funds, the change outlines that the Integrity Pact by design bolsters objectives 
(such as ensuring a level playing field in order to increase quality procurement and trust in 
public expenditure) that address the needs of relevant beneficiaries (citizens, governments 
and business). On the basis of the information available on the European Commission’s 
website, the following objectives for the Integrity Pacts could be identified533: 
 
Wider objectives 
 
-   Increase trust in public authorities and contribute to better reputation 
-   Increase transparency, accountability and good governance in procurement 
Specific objectives 
 
                                                            
 
533 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/es/policy/how/improving-investment/integrity-pacts/ [Accessed on 12-10-
2016]. 
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-   Enhance capability of stakeholders 
-   Improve competition, promote cost efficiency and savings  
Operational objectives 
 
-   Provide monitoring services 
-   Reach out to contracting authorities and bidders 
 
The objectives are to be achieved through specific interventions requiring resource 
mobilization (such as financial resources, technical expertise, capacity building activities) to 
operate an Integrity Pact. In the image below this is denoted as “inputs”. Once these 
resources are available, they can be used to accomplish planned activities. Generally, for an 
Integrity Pact this translates to monitoring, communication and project management 
activities. For example, for the EU project the European Commission clearly notes as activity 
the periodic sharing and capturing of impact, lessons learned and best practices for project 
partners and the broader public. Accomplishment of these planned activities should thus 
deliver the intended services in public procurement, providing a level of independent control, 
a system for public access to information and better-informed stakeholders. This in the image 
below is denoted as “outputs”. Once these outputs have been achieved, this can result in 
collective benefits to the beneficiaries. For example, effective outreach can support 
empowered citizens, who through increased attention to and information on the procurement 
process may submit legitimate concerns, generating a response from the public authorities. 
Such a response can result in mitigation measures in case of irregularities or concrete 
sanctions in case of corruption. This is denoted in the image below as “outcomes”. In the 
medium term, the outputs could prevent corruption, hold stakeholders accountable and make 
procurement more transparent. This is denoted in the image below as “intermediate 
outcomes”. In the long-term such outcomes could generate expected change, such as 
increased public trust in EU funding and less perception of corruption, or even 
institutionalisation of lessons learned from Integrity Pacts and overall improvement in the 
public procurement system. This is denoted in the image below as “long-term outcomes”. 
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Figure 7: Theory of change Integrity Pact 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Determining the long-term change stakeholders achieve is to an extent a bolt leap into the 
unknown. Long-term objectives can be challenging and ambitious but should be reachable. 
Civil society organisations need to consider who will need to benefit from the change, i.e. 
individuals, organisations, etc. Also they need to think about what will have changed such as 
attitudes, policies or norms. In a statement, a desired change could read: “EU citizens have 
more confidence in EU fund public expenditure because governments prevent corruption in 
public procurement through the implementation of an appropriate legal or policy framework”. 
The next step is to think about and map the current situation to understand in which context 
the civil society organisation is supposed to facilitate the desired change. What social, 
political, economic and cultural factors influence the change process? Which key 
stakeholders are involved and what are their stakes? And based on this, which opportunities 
for change can be identified. For example, a climate of public distrust against governments 
means that in order to change perception, an anti-corruption initiative should not only focus 
on improving procurement practices with contracting authorities but also target media. At this 
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stage, determining the domains of change will help a civil society organisation to organise the 
complexity of the ambitious goals and determine where to best intervene. The main question 
asked is what/who needs to change and in which way in order to make the desired change 
possible. For example, policy and legislative change (targeting authorities) for Integrity Pacts 
can include: strengthening implementation and enforcement of existing public procurement 
rules; developing new procurement rules; and improving processes concerning transparency, 
accountability and participation. In order to change public perception (targeting citizens) 
Integrity Pacts can focus on: better inform the public on public procurement; mobilize the 
public to participate (e.g. raise concerns or monitor the process) in public procurement. The 
following step in the thought process concerns setting boundaries and focusing on how the 
civil society organisation can intervene in the different domains. In other words, we can start 
mapping the pathways of change. A way to do this is to start with the desired long-term 
change and ask the question what needs to be done in order for the change to occur. In order 
to do so it is important to first consider outcomes. These, as opposed to long-term objectives, 
have a shorter time-span, which makes them reachable within the duration of the Integrity 
Pact. The pathways between the different outcomes are visualised below in a linear way. 
However, in real life this will not always be the case. This means that one has to keep in mind 
that the model can change and needs to be adapted in response to the situation at hand. This is 
particularly relevant when thinking about dynamic networks characteristic to collective action 
initiatives such as the Integrity Pacts. For example, to increase public trust in procurement 
there is need for fair competition, transparency and accountability in procurement. In order to 
achieve this, there is need for detection of irregularities, follow-up by those who detected it 
and correction of the detected irregularity. 
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Figure 8: Results chain Integrity Pact 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
At this stage it is possible to zoom in on the Integrity Pact project contribution to achieving 
these different levels of change. Now the question is asked what a civil society organisation 
can do to contribute to these outcomes. In other words, where can one have control and/or 
influence to drive for change? For example, as an independent monitor of a procurement 
process one might have control over detection and follow-up of identified irregularities. On 
the correction of the detected irregularities one might have less control but influence. This 
arguably falls more in the influence sphere of the contracting authority. Based on this an 
implementer can adapt action in order to increase the likelihood of change.  
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6.2   Integrity Pact indicators of change 
After determining the change process, it is key to consider which information or indicators 
can be collected to explain the changes at the outcome levels. Indicators could allow for 
monitoring systematically whether Integrity Pact implementers achieve the desired change. 
Deciding on indicators allows for an instrumental way to measure progress. It is not easy to 
define indicators, especially for a complex project such as the Integrity Pact. In fact, the wide 
variety of Integrity Pact projects across the globe does not lend itself to a fixed list of 
indicators. Instead, these can differ for each Integrity Pact project. In practical terms, when 
objectives are defined, one can start filling in the blanks and consider which indicators can be 
used to measure change. Indicators ideally should possess four qualities, they need to 
be: specific, measurable, available, relevant and time-bound. For each defined indicator, a 
project manager should ask the questions: 
 
-   Does the indicator provide a measurement that describes progress as closely as possible? 
-   Can the indicator be quantified? 
-   Is the information for the indicator available? 
-   Is the indicator relevant for us and/or the stakeholders? 
-   Can we specify at what moment the indicator target has been met? 
The most common indicators can be divided in the following categories: input indicators; 
output indicators; result indicators; and impact indicators. Input indicators provide a 
measurement of progress in the use of input and are normally measures in monetary units 
(e.g. EUR) or units of staff time (e.g. working days). Output indicators are normally directly 
related to a specific activity. Result indicators are often more qualitative of nature and aim to 
quantify the realisation of immediate objectives. The impact indicators measure progress in 
achieving wider objectives and normally quantify socio-economic development.  Once an 
Integrity Pact project finishes, one could assess whether the changes were reached. The main 
focus is at this stage on the longer-term and or wider objectives. As mentioned above, an 
evaluation looks beyond what has happened during the project, which to a large degree can 
be seen through monitoring. Evaluation assessments ask why activities have or have not 
progressed and why some were more successful in reaching objectives. Such findings will 
help civil society organisations to decide on future projects but also could help us to 
determine better in the future which conditions favour effective prevention of corruption. 
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Evaluations look at different aspects of the project. In general they address five different 
aspects: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.  
 
The reason to look at all the evaluation criteria is that this provides a comprehensive 
overview of the outcomes of Integrity Pacts. This can form the basis of the evidence needed 
to determine for a collective action initiative the favourable conditions that effectively allow 
civil society organizations to prevent corruption in public procurement.  
 
Relevance of a project refers to the relationship between needs that were identified during 
project identification and the actual project results and impact. In other words, an evaluation 
seeks to finds out to what extent the results and impact have contributed to improvements in 
relation to the needs of the group members to the collective action initiative. For example, 
one would have to assess whether an Integrity Pact has contributed to better following-up on 
detected irregularities. An indicator would be the extent to which Integrity Pacts have 
detected irregularities as defined in the Integrity Pact agreement such as bribes, kickbacks, 
gifts, facilitation payments, collusion, bid rigging etc. Another indicator could be the extent 
to which Integrity Pacts detected risks of corruption in public procurement. The challenge 
with determining this as an indicator is determining by the judgement criteria. After all, an 
Integrity Pact that has not detected any irregularities could mean that corruption was 
prevented and therefor it was a success. One the other hand, not detecting any irregularities 
does not mean corruption has not taken place considering that corrupt acts often go 
unnoticed. Also the success of detection of irregularities depends largely on the ability of the 
integrity monitor to detect irregularities.  
 
Efficiency relates to the relationship between input against output, results and impact. The 
main efficiency question is whether the same output could have been reached with less input. 
For example, is it possible to organise more press conferences with less resources. 
Effectiveness looks at how output was translated into results and impact. The first questions 
that should be raised is whether the set result and impact targets were achieved and if not, 
why? At the same time, one should ask the question whether with the same output more 
results and impact could have been achieved. For example, the question here is whether the 
press conference resulted in better-informed stakeholders on the procurement process? In 
addition one could ask the question whether a different format could have been more 
  
 
302 
effective in informing stakeholders. Subsequently, one could look at the wider impact of the 
Integrity Pact project as well as any unforeseen positive or negative consequences. In the case 
of an Integrity Pact one could for example look at whether the better-informed stakeholders 
have changed the perception of corruption in public procurement. This is a tricky exercise 
given that such impact is often not immediately visible, perhaps only after a period of time. 
At the same time, as mentioned above, such data can most likely not be collected from the 
monitoring data. In other words, we need to establish impact on the basis of additional 
research.  
 
The following sections present objectives, indicators and judgement criteria that could 
support the measurement of effect of an Integrity Pact on the basis of the approach presented 
in this study. 
   Value for money  
With objectives to achieve high value for money in a procurement process through efficient 
public services, a civil society organisation could determine various different indicators.  For 
example, measurement of value for money could be done in percentage of cost savings 
between the estimated project budget and the final expenditure. Or one could measure the 
percentage of acceptable over-expenditure. Respectively, the judgement criteria would then 
be that cost efficiency has been met when there is an observable reduction in incurred costs 
relating the procured work, good, or service, compared to the original costs foreseen. Or, cost 
efficiency has been met if over-expenditure does not exceed a certain percentage of the 
planned budget. Both are difficult indicators to use because the attribution of the Integrity 
Pact to the cost savings is difficult to establish. Various reasons could be given for cost 
differences between planned and actual expenditure. If cost saving are identified, the question 
is raised whether they could relate to other factors such as greater competition brought about 
by a certain change in government policy. If over-expenditure is identified, this could reflect 
on the perceived success of the Integrity Pact while this instead could be the result of poor 
planning prior to the project. 
 
From the global and European reviews it showed that monitors had difficulty capturing all 
potential contributions mainly due to lack of setting baseline information. It was therefor 
recommended that civil society organisations could select those budget lines that have 
deviated in past procurement projects. Such information could be identified in past audit 
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reports or support could be requested from audit authorities. One approach could be to select 
specific budget lines and monitor those expenses. Standard unit costs exist for specific goods 
and works, i.e. the price of 1km of highway or standard costs for providing training. This 
could form the basis of the validation of this indicator. 
 
Another indicator to measure value for money could be to look at the difference between the 
number of weeks intended and actual duration of a procurement process. Efficiency could be 
met when the expected duration does not exceed a certain number of months. When looking 
at whether the judgement criteria have been met, civil society organisations might be 
confronted with situations in which delays are the result of a number of different reasons. For 
example, this could be affected by political instability or conflict during the procurement 
process, or simply just due to poor planning. While the Integrity Pact may reduce delays due 
to conflicts between stakeholders in the procurement process, it may not have the capacity to 
influence more external conditions such as political instability. Civil society organisations 
should be aware of this and try to capture all potential contributors, internal and external. For 
example, a civil society organisation could select a specific phase of the procurement process, 
for example the bidding phase. External factors which are difficult to influence are of less 
importance here considering that time periods are often established by law. One could set 
specific indicators for the decision speed, i.e., timeliness is achieved if a decision on the 
award has been taken within 120 days. 
 
Two other possible indicators to achieve value for money could be the use of e-procurement 
as well as the use by contracting authorities of cost estimation models. In operational terms, a 
criteria could be met when the contracting authority processed a cost estimation before the 
tender was issued, when the contracting authority used forecasting methodologies to estimate 
costs, and when the contracting authority uses electronic integrated procurement and finance 
systems to forecast the budget. The mere fact that the contracting authority processed, 
following the official channels (i.e., procurement regulation or guidelines) and used a cost 
estimation could be an indicator for efficient procurement. The same for using forecast 
methodologies. 
   Trust  
The objective to increase trust in public procurement processes is arguably a very important 
element of the Integrity Pact. A possible indicator to measure this would be to assess the 
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change in the public view on the level of cleanliness of the procurement process. This could 
be achieved when the perception of cleanliness improves between the start and finish of the 
procurement process. The contracting authority clearly could benefit from this and use the 
civil society organisation as a tool to improve the perception. Participating in an Integrity 
Pact already demonstrates commitment to making change, which could influence perception. 
Measurement could look at the public statements made by the authorities in support of the 
Integrity Pact efforts by contracting authorities and civil society organisations. Another way 
to measure this could be by looking at trust levels. Obviously this is less straight forward but 
if an Integrity Pact implementer sets clear baselines at the start of the project by asking how 
citizens feel about the contracting authority and on what basis, this information can be 
assessed after the project and compared. One way to do this is by surveying citizens directly 
affected by the public procurement or consulting a membership database of worker unions. 
 
Trust from the private sector can be measured by looking at the appeals in procurement 
processes. This would translate in trust being achieved among bidders when no appeals are 
issued during the procurement process. Additionally, the indicator can be used of satisfactory 
resolution of disputes between the parties to the Integrity Pact. This is achieved when 
disputes are handled in a satisfactory manner. 
   Social accountability 
A key interest of the European Commission is to enhance social accountability in the use of 
EU funds through procurement. The way to measure whether this is achieved could be by 
looking at changes in which stakeholders challenge procurement practices (such as 
irregularities and corruption). The judgement criteria would be that stakeholders challenge 
the procurement process in relation to transparency, accountability and integrity related 
issues. With stakeholders, the emphasis should be placed on those that normally are not 
directly part of the Integrity Pact, such as citizens. After all, the idea of the Integrity Pact is 
that procurement is held accountable beyond the small group of procurement officials and 
bidders. In a way, this objective aims for raising awareness among “principles” to become 
“principled” about the way the authorities are spending EU funds.  
 
Another measurement indicator that could be used to determine enhanced social 
accountability is by looking at the existence and use of complaint mechanisms. Enhanced 
social accountability is achieved by the presence of a complaint mechanism or when 
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complaints have been received and handled. The existence of a complaint mechanism allows 
for civic engagement. The effective use of the complaint mechanism allows for changing the 
public perception but can also lead to systemic changes in public procurement.   
 
Social accountability can also be achieved by the establishment of civic coalitions as a 
response to procurement activities. Integrity Pacts could facilitate the forming of civic 
coalitions, such as neighbours united to scrutinize the procurement project to build a new 
highway. Finally, social accountability can be achieved when official data requests are made 
by journalists and citizens concerning the procurement project. The way in which civil 
society organisation could operate is by increasing visibility of the procurement project which 
generates more media attention which could result in journalists requesting data from the 
authorities on public expenditure, i.e. list of contract awards, etc. 
   Monitoring and transparency 
As put forward by the European Commission, part of the EU project’s activities will include 
training and enhancement of knowledge of the relevant stakeholders, such as, contracting 
authorities, managing authorities, economic operators, on anti-corruption and transparency 
measures in the context of the Integrity Pact approach. Increased awareness as an objective 
for the Integrity Pact could be measured by coverage of transparency, accountability and 
integrity related issues in procurement regulations and guidelines. The judgement criteria for 
the coverage of these elements could be that corruption risks are less due to existence of a 
code of conduct that informs officials and businesses on corruption risk scenarios. Another 
indicator could be the awareness of risks, which could be achieved when awareness of risks is 
high due to training of procurement officials and businesses on corruption risks. More 
straightforward could be the judgement criteria that awareness of risks is ensured when a 
certain number of officials or businesses are trained per year. 
 
Another objective highlighted in this study is the aim to decrease incidence of corruption and 
mismanagement risks. The indicator to measure this could be the number of detected 
irregularities, such as: bribers; kickbacks; gifts; facilitation payments; collusion; bid rigging, 
etc.. This can be confirmed when corruption risks are decreased due to absence of 
irregularities or when corruption risks are decreased due to the fact that scandals/irregularities 
have been detected, investigated and sanctioned through the Integrity Pact. 
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In terms of transparency, the objective to increase this for public procurement processes can 
be measured by looking at improvements in terms of the volume and type of information 
proactively made available on the public procurement project. This is achieved when more 
information is provided than by law required. 
   Level playing field 
A key objective in relation to the EU Single Market could be the increased competition 
between bidders. An indicator to measure this could be the average number of bidders 
participating in each procurement process. Increased competition would be achieved when 
more than a certain number of bids are submitted or when (a certain number of) foreign 
bidders participate. The competition in procurement can be measured by looking at the 
number bidders participating in a bid. If more bidders participate in a tender process the 
competition increases and a level playing field is enhanced. This could result in increased 
trust in fair competition. More bidders also could lead to lower public expenses, which will 
improve value for money.  
 
Another indicator for to measure increased competition could be by looking at whether the 
bid evaluation committee is independent and professional. This implies that: 
 
-   Competition is increased when the evaluation committee is selected based on criteria 
established in advance; 
-   Competition increased when controls are in place to exclude the involvement of bidders 
in the evaluation of the bids; 
-   Competition increased when bids are evaluated based on guidelines containing evaluation 
criteria; 
-   Competition is increased when external evaluators are used to evaluate technical offers. 
A range of rather simple indicators are possible when looking at objectivity of the bid 
evaluation. The idea is that this objectivity ensures that fair competition takes place. It also 
leave less room for corruption. 
   Heuristics and norms 
Changes in standards, policy and legislation could indicate that the Integrity Pact achieved 
better procurement standards, processes and practices. This can be determined: 
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-   When Integrity Pact activities are included in the internal oversight mechanisms of 
contracting authorities; 
-   When codes of conduct are established including corruption risk scenarios; 
-   When whistleblowing channels are included, including protection of whistle-blowers. 
The Integrity Pact project might focus on one specific procurement process but here the 
stakeholders could aim for change in the way officials and companies participate in a process. 
Within the existing regulatory framework, the Integrity Pact could aim for the promotion of 
best practices. Also, the Integrity Pact can break through information asymmetries that might 
exist in relation to the participating stakeholders. 
 
Another indicator in relation to the objective to better procurement standards, processes and 
practices is the improvement in the adherence to and enforcement of laws and policies. This 
could be achieved when: 
 
-   Corruption practices identified through the Integrity Pact are criminalised; 
-   Detected irregularities through the Integrity Pact are investigated and prosecuted by the 
relevant authorities; 
-   Suspected corruption through Integrity Pact results in the cancelation or suspension of the 
procurement process; 
-   Detected irregularities are sanctioned by the administration. 
Also changes in institutional capacities could be an indicator of better procurement standards. 
Such changes directed at the promotion of transparency, accountability and integrity could be 
achieved: 
 
-   When additional resources are allocated to procurement processes; 
-   When audit activities are expanded to more process assessment activities. 
The objective to better procurement standards, processes and practices does not limit itself to 
contracting authorities. The alignment of interests to better results of public expenditure also 
touches upon companies. Changing standards, processes and practices in businesses deals 
with better corporate governance. This can be achieved: 
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-   When whistle-blower mechanisms are adopted, promoted and used (internal or external 
mechanisms; 
-   When compliance systems are installed. 
Both the changes in the contracting authority and in business can in the medium-long term 
improve the quality of public procurement. 
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   Conclusions 
This chapter presents the main findings of this study. The first section reflects on collective 
action for corruption and EU public procurement. The second and third sections present the 
main findings from the Integrity Pact multi-case study analysis, followed by the reflections 
on the integrated approach for the Integrity Pact to prevent corruption in public procurement. 
The final section presents steps forward for the Integrity Pact for EU procurement. 
7.1   Reflections on collective action for corruption and EU public procurement  
Corruption scandals often point to bribed-elected officials or embezzling civil servants. 
However, the reciprocity that characterises corrupt transactions also implies that someone 
paid or offered the bribe in exchange for a favour. It is therefor also important to look at the 
supply-side of corruption, often embodied in the form of corporations and its workers. In line 
with the definitional problems when describing corruption, or measuring the scale and 
determining the methods of corruption, also different research perspectives aim to explain the 
causes of the phenomenon. 
 
This study discussed first social processes leading to corrupt behaviour. In particular it 
highlights the individual, organisation, and network, but also reflected on the social actor’s 
structure or location such as its occupation (e.g. businessman or public official) and 
institutional environment (e.g. company or public authority). Secondly, this study discussed 
the dominant principle-agent approach to studying corruption, and how research suggests that 
strategies based on the principle-agent theory failed to address serious forms of corruption. 
Instead, the debate shifted pointing to corruption as a collective action problem. 
Subsequently, the study reflected on the related collective action theories that refer to 
systemic corruption scenarios in which “principles”, that should supposedly control the agent 
do not and can share in the proceeds of corruption or are simply indifferent about the issue. 
This lack of normative constraints, which normally should endorse ethical universalism and 
monitor and prevent deviation from the norms, implies that existing societal norms do not 
work. Instead, with the lack of “principled principles”, particularism creates a scenario in 
which allocation of public resources is based on a connection between the one in power and 
the one receiving the public goods.  
 
  
 
310 
While the shift from principle-agent to collective action theories to explain the causes of 
corruption focuses on elements of incompatibility of the approaches, this study argued that in 
a EU context the two approaches are not incompatible, especially when aiming to address 
corruption as a cross-border problem. It is safe to say that the diversity in the EU makes that 
there is no one-size-fits-all solution to corruption. However, anti-corruption measures based 
on principle–agent might work for some countries or sectors suffering less political 
corruption, while collective action initiatives are more adequate for others suffering more 
systemic forms of corruption.  
 
This study supports the hypothesis that the structure for EU funding poses corruption 
challenges in public procurement for EU Member States that can more effectively be 
addressed through collective action. This study identified various elements pertaining to the 
EU context. 
 
1.   First of all, political and economic integration of the EU increased competitive pressure, 
both for companies and political parties. The economic (general) strain theory discussed 
in this study shows how corporations resort to criminal behaviour under economic 
pressure in a climate of competition. Apart from the need to economically perform to 
survive, strain theory also explains more emotional decisions that drive criminal 
behaviour, for example when companies resort to crime due to stress they experience 
from competitors. This study supports that such a scenario is present when looking at the 
integration of the EU single market and economic differences between Member States. In 
line with the market integration, the EU developed an extensive procurement legislative 
framework, providing for provisions to prevent corruption and enhance transparency. 
This study argues that the comprehensiveness of the EU legislative framework generated 
competitive pressure on the procurement market in Member States, particularly affecting 
local businesses that can face competition from foreign companies. Increased 
competitiveness is suggested to motivate local politicians stop seeking (predatory) bribes 
from local companies, in order to allow them to remain in competition and employ voters 
and pay tax. However, this study discussed that weaknesses in the EU’s accountability 
structure as well as the different attitudes towards corruption in Member States have a 
counter-effect on the normative constraints.   
2.   Secondly, the theory of anomie discussed in this study supports in understanding why 
attitudes towards corruption differ between EU Member States. EU political and 
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economic integration increases competition and associated societal situations in which 
material success is promoted but means to achieve this are not equally accessible for all. 
As a consequence, some pursue material success through criminal behaviour. For 
example, this has been observed for former Soviet states in Eastern Europe that made the 
transition from communism to free-market based economies. More recent history can be 
the enlargement of the EU with 13 more Member States since 2004. The adoption of the 
European acquis communautaire and the associated societal and political change in new 
Member States resulted in a EU with significant differences in terms of economic and 
governance levels between the countries. Arguably, while corruption in the original 15 
Member States could be conceptualised on the basis of the principle-agent theories, in the 
newer Member States the problem would be more of a collective action nature. Hence, in 
the EU the problem of corruption is still significant, despite decades of anti-corruption 
measures. This can be supported by the fact that cross-border procurement as part of the 
EU single market has not materialised in practice. 
3.   Thirdly, concerning the accountability structures of the EU, this study argued firstly that 
the effectiveness of the EU’s procurement legislative framework primarily depends on the 
implementation on the Member State level. This can be particularly illustrated by looking 
at the European Structural and Investment Funds. The Member States have delegated to 
themselves management of the funds. In the words of the principal-agent theory, the 
principles (the Member State) are for a large portion also the agents. At the same time, the 
Member States also manage the regulatory structure. At the foundation of this 
arrangement lies the debate on the difficulty for Member States to sign away sovereignty 
to European institutions and procedures that should have the power and resources to 
address corruption. On the national level one could add a political establishment that 
might be concerned about international competition and not necessarily willing to 
strengthen their own institutions to fight corruption. The EU has a governance structure 
that is different from normal, includes many different attitudes towards corruption, and 
does not necessarily promote free-market principles in all sectors. From a rational-choice 
point of view, Member States would rely on the EU institutions if by doing so they can 
promote their own interests. However, this is provided that there are rules to punish non-
cooperative behaviour. From the perspective of the collective action theories, countries 
would in principle never agree to cooperate and delegate sovereignty if there was no way 
of detecting and punishing non-cooperative behaviour. In such a scenario, it would only 
be rational for states to agree to a European regime if the benefits of organisation would 
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outweigh the risks of others cheating or if the state sees benefits in cheating others. In 
other words, Member States could see fraud and corruption as a marginal cost compared 
to the benefits from participating. However, at the same time one must keep in mind that 
the benefit could actually be the corruption itself. This scenario combines principal-agent 
dilemmas but also collective action problems. The EU can be described as an organisation 
playing to host various principal-agent relations, for example when assuming the Member 
State as principles and the European Commission as agent. However, the EU funds show 
that Member States have largely delegated management to themselves, making them the 
principals and agent. This in itself generates opportunity for corruption. Member States, 
in other words can free ride on the EU because the damage is dispersed across all 
members, while gains are country-specific. 
4.   Finally, this study concluded that while challenges to ascertain the scale and impact of 
corruption in EU procurement remain an obstacle to determine the effectiveness of any 
anti-corruption measure, its potential damage does legitimise looking into the role civil 
society could play in preventing corruption in public procurement. From the outset of the 
transparency provisions for EU fund shared management, it is clear that the European 
Commission has limited control over spending of the funds in the different Member 
States. This supports the relevance to explore the role of civil society in the control of 
public procurement of European Structural and Investment Funds through the Integrity 
Pact. The Integrity Pacts include key criteria for anti-corruption in public procurement, 
such as transparency, professionalism and accountability. The aims of the Integrity Pacts 
fall in line with public procurement objectives applied in the EU, namely ensuring a level 
playing field for all actors, and ensuring value for money by avoiding corruption. 
To conclude, businesses in endemically corrupt business environments face the challenge that 
the company most likely to pay a bribe has an unfair advantage over those that do not resort 
to such practices. A common response by businesses is denying responsibility by claiming 
that: “if we do not bribe, someone else would”. The Integrity Pact embraces the neutralization 
techniques used by companies to resist tackling the problem of corruption. Companies are 
facing dilemma scenarios and risk ending up empty-handed when being the one deciding to 
conduct clean business while their competitors continue bribing. On first sight, the choice of 
the European Commission to use the Integrity Pact as a tool seems to target various elements 
of interest for the EU:  
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-   The tool targets an area vulnerable for corruption, namely EU public procurement which 
affects a large part of EU expenditure and over which the European Commission has 
limited control.  
-   It targets businesses that can be disproportionately affected by corruption such as small 
and medium enterprises, which are specifically targeted through the EU public 
procurement legislative framework.  
-   The Integrity Pact aims to promote best public procurement practices, which could help 
harmonising the implementation of EU public procurement measures across the EU 
Member States.  
-   It aims to ensure an equal level playing field for businesses, which could ensure more 
cross-border public procurement activity and this way complete the functioning of the 
Single Market.  
-   The tool can be used on different business sectors, on different governmental levels and 
across regions.  
The main challenge, however, is that the effect or impact of collective action initiatives is 
difficult to determine and that collective action initiatives particularly fair well in endemic 
corrupt environments. Despite that collective action initiatives can also be used in non-
endemic corrupt environments; the question asked is which conditions favour the effective 
use of the Integrity Pact. 
7.2   Reflections on the Integrity Pact main take-away 
From the multiple-case study analysis various lessons can be drawn. The following section 
will sum up the main take away from the review of the Integrity Pacts, both on the global and 
European level.  
 
The analytical framework to analyse the role of the monitor to prevent corruption in public 
procurement through collective action started with a contextual analysis or defining of initial 
conditions. On the basis of the context in which Integrity Pacts operate, this study 
subsequently looked at the collective action arena of the tool. This is where the collective 
action experiences take place, where decisions are made and corruption is prevented. The 
Integrity Pact as a collective action model on first account seems to cover elements essential 
to dealing with collective action problems. The contextual analysis supports collective action 
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views that it is in the best interest of individuals in the group to act collectively towards 
shared objectives, which lies at the core of the Integrity Pact multi-stakeholder approach. The 
study also pointed out that elements of the Integrity Pact aim to overcome the temptations of 
short-run self-interest through reciprocity, reputation and trust, in order to build conditions to 
allow individuals to achieve results that are better than rational. The sanctions available in the 
Integrity Pact give impetus to groups to achieve suboptimal results and function as deterrence 
through the commitment to punish those that do not adhere to the Integrity Pact. The question 
is to what extent the Integrity Pact performs in those elements. By looking at a set of 
variables, such as trust and reputation, heuristics and monitoring and transparency, the study 
aimed to test on the basis of the case studies the hypothesis that an independent monitor, in 
form of a civil society organisation in the Integrity Pact, can play an effective role in the 
prevention of corruption and enhancing of transparency in public procurement. 
   Governance and economic context 
The study discussed how the context includes external factors that the group members of the 
collective action initiative face, as well as, other conditions relating resources and assets, 
sources of vulnerability, legal structures and power relations. On the basis of the multi-case 
study analysis, this study showed that the decision to introduce an Integrity Pact is not 
determined by the economic classification of a country. Instead, this study showed that 
governance indicators play a more important role with most countries that have implemented 
Integrity Pacts, also experiencing weak governance. The outliers identified in this study, 
meaning those countries that have implemented Integrity Pacts within a context of high 
governance indicators, can be explained by external factors such as corruption scandals that 
drove the introduction of the Integrity Pact. This study also finds that some level of 
governance effectiveness is needed in a country in order to implement the tool. This is 
supported by the fact that Integrity Pacts have been introduced in countries that, while not 
performing by governance standards, do not necessarily belong to the worst performers. This 
study found overall that the governance and economic indicators could provide insight into 
the operating environment of the Integrity Pact. However, from the economic and governance 
context it is not certain which prerequisites might influence success of the Integrity Pact. 
   Prevention of corruption 
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The case studies have shown that implementers of Integrity Pacts determined success in 
prevention and detection of corruption by either the absence of irregularities and/or the fast 
identification and resolution of irregularities. However, taking stock of both these elements 
has been difficult due to limited monitoring and analysis of Integrity Pact activities and 
outputs by the different stakeholders implementing the tool. Instead, the analysis of the cases 
suggests that stakeholder rather rely on subjective information on the prevention of 
corruption. For example, contracting authorities argue prevention of corruption due to 
intermittent feedback from companies/suppliers, or the fact that no major problems had 
emerged during the procurement process. This study cannot with certainty claim that due to 
lack of irregularities or scandal, corruption did not occur. This is also supported by the civil 
society organisations/monitors consulted for this study, whom admit it is possible that 
corruption did take place outside their view. On the basis of this, Integrity Pacts shift their 
focus on the improvement of procurement governance as a whole. This translates into: 
-   Integrity Pacts ensuring that procurement is done according to the law; 
-   Integrity Pacts promoting best practices for procurement. 
As a result, in practice, Integrity Pacts focus on finding a solution to identified irregularities 
or risks in procurement practices. Once these are mitigated, Integrity Pacts can ensure that 
these do not recur in the future. In practice this translates into monitoring activities focused 
on tangible elements of the procurement project, such as vulnerabilities discussed in this 
study. These do not necessarily point to corruption but do present a framework in which 
corruption risks are prevented and if detected, addressed. It functions as a sort of “early 
warning system”. While this allows contracting authorities to address issues before they 
manifest themselves, at the same time it fosters a culture of compliance and in time creates a 
“culture of integrity”. 
   Integrity Pact monitor 
This study finds that an independent monitor, in the form of a civil society organisation 
through the Integrity Pact, can play an effective role in the prevention of corruption and 
enhancing of transparency in public procurement. Three conditions are predominantly 
important for this: the monitor requirements, monitoring arrangements/activities, and the 
selection of the monitor. 
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Concerning the monitoring requirements, this study has found: 
1.   That independence of the monitor is important to deliver objective and quality work. 
The work needs to be performed independently but should also be perceived as such 
by all stakeholders. Monitors in the eyes of Integrity Pact practitioners need to have a 
spotless reputation in order to ensure that their activities are credible.  
2.   That legal procurement knowledge, or expertise, is needed for monitors to understand 
and anticipate weaknesses in contracting processes. Technical knowledge is needed 
when monitoring a project in a specific procurement sector.  
3.   That monitoring activities require time and resources, including a high level of 
commitment. Sufficient capacity should be assigned to effectively conduct monitoring 
especially given that procurement rules can set specific timelines.  
4.   That the monitor should be accountable to the civil society organisations as well as to 
the bidders, contracting authorities and to the public. Ensuring this “fourfold” 
accountability to stakeholders, with different and sometimes opposite interests, is 
difficult to operationalize. Such difficulties need to be emphasised when designing the 
Integrity Pact. This is why this study finds that monitors need to be practical and have 
a constructive mind-set.  
5.   That the repeated interaction between stakeholders are set in formal legislative 
processes, i.e. the bidding phases, or less formalised processes such as contract 
implementation phases. Within the formal procurement framework and the less 
formal contract implementation framework, parties to the Integrity Pact have a degree 
of manoeuvrability. This study finds that this manoeuvrability is in itself a risk area 
for irregularities and therefore subject to monitoring. A practical monitor understands 
these processes and thinks with the parties to the Integrity Pact.  
6.   That outreach to the public is a key Integrity Pact activity and that therefor the 
monitor should have communication skills. In general, outreach activities are 
conducted by the civil society organisation. However, the monitor can play a key role 
especially when drafting and presenting the periodical monitoring reports. 
Concerning the implementation arrangements and monitor activities, this study has found 
that: 
1.   Monitors conduct a wide variety of activities from review of documentation and 
participation in meetings/inspection to internal and external communication activities. 
The activities of monitors in the Integrity Pact are either on-site (e.g. attending 
  
 
317 
meetings and visiting building sites) or off-site (e.g. documentation review). 
Information reaches the monitor either through push (e.g. copied in all 
correspondence between the bidders and contracting authority) or pull (e.g. 
correspondence on the basis of request to the contracting authority) arrangements. 
This study finds that pull arrangements do not necessarily enhance trust of the 
monitor in the procurement process. Push arrangements allows for complete 
transparency and suggests to enhances trust between parties to the Integrity Pact. 
However, this study suggests that a combination between the two arrangements is 
preferred because it enables monitors to selectively monitor in light of the limited 
resources available to civil society organisations.  
2.   That monitoring teams consist of in-house and external experts, depending on whether 
civil society organisations can meet the required skills discussed earlier in 
combination with the financial capacity. An important approach identified in this 
study is that combined teams of monitors can play a proactive approach in monitoring 
the Integrity Pact. This approach suggests that activities of mixed teams expand 
beyond the formal anti-corruption objectives of procurement and also include 
transparency and value-for-money objectives.  
3.   That in terms of frequency and intensity of interaction, the degree of direct contact 
with the procurement stakeholders varied. The study suggests that the relations 
between the contracting authority and monitors are most frequent and intense due to 
the fact that the civil society monitors predominantly focus activities on the bidding 
process. Frequency and intensity of interaction with companies increases primarily 
during the contract implementation. 
4.   That the strength of the civil society organisation is to communicate the activities and 
findings of the monitors to the public. The main added value of the organisation is the 
capacity to translate technical information to more accessible language, and the access 
to the public.  
5.   That civil society organisations take up large part of the management of the Integrity 
Pact. This sometimes includes monitoring the project (meaning Integrity Pact) 
implementation and documenting activities. Mostly this concerns the management of 
the external monitors. If needed, it has shown that civil society organisation can also 
protect the external monitors from possible pressure or obstacles they might face.  
Concerning the selection of the monitor, this study finds: 
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1.   That on the basis of the economic and governance conditions in a country it can prove 
difficult to identify a suitable monitor with the requirements needed. Ensuring good 
reputation is difficult in a country with weak governance. Also, the procurement 
project can be of such a nature (i.e. size or sector-specific) that in a country only few 
people have the capability to monitor a specific procurement project.  
2.   That national or foreign monitors can be selected. The collective action initiative can 
benefit from an international angle in some contexts, i.e. countries with very weak 
governance, but should ensure local ownership in order for the initiative to be 
successful.  
3.   That civil society organisations struggle with defining the workload for monitors. This 
exposes civil society organisations to the risk of under-budgeting with the 
consequence of not being able to effectively conduct activities up until the project 
closure. A safety mechanism applied by civil society monitors is relying partially on 
in-house staff. In addition, civil society organisation adapt the level of monitoring to 
the resources available.  
4.   A possible way to avoid the risk of missing out on important moments in the 
procurement process is to assess ex-ante where to direct monitoring efforts. This 
study finds that monitoring intensity can be determined on the basis of a risk 
assessment. This can identify the key areas for concern and allow monitoring to be 
most effective, as long as activities span the entire procurement process.  
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7.3   Reflections on an approach for the Integrity Pact 
The case study analysis shows that the Integrity Pact is not considered a one-size-fits-all 
approach. The tool has shown results in different context from an economic, legal and 
governance perspective. This study in particular highlighted the importance of the monitor in 
allowing the tool to be used under different conditions. It has to be noted that the flexibility of 
the tool arguably has its limits. For example, the effective functioning of an Integrity Pact can 
be influenced by the complexity of the procurement process, number of contracts, number of 
companies involved, sectorial specifications and monetary size of the procurement.  
 
This study has looked at the Integrity Pact experiences in terms of effectiveness. As a 
consequence, the study looked at multiple units of observation and analysis. It was noted in 
this study that translating this into a corruption prevention approach is challenging due to 
various reasons. Firstly, collective action is a dynamic process that deals with social 
relationships. Establishing indicators that allow for measuring effectiveness should take into 
account that Integrity Pacts differ over time, across cultures, between government levels, etc. 
Secondly, the different methodological approaches used by social science disciplines 
complicates designing an integrated approach. This study attempted to include different 
disciplines by looking at more traditional economic analyses that focus on incentives of 
individuals to participate in collective action within institutional settings, as well as 
sociological approaches which look more at behaviour of groups and how action is motivated 
through social networks and organisations.  
 
The multi-case study analysis has shown that Integrity Pacts have been designed and 
implemented by different civil society organisations, contracting authorities, companies, 
involving different donor organisations, procurement projects, market sectors, etc. Today, a 
key question posed is how to inform policy-makers on the best ways to scale-up the use of 
the tool on the basis of past learnings. This study therefor presented an evaluation framework 
in order to shape an approach that would support the implementation of the Integrity Pact tool 
on the EU level in order to prevent public procurement corruption. The choice for an 
evaluation framework as an approach to prevent corruption in public procurement is 
primarily based on the need for a flexible tool that can be adapted to the contextual conditions 
in which an Integrity Pact can be designed. While the development of this approach in this 
study is based primarily on findings from looking back at the experiences of the Integrity 
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Pact, the objective is that by using this approach data will be more systematically collected in 
the future and help civil society organisations, donors, and academia to better assess in the 
future the effectiveness of the Integrity Pact as a collective action tool. This report presented 
a sample theory of change, as well as a reflection on various indicators in order to measure 
effectiveness and impact. Developing a monitoring and assessment framework could support 
the implementation of the Integrity Pacts and strengthens also the evaluability in order to be 
able to measure results and impact more accurately. Monitoring is primarily a management 
tool, which helps those that implement Integrity Pacts to regularly check progress against 
plans. It allows the implementers to follow project activities at all times and ensure that these 
are implemented in line with available resources. Monitoring can help the stakeholders to 
detect, in an early stage, problems relating the implementation of the project and mitigate 
these. Above all, monitoring can support the achievement of expected output, results and 
impact. 
7.4   Reflections on the Integrity Pact for EU procurement 
To conclude this study, this section will take a first look at the EU pilot Integrity Pact project 
that initiated in 2015. This section will also include reflections for future research and 
concrete recommendations.  
 
The project includes eleven EU Member States of which only Romania and Bulgaria are 
considered upper middle-income countries and the rest high-income countries. This shows 
that also for the selection of these countries, the economic classification does not determine 
whether an Integrity Pact would be relevant. This is different when looking at the governance 
indicators. The colour coding used reflects that of the percentile ranking534. This indicates the 
country’s ranking among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator with 0 
corresponding to the lowest score and 100 to the highest score. From the table below it is 
clear that those countries participating with Integrity Pacts in the European Commission’s 
pilot project also experience most governance problems. 
 
                                                            
 
534 Note that the colours used in line with those used by the World Bank. Dark colours imply better scoring on 
WGI and light colours indicate lower governance scores. 
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Table 8: European Union Member States governance indicators 
Country 
Name 
Rule of 
Law 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Participating countries in the EU project “Integrity Pacts Civil Control Mechanism for safeguarding EU funds” 
Hungary 66,8 66,0 74,0 71,2 61,1 
Greece 63,9 68,5 65,9 63,9 53,8 
Italy 64,4 77,3 73,6 69,2 57,2 
Czech 
Republic 82,7 78,3 81,3 81,7 67,3 
Portugal 83,7 83,7 79,3 86,1 79,8 
Slovak 
Republic 69,7 75,4 75,5 75,0 62,0 
Romania 61,1 61,6 72,1 51,9 57,7 
Poland 76,4 80,3 80,3 74,5 70,7 
Lithuania 81,3 75,9 88,0 85,6 70,2 
Latvia 76,0 72,9 81,7 84,1 68,3 
Slovenia 80,3 74,4 72,6 77,4 76,4 
Bulgaria 52,9 61,1 71,2 62,0 48,6 
Non-participating countries 
Belgium 88,9 94,1 87,5 88,9 90,9 
Cyprus 81,7 79,8 80,8 81,3 80,3 
Denmark 99,0 97,5 94,7 97,6 98,1 
Finland 100,0 97,0 98,1 96,6 99,5 
Ireland 93,3 92,6 97,6 91,3 91,8 
Germany 92,8 95,6 93,3 94,2 93,3 
France 88,5 86,2 83,7 89,4 88,0 
Estonia 86,5 85,2 92,8 83,2 87,0 
Croatia 62,5 64,5 64,9 71,6 63,5 
Austria 95,7 94,6 91,3 90,4 90,4 
Luxembourg 96,2 96,6 93,8 93,3 96,6 
Netherlands 97,1 98,0 96,2 97,1 94,7 
Spain 78,4 78,8 75,0 85,1 69,2 
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United 
Kingdom 93,8 92,1 98,6 93,8 94,2 
Sweden 99,5 99,5 97,1 96,2 98,6 
Malta 84.1 85.7 84.6 76 79.3 
Source: own elaboration with data from WGI 
 
Also when looking at the CPI scores, clearly countries ranking poorly in the EU participate in 
the pilot project. From the CPI viewpoint, four out of eleven participating countries rank 
below 50 indicating levels of systemic corruption. The other seven countries also show 
concerning levels of corruption according to the CPI. 
 
Table 9: European Union Member States corruption perception 
EU Member State Corruption Perception Index Transparency International (2015) 
Participating countries in the EU project “Integrity Pacts Civil Control Mechanism for safeguarding EU funds” 
Portugal 63 
Poland 62 
Lithuania 61 
Slovenia 60 
Czech Republic 56 
Latvia 55 
Hungary 51 
Greece 46 
Romania 46 
Italy 44 
Bulgaria 41 
Non-participating countries 
Denmark 91 
Finland 90 
Sweden 89 
Netherlands 87 
Germany 81 
Luxembourg 81 
United Kingdom 81 
Belgium 77 
Austria 76 
Ireland 75 
Estonia 70 
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France 70 
Cyprus 61 
Spain 58 
Malta 56 
Slovakia 51 
Croatia 51 
 
The combination of weak governance scores with high levels of corruption perception for the 
countries selected for the EU project suggests to support the contextual conditions discussed 
earlier in this report on the basis of Integrity Pacts conducted in Europe as well as in the rest 
of the world. The one country that has implemented Integrity Pacts in the past and was 
identified as an outlier in relation to governance indicators, Germany, in this occasion is not 
part of the project. This study found that the reason for the Transparency International 
chapter not to engage in the EU project has not to do with the governance or economic 
indicators in the country, but due to the bad experience with the Integrity Pact for the Berlin 
airport535. 
 
As highlighted in this study, all EU Member States are subject to EU procurement rules that 
already foresee anti-corruption and transparency provisions, thus providing in theory 
normative constraints for engaging in corrupt behaviour. However, the governance indicator 
on the rule of law questions the effectiveness in the selected countries. This raises doubts as 
to whether in these countries the law can provide sufficient safeguards for companies in case 
of conflicts in the procurement process. Weaker rule of law in countries could make a case 
for the use of the Integrity Pact given the tool can include sanctions and dispute resolution 
mechanisms. This could generate private sector trust in public procurement. Considering the 
EU project deals with EU funding, it would be interesting to assess in the future whether this 
will generate more cross-border procurement activity and hence supports a level laying field 
on the EU Single Market. 
 
When looking at government effectiveness it is possible to contextualise the perceptions of 
the quality of public services, civil service, and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures. These elements can be relevant to the procurement process and the application of 
                                                            
 
535 Interview feedback #16, collected by the co-author of the global review, September-November 2015. 
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the Integrity Pact. In particular, because this touches upon the different governmental levels 
that expose weaknesses in terms of procurement as we have seen for example in the case of 
Spain.  
 
To conclude, the case study analysis in this study did not address specifically the contextual 
conditions concerning the EU funding challenges due to the fact that the analysed Integrity 
Pacts did not specifically included ESI Funds. In the case of the Integrity Pact projects that 
will be launched in light of the EU project, it would be useful to take a first look at this issue. 
The table below presents information in relation to the Integrity Pact experience of 
Transparency International chapters, ESI funds, and general economic and governance 
indicators. Five out of eleven countries that will be participating in the project already have 
past experience with Integrity Pacts. It shows that at least four of those countries have also 
participated in Integrity Pacts that focused on procurement sectors in alignment with ESI 
thematic priorities. Arguably, this should provide the implementers with an added value 
given this experience can support in designing the Integrity Pacts foreseen in the EU project. 
 
From the perspective of the ESI funds, all major receivers of EU funding will be involved in 
the project with the exception of Spain. Also in this case, not the economic and governance 
indicator seem to have influenced this. As for the Transparency International chapter, the 
decision was based the fact that initiatives were already launched under the Siemens Integrity 
Pact536. All the countries involved in the EU project count for roughly three-fourth of the ESI 
Funds foreseen for the period 2014-2020. Relevant is also that these countries all have major 
projects537 foreseen under the EU funding structures. The money involved in these highly 
complex projects suggests that Integrity Pacts can be a complementary tool to deal with 
corruption challenges. Major projects regularly involve substantial procurement activity. 
 
                                                            
 
536 Interview feedback #28, European review, February-April 2015. 
537  Article 100 of the 'Common Provisions Regulation' (i.e. the main legal text governing the European 
Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds in 2014-2020) defines major projects as “operation comprising a series 
of works, activities or services intended in itself to accomplish an indivisible task of a precise economic or 
technical nature which has clearly identified goals and for which the total eligible cost exceeds EUR 50 000 000 
and in the case of operations contributing to the thematic objective under point (7) of the first paragraph of 
Article 9 where the total eligible cost exceeds EUR 75 000 000”. 
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Finally, from the data in the table it also shows that in the past, irregularities and breaches 
were reported in the respective member states. 
 
Table 10: ESI funds and Integrity Pacts in the European Union 
Countrie
s 
Integri
ty 
Pact 
experi
ence
538 
ESI 
alignm
ent539 
ESI 
Funds 
in 
2014-
202540 
Major 
Project
s in 
2014-
2020 
Report
ed 
breache
s ESI 
Funds 
in 
2013541 
Number 
of 
'irregular
ities 
reported 
in 
2013542 
WDI 
Control 
of 
Corrupt
ion 
Govern
ment 
Effecti
veness 
Regulat
ory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Voice 
and 
Accou
ntabilit
y 
Bulgaria ✓ ✓543 7,59 ✓ ✓ 5 UM -0,31 0,22 0,55 -0,12 0,39 
Czech 
Republi
c 
✗  Na 21,98 ✓ ✓ 20 H 0,39 1,05 1,08 1,12 1,02 
Greece ✗  Na 15,52 ✓ ✗ 30 H -0,13 0,25 0,40 0,24 0,59 
Hungary ✓  ✗ 21,91 ✓ ✗ 2 H 0,10 0,49 0,77 0,40 0,52 
Italy ✓ ✓544 32,82 ✓ ✓ 72 H -0,05 0,45 0,73 0,25 1,01 
Latvia ✓ ✓545 4,51 ✓ ✗ 27 H 0,40 1,10 1,09 0,79 0,82 
Lithuani
a ✗  Na 6,82 ✓ ✗ 2 H 0,56 1,20 1,28 0,98 0,97 
Poland ✗  Na 77,57 ✓ ✓ 48 H 0,58 0,80 1,00 0,80 1,04 
Portugal ✗  Na 21,47 ✓ ✗ 4 H 0,92 1,23 0,94 1,14 1,12 
Romani
a ✓ ✓546 22,99 ✓ ✓ 23 UM -0,05 -0,04 0,59 0,15 0,43 
Slovenia ✗  Na 3,07 ✓ ✗ 4 H 0,73 0,97 0,62 0,95 0,95 
 
                                                            
 
538 Transparency International chapter experience with Integrity Pact 
539 Integrity Pact Sector (alignment with ESI Thematic Priorities) 
540 ESI Funds in 2014-2020 (EUR billion) 
541 European Court of Audit reporting on breach of public procurement rules in relation to Structural Funds in 
2013. European Court of Auditors, Annual Report 2013, 2014. 
542 European Commission reporting on number of 'irregularities reported as fraudulent' in relation to Cohesion 
Policy in 2013. European Commission, Protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Fight against 
fraud, 2013 Annual Report, 2014. 
543 Infrastructure (works) 
544 Metro, Rail, Airport (works) 
545 Cultural Heritage (works) 
546 Road, Rail, Drinking Water, Waste Water, Communication, Energy 
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At the stage of finalizing this study, some information is available on the individual selected 
projects by the European Commission. The European Commission selected seventeen 
projects in eleven Member States (Italy will include four Integrity Pact projects, Hungary 
two, and Romania three projects). The projects cover a range of sectors (transport, 
institutional building, culture, monitoring, environment, energy, education, research and 
development, integrated territorial investment, administrative capacity and health care) 
representing roughly EUR 1 billion. Fifteen civil society organisations will be involved in the 
EU projects and will perform the role of monitor, quality assurance of project 
implementation, promotion and dissemination of the project results. If needed, the civil 
society organisations will be involved in training and capacity building activities. From the 
list available on the European Commission’s website it suggests that the projects include 
mostly national level contracting authorities (eleven out of seventeen national contracting 
authorities, three local and three regional)547. The Italian experiences would be interesting 
from a comparative angle given that regional, local and national Integrity Pact projects will 
be implemented. Thirteen Integrity projects will be done by chapters of Transparency 
International, the rest by different civil society organisations. This should provide for an 
interesting learning opportunity to consider different implementation arrangements used for 
Integrity Pacts.  
                                                            
 
547 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (n.d.). Integrity Pacts [WWW]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/es/policy/how/improving-investment/integrity-pacts/ [Accessed on 12-10-
2016]. 
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7.5   Concluding remarks 
This study combines both theoretical considerations as well as practical considerations on the 
use of the Integrity Pact as a tool to prevent corruption in public procurement. Collective 
action initiatives for the fight against corruption are increasingly used by a multitude of 
stakeholders around the world. With emphasising the relevance of monitoring and evaluating 
these initiatives, this study hopes to contribute to further the understanding of the 
effectiveness on prevention of corruption. With this in mind, this study ends with some 
practical recommendations for contracting authorities, companies and civil society 
organisations working jointly to fight corruption through the Integrity Pact. 
Ensure multi-stakeholder engagement.  
-   Actively involve all parties to the Integrity Pact from the design phase up until the end of 
the collective action initiative.  
-   Identify and match a champion within the contracting authority/government to the 
monitor, and identify government policy priorities that align with transparency and 
integrity measures. 
-   Consider the use of incentives to encourage participation, such as White Lists or other 
forms of recognition for firms that champion and take part in Integrity Pacts.   
-   Impose a ‘pay-to-play’ methodology whereby all stakeholders contribute to the 
remuneration of the independent monitor and in part to the overall architecture of the 
Integrity Pact so as to promote greater ownership from all stakeholders. 
Incorporate greater social control mechanisms whenever possible.  
-   Consider the inclusion of the Integrity Pact as a project-based initiative into a wider array 
of collective action initiatives aiming for long-term change. 
Ensure strong design of the collective action initiative 
 
-   Understand the legal, political and economic conditions at hand before and during the 
Integrity Pact, and adjust accordingly.  
-   Study the other stakeholders involved in the project, as well as the corruption risks 
involved in the procurement. A risk-based approach is essential.  
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-   Ensure that procurement processes which feature Integrity Pacts have been subject to a 
needs assessment, thorough analysis of the corruption risk profile as well as the legal, 
political and economic conditions surrounding the proposed Integrity Pact. This can serve 
as a baseline to further measure impact of Integrity Pacts.  
-   Establish rigorous methodology and evaluation framework in order to capture baseline 
assumptions and the change - positive or negative - that the intervention created. In light 
of difficulties in evidencing corruption and corruption prevention, focus instead on 
prevention and management of irregularities, ensuring that the procurement process has 
minimal disruptions, and mediation capabilities that are quick and effective. 
-   If feasible and after taking potential limitations into account, promote IPs in the context 
of legislative change or recommendations from ministries within the government.  
Consider the implementation arrangements 
-   Adopt an internal decision-making mechanism that is adjusted to the needs of the 
Integrity Pact. This could be done by establishing an advisory committee with a degree of 
decision-making power. 
-   Establish a clear set of procedures for the imposition of sanctions. This should include a 
process for screening the complaints (and delineation of who can submit them), 
assessment criteria for the complaint, a resolution approach, escalation criteria and 
procedures in cases where the involvement of legal authorities is required, and recourse 
procedures in cases of disputes.  The procedures should be transparent and disseminated 
to all stakeholders.  
-   For Integrity Pacts that are suspected of not being fit to purpose, the civil society 
organisation should have and make use of the option to exit the Integrity Pact. Establish a 
clear escalation protocol for these eventualities and make public the reporting on these 
decisions. 
-   Establish a clear communication strategy using media adapted to the local context that 
will have the best outreach capabilities, particularly digital communications strategies, 
regularly updating on Integrity Pact activities, progress; provide fora for feedback. 
Optimise the role of the monitor 
 
-   Involve the monitor from the earliest possible stage of the procurement process, 
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preferably during the design stage of the tender, the monitor should field appropriate 
experts at this stage to ensure credibility and to have a strong position from the start of the 
process.  
-   Professionalize the monitor: 
o   Use monitors that have procurement process knowledge and technical knowledge of 
the industry involved in the procurement.  
o   Ensure capacity to assemble a monitoring team that can draw on expertise when 
necessary.  
o   Provide training to the monitor on Integrity Pact implementation issues, procurement 
red flags. 
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Survey European review – shadow experts 
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Survey global review – civil society organisations 
 
-­‐   Introduction – IP typological elements 
-­‐   Country:   
-­‐   Respondent: 
-­‐   Personal Experience and Involvement in IPs: 
-­‐   Year that IPs were introduced in the Chapter’s work: 
Can you describe briefly the sequence of activities from the moment the National Chapter decides to intervene until the end 
of this intervention? 
 
(Further interview Introduction questions divided by Integrity Pact (IP) Content and Implementation questions from the 
survey. The question is as to whether or not to go over them during the interviews, or instead to provide the survey directly 
after the interview per Claire’s suggestion.) 
 
I.   IP Content Questions 
a.   Undertaking of the Bidders 
i.   Does the IP Include a commitment of the Bidders? (Y/N) 
1.   If YES, does it include these provisions? 
a.   Not to bribe (Y/N) 
b.   Not to use facilitation payments (Y/N) 
c.   Not to collude (Y/N) 
d.   To disclose information regarding payments related to the contracting process, including to agents and 
other middlemen (Y/N) 
e.   To provide the same undertaking from all sub- contractors and joint venture partners (Y/N) 
f.   Advised or requested to have a company code of conduct (clearly rejecting bribery) and a compliance 
programme (Y/N) 
g.   Commitment by each bidder that documents are truthful, and acceptance of strict liability for 
misrepresentation, fraudulent representation or false declaration (Y/N) 
h.   Statement of non-involvement in conduct forbidden by the IP or related corrupt behavior in period 3-5 
years prior to bid (Y/N) 
i.   Cap on payments to agents (Y/N) 
j.   Extension of undertakings to other obligations  (Y/N) 
k.   To refrain from all other illegal acts (Y/N) 
l.   To report to monitor any attempted or fulfilled breaches of IP (Y/N) 
m.   Other – please specify and explain importance and reasons for inclusion of such provisions 
b.   Commitment of the public authority 
i.   Does the IP include a commitment of the Public Authority? (Y/N) 
1.   If YES, does it include the following provisions? 
a.   Not to demand or accept bribes (Y/N) 
b.   Not to demand or accept facilitation payments  (Y/N) 
c.   To disclose relevant and equal information to all bidders (Y/N) 
d.   To guarantee protection of restricted information (Y/N) 
e.   To report any attempted or completed breaches of these clauses (Y/N) 
f.   To provide public information on the contracting process (Y/N) 
g.   Ethical commitment establishing rules of interaction with bidders during and after tender process 
(Y/N) 
h.   To refrain from all other illegal acts (Y/N) 
i.   To disclose on a regular basis their own and their family’s assets (Y/N) 
j.   Other – please specify and explain importance and reasons for inclusion of such provisions 
c.   Sanctions 
i.   Does the IP provide sanctions different to the ones provided by the national legal system? (Y/N) 
1.   If NO, because: 
a.   Sanctions are already covered by national law. If so, please specify which sanctions already covered 
by national law apply to the IP violation  _________________ 
b.   Other reason, please specify:  ___________________________ 
  
 
364 
2.   If YES, are they applicable to bidders? (Y/N) and do they include: 
a.   Loss or denial of contract (Y/N) 
b.   Forfeiture of bid security and performance bonds (Y/N) 
c.   Liquidated damages to principal and competitors (Y/N) 
d.   Debarment of violator from contracting with government/authority (Y/N) 
e.   Other, please specify and explain importance and reasons for inclusion of such provisions 
3.   If YES, are they applicable to government officials? (Y/N) 
a.   Criminal sanctions? (Y/N) 
b.   Disciplinary sanctions? (Y/N) 
c.   Civil sanctions? (Y/N) 
d.   Other, please specify ____________________ 
d.   Monitoring 
i.   Does the IP include independent monitoring during the bidding process? (Y/N) 
ii.   Does the IP include independent monitoring during the execution phase? (Y/N) 
iii.   Does the IP include whistleblower protection? (Y/N) 
e.   Stakeholder Participation and Information Disclosure 
i.   Does the IP include town hall / targeted public hearings? (Y/N) 
ii.   Does the IP include internet/electronic information disclosure mechanisms? (Y/N) 
iii.   Other, please specify and explain _________________________ 
f.   Dispute Resolution 
i.   Does the IP include a predetermined procedure to pursue IP breach claims? (Y/N) 
1.   If NO, because: 
a.   Procedure already provided in national law to pursue breaches of IP requirements 
b.   Other reason, please specify __________________________ 
2.   If YES, is the procedure: 
a.   Arbitration (National or International, please specify) 
b.   Judicial review  
c.   Other, please specify ________________________________ 
ii.   How is the arbitration mechanism selected? Please specify __________________ 
iii.   Are decisions to enter procedures public? (Y/N) 
g.   Please include any further information on the content of the IP 
-    
II.   IMPLEMENTATION 
a.   Characteristics of IP Implementation 
i.   In which stages of the contracting cycle can an IP project be run 
1.   PRE-BIDDING STAGE (including: Needs assessment; Feasibility Studies; Market Research Studies; 
Planning and Budgeting; Definition of Requirements; Choice of procedures). ☐ 
-   Please specify in which ones_____________ 
2.   BIDDING STAGE (including: Invitation to Bid; Evaluation of Bids; Bid Award, Signing of Contract). ☐ 
-   Please specify in which ones _____________ 
3.   POST-BIDDING STAGE (including: Contract Management, Internal Supervision or Control of 
Activities, External Audit, External Technical Supervision of Implementation; Payment Orders). ☐ 
-   Please specify in which ones_____________ 
ii.   In which moment of the bidding process have IPs been signed? Select all that apply: 
1.   At the beginning of the pre-bidding stage ☐ 
2.   At the beginning of the selection process before the bidders pre-qualification (if pre-qualification is 
applied) ☐ 
3.   At the time of the submission of the tender by the bidders ☐ 
4.   For the contract implementation, please specify the exact moment of signing of the IPs ☐ 
a.   At contract signing ☐ 
b.   Other moment, please specify 
5.   Other moment during the bidding process, please specify 
iii.   Is the IP applied: 
1.   On an individual basis (for selected contracts) ☐ 
2.   On a general basis (law or policy provision establishes the IP as a requirement) ☐ 
a.   for a sector ☐ 
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b.   for a government agency or group of government agencies ☐ 
c.   for a provincial (state) / local government ☐ 
d.   for all government contracts ☐ 
e.   for procurement above a certain monetary value ☐ 
f.   other, please specify  __________________ 
iv.   Does the general public have an opportunity to comment on drafts of the bidding documents before 
official invitation to tender is published? (Y/N) 
1.   If YES, is this done via: 
a.   Internet☐ 
b.   Public hearings☐ 
c.   Other, please specify 
2.   If YES, does this opportunity exist for: 
a.   Only for contracting processes with IPs ☐ 
b.   For any public contracting process ☐ 
v.   Are bidders involved in discussion regarding IP content? (Y/N) 
1.   If YES 
a.   With negotiation powers? ☐ 
b.   Without negotiation powers? ☐ 
c.   Other, please specify _____________ 
2.   If NO, why not? 
vi.   The initiative to promote the IP comes from: 
1.   Government ☐ 
2.   Firms/ Professional associations/ Chambers of Commerce ☐ 
3.    Individuals / Civil Society (NGOs, CSOs) ☐ 
4.    TI ☐ 
5.    Donors / International Financial Institutions (IFIs) ☐  
6.    Other, please specify __________________ 
vii.   How has the IP been advocated in the country? 
1.   Through direct contacts with high level government officials (e.g. President, Ministers, etc.) ☐ 
2.   Seminars and international workshops ☐ 
3.   Training public officials, companies and/or civil society ☐ 
4.   Publicizing results and evaluation of IP implementation processes ☐ 
5.   Other, please specify 
6.    Which has been most effective and why? ___________ 
viii.   How has government commitment to the IP been achieved? 
1.   Through an agreement/MOU  ☐  
-   Please specify the parties involved __________________ 
2.    Other, please specify__________________ 
ix.   Did the document signed with the government include a withdrawal clause for the chapter or the 
monitor? (Y/N) 
x.   What type of evidence /proof is required to allege IP Violations? _________________  And who is 
entitled to make allegations? 
1.   Monitor ☐ 
2.   Chapter ☐ 
3.   Bidders ☐ 
4.   Citizens/Whistle-blowers ☐ 
5.   Contracting authority ☐ 
6.   Other, please specify _______________ 
b.   Monitoring 
i.   Who monitors the procurement processes involving IPs? 
1.   TI Chapter 
2.   Independent civil society external monitor 
3.   Other NGO, please specify 
4.   Independent private sector inspector general 
5.   Independent government official 
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6.   Other, please specify 
ii.   Who selects the monitor? Please explain the process _______________________________ 
iii.   When does monitoring begin and end? ______________________ 
iv.   What are the functions of the monitor? Please select all that apply: 
1.   Monitor the compliance with IP ☐ 
2.   Review / comment on drafts of bidding documents ☐ 
3.   Review / comment on official bidding documents ☐ 
4.   Discuss / negotiate the IP with participants ☐ 
5.   Observe / comment on evaluation and award process  ☐ 
6.   Deal with complaints ☐ 
7.   Observe implementation, supervision and variations of contract ☐ 
8.   Inform the public opinion on the process. If NOT, why not? Please explain______________________ 
9.   Attending meetings with responsible teams within the Public Authority along the contracting process 
10.   Other, please specify and explain importance  _________________ 
v.   Does the monitor have access to the following documents? Please select all that apply and when in the 
process that they have access: 
1.   Procurement Plan  ☐ 
2.   Drafts of bidding documents ☐ 
3.   Official bidding documents ☐ 
4.   Amendments to bidding documents☐ 
5.   Bidders' pre-qualification documents ☐ 
6.   Pre-qualification evaluation report ☐ 
7.   Official bid invitation ☐ 
8.   Bidders' proposals ☐ 
9.   Bid evaluation report ☐ 
10.   Award decision (including the reasons that substantiate it) ☐ 
11.   Text of the contract signed by the parties ☐ 
12.   Variations of contract ☐ 
13.   Progress reports ☐ 
14.   Audit / supervision reports ☐ 
vi.   What type of analysis does the monitor carry out on the documents? Please select all that apply: 
1.   whether laws / rules are followed ☐ 
2.   whether the bidders have submitted the full documentation required ☐ 
3.   identify possible indicators or corruption / lack of competitive conditions in the  bidding documents (e.g. 
tailored technical specifications, etc.) ☐ 
4.   identify possible indicators of corruption in the bidders proposals (e.g. artificially low prices, identical 
prices, same addresses, etc.) ☐ 
5.   other analysis, please describe _____________ 
vii.   What interaction does the monitor have with contract beneficiaries – local communities? 
viii.   What is the process that the monitor undertakes when detecting or being alerted to a 
problem/compliant? Please select all that apply: 
1.   Report to the contracting authority ☐ 
2.   Report to other control bodies ☐ 
3.   Alert the judiciary ☐ 
4.   Inform the media ☐ 
5.   Other, please specify ______________ 
6.   Can the monitor influence or affect the bidding process in these situations? Please explain____________ 
ix.   How is the independence of the monitor guaranteed vis-à-vis the funding source? _____________ 
x.   If not undertaken directly by the TI-NC, what is the role of the chapter in the monitoring process and in 
other IP implementation activities? Please explain _________________ 
xi.   What contributed to the success of the monitoring? _______________ 
xii.   What made monitoring difficult? ______________________ 
c.   Other tools 
i.   Please specify other tools frequently used in the implementation of the IP, their methodology and their 
importance in the process 
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d.   Additional implementation information 
i.   Are there significant differences in IP Implementation according to sector, level of government, and 
other factors? Please explain _________________ 
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   Annex II Interviews 
10.1   List of interviews 
Interviews conducted for the European review by the author of this study, Mike Beke 
# Category Organisation 
Field mission Hungary (18-22 March 2015) 
1. Private Sector Nimród-Bau 
2. Contracting Authority 13th District Budapest 
3. Civil society K-Monitor 
4. Civil society K-Monitor 
5. Civil society Transparency International Hungary 
Field mission Latvia (23-25 March 2015) 
6. Civil society Delna  
7. Private Sector Zverinats Advocats 
8. Private Sector Hill International 
9. Civil society European Institute for Gender Equality (former Delna) 
10. Civil society Delna 
11. Civil society Delna 
12. Civil society Lawyer (former Delna) 
13. Contracting Authority National Latvian Library 
14. Contracting Authority Ministry of Culture 
15. Private Sector National Builders Association 
Field mission Bulgaria (31 March – 02 April 2015) 
16. Donor organisation Siemens Bulgaria 
17. Contracting Authority Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works (Bulgaria) 
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18. Integrity Pact Monitor Peterkap Partners 
19. Private Sector PMI Bulgaria Chapter 
20. Civil society Transparency International Bulgaria 
21. Civil society Transparency International Bulgaria 
22. Integrity Pact Monitor Independent consultant 
Others (February – April 2015) 
23. Other Independent consultant (Transparency International) 
24. Other Independent consultant (former Transparency International) 
25. Other UNDP (former Transparency International) 
26. Civil society Transparency International Germany 
27. Civil society Transparency International EU office 
28. Civil society Transparency International Spain 
29.548 Civil society Transparency International India 
Workshop Berlin (23 February 2015) 
30.549 
Civil society Transparency International Lithuania 
Civil society Transparency International Lithuania 
Civil society Transparency International Greece 
Civil society Transparency International Cyprus 
Civil society Transparency International Hungary 
Civil society Transparency International Luxembourg 
Civil society Transparency International Latvia 
Civil society Transparency International Italy 
                                                            
 
548 Workshop in Berlin, 26 April 2015 
549 Focus group meeting in Berlin, 23 February 2015 
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Civil society Transparency International Poland 
Civil society Transparency International Czech Republic 
Civil society Transparency International Czech Republic 
Civil society Transparency International Bulgaria 
Civil society Transparency International Slovenia 
Civil society Transparency International Croatia 
Civil society Transparency International Romania 
Donor organisations European Commission DG Regio 
Civil society Transparency International Secretariat 
Civil society Transparency International Secretariat 
Civil society Transparency International Secretariat 
Civil society Transparency International Secretariat 
Civil society Transparency International Secretariat 
Civil society Transparency International EU Office 
Interviews conducted for the global review by the author of this study, Mike Beke 
Field Mission Mexico: 21-25 September 2015 
31. Civil Society TI Mexico 
32. Integrity Pact Monitor Lawyer (independent) 
33. Other Member of Parliament 
34. Integrity Pact Monitor University of Mexico 
35. Contracting Authority  Energy sector 
36. Civil Society Transparency International Mexico  
37. Civil Society Transparency International Mexico 
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Others: September - November 2015 
38. Civil Society Transparency International Slovakia 
39. Civil Society Transparency International Rwanda 
40. Civil Society Transparency International Uganda 
41. Civil Society Transparency International Indonesia 
42. Civil Society Transparency International Malaysia 
43. Civil Society Transparency International Honduras 
44. Civil Society Independent consultant energy sector 
45. Private Sector Hill International 
 
Interviews conducted by co-author Global Review, William Nero 
Field Mission India: 17-23 September 2015  
1. Civil Society 
Interviews conducted face-to-
face and in focus group setting. 
2. Civil Society 
3. Civil Society 
4. External Monitor 
5. Private Sector 
6. External Monitor 
7. External Monitor 
8. Contracting Authority 
9. Contracting Authority 
10. Contracting Authority 
11. Contracting Authority 
12. Contracting Authority 
13. Civil Society 
Mission Germany: 28 September - 1 October 2015 
14. External Monitor Independent 
15. Contracting Authority Hannover 
16. Civil Society Transparency International 
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Germany 
17. Civil Society Transparency International Germany 
Others: September - November 2015 
18. Civil Society Transparency International Thailand 
19. Civil Society Transparency International Pakistan 
20. Private sector Siemens 
21. Civil Society CoST 
 
10.2   Interview questions European review 
European review guiding questions 
 
1.   Have Integrity Pacts achieved their stated outcomes (e.g. prevention, detection and follow-up of irregularities)? Which 
factors contributed to the achievement or non-achievement of the stated outcomes? 
2.   What changes have Integrity Pacts contributed to (e.g. visibility procurement project, credibility and legitimacy 
procurement project)? Which factors contributed to these changes? 
3.   Did Integrity Pacts make procurement more efficient (e.g. costs procurement project, resources allocated, duration)? 
4.   Did Integrity Pacts have any negative effects (e.g. duplication of activities, red tape, additional costs)? How can this be 
addressed? 
5.   What are the best approaches for the independent monitoring component of the Pacts (e.g. selection process, 
accountability, funding, activities monitor)? 
6.   To what extent did the benefits of Integrity Pacts continue or lead to other follow-up activities after the project ended 
(e.g. reform of contracting process, engagement decision-makers, engagement economic operators, corruption 
perception)? 
7.   What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of Integrity Pacts 
(e.g. political will, transparency and professionalism, independent monitoring, participatory stakeholder involvement)? 
8.   How can the model be adapted to small procurement projects and to diverse sectors, types of procurement, and legal, 
cultural and economic contexts? 
9.   Is there any ideal size and type of procurement for the implementation of Integrity Pacts? Conversely, are their 
types/sizes of procurement for which an Integrity Pact is not an appropriate tool? 
10.   Are there any elements in the Integrity Pact model that are useful only under certain circumstances? Can any element be 
added in some (or all) contexts? 
11.   How can Integrity Pacts be used to monitor EU-funded procurement projects? How should they be adapted? 
 
Interview questions – civil society organisations 
 
-­‐   Introductory Information 
-­‐   Name of Interviewee: 
-­‐   Civil society organization: 
-­‐   Number of Integrity Pacts involved in (as a company and as an individual): 
Effectiveness and impact 
 
1.   Can you describe briefly the sequence of activities from the moment you decide to intervene until the end of this 
intervention? 
2.   Which activities are undertaken to advocate for the use of Integrity Pacts in the country? 
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3.   Which activities do you reckon most effective to advocate for the use of Integrity Pacts? 
4.   Where did the initiative come from to initiate an Integrity Pact? 
5.   How was the Integrity Pact content established? 
6.   Which parties were involved in designing Integrity Pact? 
7.   Was the content discussed with any other stakeholders? Should it be discussed with the bidders? 
8.   How was commitment of the public authority secured? 
a.   Through an agreement? 
b.   Through a Memorandum of Understanding? 
9.   Did the possibility exist for civil society organisations to withdraw from the process? 
10.   Which role did the civil society organisations play in the Integrity Pact? 
11.   How was the Integrity Pact financed? 
12.   How is the independence of the civil society organisations foreseen vis-à-vis the funding source? 
13.   Have there been concerns as to the independence of the civil society organisations or monitor? 
14.   What kind of human resources did the civil society organisations need to implement the Integrity Pacts? 
15.   What kind of financial resources did the civil society organisation need? 
 
Integrity Pact agreement 
 
1.   Does the Integrity Pact include provisions with relation to bidders? 
2.   Which provisions? 
a.   Not to bribe? 
b.   Not to use facilitation payments? 
c.   Not to collude? 
d.   To disclose information regarding payments? 
e.   Including subcontractors? 
f.   Others? 
3.   Does the Integrity Pact include provisions with relation to public authority? 
4.   Which provisions? 
a.   Not to demand or accept bribes 
b.   Not to demand or accept facilitation payments 
c.   To disclose relevant and equal information to all bidders 
d.   To guarantee protection of restricted information 
e.   To report any attempted or completed breaches of these clauses 
f.   To provide public information on the contracting process 
g.   Other 
5.   Have Integrity Pacts been applied on an individual basis (for selected contracts) or on a general basis (through policy)? 
a.   If on a general basis, was this for a specific sector or governmental agency? 
 
Transparency 
 
6.   Does the Integrity Pact foreseen specific provisions that increase transparency beyond legislative requirements? 
a.   Use of Internet? 
b.   Use of public hearings? 
c.   Opportunity for public to comment on tender documentation? 
7.   What means are used to make documents accessible to the public? 
8.   In which way does the Integrity Pact foresee additional transparency to the public? 
d.   Monitoring reports? 
e.   Additional documentation? 
9.   Were transactions from economic operators relating the project disclosed? 
 
Monitoring provision 
 
10.   Has independent monitoring been foreseen during: 
a.   The bidding process? 
b.   The contract execution? 
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11.   Who monitored the procurement process where Integrity Pacts are used? 
12.   Who selects the monitor? 
13.   Which characteristics are essential? 
14.   How is the monitor financed? 
15.   When does the monitoring start and end?  
16.   To whom is the monitor accountable? 
17.   Did the possibility exist for the monitor to withdraw from the process? 
18.   How is independence of the monitor foreseen? 
19.   What are the functions of the monitor? 
c.   Monitor compliance with the Integrity Pact 
d.   Review / comment on documents 
e.   Discuss with participants 
f.   Observe and comment on the evaluation and award process 
g.   Deal with complaints 
h.   Observe implementation of the contract 
i.   Inform public opinion 
j.   Attend meetings with the responsible teams 
20.   In which way does the monitor duplicate work that has already been foreseen through formal arrangements? (red tape) 
21.   Did the monitor have access to all relevant documentation? 
22.   Did the monitor enjoy easier or more access to documentation than foreseen by relevant legislation? 
23.   What type of analysis does the monitor carry out on documents? 
k.   Whether laws are followed? 
l.   Identify corruption risks in bidders proposals / bidding documents? 
24.   What type of activities does the monitor undertake during the contract execution phase? 
25.   What steps does the monitor take when breaches of the Integrity Pact are identified? 
26.   Have breaches been identified during Integrity Pacts?  
27.   If yes, how many? 
28.   If yes, what type of breaches? 
 
Dispute resolution mechanism 
 
29.   Is there a predetermined procedure to pursue violations of the Integrity Pact? 
30.   If no, why not?  
31.   If yes, please specify 
a.   National arbitration? 
b.   International arbitration? 
c.   Judicial review?  
32.   Who is entitled to allege the Integrity Pact violations? 
33.   What type of evidence is required to allege violations? 
34.   Have all violations been notified to authorities? 
35.   Is there a predetermined procedure to pursue complaints? 
36.   Were complaints made in relation to the procurement process? 
37.   In how many Integrity Pact cases have complaints been made to the monitor? 
38.   Does the dispute resolution system differ in any way from the formal mechanisms in place? 
39.   Does the system foreseen through the Integrity Pact, increase efficiency? 
 
Sanctions 
 
40.   What kinds of sanctions are included in the Integrity Pacts? 
a.   Loss or denial of contract? 
b.   Forfeiture of bid and performance bonds? 
c.   Liquidated damages to principal and competitors? 
d.   Blacklisting? 
e.   Other? 
41.   Do these differ from those provided by the national legal system? 
42.   Which sanctions you reckon are most effective to include in an Integrity Pact? 
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43.   Are sanctions also applicable to government officials? 
f.   Criminal sanctions? 
g.   Disciplinary sanctions? 
h.   Civil sanctions? 
i.   Other? 
44.   Have breaches or irregularities lead to sanctions? 
45.   How likely will an irregularity result in a sanction? 
Communication 
 
46.   Was there a strategy in place to communicate the Integrity Pact to the media? 
47.   Who executed the communication strategy? 
48.   Did you perceive a difference between stakeholders’ outreach (window-dressing risk)? 
49.   Which activities were conducted to reach out to the media? 
50.   Has there been media coverage of the Integrity Pact during and after the project? 
51.   Has there been response on outreach activities to the public? 
52.   How did this response materialize?  
53.   Have there been public scandals relating the procurement process or the contractors/contracted? 
54.   How would you rate the level of interaction with stakeholders such as the public and the media? 
55.   What impact does an Integrity Pact have on the perception of the public on public procurement? 
 
Public procurement costs 
 
56.   Has there been over-expenditure during the bidding process / during the contract implementation (Difference between 
the estimated project’s budget and the final expenditure)? Which factors contributed to this? 
57.   Are there indications that costs were saved on the procurement process? 
58.   Did the use of an independent monitor have effect on the resources allocated by the contracting authority to the 
process? 
 
Public procurement time 
 
59.   Has there been a delay in the procurement process? In which way did this relate to the Integrity Pact? 
 
Sustainability 
 
60.   Did the Integrity Pact result in any reform of contracting processes on an organizational or institutional level? 
61.   Have any activities been undertaken to ensure that Integrity Pacts become a permanent tool in public procurement 
62.   Have activities been undertaken to ensure that anti-corruption measures have been included in a reform of the 
procurement process? 
63.   In which way has the application of an Integrity Pact contributed to broader recommendations against corruption in 
public procurement / incited reforms in procurement processes?  
64.   Has funding been ensured for follow-up activities relating corruption in public procurement? 
65.   Have activities been undertaken to secure funding for follow-up activities such as training on IPs, promotion material, 
research on public procurement? 
66.   Has funding been ensured for follow-up Integrity Pact? 
67.   Which activities have been undertaken to secure funding for follow-up Integrity Pact projects? 
68.   Which activities have been undertaken to ensure stakeholder commitment beyond the Integrity Pact agreement? 
69.   Which activities have been undertaken to ensure engagement of politicians after the Integrity Pact? 
70.   Has there been an observed change in corruption cases relating public procurement? To which extent does this change 
relate to the Integrity Pact? 
71.   Has there been an observed change in perception of corruption in public procurement? 
72.   To which extent does this change relate to the Integrity Pact? 
73.   Overall, do you believe that sustainability of the IP has been achieved? 
 
Adaptability 
 
74.   Was there need to adapt the content of the Pacts to: 
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a.   Local conditions? 
b.   The size of the Integrity Pact? 
c.   The sector of the Integrity Pact?  
75.    What are the main differences of applying Integrity Pacts to different sectors and governmental levels? 
76.   Are there any elements in the Integrity Pact model that are useful only under certain circumstances? Can any element 
be added in some (or all) contexts? 
77.   How can the model be adapted to small procurement projects and to diverse sectors, types of procurement, and legal, 
cultural and economic contexts? 
78.   How can Integrity Pacts be used to monitor EU-funded procurement projects? How should they be adapted? 
79.   In which way can the Integrity Pact be used as a tool to call for reform of the procurement process 
 
 
Interview questions – contracting authorities 
 
-­‐   Introductory information 
-­‐   Name of Interviewee: 
-­‐   Contracting authority: 
-­‐   Governmental level: 
-­‐   Number of procurements with Integrity Pacts conducted: 
Effectiveness and impact 
 
1.   Could you briefly describe your role in the Integrity Pact project? 
2.   Can you describe briefly how and when the decision was made to initiate an Integrity Pact? 
3.   Did you undertake activities to advocate the use of Integrity Pacts within your organization? 
4.   How was the Integrity Pact content established? 
a.   Which parties were involved in designing the Integrity Pact? 
b.   Was the content discussed with any other stakeholders? Should it be discussed with the bidders? 
5.   How did you secure commitment of your organization to initiate and Integrity Pact and during the Integrity Pact? 
6.   How was the Integrity Pact financed? 
7.   What kind of human and financial resources did you need for the Integrity Pact? 
 
Integrity Pact agreement 
 
8.    What kind of provisions did the Integrity Pact contain with relation to your organization? 
a.   Not to demand or accept bribes 
b.   Not to demand or accept facilitation payments 
c.   To disclose relevant and equal information to all bidders 
d.   To guarantee protection of restricted information 
e.   To report any attempted or completed breaches of these clauses 
f.   To provide public information on the contracting process 
g.   Other 
9.   Do these provisions go beyond those required by law?  
10.   Have Integrity Pacts been applied on an individual bases (for selected contracts) or on a general basis (through policy)? 
h.   If on a general basis, was this for a specific sector or governmental agency? 
 
Transparency 
 
11.   Does the Integrity Pact foresee specific provisions that increase transparency beyond legislative requirements? 
a.   Use of Internet? 
b.   Use of public hearings? 
c.   Opportunity for public to comment on tender documentation? 
12.   What means are used to make documents accessible to the public? 
13.   In which way does the Integrity Pact foresee additional transparency to the public? 
d.   Monitoring reports? 
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e.   Additional documentation? 
14.   Were transactions from economic operators relating the project disclosed? 
 
Monitoring provision 
 
15.    Has independent monitoring been foreseen during: 
a.    The bidding process? 
b.   The contract execution? 
16.    Who monitored the procurement process where Integrity Pact are used? 
17.   Which characteristics are essential for the monitor? 
18.   To whom is the monitor accountable? 
19.   How is independence of the monitor foreseen? 
20.   What are the functions of the monitor? 
c.   Monitor compliance with the Integrity Pact 
d.   Review / comment on documents 
e.   Discuss with participants 
f.   Observe and comment on the evaluation and award process 
g.   Deal with complaints 
h.   Observe implementation of the contract 
i.   Inform public opinion 
j.   Attend meetings with the responsible teams 
21.   In which way does the monitor duplicate work that has already been foreseen through formal arrangements? 
(duplication work contracting authority / red tape) 
22.   What steps does the monitor take when breaches of the Integrity Pact are identified? 
23.   Have breaches been identified during Integrity Pacts?  
24.   If yes, how many and what types? 
 
Dispute resolution mechanism 
 
25.   Is there a predetermined procedure to pursue violations of the Integrity Pact? If no, why not? If yes, please specify: 
a.   National arbitration 
b.   International arbitration 
c.   Judicial review 
26.   Who is entitled to allege the Integrity Pact violations? 
27.   What type of evidence is required to allege violations? 
28.   Have all violations been notified to authorities? 
29.   Is there a predetermined procedure to pursue complaints? 
30.   Were complaints made in relation to the procurement process? 
31.   In how many Integrity Pact cases have complaints been made to the monitor? 
32.   Does the dispute resolution system differ in any way from the formal mechanisms in place? 
33.   Does the system foreseen through the Integrity Pact increase efficiency? 
 
Sanctions 
 
34.   What kinds of sanctions are included in the Integrity Pacts? 
a.   Loss or denial of contract? 
b.   Forfeiture of bid and performance bonds? 
c.   Liquidated damages to principal and competitors? 
d.   Blacklisting? 
e.   Other? 
35.   Do these differ from those provided by the national legal system? 
36.   Which sanctions you reckon are most effective to include in an Integrity Pact? 
37.   Are sanctions also applicable to government officials? 
a.   Criminal sanctions? 
b.   Disciplinary sanctions? 
c.   Civil sanctions? 
d.   Other? 
38.   Have breaches or irregularities lead to sanctions? 
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39.   How likely will an irregularity result in a sanction? 
 
Communication 
 
40.   Was there a strategy in place to communicate the Integrity Pact to the media? 
41.   Who executed the communication strategy? 
42.   Did you perceive a difference between stakeholders outreach (window-dressing risk)? 
43.   Which activities were conducted to reach out to the media? 
44.   Has there been media coverage of the Integrity Pact during and after the project? 
45.   Has there been response on outreach activities to the public? 
46.   How did this response materialize?  
47.   Have there been public scandals relating the procurement process or the contractors/contracted? 
48.   How would you rate the level of interaction with stakeholders such as the public and the media? 
49.   What impact does an Integrity Pact have on the perception of the public on public procurement? 
 
Public procurement costs 
 
50.   Has there been over-expenditure during the bidding process / during the contract implementation? Difference between 
the estimated project’s budget and the final expenditure 
51.   Which factors contributed to this? 
52.   Are there indications that costs were saved on the procurement process? 
53.   Did the use of an independent monitor have effect on the resources allocated by the contracting authority to the 
process? 
Public procurement time 
 
54.   Has there been a delay in the procurement process? 
55.   In which way did this relate to the Integrity Pact? 
Sustainability 
 
56.   Did the Integrity Pact result in any reform of contracting processes on an organizational or institutional level? 
57.   Which activities have been undertaken to ensure stakeholder commitment beyond the Integrity Pact agreement? 
58.   Which activities have been undertaken to ensure engagement of politicians after the Integrity Pacts? 
59.   Has there been an observed change in corruption cases relating public procurement? 
60.   To which extent does this change relate to the Integrity Pact? 
61.   Has there been an observed change in perception of corruption in public procurement? 
62.   To which extent does this change relate to the Integrity Pact? 
63.   Overall, do you believe that sustainability of the Integrity Pact has been achieved? 
Adaptability 
 
64.   Was there need to adapt the content of the Pacts to: 
65.   Local conditions? 
66.   The size of the Integrity Pact? 
67.   The sector of the Integrity Pact?  
68.   What are the main differences of applying Integrity Pact s to different sectors and governmental levels? 
69.   Are there any elements in the Integrity Pact model that are useful only under certain circumstances? Can any element be 
added in some (or all) contexts? 
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70.   How can the model be adapted to small procurement projects and to diverse sectors, types of procurement, and legal, 
cultural and economic contexts? 
71.   How can Integrity Pact s be used to monitor EU-funded procurement projects? How should they be adapted? 
72.   In which way can the Integrity Pact be used as a tool to call for reform of the procurement process? 
Interview questions – companies/bidders 
 
-­‐   Introductory Information 
-­‐   Name of Interviewee: 
-­‐   Company: 
-­‐   Sector: 
-­‐   Number of Integrity Pacts involved in (as a company and as an individual): 
Effectiveness and impact 
 
1.   Could you briefly describe your role in the procurement project? 
2.   At what stage did your company got involved in the Integrity Pact? 
3.   Was your company familiar with the tool? 
4.   Does your company have a compliance programme in place? 
5.   Does your company have anti-corruption policies in place? 
6.   Do you have a code of conduct in place? 
7.   Did you undertake activities to advocate the use of Integrity Pacts within your organization? 
8.   How did you secure commitment of your organization during the Integrity Pact? 
9.   Did you require additional resources to implement the Integrity Pact? 
10.   What kind of human and financial resources did you need for the Integrity Pact? 
11.   Did you undertake any additional activities apart from those required to comply with procurement law? 
12.   What were your expectations of the Integrity Pact? Were the expectations met?  
13.   From the perspective of your business sector what are the main challenges you face in public procurement? What effect 
does the Integrity Pact have on this? 
14.   Do Integrity Pacts have a negative/ positive impact on public procurement? 
 
Transparency 
 
15.   Does the Integrity Pact foresee specific provisions that increase transparency for your company beyond legislative 
requirements? 
16.   Were transactions relating the project disclosed? 
 
Communication 
 
17.   Was there a strategy in place to communicate the Integrity Pact to the media? 
18.   Who executed the communication strategy? 
19.   Which activities were conducted to reach out to the media? 
20.   Has there been media coverage of the Integrity Pact during and after the project? 
21.   Has there been response on outreach activities to the public? 
22.   How did this response materialize?  
23.   How would you rate the level of interaction with stakeholders such as the public and the media? 
24.   What impact does an Integrity Pact have on the perception of the public on public procurement? 
25.   How did you perceive collaboration with the other stakeholders involved? 
 
Public procurement costs 
 
26.   Has there been over-expenditure during the bidding process / during the contract implementation? Difference between 
the estimated project’s budget and the final expenditure 
27.   Which factors contributed to this? 
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28.   Are there indications that costs were saved on the procurement process? 
 
Public procurement time 
 
29.   Has there been a delay in the procurement process? 
30.   In which way did this relate to the Integrity Pact? 
 
Sustainability 
 
31.   Did the Integrity Pact result in any reform of contracting processes on an organizational or institutional level? 
32.   Which activities have been undertaken to ensure your companies commitment beyond the Integrity Pact agreement? 
33.   Overall, do you believe that sustainability of the Integrity Pact has been achieved? 
 
Adaptability 
 
34.   Was there need to adapt the content of the Pacts to: 
a.   Local conditions? 
b.   The size of the Integrity Pact? 
c.   The sector of the Integrity Pact?  
35.    What are the main differences of applying IPs to different sectors and governmental levels? 
36.   Are there any elements in the Integrity Pact model that are useful only under certain circumstances? Can any element 
be added in some (or all) contexts? 
37.   How can the model be adapted to small procurement projects and to diverse sectors, types of procurement, and legal, 
cultural and economic contexts? 
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10.3   Interview questions global review 
Global review guiding questions 
 
1.   Have Integrity Pacts been effective in preventing and detecting corruption? And if so, which forms of corruption? 
Which factors contributed to the achievement or non-achievement of the stated outcomes? 
2.   What changes/benefits (including economic and social) and impact have Integrity Pacts contributed to? And why did 
these changes happen? 
3.   Did Integrity Pacts make procurement more efficient? And if yes, are there differences in efficiency gains between the 
parties to an Integrity Pact? Have there been cost or time savings associated with their application? Has there been 
evidence of increased competitiveness in the procurement process and/or competitive advantages/disadvantages for 
specific groups, i.e. SMEs? 
4.   To what extent did the benefits of Integrity Pacts continue or lead to other follow-up activities after the project ended? 
5.   What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of Integrity Pact 
results? 
6.   Are there certain legal, political, cultural or economic contexts in which the Integrity Pact is best suited? 
7.   Are there certain elements of the Integrity Pact and/or specific tender that are necessary or sufficient in order to increase 
chances of success? 
8.   One of the most important and defining elements of the Integrity Pact is the use of external independent monitoring. 
Let’s focus further on this piece of the Integrity Pact. 
9.   Did Integrity Pacts have any negative effects? Major weaknesses and critiques? How can this be addressed? 
10.   What is the business case for the Integrity Pact? 
Interview questions global review - civil society organisations 
 
-­‐   Introductory Information 
-­‐   Name of Interviewee: 
-­‐   Civil society organization: 
-­‐   Number of Integrity Pacts involved in (as a company and as an individual): 
Efficiency, effectiveness and impact 
 
1.   How does your chapter define success of Integrity Pact implementation and outcomes? 
2.   Has use of the Integrity Pact discouraged corruption during the contracting process? If so, please explain how and what 
types of corruption. 
a.   Which elements of and arguments for the Integrity Pact were most important in the discouragement of bribery? I.e., 
fear of loss of reputation, level playing field, fear of sanctions, etc. 
3.   How has the effectiveness of the Integrity Pact varied in comparison to procurement processes without Integrity Pacts 
applied?   
4.   What have been the main short and long-term impacts of the Integrity Pact and what are your metrics for identifying 
these? 
4.   How has support for the Integrity Pact and its outcomes been communicated to the general public? Has this played a 
role in support for the Integrity Pact from the public, private sector and/or other stakeholders? 
5.   Has the Integrity Pact contributed to increased transparency and accountability in the public procurement process? If so 
why or why not, how has this been measured and what were the principle elements of the Integrity Pact and conditions 
of its application that contributed to this? 
6.   Has there been an observed change in public/private sector/other stakeholder perceptions of corruption in procurement?  
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7.   Has there been an observed increase/decrease in public procurement time due to the Integrity Pact? If so, what were the 
factors of the Integrity Pact or the circumstances of its implementation behind this development? 
8.   Has there been an observed increase/decrease in public procurement costs due to the Integrity Pact? If so, what were the 
factors of the Integrity Pact or the circumstances of its implementation behind this development? 
9.   Has there been evidence of increased competitiveness in the procurement process? 
 
Sustainability 
 
10.   Have there been any organisational or institutional changes among both public sector and private sector participants 
stemming from the application of Integrity Pacts?  
11.   To what extent have Integrity Pacts, elements of them and lessons learned from their outcomes been institutionalized in 
your country’s public procurement processes and/or agencies? 
12.   Has there been a recognized spread of or interest in the application of Integrity Pacts locally, nationally or regionally 
since their initial use by the chapter? 
13.   What activities have been undertaken to build stakeholder capacity and interest in future engagement in Integrity Pacts? 
14.   Who has been the primary ‘champion’ of the Integrity Pact among the various stakeholders involved, i.e. the national 
chapter? Contracting authorities? Private sector? NGOs? Public? Government? 
15.   What factors of the Integrity Pact or its implementation help or hinder sustainability of results? 
16.   How has the sustainability of Integrity Pact outcomes varied in comparison to procurement without Integrity Pacts and 
what reasons would you give for these differences? 
 
Flexibility  
 
17.   Please share your views on differences in application of the Integrity Pact according to government level, sectors, 
monetary value of the Integrity Pact, etc., including where it works best and where there are more challenges.  
18.   Is the signing of the Integrity Pact mandatory or voluntary? Which in your view is the best option and why? 
19.   Has there been a need to adapt the Integrity Pact content to local conditions – legal, cultural, political, economic etc.? If 
so, how, why, and what effects do you think that this has had on the Integrity Pact outcomes? 
20.   When in the procurement process do you think that the Integrity Pact should be signed? 
21.   How much flexibility do you believe should be permitted in the application of Integrity Pacts? In your opinion, should 
bidders be involved in negotiations on Integrity Pact content? Why or why not? 
22.   What are in your view the most important elements within the Integrity Pact itself that are necessary for it to achieve 
successful outcomes, and why? 
23.   What are in your view the most important conditions of Integrity Pact implementation that are necessary for it to 
achieve success, and why? 
24.   What other tools have you used and promoted in preference to or in complement with the Integrity Pact and why? What 
role do you believe that this has on the outcomes of the Integrity Pact? 
25.   Please share our experiences with the independent external monitoring, for example in selection, independence, and 
financing, etc. 
a.   What role does the monitor and the allowance for dispute resolution mechanisms play in the effectiveness and 
general success of an Integrity Pact? 
b.   What role do the characteristics of the monitor – selection process, guarantees of independence, financing, 
operative capabilities – play in the successful completion of its duties? Which are the most important? 
Cross-cutting  
26.   What have been some of the greatest challenges in promoting and implementing Integrity Pacts in the country among 
various stakeholders? 
27.   In your view as well as those received from other stakeholders (i.e. bidders/private sector companies, contracting 
authorities, government, NGOs, the public), what are some of the weaknesses and criticisms of IPs? What are the 
strengths and benefits?  
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28.   How do the sanctioning, dispute resolution mechanism, and public disclosure elements of Integrity Pact implementation 
differ and align with established legislative practice in the country?    
29.   How does the civil society organisation address concerns regarding the business case for the Integrity Pact? 
30.   Would you like to share any further information on Integrity Pacts? 
 
Interview questions global review – contracting authorities 
 
-­‐   Introductory information 
-­‐   Name of Interviewee: 
-­‐   Contracting authority: 
-­‐   Governmental level: 
-­‐   Number of procurements with Integrity Pacts conducted: 
Efficiency, effectiveness and impact 
 
1.   How does your organisation define success of Integrity Pacts implementation and outcomes? 
2.   Has use of the Integrity Pact discouraged corruption during the contracting process? If so, please explain how and what 
types of corruption. 
a.   Which elements of and arguments for the Integrity Pact were most important in the discouragement of bribery? 
I.e., fear of loss of reputation, level playing field, fear of sanctions, etc. 
3.   How has the effectiveness of the Integrity Pact varied in comparison to procurement processes without Integrity Pacts 
applied?   
4.   Where do you see the greatest corruption risks in procurement and how do you see the Integrity Pact as contributing in 
mitigating them? 
5.   What have been the main short and long-term impacts of the Integrity Pact and what are your metrics for identifying 
these? 
6.   How has support for the Integrity Pact and its outcomes been communicated to the general public? Has this played a 
role in support for the Integrity Pact from the public, private sector and/or other stakeholders? 
7.   Has the Integrity Pact contributed to increased transparency and accountability in the public procurement process? If so 
why or why not, how has this been measured and what were the principle elements of the IP and conditions of its 
application that contributed to this? 
8.   Has there been an observed change in public/private sector/other stakeholder perceptions of corruption in procurement?  
9.   Has there been an observed increase/decrease in public procurement time due to the Integrity Pacts? If so, what were 
the factors of the Integrity Pact or the circumstances of its implementation behind this development? 
10.   Has there been an observed increase/decrease in public procurement costs due to the Integrity Pact? If so, what were the 
factors of the Integrity Pact or the circumstances of its implementation behind this development? 
11.   Has there been evidence of increased competitiveness in the procurement process? Change in the share of international 
companies in procurement, the share of SMEs or the share of open vs closed tenders? 
 
Sustainability 
 
12.   Have there been any organisational or institutional changes among both public sector and private sector participants 
stemming from the application of Integrity Pacts?  
13.   To what extent have Integrity Pacts, elements of them and lessons learned from their outcomes been institutionalized in 
your organizational and/or national public procurement processes? 
14.   Has there been a recognized spread of or interest in the application of Integrity Pacts locally, nationally or regionally 
since their initial use by the chapter? 
15.   What activities have been undertaken to build stakeholder capacity and interest in future engagement in Integrity Pacts? 
16.   Who has been the primary ‘champion’ of the Integrity Pact among the various stakeholders involved, i.e. the 
Transparency International national chapter? Contracting authorities? Private sector? NGOs? Public? Government? 
17.   What factors of the Integrity Pact or its implementation help or hinder sustainability of results? 
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18.   How has the sustainability of Integrity Pact outcomes varied in comparison to procurement without IPs and what 
reasons would you give for these differences? 
Flexibility  
 
19.   Is the signing of the Integrity Pact mandatory or voluntary? Which in your view is the best option and why? 
20.   Has there been a need to adapt the Integrity Pact content to local conditions – legal, cultural, political, economic etc.? If 
so, how, why, and what effects do you think that this has had on the Integrity Pact outcomes? 
21.   When in the procurement process do you think that the Integrity Pact should be signed? When is it signed in your 
processes? 
22.   How much flexibility do you believe should be permitted in the application of Integrity Pacts? In your opinion, should 
bidders be involved in negotiations on Integrity Pact content? Why or why not? 
23.   What are in your view the most important elements of the Integrity Pact that are necessary for it to achieve successful 
outcomes, and why? 
24.   What are in your view the most important conditions of Integrity Pact implementation that are necessary for it to 
achieve success, and why? 
25.   What other tools have you used and promoted in preference to or in complement with the Integrity Pact and why? What 
role do you believe that this has on the outcomes of the Integrity Pact? 
26.   Please share our experiences with the independent external monitoring, for example in selection, independence, and 
financing, etc. 
a.   What role does the monitor and the allowance for dispute resolution mechanisms play in the effectiveness and 
general success of an Integrity Pact? 
b.   What role do the characteristics of the monitor – selection process, guarantees of independence, financing, 
operative capabilities – play in the successful completion of its duties? Which are the most important? 
Cross-cutting 
 
27.   What have been some of the greatest challenges in promoting and implementing Integrity Pacts in the country among 
various stakeholders? 
28.   In your view as well as those received from other stakeholders (i.e. bidders/private sector companies, contracting 
authorities, government, NGOs, the public), what are some of the weaknesses and criticisms of Integrity Pacts? What 
are the strengths and benefits?  
29.   How do the sanctioning, dispute resolution mechanism, and public disclosure elements of Integrity Pacts 
implementation differ and align with established legislative practice in the country?    
30.   How do you address concerns regarding the business case for the Integrity Pact in interactions with the private 
sector/bidding companies? 
31.   Would you like to share any further information on Integrity Pacts? 
 
Interview questions global review – companies/bidders 
 
-­‐   Introductory Information 
-­‐   Name of Interviewee: 
-­‐   Company: 
-­‐   Sector: 
-­‐   Number of Integrity Pacts involved in (as a company and as an individual): 
Efficiency, effectiveness and impact 
 
1.   Where do you see or experience the greatest risks in public procurement in this country?  
2.   In your view and experience, is the Integrity Pact effective in mitigating these risks?  
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3.   Has IP use discouraged bribery during the contracting process? If so, please explain how as well as what the most 
important element of the process was that discouraged bribery (i.e. knowledge that competitors are bound by the same 
rules, fear of sanctions, fear of loss of reputation, knowledge that government agencies will undertake measures to 
prevent corruption, other) 
4.   How has anti-bribery and corruption been perceived and experienced by your company in procurement processes with 
Integrity Pacts compared to those procurement processes conducted without Integrity Pacts? 
5.   Were there experiences of violations raised by your company or competitors during the bidding process? If yes, to who 
were these issues brought to and what was your satisfaction with the response and the process as a whole? How did this 
experience compare to similar experiences in contracting procedures without Integrity Pacts? 
6.   Do you perceive an increased commitment on the part of the contracting authorities to effective and efficient 
procurement, and a commitment to anti-corruption, since the introduction of the Integrity Pact? 
7.   Have you seen an effect - positive, negative or neutral - on your company’s reputation or image since engaging in 
Integrity Pacts?  
8.   How has interaction with customers and other stakeholders changed, if at all, since your engagement in Integrity Pacts? 
9.   How has the inclusion of an Integrity Pact affected the speed with which the contracting process has taken place? 
10.   Have you seen a reduction in legal proceedings/arbitration in contracting procedures with IPs compare to procedures 
without Integrity Pacts? 
11.   How has the inclusion of an Integrity Pact affected your company’s costs? Financial and human resource requirements? 
12.   What affect did the Integrity Pact have on the final price of the winning bid in the contracting processes in which you 
have been involved?  
 
Sustainability  
 
13.   Did engagement in Integrity Pacts influence your internal anti-corruption policies, over the short or long term, in 
contracting procedures that you have undertaken since first taking part in Integrity Pacts? 
14.   Do you require your subcontractors to adhere to the terms of the Integrity Pact? To your anti-corruption and compliance 
policies in general? 
15.   What role did your company’s CEO/top management play in decision to engage in and the implementation of the 
Integrity Pact? 
16.   How did the company communicate its engagement in the IP internally/externally, as well as during and after the 
conclusion of the Integrity Pact? 
 
Flexibility  
 
17.   Did your company have a Code of Conduct and/or an anti-corruption compliance programme prior to engaging in 
Integrity Pacts? 
18.   Were there any clauses in the Integrity Pacts in which you have been involved that you found to be particularly 
useful/onerous/unnecessary for the success of the Integrity Pact? If so, why? 
19.    Were there any clauses in the Integrity Pacts in which you have been involved that you found burdensome/beneficial to 
you as a company? If so, why? 
20.   Did bidding companies have a voice in deciding the content of the Integrity Pact? Please share your thoughts on this. 
21.   Please share your views on the contribution of the independent external monitor(s) in the Integrity Pact and your 
interactions with them. 
22.   What other tools have you used in contracting procedures, in preference to or in complement with the Integrity Pact, 
and why? What effect do you believe that this has, if any, on the outcomes of the Integrity Pact? 
Cross-cutting  
23.   What in your opinion and experience are the strengths and weaknesses of the Integrity Pact system? 
24.   Where do you see that the Integrity Pact can be improved, particularly from the private sector standpoint? 
25.   What in your view can governments, contracting authorities, civil society and other stakeholders do to increase private 
sector participation in Integrity Pacts? 
 
